Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC20-1589
____________
QUENTIN MARCUS TRUEHILL,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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No. SC21-828
____________
QUENTIN MARCUS TRUEHILL,
Petitioner,
vs.
RICKY D. DIXON, etc.,
Respondent.
September 29, 2022
PER CURIAM.
Quentin Marcus Truehill appeals the circuit court’s order
denying numerous guilt and penalty phase claims raised in his
postconviction motion filed under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas
corpus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s
order and deny the habeas petition. 1
I. BACKGROUND
Truehill, Kentrell Johnson, and Peter Hughes embarked on a
crime spree stretching from Louisiana to south Florida leaving
numerous victims in their wake. That journey began when the
three men escaped from a Louisiana prison and stole a black truck.
They drove east, later stopping at a parking lot in Broussard,
Louisiana. There, they confronted LeAnn Williams and stole her
purse, which contained credit cards. Truehill and his cohorts
would later use those credit cards to fund their journey.
After stealing Williams’s purse, the men continued east to
Pensacola where they attacked Brenda Jo Brown in an apartment
complex. During the violent encounter, Truehill threatened Brown
with a knife and as a result of the attack, Brown suffered serious
injuries resulting in the amputation of five fingers.
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
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The three then made their way to Tallahassee, eventually
attacking Mario Rios in a parking lot. During the attack, Truehill
grabbed Rios by the shirt and displayed a large knife. Rios was able
to escape and later provided his shirt to law enforcement for DNA
testing.
The three men then drove a short distance to another parking
lot where they robbed Cris Pavlish. During this attack, Truehill
swung a large knife resembling a machete at Pavlish. Though she
was able to get away unharmed, Truehill succeeded in taking
Pavlish’s purse.
Shortly thereafter, the men encountered their final victim,
Vincent Binder, as he was walking home from a study session.
Binder was kidnapped and brutally murdered. His decomposed
body was found in an empty field in St. Augustine. We previously
described that scene as follows:
Binder’s hat was about twenty-five feet away from his
body with a straight-line cut on the bill going toward the
hat. Binder had four stab wounds to his back and blunt-
force injuries to his left head area that penetrated into
the cranium. Approximately ten chopping-type injuries
to the back of Binder’s head caused fractures and a four-
inch hole in the back of his head. In addition, Binder’s
ribs were fractured, his ulna bone in the left forearm was
fractured, and the radius was dislocated—classic
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defensive injuries. Binder also sustained chopping
injuries on his hands, causing fractures that also could
be considered to be defensive injuries. Dr. Frederick
Hobin, the medical examiner, opined that two knives
were used to kill the victim, and that some of the wounds
were consistent with a machete, while the stab wounds
were caused by a different knife.
Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 939 (Fla. 2017).
Eventually, the three men traveled to Miami where they were
ultimately arrested. Upon their arrest, more evidence of their
crimes came to light. Binder’s wallet, a garbage bag full of clothing,
a metal handsaw, a machete, a pair of black jeans, a black knife
sheath, and a pair of blue jeans were found by law enforcement in
the group’s motel rooms. Law enforcement submitted the evidence
for DNA testing.
Also in Miami, law enforcement located the stolen truck and
found a bloody knife underneath the front passenger seat.
Subsequent testing of the knife revealed that eight of the
bloodstains contained a complete DNA profile matching Binder.
Additionally, Williams’s Louisiana identification card, ATM receipts,
Pavlish’s personal documents, and a blood-soaked green washcloth
were also found in the truck. DNA testing of the washcloth would
later reveal that the stain contained a complete DNA profile that
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matched Binder, and a mixed DNA profile that was consistent with
Binder and Johnson.
After locating this physical evidence, the State charged
Truehill and his accomplices with the first-degree murder of Binder
and sought the death penalty. During the ensuing guilt phase trial,
the State called Williams, Brown, Rios, and Pavlish, who spoke of
their encounters with Truehill. The State also called Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) analyst Suzanne
Livingston, who had tested the DNA samples taken from the
evidence submitted by law enforcement.
At the close of the State’s case, Truehill requested a judgment
of acquittal, which the trial court denied. The trial court thereafter
submitted the case to the jury which found Truehill guilty of first-
degree murder and kidnapping. The case then proceeded to the
penalty phase.
At the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of several
aggravating factors. As part of that evidence, the State showed that
Truehill had been convicted of prior violent felonies and was serving
a thirty-year sentence when he escaped from prison.
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Following the State’s case, numerous family members testified
in support of Truehill. His stepmother, Miranda Truehill, testified
that Truehill did not adjust well to his parents’ divorce or his
father’s remarriage. She also stated that Truehill was an unhappy
child who was more of a follower than a leader.
His sister, Jessica Gresko, testified about their upbringing,
discussed the fighting that occurred between their parents, and
described their father as a strict disciplinarian. She also elaborated
on Truehill’s troubled childhood, which included witnessing a
school shooting.
His mother, Valli Trahan, testified about her marriage to
Truehill’s father, including the physical, verbal and emotional abuse
that she suffered in front of her children. She described how
Truehill was upset over the divorce and remarriage and further
explained that his experience during Hurricane Katrina only made
Truehill an angrier and more hostile person.
