NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2840-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHANE A. WHIPPLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted September 19, 2022 – Decided September 30, 2022
Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 18-03-0692.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Rachel M. Lamb, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
A jury convicted defendant Shane Whipple of the first-degree murder of
his aunt, Jennifer Whipple, with a hatchet. On this appeal, he challenges an
order denying his motion to suppress the warrantless entry into Jennifer's 1
apartment, raises various claims of trial errors, and challenges his sentence. We
affirm.
On Thursday, January 25, 2018, Officer James Bendig of the Winslow
Township Police Department responded to a domestic incident at Jennifer's
apartment. Defendant also lived in the apartment. Jennifer called the police
because defendant had been throwing things in his bedroom. In addition,
Jennifer told police that earlier in the week, defendant told her "to go put a knife
in her throat." Jennifer told police she was scared and wanted defendant
removed from the apartment. Officer Bendig confiscated two key fobs from
defendant, escorted him to gather some belongings from his room, and advised
him he needed a police escort if he wanted to return to the apartment.
Two days later police were contacted by Jennifer's father, David,
requesting a well-being check on her. Officer Nicholas Cobian arrived and
knocked on Jennifer's apartment door but did not receive a response. He noted
1
Because multiple people in this matter share the Whipple surname, this opinion
will refer to them by first name. We intend no disrespect.
A-2840-19
2
her car was still in the parking lot and the hood was cold, indicating the car had
not been operated recently. He then contacted David and learned of the previous
incident and looked up the police report. Patrolman Kurt Gunson arrived at the
scene, then both officers returned to Jennifer's apartment and knocked, but did
not receive an answer. Officer Cobian noticed the apartment door was unlocked.
The officers entered and discovered Jennifer's body on her bedroom floor.
A Camden County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant
with: First-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); unlawful
possession of certain weapons (a hatchet), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count two); and
possession of a weapon for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count
three).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the warrantless entry into Jennifer's
apartment. Officer Cobian testified on behalf of the State, recounting the facts
of his January 27 visit to Jennifer's apartment. After receiving no answer to his
knocks on Jennifer's door and the observations he made about her car, Officer
Cobian testified he called David, who relayed "that two nights prior there was a
disturbance at the residence between Jennifer and [defendant]" and defendant
"was escorted off the property and . . . forfeited his key." David explained he
spoke to his daughter daily but had no contact from her in one or two days.
A-2840-19
3
Officer Cobian then looked up the prior domestic incident report, which
recounted defendant's removal from Jennifer's apartment. In pertinent part, the
report stated an officer
spoke to [defendant] and advised him . . . Jennifer
wanted him to leave the residence for good.
[Defendant] stated that[] all he wants to do is leave. He
handed over the keys to the entry gate and doorway for
the complex. [The officer] stood by as [defendant]
removed his belongings from the residence and into his
vehicle. Jennifer was given the signed copy of the
Victim Notification Form stating she did not want to
apply for a [temporary restraining order] at this time.
[Defendant] advised he was going to stay in a shelter
for the evening.
After Officer Cobian read the report, he called Officer Gunson for backup, and
the two proceeded upstairs.
The officers attempted to contact building management to obtain entry
into Jennifer's apartment but were unable to reach anyone. They knocked on
Jennifer's door "for several minutes" but did not receive an answer. When
Officer Cobian discovered the door unlocked he radioed dispatch and stated he
was going to enter the apartment and discovered Jennifer. The officers recorded
their entry into the apartment on their body worn cameras and the footage from
Officer Gunson's camera was played at the suppression hearing.
A-2840-19
4
The State also called Sergeant Victoria Patti, the lead crime scene unit
detective from the Camden County Prosecutor's Office in charge of the
investigation. She stated she and the other law enforcement officers left the
apartment complex once Jennifer's body was removed because they were
awaiting a search warrant, which was issued a few hours later.
