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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: Y.A.P., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: N.N.L., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1546 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 16, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
2021-A9094
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 4, 2022
Appellant N.N.L. (hereinafter “Mother”) appeals from the Decree entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans’ Court Division on
May 16, 2022, granting the Petition filed by the Bucks County Children and
Youth Social Services Agency (hereinafter the “Agency”) to involuntarily
terminate Mother’s parental rights to her minor child Y.A.P. (hereinafter
“Child”).1 Following a careful review, we affirm.
The orphans’ court detailed the relevant facts and procedural history
herein as follows:
Y.A.P. was born [i]n March [] 2011. See N.T. 11/05/2021,
p. 24. Mother’s own actions were the catalysts that brought Child
under the care of the Agency. Id. at p. 30. The initial referral of
Child to the Agency was in October 2018, when concerns were
raised as to Child’s welfare following an instance of alleged
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child was born in March of 2011.
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physical abuse at the hands of Mother. Id. As a result, Mother was
criminally charged with and subsequently pled guilty to one count
of Endangering the Welfare of a Child2 and one count of Simple
Assault.3 She was sentenced to two years of probation.4 Id. at
pp. 79-80.
Child came into care of the Agency on October 11, 2018,
pursuant to an Emergency Order issued by the Bucks County
Dependency Court. Id. at pp. 73-74. A Shelter Care Order was
entered the next day. Id. at p. 74. A subsequent dependency
hearing occurred on November 26, 2018, wherein Child was
adjudicated dependent. Id. Child has been in the care of the
Agency since that date more than three and one-half years ago.
Id.
After Child was adjudicated dependent, the Agency sought
to implement a Family Service Plan with the ultimate goal of
reunifying Mother and Child. Id. at p. 75. This plan primarily
focused on having Mother acknowledge the incident that brought
Child into the care of the Agency, and to provide Child with the
support she needed going forward. Id. On February 1, 2019,
Ashley Lorenz (“Ms. Lorenz”), an Agency caseworker involved in
this case from December 2018 until March 2019, met with Mother
to review the Family Service Plan. Id. at pp. 65, 76. At the
meeting, it was also requested of Mother that she provide income
verification. Id. at p. 76. Mother refused to sign the Family Service
Plan and was also unwilling to provide income verification. Id.
On March 15, 2019, a meeting took place with the Agency,
Mother, Child’s foster parents, Child’s guardian ad litem, and
Mother's legal counsel. Id. The purpose of this meeting initiated
by the Agency was to review the reunification objectives of the
Family Service Plan and to discuss Child’s progress.5 Id. at pp. 76-
77. Again, Mother refused to sign the Family Service Plan. Id. at
p. 78.
On April 25, 2019, Desiree Mullen (“Ms. Mullen”), a
supervisor in the permanency division of the Agency, and Kristen
Griego (“Ms. Griego”), the caseworker involved in this matter from
March 2019 until June 2020, went to Mother’s residence in another
attempt to discuss the Family Service Plan. Id. at pp. 64-65, 68,
78. While at the residence, Ms. Mullen attempted to discuss with
Mother the reasons for Child’s removal from her care, referring to
the physical abuse perpetrated by Mother against Child. Id. at p.
78. Mother, once again, refused to review the Family Service Plan.
Id. Mother also denied that the allege[d] abuse occurred. Id. at p.
79-80. She also accused Ms. Mullen of “overcommunicating” with
her about changes that had occurred to the visitation schedule.
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Id. Mother then proceeded to “kick [ Ms. Mullen] out of her home.”
Id. at pp. 78-79. Later that day, Mother left a voicemail with the
Agency stating that Ms. Mullen was no longer allowed in her home
because Ms. Mullen had not been “understanding of her migraine
that she had that day.” Id. at p. 81.
On June 21, 2019, there was a meeting between Ms. Griego
and Mother where another attempt was made to have Mother sign
the Family Service Plan. Id. at p. 82. Mother, once again, refused
to sign the Plan.