In addition to family members, the defense called Dr. Fredrick
Sautter, a clinical psychologist, as a witness. He opined that
Truehill suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
depression. In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Gregory Prichard, who
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testified that the level of trauma experienced by Truehill did not
support a PTSD diagnosis.
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury unanimously
recommended that Truehill be sentenced to death. For its part, the
trial court found six aggravators, which it weighed against five
statutory and forty nonstatutory mitigators. Finding that the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances, the
trial court imposed a sentence of death consistent with the jury’s
recommendation.
Truehill appealed, raising six issues for our review. 2 Finding
no merit in any of the arguments, we affirmed in all respects. Id.
Truehill then sought certiorari review in the United States Supreme
Court, which was denied. Truehill v. Florida, 138 S. Ct. 3 (2017).
2. Truehill argued that: (1) the trial court erred in overruling
his objection to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to an
African–American juror; (2) exclusion of potential jurors due to their
age violates the constitution; (3) the trial court erred in permitting
the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes; (4) the
cumulative effect of improper closing comments warranted a new
trial; (5) the trial court’s erroneous rulings during the penalty phase
deprived him of a fair trial; and (6) Florida’s death sentencing
scheme is unconstitutional based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002). Truehill, 211 So. 3d at 941-42.
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II. POSTCONVICTION APPEAL
Truehill timely filed a motion for postconviction relief under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising eleven claims and
numerous subclaims. The circuit court summarily denied three
claims but granted an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims.
After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order
denying Truehill’s motion in its entirety. This appeal follows.
On appeal, Truehill argues that the circuit court erred in
denying various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
denying two Giglio 3 claims, denying a newly discovered evidence
claim, and summarily denying three claims.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffectiveness claims are governed by the standard set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Nelson v.
State, 73 So. 3d 77, 84 (Fla. 2011). We have recently described that
standard as follows:
Under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant alleging that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel has the
burden to demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. In order
to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
3. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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defendant must show both that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687. “Both prongs of the Strickland test present
mixed questions of law and fact.” Johnson v. State, 135
So. 3d 1002, 1013 (Fla. 2014). “In reviewing a trial
court’s ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court defers
to the factual findings of the trial court to the extent that
they are supported by competent, substantial evidence,
but reviews de novo the application of the law to those
facts.” Id. (quoting Mungin v. State, 932 So. 2d 986, 998
(Fla. 2006)).
As to the first prong, the defendant must establish
“that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
A court reviewing the second prong must determine
whether “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[T]here is no
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance
claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if
the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”
Id. at 697.
Smith v. State, 330 So. 3d 867, 875 (Fla. 2021) (some citations
omitted).
With this standard in mind, we now consider each
ineffectiveness claim as ruled on by the circuit court.
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1. Failure to Properly Question the Venire
Truehill challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim that
trial counsel was ineffective in its questioning of the venire during
jury selection. Since Truehill failed to establish deficient
performance or prejudice, we affirm the court’s ruling as to this
claim.
Truehill first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to uncover racial bias in the jury because counsel failed to ask
specific questions designed to expose racial bias. The circuit court
found that counsel’s decision not to question the prospective jurors
about racial bias was a reasonable trial strategy. The record
supports that finding.
At the evidentiary hearing, counsel spoke of his strategy to
avoid asking questions about race. Defense counsel testified that
his general trial strategy is to avoid questions about racial bias
unless the facts of a particular case pointed to a racially motivated
crime. And in this case, he viewed the allegations and pretrial
evidence as showing crimes being committed based on opportunity,
not race. Furthermore, counsel testified that asking specific
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questions about racial bias can be damaging, and that he wanted to
avoid offending potential jurors by asking race-related questions.
We agree with the trial court that this strategy was reasonable
under the norms of professional conduct. See Boyd v. State, 200
So. 3d 685, 699 (Fla. 2015). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit
court’s denial of relief.
Next, Truehill asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to individually question two empaneled jurors on their views
of the death penalty. Finding no deficient performance, the circuit
court ruled that trial counsel sufficiently questioned the venire
collectively about their views on the death penalty in light of the
circumstances of this case. The record supports that finding.
The prosecutor posed a general question to the jury panel
about their views on the death penalty. Specifically, the prosecutor
asked whether any jurors were so opposed to the death penalty that
they could never impose it under any circumstances or whether
they believed in the death penalty so strongly that they thought it
was the only appropriate punishment for murder. Jurors who had
strong opinions on the death penalty raised their hands, and those
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who did so were questioned further about their views. Neither of
the two jurors in question here raised their hand.
On this same topic, defense counsel also asked the panel
whether anyone would automatically impose the death penalty in
cases involving a child or animal victim, or whether their
impartiality might be affected by the violent images that would be
introduced into evidence in this murder case. Jurors who
expressed extreme views concerning the death penalty were
stricken for cause.
Based on this record evidence, Truehill has not demonstrated
deficient performance. See Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 744
(Fla. 2011). Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this
subclaim.
In his last voir dire-related argument, Truehill contends that
counsel was ineffective for failing to ascertain if any of the jurors
would be able to meaningfully consider mitigating evidence. The
circuit court found no deficient performance, and the record
supports that finding.
At the outset, we note that Truehill acknowledges defense
counsel’s extensive questioning on this topic but insists that the
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defense did not ask the “right kind” of questions that would result
in a fair and impartial jury.
Defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that his
questioning on mitigation was well thought out, that he had
employed similar questions in other cases with success, and that
the questions were designed to ensure that the jurors could fairly
weigh the evidence. Counsel also provided specific reasons for not
asking direct questions about certain mitigators. Accordingly,
Truehill has not demonstrated that counsel’s strategic decision was
unreasonable, and we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.
See Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671 (Fla. 2010) (noting that
defendant has burden to “overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered
sound trial strategy’ ”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
2. Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Comments
Truehill next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his
claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to
comments made by the prosecutor during opening and closing
statements. We disagree.
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First, Truehill asserts counsel was ineffective during opening
statements for failing to object when the prosecutor claimed that
Truehill attacked a witness and took her purse where the facts
ultimately introduced at trial did not support that assertion. The
circuit court ruled that Truehill failed to show deficient performance
as the comment merely outlined what the prosecutor expected the
evidence would show. We agree with that reasoning.
“Opening remarks are not evidence, and the purpose of
opening argument is to outline what an attorney expects to be
established by the evidence.” Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902,
904 (Fla. 1990) (citing Whitted v. State, 362 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1978).
The fact that such testimony is not ultimately elicited at trial does
not render the initial comments objectionable. See id. Thus, the
fact that the challenged comment here turned out to be
unsupported by trial evidence does not render the comment
improper. Since Truehill has not shown the comment to be
improper, he cannot demonstrate that counsel was deficient for
failing to object. See Peterson v. State, 154 So. 3d 275, 280 (Fla.
2014) (finding no deficient performance for failing to raise meritless
objection). Accordingly, Truehill has failed to show deficient
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performance, and we affirm the circuit court’s ruling as to this
point.
Second, Truehill faults counsel for failing to object during
closing arguments to the prosecutor’s description of him as the
“hatchet man” in the attack on Brown. According to him, the
evidence demonstrated that Brown neither saw nor identified the
individual who caused her injuries. The circuit court found no
deficient performance, reasoning that the description was a fair
comment based on the evidence presented at trial. The record
supports that finding.
Fairly interpreted, the comment did not constitute a specific
accusation that Truehill injured Brown. Instead, as noted by the
circuit court, it was a reasonable conclusion drawn from the
evidence that Truehill was consistently the one seen wielding a
knife. Moreover, contrary to Truehill’s argument, Brown’s trial
testimony indicated that Truehill came at her with a knife. The
statement was not a mischaracterization of the evidence warranting
an objection, and counsel was not deficient for not objecting to it.
See Peterson, 154 So. 3d at 280. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s
ruling in this regard.
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3. Ineffectiveness in Handling of Witnesses
Truehill argues that the circuit court erred in denying his
claim that counsel was ineffective in its handling of several
witnesses. That argument lacks merit for the reasons explained
below.
a. Guilt Phase Witnesses
Truehill asserts trial counsel was ineffective in its cross-
examination of four State witnesses during the guilt phase.
i. Leann Williams
Truehill argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he
failed to cross-examine Leann Williams based on information she
provided to law enforcement prior to trial. Specifically, he asserts
Williams originally identified her attacker as Hispanic, identified
only Johnson in a lineup, and failed to implicate Truehill as one of
her attackers. The circuit court found that counsel was not
deficient. The record supports that finding.
As the circuit court properly observed, there was other
evidence tying Truehill to the attack on Williams. Several of
Williams’s personal items were discovered inside the stolen black
truck. In addition, video evidence tied Truehill to the fraudulent
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use of Williams’s credit card. Questioning Williams on her prior
identifications would have had limited impeachment value in light
of the other evidence presented at trial. Thus, Truehill has failed to
show deficient performance. See Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d
535, 554 (Fla. 2010) (explaining that trial counsel is not deficient
for making reasonable decisions regarding trial strategy).
ii. Brenda Brown
Similarly, Truehill argues that counsel was deficient for failing
to cross-examine Brenda Brown based on information she provided
to law enforcement prior to trial. The circuit court found that
Truehill failed to show deficient performance because counsel had a
strategic reason for its decision not to impeach Brown. The record
supports that finding.
Defense counsel testified that he chose not to question Brown
about the misidentification because he feared it would only have the
effect of bolstering her in-court identification of Truehill.
Specifically, counsel explained:
[I]f somebody’s identified somebody on the stand, then
you ask them, well, did you misidentify them in the past,
and they say, well, yes, I did, but he’s the man, all I’ve
done is accomplished a second identification of a man in
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front of the jury that I caused by my own reckless
question.
Additionally, in deciding not to cross-examine Brown as to her
prior misidentification, counsel relied on the fact that Brown’s DNA
was found on a pair of black jeans. That DNA evidence
corroborated Brown’s trial testimony. Thus, in light of all the
evidence connecting Truehill to Brown, he has not demonstrated
that counsel’s strategic decision to avoid the topic of the prior
identification was unreasonable and we affirm the circuit court’s
determination as to this issue. See Sheppard v. State, 338 So. 3d
803, 819-20 (Fla. 2022) (reasonable trial strategy to avoid
challenging a witness’s identification to avoid giving the witness
another opportunity to identify the defendant as the shooter).
iii. Cris Pavlish
Truehill also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to cross-examine Cris Pavlish on information she provided prior to
trial. The trial court found that Truehill failed to show deficient
performance, again finding that trial counsel employed a reasonable
trial strategy. The record supports that finding.