Defendant argued he had standing to contest the warrantless entry to the
apartment because he lived in the apartment for two years prior. He pointed to
the domestic incident report, which stated defendant "advised he was going to
stay in a shelter for the evening." (emphasis added). He claimed he did not
remove all his belongings from the home, which showed an intent to return, and
Jennifer did not seek a restraining order, which belied an intent to permanently
remove him.
The defense also argued the emergency aid warrant exception did not
apply because "there was no objectively reasonable belief that immediate action
was necessary to protect or to save a life." David had lost contact with Jennifer
for a brief time and police did not hear or observe anything requiring them to
enter without a warrant. Further, "police didn't act as if it was an emergency"
because officers spent approximately half-an-hour on the premises before
A-2840-19
5
opening the unlocked door. The unlocked door did not prove an emergency
because Jennifer could have forgotten to lock it.
The trial judge found Officer Cobian's testimony "extremely credible" and
corroborated by the domestic incident report, the dispatch call Jennifer made,
and the body-worn camera footage. The judge concluded defendant lacked
standing to object to the warrantless entry because he "was a trespasser. It's
clear that he was told he had to leave terminally. He turned in his keys. He
knew that he was not to return to the residence, and he did." Defendant "no
longer lived at the address in question. Neither of them, . . . defendant or
[Jennifer], were under the impression that he lived there. Because he is not an
owner or a resident, he has no reasonable expectation of privacy."
Even if defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the judge found
the emergency aid warrant exception applied because "when [police] went to
enter, they had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
required . . . they check to make sure . . . [Jennifer] was okay, to protect or
preserve life or serious injury." The judge cited the information police had at
the time, namely, the domestic incident report and David's request for a well-
being check. The "motivation for entering into the home was certainly not to
find or seize any evidence. It was to render assistance." The discovery of
A-2840-19
6
Jennifer's body on the floor of her bedroom proved "a reasonable nexus between
the emergency and the area or the place to be searched." The judge denied the
motion.
David testified for the State at trial. He said he was concerned for
Jennifer's safety "[b]ecause she had some incidents with problems with
[defendant and] arguments" during the two years defendant lived with her.
The State called Officer Bendig, who testified about his response to the
domestic incident. When the officer arrived, he "found [defendant] in the
parking lot in his vehicle." The officer's conversation with defendant was
recorded on his body-worn camera, which the State played for the jury. On the
recording, defendant claimed he was "just going through a lot in [his] head" and
that he "wasn't fighting with [Jennifer] at all." He stated he "was throwing stuff
in [his] room and then [Jennifer] yelled." When the officer told defendant he
was responding to a domestic incident, defendant admitted he "got mad" and
"flipped [his] bed over." He stated: "We just had a fucking beef . . . . I threw
my shit out. . . . [S]he tried to come talk to me. I locked my door. She went
back to her room and then I just came out here to fucking try to calm down."
Officer Bendig urged defendant to "go inside and figure out what's going
on" but defendant responded: "I don't want to go inside. I don't want to talk to
A-2840-19
7
her. . . . I didn't touch her. I didn't say anything. We weren't even arguing. I
yelled at her one time."
Officer Cobian testified for the State about the discovery of Jennifer's
body and the murder scene. He stated Jennifer's bedroom door was "cracked
open with the light on inside" and when he entered the bedroom, he "observed
Jennifer deceased on the floor. . . . There was a large amount of blood on her
and throughout the bedroom and it appeared that she suffered from trauma to
the head and face." While clearing the apartment, he observed "[s]everal blood
spatters on the floor" and "[a] button on the floor."
Sergeant Patti also testified and described the scene in a similar fashion.
She "observed . . . what appeared to be teeth and also some suspected bone
fragment on the floor as well as several clumps of hair." She found a suspected
blood stain on the front door of the apartment, two blood stains on the kitchen
floor, and four suspected blood stains in the kitchen sink.