In early November 2019, Mother communicated to the
Agency that she would not meet with their workers unless her
attorney was present at the meetings. Id. From November 2019
into early December 2019, the Agency attempted to contact
Mother concerning her request to meet with the Agency. Id.
Mother was unresponsive to the Agency’s attempts to have a
meeting. Id. However, a meeting was ultimately scheduled and
held on December 13, 2019. At this meeting, Mother did
acknowledge that “she needed to work on her relationship with
[Child].” Id. at pp. 82-83. In April 2020, the Agency sent Mother
a letter concerning the objectives of the Family Service Plan. Id.
However, the Agency did not receive a response or any
communication regarding the contents of its letter. Id. at p. 83.
During the time Child has been under the care of the
Agency, numerous therapeutic services have been offered to both
Mother and Child.6 Id. at p. 84. One such therapist was Tedd
Bradford (“Mr. Bradford”) of K/S Services, who remained actively
involved in this matter from December 2019 until August 2020.7
Id. at pp. 84, 86. Mr. Bradford’s involvement was for the purpose
of “work[ing] on” the relationship between Mother and Child. Id.
at p. 85. More specifically, Mr. Bradford sought to facilitate an
apology from Mother, to Child, regarding the physical abuse
incident that initially brought Child into the care of the Agency. An
additional goal was having family therapy sessions between
Mother and Child. Id. at pp. 85-87.
On July 8, 2020, there was a meeting among Mother,
Mother’s attorney, Mr. Bradford, and Child’s individual therapist.
Id. at p. 88. At this meeting, the Agency explicitly informed Mother
what must occur in order for her to be reunified with Child. Id.
Mother was informed that in order to move forward with
reunification, she would be required to acknowledge the past
abuse and to apologize to Child for what happened, for the
purpose of rebuilding trust with Child. Id. at pp. 88-89. Mother
was also told that for family therapy sessions to commence with
Mr. Bradford, she would be required to acknowledge and apologize
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for the abuse so that Child would feel comfortable attending family
therapy sessions with Mother. Id. at p. 99. While Mother initially
agreed to engage in reunification therapy with Child, during an
August 14, 2020 home visit, Mother recanted her agreement and
told the Agency that she would not write an apology letter because
she did not feel comfortable putting anything in writing. Id. at pp.
90-91.
At a September 3, 2020 meeting with Mr. Bradford, Child’s
individual therapist, and Mother, Mother was once again, explicitly
told that she needed to be honest with Child about the physical
abuse, and that she needed to apologize to Child. Id. at p. 91.
Mother purportedly replied that she had already agreed to
apologize to Child and that “she didn’t understand why the issue
was continuing to be brought up.” Id. at p. 92. On January 12,
2021, there was a virtual meeting among the Agency's clinical
team, Mother, and Mother’s attorney. Id. at p. 94. The Agency,
yet again, explained to Mother that she needed to acknowledge
the past abuse, provide Child with an apology, and provide
assurances to Child that it would not happen again. Id. At this
meeting, Mother indicated that if Laura Reynolds (“Ms.
Reynolds”), another family therapist at K/S Services, believed that
an apology was necessary to move forward, then Mother would
provide the apology. Id. at p. 94.
During a February 19, 2021 telephone call between Mother
and the Agency, it was reiterated that in order to move forward
with the goal of reunification, Mother needed to acknowledge the
abuse, apologize to Child, and assure Child that it would not
happen again. Id. at p. 95. Despite Mother stating that she was
ready to apologize, Mother failed to provide an apology to Child.
Id. Approximately one month later, on April 13, 2021, Mother
lamented “about how everybody wants her to apologize to [Child]
but no one... has ever apologized to her for the things that [have
been] said to her.” Id. at pp. 95-96.
On April 22, 2021, Child’s case was transferred to Deborah
Selby (“Ms. Selby”), a caseworker in the Agency’s permanency
division. Id. at pp. 134-35. At that point, the Agency was still
considering two options with regard to permanency for Child; that
is, reunification with Mother or adoption. Id. at p. 135. Ms. Selby
was also aware that the Agency was requiring Mother to
acknowledge and take ownership of the physical abuse that she
had directed toward Child. Id. at p. 137.