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At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel explained that he
chose not to question Pavlish on her prior lack of identification to
avoid a dramatic reidentification of the defendant in front of the
jury. This explanation shows counsel had a logical reason for
choosing not to impeach Pavlish as to this issue. Furthermore,
counsel considered the fact that Pavlish’s personal documents were
later recovered in the stolen truck when determining whether to
question Pavlish on the prior lack of identification. Since Truehill
failed to demonstrate that counsel’s strategy in not questioning
Pavlish was unreasonable, we affirm the circuit court’s finding as to
Pavlish. See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 554.
iv. Mario Rios
Finally, Truehill argues trial counsel was ineffective for wholly
failing to cross-examine Mario Rios. The circuit court found that
trial counsel exercised sound strategy, and the record supports that
finding.
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel explained that he
did not cross-examine Rios because of the existence of the
corroborating DNA evidence implicating Truehill in the crime. That
evidence came from the portion of Rios’s shirt that Rios testified
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had been grabbed by Truehill. This testimony shows that counsel
had a tactical reason for not cross-examining Rios—one which we
find to be reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this
case. Thus, we affirm the circuit court’s determination as to trial
counsel’s performance as to Rios. See id.
b. Penalty Phase Witnesses
In addition to the guilt phase witnesses, Truehill also takes
issue with trial counsel’s performance with respect to six penalty
phase witnesses.
i. Miranda Truehill
Truehill argues that his stepmother, Miranda Truehill, was
insufficiently prepared to testify during the penalty phase. As a
result, she was unable to fully convey the depths of the abuse the
family suffered at the hands of Truehill’s father. The circuit court
found no deficient performance, stressing that Truehill’s home life
was sufficiently explored during Ms. Truehill’s testimony and that
her inability to fully convey the “extent the abuse” was not due to
trial counsel’s lack of preparation. The record supports that
finding.
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Ms. Truehill’s evidentiary hearing testimony largely contradicts
her penalty phase testimony. At the evidentiary hearing she
testified that Truehill’s behavior was affected by his father’s
duplicitous personality and that she was responsible for
disciplining Truehill because of the strained relationship between
Truehill and his father. This was in stark contrast to her penalty
phase testimony that Truehill’s father was a disciplinarian and that
the discipline Truehill received was appropriate under the
circumstances. Accordingly, as the circuit court properly found,
there was nothing more trial counsel could have done to elicit this
testimony at the penalty phase. Moreover, Truehill has failed to
explain how the additional information provided by Ms. Truehill
would have been revealed at the penalty phase with more extensive
preparation by defense counsel. Of note, during the penalty phase,
she was directly asked whether Truehill’s father was violent towards
her, and she opined that he was not threatening or violent. In sum,
Truehill has failed to show that trial counsel was deficient in
preparing Ms. Truehill to testify, and we affirm the circuit court’s
finding on this point. See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 786 (Fla.
2004).
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ii. Jessica Gresko
Truehill similarly argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
not adequately preparing his sister Jessica Gresko for her penalty
phase testimony. As a result, Truehill asserts, Gresko was unable
to provide a comprehensive narrative about the abuse caused by
their father. The circuit court ruled that trial counsel was not
deficient because her evidentiary hearing testimony was
substantially similar to her penalty-phase testimony. The record
supports that finding.
At the penalty phase, Gresko testified that her parents
frequently fought and were physically abusive in front of the
children. She testified to an incident where she was beaten over the
head with a belt by her father and another time where her father
slammed her older sister on the bed with his hand around her
throat. She further testified that as a disciplinarian, her father was
even harder on her brothers. According to her, he would break
Truehill’s skin when disciplining him; and he would verbally insult
Truehill and his brother. In addition, she provided testimony
showing that her parents’ divorce was very difficult for Truehill.
She also testified to the trauma Truehill experienced after the death
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of his girlfriend’s baby, and then later the death of his girlfriend.
Gresko’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing did not materially
differ from her account given at the penalty phase.
Thus, Truehill has failed to show deficient performance and we
affirm the circuit court’s determination as to Gresko. See id. at
781-83.
iii. Valli Trahan
Similarly, Truehill faults trial counsel for not properly
preparing his mother, Valli Trahan, to testify at the penalty phase.
In his view, with proper preparation, Trahan would have been able
to provide a more comprehensive picture at the evidentiary hearing
of the abuse she and her children suffered. The circuit court found
no deficient performance because Trahan’s testimony was largely
cumulative to what she provided at the penalty phase. The record
supports that finding.
At the penalty phase, Trahan testified to the marital problems
she had with Truehill’s father and also detailed his abuse of her.
That abuse, she explained, was observed by Truehill and the other
children. The testimony Trahan gave at the evidentiary hearing was
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substantially similar to the testimony at the penalty phase. Thus,
we affirm the circuit courts determination as to Trahan. See id.
iv. Susan Herrero
Next, Truehill argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to produce mitigation specialist Susan Herrero to testify at
the penalty phase and for failing to provide her with the resources
necessary to interview more mitigation witnesses. We agree with
the circuit court that the record refutes those assertions.