The State called Gary Luh, the owner and manager of Asian Pavilion, a
martial arts and gifts store. He testified his store sells axes and hatchets and that
his store packages items in a white box with a red sticker. He recalled selling
"one or two" hatchets on January 26. Luh provided police a receipt dated
January 26 at approximately 3:58 p.m. for $28.80, including tax, bearing the
A-2840-19
8
same last four digits as defendant's credit card and defendant's signature. He
confirmed the item sold corresponded with the price of an axe.
The State called Jennifer's neighbor who testified he arrived home on
January 26 around 4:52 p.m.2 As he made his way to his apartment, he observed
a Caucasian male wearing dark clothing at the top of the stairwell. As the
neighbor passed the man, he was able to get a "[p]retty good look" at his face,
and he heard "like a little snicker." The neighbor later picked defendant out of
a photo array and identified him as the individual he saw on January 26.
The State called Camden County Prosecutor's Office Detective Matthew
Barber. He retrieved the surveillance video of vehicles entering through the
main gate of the apartment complex and the common entryway used by persons
entering the building. The footage showed defendant's vehicle entering the
apartment complex gate at 4:11 p.m. on January 26. Detective Barber testified
the video showed a male wearing a black hat, black jacket, and camouflage pants
enter the building around 4:38 p.m. "carrying a flat white box in a bag." The
box "had a[n] orange sticker on the end of it." He testified the individual's
description matched the description of defendant from the domestic incident.
2
The State played surveillance footage from the apartment complex depicting
the neighbor arriving at 4:57 p.m.
A-2840-19
9
Approximately one minute later, the individual exited the building carrying the
same white box. The individual entered the building again carrying the white
box at 4:50 p.m. and exited at 5:01 p.m., and his vehicle exited the gate at 5:02
p.m. The State played the surveillance footage for the jury.
Detective Barber corroborated the testimony regarding Jennifer's wounds
and testified regarding the evidence retrieved from her cell phone. On January
26, at 4:35 p.m. defendant texted Jennifer: "I need to come get some of my stuff
out of the apartment." Defendant subsequently called Jennifer, but his call went
unanswered. Then, the following text message exchange occurred between 4:45
p.m. and 4:47 p.m.:
[Jennifer:] Did you call officers to have them come? I
can take it to you. I have been washing clothes and
packing when I can while working.
....
[Defendant:] I'm here now. I just need some stuff from
the closet.
....
[Jennifer:] I'm almost done packing but working right
now. In a meeting, M-T-G. When do you need?
....
[Jennifer:] Clothes?
A-2840-19
10
....
[Defendant:] Now.
....
[Jennifer:] Do you have room for food?
....
[Defendant:] Paperwork and socks.
....
[Jennifer:] Are you outside?
....
[Defendant:] Yep.
After the last message, Jennifer called officer Bendig at 4:48 p.m.
Defendant then sent Jennifer another message at 4:51 p.m., stating: "I'm coming
up now." Jennifer responded: "You are supposed to have officers." Defendant
replied: "I don't need to bother the cops with socks." At 4:55 p.m., Jennifer
responded: "I will bring it out. You're coming in." At 5:10 p.m. defendant sent
an additional text stating: "[Never mind]. I'll just get it later." This last message
was sent approximately nine minutes after the surveillance footage captured
defendant leaving the building.
A-2840-19
11
Lieutenant Barber testified he also spoke to the manager of the Berlin
Mart, which houses the Asian Pavilion, and retrieved surveillance footage from
the premises. He reviewed footage near the time noted on the credit card receipt
and discovered footage showing a white vehicle the same color as defendant's
pull into the parking lot and the driver enter the Asian Pavilion. The driver
"dressed and looked similar to the individual" at Jennifer's apartment complex
and wore a black hat, black jacket, and camouflage pants. The individual exited
the store at approximately 3:59 p.m. carrying a flat white box in a plastic bag.
