FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 19 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT GARBER, No. 11-56217
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-07254-DDP-
RNB
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES GENERAL MEMORANDUM *
SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a political
subdivision of the City of Los Angeles; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 11, 2013 **
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Robert Garber appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment, following a
partial grant of judgment on the pleadings and a jury trial, in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
action alleging unlawful search and seizure, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and
excessive force. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings. MacDonald v. Grace
Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). We affirm.
The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings on Garber’s
claims alleging unlawful search and seizure, conspiracy, and malicious prosecution
because those claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See
Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Under Heck v. Humphrey,
a state prisoner cannot recover damages in a § 1983 suit if a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff ‘would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence
. . . unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.’” (alteration in original; citation omitted)); see also id. at 704-05
(claims implying the invalidity of plaintiff’s underlying conviction were Heck-
barred even though plaintiff was no longer in custody).
The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings on Garber’s
claims alleging municipal liability because Garber failed to allege facts
demonstrating that the officers’ actions “implement[ed] or execute[d] a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision, officially adopted and promulgated”
2 11-56217
by the City, or that any deprivation was inflicted “pursuant to governmental
‘custom.’” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
To the extent that Garber is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict, he has waived that challenge by failing to file a post-
verdict motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. See Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian,
491 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] post-verdict motion under Rule 50(b) is
an absolute prerequisite to any appeal based on insufficiency of the evidence.”).
We reject Garber’s contentions that the district court biased the jury against
him during voir dire, erred in its evidentiary rulings, improperly denied motions for
contempt and a continuance, and improperly failed to rule that defense counsel
committed misconduct.
AFFIRMED.
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