Defense counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that there
were no constraints placed on Herrero’s work, and that Herrero
never asked to question additional witnesses or pursue a different
line of investigation. According to counsel, had such a request been
made, it would have been approved.
In addition, counsel explained that he did not believe Herrero
had offered to be present at trial. That explanation was
corroborated by an email from Herrero to defense counsel indicating
she was scheduled for surgery during the time of the trial. Thus,
we conclude that Truehill has failed to show deficient performance
and we affirm the circuit court’s determination as to Herrero. See
Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2004) (“If a witness would
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not have been available to testify at trial, then the defendant will
not be able to establish deficient performance or prejudice from
counsel’s failure to call, interview, or investigate that witness.”
(footnote omitted)).
v. Dr. Frederick Sautter
Next, Truehill claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not
properly preparing defense witness, Dr. Frederick Sautter. That
inadequate preparation, Truehill argues, prevented Dr. Sautter from
fully explaining the effects of Truehill’s PTSD. The circuit court
found no deficient performance, stressing that Dr. Sautter
effectively tied Truehill’s prior traumas to his PTSD diagnosis. The
record supports that finding.
Dr. Sautter’s penalty phase testimony spans nearly one
hundred pages of transcript. He explained the many ways PTSD
can form and opined as to how the events surrounding Hurricane
Katrina caused a spike in PTSD. And, based on his interviews with
individuals who were involved in Truehill’s life, Dr. Sautter
thoroughly discussed Truehill’s prior traumas and how they caused
PTSD. Of significance, Dr. Sautter’s testimony was the basis for
several statutory and nonstatutory mitigators related to Truehill’s
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mental health condition—a significant portion of the overall
mitigation.
In light of this evidence, we find that Truehill has failed to
show deficient performance with respect to Dr. Sautter. See Carroll
v. State, 815 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2002).
vi. Dr. Gregory Prichard
Finally, Truehill argues that counsel was ineffective for failing
to properly cross-examine the State’s expert witness, Dr. Gregory
Prichard.4 Specifically, he faults counsel for only asking Dr.
Prichard three “immaterial” questions on cross-examination. The
trial court found no deficient performance, concluding in part that
trial counsel employed a reasonable strategy. The record supports
that finding.
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified to the
strategy informing his decision to limit the scope of cross-
examination. Counsel weighed the pros and cons of limiting the
4. Truehill also seems to argue that counsel was ineffective for
not objecting to certain portions of Dr. Prichard’s testimony.
However, these arguments were not raised in his postconviction
motion, and thus are waived. Jackson v. State, 47 Fla. L. Weekly
S167, S168 (Fla. June 30, 2022) (failure to timely raise specific
arguments results in waiver).
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testimony or impeaching on different issues, ultimately deciding in
favor of a more succinct cross-examination. In counsel’s view, an
extensive cross-examination of Dr. Prichard would have opened the
door for the State to elicit more damaging information. Under the
circumstances of this case, we hold that Truehill has failed to show
that this strategy was unreasonable. We thus affirm the circuit
court’s determination as to counsel’s performance with Dr.
Prichard. See Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2002).
4. Ineffectiveness in Handling of DNA Evidence
We now turn to Truehill’s principal claim on appeal, in which
he argues that the circuit court erred in denying his ineffectiveness
claim—which consists of several subclaims—regarding the DNA
evidence. We conclude that even if Truehill could show deficient
performance on the subclaims raised, he is not entitled to relief
because he failed to demonstrate prejudice.
Truehill raises a total of five subclaims relating to the DNA
evidence presented at trial. He asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective for: (1) failing to obtain or present three documents at
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trial 5; (2) failing to object to portions of DNA expert Suzanne
Livingston’s testimony; (3) failing to question Livingston on transfer
DNA; (4) failing to cross-examine Livingston on the changes to the
FDLE guidelines implemented after she conducted her DNA
analysis; and (5) failing to cross-examine or object to Livingston’s
testimony on the basis that she violated the lab operating
procedures in effect at the time of her analysis. However, even if we
agreed with Truehill that defense counsel’s performance fell below
objective standards of reasonableness with respect to the DNA
evidence, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that the
jury would have acquitted him in light of the overwhelming evidence
of guilt. We now discuss that evidence.
The record in this case shows that Truehill, Hughes, and
Johnson escaped from a Louisiana prison, stole a truck, and
embarked on a crime spree that ended with their arrests in Miami.
5. Those documents were: (1) the 2010 Scientific Working
Group on DNA Analysis Method (“SWGDAM”) guidelines, which
updated the way low-level mixed DNA profiles were evaluated; (2)
the 2012 FDLE Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that
implemented the 2010 SWGDAM guidelines at FDLE labs; and (3)
the FDLE lab audits conducted in 2012 on the lab that analyzed the
DNA evidence in this case.
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While on their way to Miami, Truehill and his cohorts attacked
Williams, Brown, Rios, and Pavlish before encountering Binder. We
previously detailed some of the evidence linking Truehill to Binder’s
murder as follows:
Binder had his bankcard with him earlier [in the]
evening when he made a purchase at a gas station. He
then joined some friends at their home, where they
studied until midnight. Binder decided to walk home,
which was about a mile away. Fifteen minutes after
Binder left his friends’ house, Truehill was videotaped
using Binder’s bankcard at the ATM machine inside the
Half Time Keg store, without Binder’s presence, as
Truehill withdrew money from Binder’s account. Binder
did not have any connections to Truehill or the other two
codefendants.