The surveillance was also jury also shown to the jury.
Sergeant William Rumell, Jr. from the Camden County Prosecutor's
Office's Crime Scene Investigations Unit also testified on behalf of the State
regarding the evidence collected from defendant's person and his vehicle. He
testified defendant's personal items included a dark knit hat and a black jacket.
While photographing defendant, the sergeant observed and "photographed a
small cut on one finger of each hand." Police also recovered an "olive green
knit hat, two green washcloths, one of which appeared to have suspected blood
stains, and one red washcloth." The washcloth stains subsequently tested
positive for blood.
A-2840-19
12
Sergeant Rumell retrieved "a pair of camouflage cargo style pants with
suspected blood stains on the legs, two black Puma sneakers, high top sneakers,
with suspected bloodstains, [and] a black hooded sweatshirt with what [police]
thought were suspected blood stains . . . ." He testified the pants were missing
the top button, and noted "[a] button similar to the remaining buttons on the
pants was collected at the crime scene." The stains on the pants and sneakers
were positive for blood. Blood stains were also found on the vehicle's
emergency brake and gear shifter.
The State called a forensic scientist from the New Jersey State Police
Laboratory's serology unit who was admitted as an expert in biological stain
analysis and forensic serology. He confirmed a swab taken from Jennifer's
kitchen sink, defendant's camouflage pants, and a swab from the gear shift from
defendant's vehicle all tested positive for blood.
The State called a forensic scientist from the New Jersey State
Laboratory's DNA unit who was admitted as an expert in forensic DNA analysis.
She testified the stain on defendant's pants contained DNA from two people, one
of which was Jennifer's. She was unable to identify the other person.
The State called the medical examiner who performed Jennifer's autopsy
and was admitted as an expert in anatomic and forensic pathology. He testified
A-2840-19
13
Jennifer had "multiple complex injuries to her face, meaning, . . . they
overlapped each other and created multiple areas of injuries." He noted "large
gaping injuries to the eyes, as well as . . . around the mouth area." Jennifer's left
eye was ruptured and her right eye had abrasions and scrapings. In addition she
had "fracturing to the facial structures[,]" including a crushed jaw, missing teeth,
and a fractured cheek bone.
On the left side of Jennifer's head there was "a three[-]centimeter defect"
in her scalp and two additional defects approximately seven or eight inches
behind her left ear. Jennifer had suffered crushing bone injuries which fractured
the base of her skull and damaged her brain. The examiner observed "a large
area of sharp force injury" on the back of Jennifer's wrist. She also had injuries
on her right upper arm and forearm. Siebert testified these were defensive type
injuries. He observed a large injury on her left arm that appeared to be created
on a tangent, causing a flap in the skin, among other various injuries.
The medical examiner concluded Jennifer died due to "[m]ultiple sharp
and blunt force injuries" and the manner of her death was homicide. Further,
"these wounds were not caused, simply, by a typical knife that you would expect,
that it would be something larger and heavier like a hatchet, an axe or, maybe
even a small machete."
A-2840-19
14
During a break on the second day of trial, defense counsel informed the
judge that the previous day she "was walking out of the back hallway, and Juror
Number 1 was walking — was waiting, and she walked in. And [defense
counsel] stopped her and . . . said, 'Oh no, you can't — you can't go in.'" Counsel
stated she informed the prosecutor of the interaction but "didn't think anything
of it." She was informing the court because when the judge advised the jury not
to interact with the parties or attorneys, the juror "looked over" at her. After
conferring with counsel, the judge told the jury:
I do understand yesterday in the back hallway there was
a brief interaction between one of the jurors and one of
the attorneys. The attorney explained to me what
happened, and that interaction was perfectly fine. So
after the cautionary instruction, I just wanted to make
sure that attorney did explain to me the brief
interaction, and it, again, was perfectly okay, perfectly
fine.