On April 29, 2021, Mother told Ms. Selby that she was not
to contact her by phone, and that instead, Ms. Selby should only
contact her via email, with Mother’s attorney copied on the
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communications. Id. at p. 138. Mother also banned Ms. Selby from
entering her residence. Id. At the time Ms. Selby took over the
case, Mother was scheduled for visitation once a week for four
hours, with family therapy facilitated by Ms. Reynolds to occur
during the last hour of the visit. Id. at pp. 139-40. In April 2021,
Mother attended three out of the four visitations offered. Id. at p.
141. From May 2021 to September 2021, Mother only attended
seven of the 20 visitation opportunities offered. Id.
In early May 2021, a conference was held among various
members of the Agency to discuss the direction of Child’s case,
since it had been nearly three years since Child had come into the
care of the Agency, and little progress toward reunification had
been made on the case. Id. at p. 170. On May 7, 2021, the Agency
sent an email to Mother’s attorney, indicating that the Agency
would support the goal of reunification if Mother “would agree to
acknowledge, take ownership of the abuse, apologize to [Child]
and reassure her that this abuse would not occur again. (The
Agency) offered that this could be done in the presence of [Child's
guardian ad litem].” Id. at pp. 171-72. The Agency proposal was
articulated as follows:
Good Afternoon [Mother’s attorney]:
I have spoken with [the Agency] and I am authorized to
make the following proposal to you on behalf of your
client, [Mother].
For almost the entirety of this case, the Agency has
advised you and previous counsel in correspondence and
your client and her attorneys, during court proceedings,
that there were two things that [Mother] would need to
do for the Agency to support reunification with [Child].
The first was for her to unconditionally apologize to
[Child] for what she did. The second was to provide
assurances to [Child] that she would never do anything
inappropriate again. [Mother] was never willing to do so.
At this point in time the Agency prepares to make the
proposal one last time and here are the specifics:
1. An in-person meeting will be set up between
[Mother], [Child], [Child’s guardian ad litem] and
no one else at a neutral location.
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2. There will be no discussion, no questions, no
comments and no statements other than what
[Mother] will say to [Child].
3. [Child] will be told, before the meeting, that
[Mother] wants to say some things to her and it is
expected that she will listen.
4. [Child] will be told, before the meeting, that she
will be unable to ask any questions or make any
comments, as will her mother.
5. [Mother] will say the following and only the
following: “[Child] I have thought carefully and I
want to say two things to you — First, I am truly
sorry that I have hit you in the past. Second, I
promise that I will never hit you again with my
hands or anything else.”
6. After this statement is made, all parties will leave
the meeting.
If [Mother] is in agreement and follows through, the
Agency will recommend to the Court that [Child] be
returned to [Mother's] custody and that the case be
closed.
See Exhibit CY5. Mother’s counsel responded to the email that
Mother was unwilling to participate in the scenario proposed by
the Agency. N.T. 11/05/2021, p. 173. Thereafter, on August 30,
2021, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s Parental
Rights and Duties pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and ( 8)
of the Adoption Act.
While the Agency’s petition was pending, Mother continued
to be offered visits with Child. During a September 24, 2021
visitation between Mother and Child, Patricia Samuel (“Ms.
Samuel”), a case aide for the Agency, observed and memorialized
the following interaction between Mother and Child8:
[Mother] was on time for the visit. Upon this
worker's arrival, [Mother] and her two children,
[Child’s Sister] and [Child’s Brother] came
downstairs so that this worker could take them to
the supermarket.
While in the supermarket, [Mother] purchased food
and snacks for the children and the following
dialogue took place. [The Child who is the subject
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of these proceedings] said: I didn't get one.
Referring to a bag of donuts.
[Mother] replied: Where do you live? And then she
repeated: Where do you live?