A few hours later, around 2:33 a.m., on April 2,
2010, Binder’s bankcard was used in Jacksonville,
Florida, to make additional gasoline purchases. Truehill
and his codefendants successfully used Binder’s
bankcard as they continued toward Miami, including
using it in Daytona Beach, Fort Pierce, Opa Locka, and
Miami.
Truehill, 211 So. 3d at 952.
Truehill and his codefendants later attempted to withdraw
money from Binder’s bank account using Binder’s driver’s license
and bankcard. This was corroborated by a bank employee and
photographic evidence.
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Additional evidence connecting Truehill to Binder was found
inside the stolen truck. Specifically, law enforcement discovered
Binder’s bankcard receipts, a bloodstained washcloth, and a
bloodstained silver knife. The blood on the knife came back with
eight complete profiles that matched Binder’s known DNA. 6 And it
was clear that Binder’s extensive injuries were consistent with knife
wounds. Furthermore, the silver knife matched the description of
the knife Truehill wielded when threatening Brown and Rios.
Moreover, there was considerable evidence in the men’s motel
rooms that further tied Truehill to the murder, including Binder’s
wallet, a black knife sheath, a heavy-duty garbage bag containing
male clothing, a metal handsaw, and a machete.
In sum, there is overwhelming evidence linking Truehill to the
murder and kidnapping of Binder. Based on this record, we find
that there is no reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict of guilt
would have been different even if the challenged DNA evidence were
6. None of Truehill’s DNA challenges attack the
complete-profile DNA matches.
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wholly excluded. 7 Thus, Truehill has failed to show prejudice, and,
as a consequence, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling on this claim
without reaching the deficient-performance prong. Sheppard, 338
So. 2d at 816 (“Because Strickland requires a defendant to establish
both prongs, if one prong is not met, the Court need not reach the
other.” (citing Stewart v. State, 801 So. 2d 59, 65 (Fla. 2001))).
B. Giglio Claim
Truehill next argues that the circuit court erred in finding that
no Giglio violations occurred at his trial with respect to the
testimony of DNA expert Livingston. We disagree.
To establish a Giglio violation, a defendant must demonstrate:
“(1) the testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the
testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material.” Guzman
7. We have not overlooked our statement on direct appeal that
“the forensic testing of the washcloth, the knives, and the jeans
indicates that Truehill was present for the murder.” Truehill, 211
So. 3d at 953. But that statement does not undermine our
prejudice analysis now. Critically, we now focus on the other
evidence of guilt, such as the timing of the collateral crimes in
Tallahassee, Truehill’s use of Binder’s bankcard just minutes after
Binder left the study group, and the evidence found inside the
stolen truck. And, consistent with our analysis above, we
concluded on direct appeal that Truehill played an active role in the
murder—doing so without relying on Truehill-specific DNA or any
mixed sample evidence.
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v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003) (citing Ventura v. State,
794 So. 2d 553, 562 (Fla. 2001)). A statement is considered
material under Giglio if “there is a reasonable probability that the
false evidence may have affected the judgment of the jury.”
Ventura, 794 So. 2d at 563 (quoting Routly v. State, 590 So. 2d 397,
400 (Fla. 1991)). “In analyzing this issue . . . courts must focus on
whether the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the
whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in
the verdict.” Id. (quoting White v. State, 729 So. 2d 909, 913
(Fla. 1999)). 8
Here, Truehill’s Giglio claim relies on many of the same facts
advanced in his DNA-related ineffectiveness claim. Specifically,
Truehill asserts that Livingston’s testimony violated Giglio because
she (1) failed to disclose that FDLE’s new procedures could have
potentially changed her interpretation of certain DNA results and
8. In assessing a ruling on a Giglio claim, we apply a mixed
standard of review, deferring to the factual findings made by the
trial court to the extent they are supported by competent,
substantial evidence, but reviewing de novo the application of the
law to those facts. Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 785.
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(2) failed to provide a statistical weight for some results that
implicated him.
As to the first alleged Giglio violation, Truehill does not cite to
any specific portion of Livingston’s testimony that was false.
Instead, he suggests that Livingston should have retested the DNA
evidence, issued a new report, given new testimony, and notified the
parties that her conclusions could be called into question. In
essence, Truehill argues that the falsity lies in Livingston’s lack of
testimony regarding the change in guidelines. However, Truehill
provides no case law holding that an absence of testimony can
satisfy the requirements of Giglio. Moreover, even if he had
demonstrated falsity, Truehill has failed to show that the lack of
testimony as to the guidelines change was material to the case. The
same evidence we discussed in the prejudice analysis demonstrates
why there is no reasonable likelihood of a different verdict. 9
9. We acknowledge that the materiality prong of Giglio differs
from the prejudice prong of Strickland, but find that the evidence
presented in this case satisfies both standards. Compare Ponticelli
v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 690 F.3d 1271, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012),
with Guidry v. Lumpkin, 2 F.4th 472, 492 (5th Cir. 2021).
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As to the second alleged Giglio violation, Truehill argues that
the guidelines in effect at the time of Livingston’s testimony
required her to assign statistical weights to items of evidence
containing low-level mixed DNA samples and her failure to do so
violated Giglio. The trial court denied this claim, and the record
supports that finding.