At the charge conference, the trial judge asked the attorneys whether they
sought to charge the jury on lesser included offenses, and both declined. The
judge agreed and made the following findings: "And there [i]s no rational basis
that I saw for either aggravated manslaughter or any lesser included in the
murder charges based on the evidence that was presented in court . . . ." After
delivering the charges, the judge asked the parties if they had objections and
neither objected. Later that day, the jury convicted defendant on all three counts.
A-2840-19
15
At sentencing, the trial judge found aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(1), "[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense . . . including whether or
not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner" and
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), "[t]he risk that the defendant will commit another
offense," and gave them great weight. The judge gave moderate weight to
aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), "[t]he extent of the defendant's prior
criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has
been convicted." He found aggravating factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9),
"[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from violating the law" and
assigned it great weight. The judge found no mitigating factors, concluding he
was "clearly convinced that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors."
The judge sentenced defendant to seventy-five years' imprisonment with
eighty-five percent parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The judge merged counts two and three into count
one and imposed the corresponding fines and fees.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
A-2840-19
16
WAS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL — EVIDENCE
THAT WAS DISCOVERED DURING, OR AS A
DIRECT RESULT OF, A WARRANTLESS ENTRY
INTO THE HOME NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE
EMERGENCY AID EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT. U.S. Const. amends.
IV and XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7.
POINT II
THE [SEVENTY-FIVE]-YEAR NERA SENTENCE
WAS UNDULY PUNITIVE, MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE, AND SHOULD BE REDUCED.
Defendant's pro se brief raises the following points:
POINT I:
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE COURT'S FAILURE
TO CHARGE THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSES.
POINT II:
THE VERDICT MUST BE SET ASIDE AND
DEFENDANT GIVEN A NEW TRIAL DUE TO THE
FACT ONE OF THE JURORS WAS COMPROMISED
AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RELEASED, AND THE
ENTIRE JURY PANEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN
QUERIED.
POINT III:
THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE STATE HAS
BLATANTLY LIED AND MISCONSTRUED FACTS
IN THIS CASE CONSTITUTES A CERTAIN LEVEL
OF PERJURY AND/OR ENTRAPMENT. AS SUCH,
A-2840-19
17
THE STATE MUST BE DENIED THE ABILITY TO
FURTHER LITIGATE THIS CASE.
I.
Defendant challenges the denial of the suppression motion on standing
grounds and argues the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement did
not apply. We are unconvinced the trial judge erred.
"In reviewing a motion to suppress, an appellate court 'must uphold the
factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Handy,
206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Fact-
finding based on video-recorded evidence is subject to the same standard of
review. State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 38 (2018). A trial court's factual findings
are afforded deference because they are "substantially influenced by [a trial
judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the
case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Elders, 192 N.J. at 244 (quoting
State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are reviewed de novo. State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 387 (2012).
The United States and New Jersey Constitution guarantee an individual's
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by government
officials. U.S. Const. amend IV; N.J. Const. art I, ¶ 7. The Supreme Court has
A-2840-19
18
emphasized "[t]he sanctity of one's home is among our most cherished rights"
which is "entitled to the highest degree of respect and protection within our
constitutional framework." State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 611-12 (2004). A
warrantless search is therefore presumptively unreasonable unless the State can
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, there was probable cause and
the search "f[ell] within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement." Hagans, 233 N.J. at 38-39 (alteration in original) (quoting State
v. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016)).
Our law confers automatic standing upon a defendant to challenge a search
or seizure "where they have either 'a proprietary, possessory or participatory
interest in either the place searched or the property seized. . . .'" State v. Lamb,
218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014) (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228 (1981)). In
State v. Randolph, the Court recognized exceptions to the automatic standing
rule holding that in cases concerning real property, a defendant does not have
automatic standing to contest a search if the defendant was trespassing or
lawfully evicted from the premises. 228 N.J. 566, 585 (2017). The Court
reasoned "[a] trespasser does not have standing to challenge a search because 'a
trespasser, by definition, does not have a possessory or proprietary interest in
A-2840-19
19
property where he does not belong—where he does not have permission or
consent to be.'" Id. at 586 (quoting State v. Brown, 216 N.J. 508, 535 (2014)).