[Child] replied: With you. [Mother] then replied:
No, you don’t. You live with [a foster family]. The
food that I’m buying are for them, referring to
[Child’s Sister] and [ Child’s Brother], because they
live with me. You should be asking [your foster
family] to buy your snacks because they are getting
child support from me along with money from the
Agency. Be grateful you’re getting this bag of
[donuts].
While on the way back, [Mother] mentioned an
upcoming TPR hearing, and the following dialogue
took place. [Mother] stated: [Child], do you want to
come back home with me or do you want to be
adopted? [Child] replied: Be adopted.
…
[Mother] replied: That’s okay. You go ahead and let
them adopt you. I bet the Agency didn't tell you
that when you are adopted, you won't see me or
your sister and brother again. You are running
around, acting like you are crazy and telling these
people that you are scared to come home. Did you
think about this -- do you think about how this is
affecting your sister and brother?
Okay. You keep listening to these people and letting
them tell you that if you are adopted you will be
able to see your mother and siblings. These people
don’t care about you, and I keep telling you that.
Oh, and just so you know, you are just a paycheck
to them. Wait until they adopt you and they are no
longer receiving money from you or the Agency. Do
you see how you are dressed now? Is that what the
fuck you want. Tell them be careful what they wish
for and you need to be careful of what you wish for.
Oh, and if you think that you are going to be
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adopted and still be able to come home--come to
my house, you got me fucked up. Since you don’t
give a fuck, guess what? I don’t give a fuck either.
[Ms. Samuel] said: [Mother], just so you know, I’m
going to have to document this conversation.
[Mother] replied: Go ahead. I don't give a fuck. I
want you to tell them exactly what I said. I might
write Debbie a letter.
When we arrived back to [Mother’s] house, [Child’s
Sister] was crying. Mother stated: Why are you
crying? Turn around and show your sister
[(referring to Child)] your tears. Do you see any
tears on her face?
[Child’s Sister]: Mommy, please give [Child] one
more chance. And [Mother] replied: I’m not keeping
[Child] from coming home. Why don't you ask her
why she’s not coming home.
[Child's Sister] replied: [Child] will you please
change your mind and come home? And [Child]
replied: Maybe. [Child's Sister]: Mommy, she said
maybe.
[Mother] replied: Is that answer good enough for
you? [Child’s Sister] replied: Yes. [Mother] said:
This will be the last visit. I do not want any more
visits.
[Ms. Samuel] asked [Child’s Sister] and [Child’s
Brother] to give their sister [(Child)] a hug and a
kiss. Once [Ms. Samuel and Child] left, [Ms.
Samuel] spoke to [Child] to help her unpack what
just happened. [Child] yelled out: No child should
be afraid to get hit by their mother.
This worker continued talking to [Child] and allowed
her to vent. This worker drove [Child] to McDonald's
and she ate dinner before returning to her foster
home.
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Upon arrival at the foster home, this worker briefed
[Child's foster mother] so that she could have a talk
with [Child] if necessary.
N.T. 11/05/2021, pp. 55-62.
Evidentiary hearings regarding the termination of Mother's
Parental Rights took place on November 5, 2021, January 24,
2022, March 30, 2022, and April 26, 2022.9 During the course of
the hearings, the Court heard evidence from Agency caseworkers,
social workers, a family therapist, a former foster parent, and
Mother.10 On May 12, 2022, this Court signed a Decree
terminating Mother's Parental Rights and Duties concerning Child.
On June 9, 2022, Mother filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the
Superior Court from our May 12, 2022 Decree.
____
2 18 Pa. C.S. § 4304(a)(1).
3 18 Pa. C.S. § 2701(a)(1).
4 Mother pled guilty to these charges on September 17, 2019. See
N.T. 11/05/2021, p. 80; see also Criminal Docket number CP-09-
CR-0002145-2019.
5 During this meeting, a miscommunication occurred between
Mother and Ms. Lorenz. During the meeting, Ms. Lorenz
referenced an incident where Child made statements about
wanting to harm herself. Ms. Lorenz made these statements with
the belief that the foster care agency had previously relayed this
information to Mother; however, it had not. Mother became
understandably upset and subsequently “accused Ms. Lorenz of
being a liar and that she was providing gross miscommunication
and that she did not want to work with her.” N.T. 11/05/2021, p.