Here again, Truehill has not pointed to any portion of
Livingston’s testimony that was false. Nor has Truehill cited any
case law supporting his claim that a lack of testimony as to the
statistical value of DNA constitutes a Giglio violation. And Truehill
does not explain how the absence of statistical weight would have
caused the jury to overvalue Livingston’s testimony that Truehill
possibly left DNA on the wallet, washcloth, and a pair of jeans. As a
consequence, Truehill has failed to show that Livingston’s testimony
was false. And, even if Truehill had shown falsity, he would still not
be entitled to relief as he failed to prove the materiality prong.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of the Giglio
claims.
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C. Newly Discovered Evidence
Truehill next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his
claim seeking relief based on newly discovered evidence. To
establish a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d
512, 521 (Fla. 1998):
Two requirements must be met in order for a conviction
to be set aside on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the
evidence “must have been unknown by the trial court, by
the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must
appear that defendant or his counsel could not have
known [of it] by the use of diligence.” Torres–Arboleda v.
Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324–25 (Fla. 1994).
Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of
such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal
on retrial. Jones [v. State], 591 So. 2d at 911, 915 [(Fla.
1991)]. To reach this conclusion the trial court is
required to “consider all newly discovered evidence which
would be admissible” at trial and then evaluate the
“weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the
evidence which was introduced at the trial.” Id. at 916.
Truehill asserts that the MIX 13 studies, a series of scientific
studies conducted on DNA labs across the country, is newly
discovered evidence because it brings to light inconsistencies in
DNA interpretation. The record supports that trial counsel was
aware of the discrepancies with DNA interpretation among labs.
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Thus, to the extent that the MIX 13 study is based on information
that was previously available to counsel at the time of trial, it does
not constitute newly discovered evidence. See Schwab v. State, 969
So. 2d 318, 325–26 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]his Court has not recognized
‘new opinions’ or ‘new research studies’ as newly discovered
evidence.”); see also Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2014);
Branch v. State, 236 So. 3d 981 (Fla. 2018).
Even if the information in the studies was not available at the
time of trial, Truehill has failed to satisfy the second prong of Jones.
If admitted, the MIX 13 studies would, at best, slightly undermine
the mixed, low-level DNA evidence. However, we concluded above
that any deficient performance as to the DNA evidence—which
necessarily includes the mixed, low-level DNA—did not prejudice
Truehill under the higher Strickland prejudice standard. 10
10. Compare Taylor v. State, 260 So. 3d 151, 160 (Fla. 2018)
(“The second prong of the Jones test requires that the newly
discovered evidence be of such a nature that it would probably
produce an acquittal on retrial.”), with Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d
1169, 1190 (Fla. 2014) (“Strickland does not ‘require a defendant to
show “that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered
the outcome” of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish
“a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that]
outcome.” ’ ” (quoting Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44 (2009))).
- 36 -
Therefore, consistent with that holding, we now conclude that the
MIX 13 studies would not lead to an acquittal on retrial.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of this claim.
D. Claims Denied an Evidentiary Hearing
Next, Truehill argues that the circuit court erred in denying
several of his claims without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.
An evidentiary hearing must be held on an initial 3.851
motion whenever the movant makes a facially sufficient claim that
requires a factual determination. Seibert v. State, 64 So. 3d 67, 75
(Fla. 2010) (“On an initial rule 3.851 motion, to the extent there is
any question as to whether the movant has made a facially
sufficient claim requiring a factual determination, the court must
presume that an evidentiary hearing is required.”). “A summary or
conclusory allegation is insufficient to allow the trial court to
examine the specific allegations against the record.” Ragsdale v.
State, 720 So. 2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1998). The determination of
whether a claim warrants a hearing is subject to de novo review. 11
11. Rogers v. State, 327 So. 3d 784, 787 n.5 (Fla. 2021) (“The
standard of review here is de novo.” (citing Boyd v. State, 324 So. 3d
908, 913 (Fla. 2021))).
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First, Truehill argues that the circuit court erred in summarily
denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
change venue. We find no error in the summary denial of this
claim. Truehill’s brief provides no legal basis or explanation as to
why a change-of-venue motion would have been granted, and is
thus legally insufficient to show why an evidentiary hearing was
warranted. See Sexton v. State, 997 So. 2d 1073, 1086 (Fla. 2008)
(“Because Sexton does not provide in the initial brief ‘an
explanation why summary denial was inappropriate or what factual
determination was required on each claim so as to necessitate an
evidentiary hearing,’ his conclusory argument is insufficient to
preserve his claim.” (quoting Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482
(Fla. 2008)). 12
Next, Truehill argues that the trial court improperly denied an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that Florida’s statute revoking the
voting rights of convicted felons denied him a fair cross-section of
12. To the extent that Truehill asserts new arguments in his
reply brief that were not raised in his initial brief, we find that those
arguments are waived. State v. Dougan, 202 So. 3d 363, 378 (Fla.
2016) (arguments raised for first time in reply brief are waived); see
also Johnson, 135 So. 3d at 1033.
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the community from which to select a jury. This claim is
procedurally barred because Truehill should have raised it on direct
appeal. See Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 932, 936 n.3 (Fla. 2002)
(denying Reaves’s claim that the jury was not composed of a fair
cross-section of the community as procedurally barred because that
argument should have been raised on direct appeal but was not).