We are convinced the trial judge properly found defendant was a
trespasser. The evidence shows defendant was asked to leave the premises for
good. When police advised defendant of Jennifer's wishes, he relinquished his
keys and was advised not to return to the apartment without calling police.
Notwithstanding the trespasser issue, the warrantless entry was valid
under the emergency-aid exception. State v. Fede, 237 N.J. 138, 146 (2019).
This exception furthers a police officer's "vital community-caretaking role." Id.
at 145. An officer may conduct a warrantless entry "for the purpose of
protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." Id. at 146 (quoting
State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 130 (2012)). The State must demonstrate "(1)
the officer had 'an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
requires that he provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve life, or to
prevent serious injury' and (2) there was a 'reasonable nexus between the
emergency and the area or places to be searched.'" Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 132
(quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 600); see also State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453,
468-70 (2015).
A-2840-19
20
The plain-view doctrine is another recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 90 (2016). The doctrine's
"constitutional limiting principle is that the officer must lawfully be in the area
where he observed and seized the incriminating item or contraband, and it must
be immediately apparent that the seized item is evidence of a crime." Id. at 101.
If an officer enters a home pursuant to the emergency-aid exception looking for
an injured person, they may seize evidence observed in plain view so long as the
scope of the search is not extended beyond the circumstances which prompted
the entry. Hathaway, 222 N.J. at 470.
The trial judge's finding that officers were permitted to enter Jennifer's
apartment without a warrant under the emergency-aid exception is supported by
the record. As the judge noted, officers "had an objectively reasonable basis to
believe that an emergency required . . . they check to make sure . . . [Jennifer]
was okay, to protect or preserve life or serious injury." The officer's
understanding was based on David's concern and inability to contact Jennifer,
her failure to answer the door despite her car being parked in front of the
building, and the officers' review of the domestic incident report.
There was also a reasonable nexus between the emergency and the place
to be searched, considering it was Jennifer's home; her car was parked outside,
A-2840-19
21
indicating she may be present; and it was the scene of the prior domestic
incident. Also, Jennifer's body was found in plain view through her open
bedroom door.
II.
We reject defendant's argument the trial judge erred by not sua sponte
charging the jury with lesser included offenses. Defendant's assertion there was
reversible error in how the judge handled the juror interaction with defense
counsel is also unpersuasive.
A.
It is well established that "'[a]ppropriate and proper charges to a jury are
essential for a fair trial.'" State v. Carrero, 229 N.J. 118, 127 (2017) (quoting
State v. Daniels, 224 N.J. 168, 180 (2016)). The trial court has a duty "'to ensure
that the jurors receive accurate instructions on the law as it pertains to the facts
and issues of each case, irrespective of the particular language suggested by
either party.'" State v. Canfield, 470 N.J. Super. 234, 269 (App. Div. 2022)
(quoting State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 159 (2016)); see also State v. Funderburg,
225 N.J. 66, 80 (2016) ("A trial court is vested with discretion in delivering the
jury instructions that are most applicable to the criminal matter before it.").
A-2840-19
22
"[N]o defendant should be convicted of a greater crime or acquitted
merely because the jury was precluded from considering a lesser offense . . . ."
State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 577 (2005) (quoting State v. Garron, 177 N.J.
147, 180 (2003)). A court may instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense so
long as it is supported by the rational basis in the record. Canfield, 470 N.J.
Super. at 272. However, "[i]f parties do not request a lesser-included-offense
charge, reviewing courts 'apply a higher standard, requiring the unrequested
charge to be "clearly indicated" from the record.'" Id. at 272-73 (quoting State
v. Fowler, 239 N.J. 171, 188 (2019)).
