FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 19 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EUGENE J. COFSKY, No. 09-16189
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-08126-FJM
District of Arizona,
v. Prescott
CHARLES L. RYAN, et. al.,
MEMORANDUM*
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 11, 2013**
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, THOMAS, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Eugene J. Cofsky appeals the district court’s denial of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his conviction for conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Arizona state courts’ finding – that sufficient evidence supported
Cofsky’s conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder – was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.1
Neither the postconviction review court nor the Arizona Court of Appeals on direct
review provided reasoning for their respective conclusions that sufficient evidence
was presented to convict Cofsky of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.
Where a state court rules on the issue at hand, but does not supply reasoning for its
decision, we “perform an independent review of the record to ascertain whether the
state court decision was objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d
848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Independent review
of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only
method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is
objectively unreasonable.” Id.
Under clearly established federal law, when considering a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge, we ask “whether the record evidence could reasonably support
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
318 (1979). In other words, “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
1
Cofsky no longer challenges whether conditional intent is sufficient to
show the specific intent needed to prove a conspiracy to commit first-degree
murder. Accordingly, this argument is abandoned.
2
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. Where
conflicting inferences may be supported by the record, we presume “that the trier
of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and [we] must defer
to that resolution.” Id. at 326. Moreover, “[a]fter AEDPA, we apply the standards
of Jackson with an additional layer of deference.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d
1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
An independent view of the record demonstrates that neither state court
decision finding sufficient evidence was objectively unreasonable. Considering
the evidence presented against Cofsky in the context of the elements of the crime,
Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275, and viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, Cofsky has not demonstrated that “any rational trier of fact could
[not] have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. To the contrary, the record reflects sufficient evidence
to allow any reasonable factfinder to find (1) intent to promote the murder of the
corrections officer, and (2) an agreement between Cofsky and the other
conspirators to kill the corrections officer if he resisted. See Evanchyk v. Stewart,
47 P.3d 1114, 1117 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc). Although evidence of Cofsky’s
involvement is circumstantial, considering the evidence of (1) Cofsky’s known
3
involvement in the jailbreak planning, including his role of keeping track of the
conspirator tasked with killing the guard if necessary, (2) the close proximity of
events and physical evidence on Cofsky’s property, and (3) Cofsky’s appearance in
the designated courtroom at the planned time, a reasonable factfinder could have
concluded that Cofsky agreed to the jailbreak with the other conspirators and
agreed that a corrections officer would be shot if necessary. Accordingly, we must
uphold the jury’s verdict.
AFFIRMED.
4