And, as with the former claim, Truehill fails to assert what factual
dispute would be resolved at an evidentiary hearing. Thus, we
affirm the circuit court’s summary denial of this claim.
Finally, Truehill argues that the circuit court should have held
an evidentiary hearing on his proportionality claim. According to
Truehill, his codefendants’ life sentences render his death sentence
disproportionate. But at minimum, Truehill insists, we or the
circuit court must reconsider his death sentence in light of his
codefendants’ sentences. We affirm the summary denial of this
claim as well.
A claim of relative proportionality fails where there are purely
legal reasons for the more lenient punishment of a codefendant.
See Walton v. State, 246 So. 3d 246, 252 (Fla. 2018) (holding that
- 39 -
when codefendants receive lesser sentences due to purely legal
reasons, proportionality is not an issue).
That rule applies here. Hughes pled guilty to first-degree
murder in exchange for a life sentence. And Johnson’s death
sentence was vacated on the singular basis that he made a deal
with law enforcement that he would help them find Binder’s body in
exchange for avoiding the death penalty. Johnson v. State, 238 So.
3d 726, 739 (Fla. 2018). In short, the reasons for Hughes’s and
Johnson’s life sentences have no connection to aggravating and
mitigating circumstances applicable to Truehill. Thus, Truehill’s
relative proportionality claim fails, and we affirm the circuit court’s
summary denial. 13
E. Cumulative error
In the final issue of his appeal, Truehill argues that the
cumulative effect of the errors at the guilt and penalty phases
deprived him of a fundamentally fair proceeding. We disagree.
13. To the extent Truehill is also requesting a new
comparative proportionality review, we decline to revisit our
precedent in this regard. See Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544,
552 (Fla. 2020) (abandoning comparative proportionality review).
- 40 -
“[W]here the individual claims of error alleged are either
procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error
also necessarily fails.” Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla.
2005); see also Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003). As
discussed in the analysis of the individual issues above, the alleged
errors are either meritless, procedurally barred, or fail to meet the
Strickland standard. Thus, Truehill is not entitled to relief on this
claim either.
III. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Truehill has also petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas
corpus raising two claims for our consideration—one asserting
deficient performance of appellate counsel and the other seeking
relief based on proportionality review. Neither has merit.
A. Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel
For his ineffectiveness claim, Truehill argues that appellate
counsel defaulted on his opportunity for federal habeas review
because he did not explicitly raise federal issues in three separate
claims on direct appeal. 14 Truehill acknowledges that counsel
14. The three claims were: (1) whether the trial court erred in
permitting the State to introduce other crimes, wrongs or acts over
- 41 -
raised the substance of the issues, but he nevertheless asserts
ineffectiveness because counsel did not explicitly allege federal
constitutional violations. In addition, Truehill argues, counsel did
not preserve his claims for appellate review. We disagree.
The standard for assessing a claim for ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel parallels the Strickland standard for trial counsel.
Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985). Thus, to
succeed on such a claim, the petitioner must establish that
appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance resulted in prejudice. Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d
637, 643 (Fla. 2000).
We conclude that Truehill has failed to show deficient
performance as to any of the three claims. As for his argument that
failing to present arguments expressly premised on the federal
constitution affected our review on direct appeal, Truehill neither
explains nor provides a legal basis for his argument that pleading
Truehill’s objection; (2) whether the cumulative effect of the
prosecutor’s improper comments during closing arguments vitiated
the entire trial and warrants a new trial; and (3) whether the trial
court’s erroneous rulings during the penalty phase, in the
aggregate, deprived Truehill of a fair trial.
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specific federal issues would have had an impact on our ruling.
Notably, he has not identified how the federal constitutional
standards to which he alludes differed from the standard we applied
on direct appeal. Nor does he indicate how failing to specifically cite
pages in the record precluded our review of his appellate argument.
Accordingly, Truehill has failed to meet his burden of alleging “a
specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.” Frances v. State,
143 So. 3d 340, 357 (Fla. 2014) (citing Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d
1114, 1127 (Fla. 2003)).
As for his argument claiming a default for purposes of federal
habeas review, Truehill misstates the exhaustion and preservation
requirements applicable in federal habeas cases. “To exhaust state
remedies and preserve a claim for federal review, a defendant need
only present the substance of a federal constitutional claim to the
state court.” Anderson v. State, 313 So. 3d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2021) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971)).
Appellate counsel presented the substance of the federal claims;
therefore, Truehill’s federal claims are not waived.
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Accordingly, we deny his claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel.
B. Proportionality
In his second claim, Truehill argues that he is entitled to a
new proportionality review because his codefendants are serving life
sentences. As noted previously, Truehill has provided no legal basis
that obliges us to perform comparative proportionality or relative
proportionality review now. Accordingly, we deny this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the challenged order
and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, POLSTON, COURIEL, and
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result.
FRANCIS, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St. Johns County,
Raul A. Zambrano, Judge – Case No. 552010CF000763XXAXMX
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Tracy M. Henry,
Lisa M. Fusaro, and James L. Driscoll, Jr., Assistant Capital
- 44 -
Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, Temple Terrace,
Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Patrick
A. Bobek, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
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