A defendant may be charged with aggravated manslaughter if he
"recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to human life[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). Manslaughter may be charged if a
defendant recklessly committed a homicide or the homicide was "committed in
the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation." N.J.S.A. 2C:11 -
4(b). An individual behaves recklessly when they "'consciously disregard[] a
substantial and unjustifiable risk' that death will occur from the defendant's
conduct, and disregarding the risk 'involves a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a reasonable person would observe' in the same situation."
Fowler, 239 N.J. 171 at 188-89 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3)).
A-2840-19
23
As we noted, neither party requested a lesser-included offense instruction
and expressly declined such a charge. Moreover, as the trial judge correctly
found, there is nothing in the record supporting a manslaughter or aggravated
manslaughter charge and the recklessness attendant to the elements of either
statute. The evidence only supports the State's theory of the case; that defendant
acted purposely and with premeditation in purchasing the hatchet, traveling to
Jennifer's apartment, and murdering her. The domestic incident with Jennifer
would not lead a jury to conclude defendant acted recklessly or was provoked
to do so because the dispute occurred two days prior to the murder.
Additionally, no evidence was adduced of a provocation occurring on the day of
the murder.
B.
Defendants have a constitutional right to an impartial jury. State v. Little,
246 N.J. 402, 414 (2021). "That constitutional privilege includes the right to
have the jury decide the case based solely on the evidence presented at trial, free
from the taint of outside influences and extraneous matters." State v. R.D., 169
N.J. 551, 557 (2001) (citing State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 75 (1988)). "[I]f during
the course of the trial it becomes apparent that a juror may have been exposed
to extraneous information, the trial court must act swiftly to overcome any
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potential bias and to expose factors impinging on the juror's impartiality." Id.
at 557-58. If the circumstances suggest a juror was tainted, the trial court "is
obliged to interrogate the juror in the presence of counsel to determine if there
is a taint. If so, the court is then obliged to interview the other jurors to
determine if they or any of them have been infected by the taint." Pressler &
Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 2.1 on R. 1:16-1 (2022). Once the trial
court has ascertained the extent of the taint, it should determine whether any
jurors should be dismissed or whether a mistrial should be declared. Ibid.; see
also State v. Brown, 442 N.J. Super. 154, 180-82 (App. Div. 2015).
The brief interaction between defense counsel and the juror does not
convince us the juror was tainted thereby requiring a further investigation by the
judge. No trial related information was exchanged between counsel and the
juror. Defense counsel merely informed the juror she was not allowed into the
courtroom. Regardless, defense counsel requested the judge address the jury to
prevent the juror from thinking she did something wrong and we are satisfied
the curative instruction given by the judge after consulting with the parties
resolved the issue.
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III.
Defendant alleges the trial court improperly weighed the aggravating and
mitigating factors. He argues he should have received a thirty-year sentence.
Defendant challenges the trial court's finding of aggravating factor
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), arguing the court double counted Jennifer's death, an
element of the offense. He contends "Jennifer had expired from her injuries
within seconds of the attack — there was no indication that she was subjected
to additional suffering or torture." He claims the only harm Jennifer suffered
was death, which occurs in all murders.
Defendant also challenges the court's finding of aggravating factor
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3). He asserts the judge observed a "scowl" on defendant's
face when Jennifer's family members were speaking at sentencing and
impermissibly deduced his emotional state and propensity for future criminality
based on a facial expression. Defendant argues the finding of aggravating
factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) and (9) was erroneous, because these factors are
routinely found together and "should be given little weight, particularly when
found in conjunction with each other."
Defendant argues the court erred in failing to find mitigating factor
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8) ("The defendant's conduct was the result of
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circumstances unlikely to recur."). He argues the trial court misinterpreted the
holding in State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 414-15 (1989), stating mitigating factor
eight only applies when the defendant has no prior record, and the death was
accidental. Regardless, he maintains he did not have a history of violence and
there was no indication a "unique domestic circumstance[] between an aunt and
her nephew" would recur because "there is no reason to believe . . . this was not
an aberrational, one-time event."