77. Ms. Lorenz was subsequently removed from the case.
6 In addition to having an individual therapist and a family
therapist, Child received trauma-focused cognitive behavioral
therapy and wrap-around services from several different service
providers, beginning in October 2018. N.T. 11/05/2021, pp. 123-
27.
7Mother subsequently requested that Mr. Bradford be removed
because she felt “it was a waste of time, he was dragging his feet
with starting the family therapy sessions and that he didn't
communicate enough with her.” Id. at p. 86.
8 Mother has two additional children, a 4-year-old son and an 8-
year-old daughter, who are not in the custody or care of the
Agency.
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9 Mother sought, and was granted, a continuance of the January
24, 2022 Hearing because the individual who was to watch her
two younger children was exposed to COVID-19, and, as a result,
she did not have childcare. Mother failed to appear at the April 26,
2022 Hearing, apparently out of fear of being arrested on an
outstanding Domestic Relations bench warrant. N.T. 04/26/2022,
p. 5.
10 Mother participated in her direct examination at the March 30,
2022 hearing; however, she was not cross-examined by other
interested parties due to her failure to appear at the April 26, 2022
hearing. We further note that facts of record pertinent to the
needs and welfare of Child are recited throughout Sections IVb
and IVc of this Opinion, pages 14-22.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 1-10.
The orphans’ court granted the Agency’s termination petition pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother filed her Concise
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on June 9, 2022, and the
orphans’ court filed its Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on July 7, 2022.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for this Court’s review:
1. Did the trial court erroneously grant Bucks County Children &
Youth Social Services Agency's petition to involuntarily
terminate the parental rights of Appellant pursuant to 23 Pa.
C.S. § 2511(a)(2) when the Agency failed to prove the grounds
thereunder by clear and convincing evidence?
2. Did the trial court erroneously grant the Agency’s petition to
involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Appellant
pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(a)(5) when the Agency failed to
prove the grounds thereunder by clear and convincing
evidence?
3. Did the trial court erroneously grant the Agency’s petition to
involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Appellant
pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511(a)(8) when the Agency failed
to prove the grounds thereunder by clear and convincing
evidence?
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4. Did the trial court erroneously move its inquiry to the needs
and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) and
erroneously find that termination would best meet said needs
and welfare when the Agency failed to prove grounds for
involuntary termination of parental rights pursuant to the
grounds alleged under 23 Pa. C.S. § 2511(a)(2), ( 5) and ( 8)
by clear and convincing evidence?
5. Did the trial court erroneously find that the needs and welfare
of the child as contemplated under 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) were
best met by terminating the parental rights of Appellant?
Brief for Appellant at 5.
In support of her first claim, Mother states that she completed her
probation and has remedied the abuse which caused Child to be removed from
her care. She believes her reformation is evident in the fact that she is caring
for her other two children and “no abuse continues toward Child.” Brief for
Appellant at 15. She explains one of the therapists who had worked with the
family, Laura Reynolds, LCSW, testified that “she (Ms. Reynolds) did not want
to orchestrate an apology because it would not be true.” Id. (citing N.T.
3/30/22, at 85-86). Appellant stresses that Ms. Reynolds also testified Child
seems to enjoy Mother’s company and that she believed further family therapy
would be useful. Id. (citing N.T., 3/30/22 at 100, 114).
In her next two issues, Mother asserts the Agency failed to prove the
grounds for termination under Subsections (a)(5) and (8) of Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Mother reiterates that the reason for the Child’s removal, the physical abuse,
no longer exists. She also relies upon Ms. Reynolds’ observations that Child
was affectionate with her siblings during visits, did not appear fearful of
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Mother, and would benefit from additional therapy. Brief for Appellant at 17-
19.