Our review of a sentencing court's decision is limited and subject to an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). A
reviewing court should defer to the sentencing court's factual findings and
should not "second-guess" them. State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). The
deferential standard of review applies "only if the trial judge follows the
[Criminal] Code and the basic precepts that channel sentencing discretion.'"
State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020) (quoting Case, 220 N.J. at 65).
Therefore, we "must affirm the sentence of a trial court unless: (1) the sentencing
guidelines were violated; (2) the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were
not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the application of
the guidelines to the facts' of the case 'shock[s] the judicial conscience.'" State v.
Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95
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N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
Under aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), the court "reviews the
severity of the defendant's crime, 'the single most important factor in the
sentencing process,' assessing the degree to which defendant's conduct has
threatened the safety of its direct victims and the public." State v. Fuentes, 217
N.J. 57, 74 (2014) (quoting State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 609 (2013)). This
analysis "must be premised upon factors independent of the elements of the
crime and firmly grounded in the record." Id. at 63. Where appropriate, the
court may "reference . . . the extraordinary brutality involved in an offense." Id.
at 75. A court may consider whether "the defendant intended 'to inflict pain,
harm, and suffering — in addition to intending death.'" Ibid. (quoting State v.
O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 217-18 (1989)).
We discern no error in the trial judge's analysis. Defendant was convicted
of first-degree murder. The judge relied on Fuentes, and its finding that a court
may reference the "extraordinary brutality" used to commit an offense to justify
finding aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). The judge found "[t]here are
several facts present in this case which illuminate the heinous nature of this
crime which far exceed that which is required to prove . . . [defendant] caused
the victim's death and he did so purposely and knowingly." The judge noted the
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following: Jennifer was defendant's close relative; she "was found with deep
defens[ive] wounds on both of her arms" and head; was missing seven teeth; and
had crushed facial bones, resulting in a "mutilated" face. The judge correctly
concluded "this crime was excessive and it was gory" and did not impermissibly
double-count by considering the manner of killing.
The trial judge's reference to defendant's scowl was relevant to the court's
analysis of defendant's lack of remorse. More importantly, the judge noted
defendant "was arrested on ten separate occasions in five different states from
2009 through 2016." Defendant was on probation for an offense committed in
Kansas in 2015 when he murdered Jennifer. Based on this, the court concluded
"[c]learly, when he was under . . . supervision, he is not capable of abiding by
the law" and posed a risk of re-offending. Therefore, the judge's findings under
aggravating factors N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) and (6), and the weight accorded
them, were supported by the record.
Pursuant to aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), the judge
concluded "punishing [defendant] harshly for this crime, would also . . . greatly
ensure that he would be less likely to commit another crime, as well as deter him
if he is released." The judge also found a general need for deterring society from
committing violent crimes such as the murder of a family member.
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Our Supreme Court has stated: "In the absence of a finding of a need for
specific deterrence, general deterrence 'has relatively insignificant penal value.'"
Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 79 (quoting Jarbath, 114 N.J. at 405). Here, the evidence
supports the judge's finding of a need for specific deterrence, and we discern no
error in finding aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).
Likewise, the judge did not err in declining to find mitigating factor
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8). Mitigating factor eight may be declined if a court
concludes defendant "might act similarly" if "he found himself in a situation like
the one underlying the present case[.]" State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 9 (1990).
The judge correctly declined to find this factor because Jennifer's murder
was premeditated and purposeful. He noted defendant is "somebody who cannot
control his emotions. So I do find this is a circumstance[] that is likely to
reoccur." Based on the evidence, we are unconvinced this was an erroneous
conclusion.
Finally, to the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on the
appeal, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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