In support of her final two issues, Mother posits the orphans’ court erred
when engaging in an analysis under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b), because the
Agency had failed to prove grounds for termination under Section 2511(a).
She argues that ending contact between Mother and Child and between Child
and her two siblings would fail to serve Child’s needs and welfare. Brief for
Appellant at 19-21.
This Court’s standard of review of a ruling on the
involuntary termination of parental rights is as follows:
[A]ppellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
require the appellate court to accept the lower court's inferences
or conclusions of law. ... An abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion “only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill will.” ... “We have previously emphasized our
deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings.” However, “[w]e must
employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to
determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by
competent evidence.”
In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (Pa. 2021) (citations omitted).
When considering a petition to terminate parental rights, an orphans’
court must balance a parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions
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concerning the care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child's
essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” Id., at 358. The
court also must consider Subsections 2511(a) and (b) independently:
Termination of parental rights is controlled by statute. See
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511[.] Our case law has made clear that
under Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, the focus is
on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated
in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s
conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does
the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant
to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major
aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close
attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing
any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (case citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court has explained:
[T]he burden of proof is upon the party seeking termination to
establish by “clear and convincing” evidence the existence of the
statutory grounds for doing so. “[C]lear and convincing evidence
is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty, and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in
issue.’”
In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d at 358 (citations omitted).
Where the orphans’ court terminates parental rights pursuant to
multiple subsections of the Adoption Act, this Court need only agree with the
orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section
2511(b), to affirm a termination of parental rights. In re Adoption of C.J.P.,
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114 A.3d 1046, 1050 (Pa.Super. 2015). As previously stated, the orphans’
court herein terminated Mother’s parental rights under Subsections
2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We will analyze the court’s decision to
terminate pursuant to Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as
follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
With regard to termination under Section 2511(a)(2), this Court has
determined:
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[T]he following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted).
“The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal[,] as well as incapacity to perform
parental duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citation
omitted).
[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to
conduct his [,or her] life in a fashion that would provide a safe
environment for a child, whether that child is living with the parent
or not, and the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported
by clear and competent evidence, the termination
of parental rights is justified.” “A parent's vow to cooperate, after
a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or
availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous.
Id. at 1105 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, we first address whether the orphans’ court abused
its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511(a)(2). The court has determined that Mother’s refusal to act in an
appropriate and reasonable parental capacity toward Child, and her refusal to
remedy the situation, has caused Child to have been without essential parental
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care. Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 15. The court notes that Mother
refused on three occasions to review and sign the Family Service Plan and
repeatedly “obstinately and inexplicably refused to provide the
acknowledgement, apology, and assurances necessary to promote rebuilding
trust with Child, so that a loving parent-child relationship could be promoted
and restored.” Id. at 16.2
The orphans’ court also stresses Mother’s refusal to cooperate with
school officials’ repeated requests to complete an evaluation has prevented
Child from having access to necessary educational services. Id. at 16-17.
The court concludes:
We heard no credible, reasonable explanations for Mother’s
failure to comply with the Agency’s proposed Family Service Plan,
her failure to acknowledge the abuse, her refusal to provide Child
with an apology, and her refusal to provide assurances to her
understandably anxious Child that it would not happen again. Nor
did we hear a reasonable explanation for Mother’s failure to sign
the educational evaluation forms so that Child has access to the
____________________________________________
2 Significantly, the orphans’ court explained:
We want to be clear that we are not holding that a parent
must necessarily follow every dictate of the Agency in order to
avoid termination of parental rights. In this case, the reunification
predicate of acknowledgement, apology, and assurance was a
reasonable consensus decision of mental health professionals
which was intended to address the clear needs and welfare of
Child- emotionally as well as physically. Mother’s continued failure
to cooperate with reasonable Agency directives was harmful to
Child in multiple significant ways, including Child’s needs for
stability and security, and for a relationship with Mother which
would be built upon a foundation of trust and love.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 16 n. 12.
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educational services she requires. Mother’s continued refusal to
perform even the most basic parental duties regarding Child has
been to the detriment of not only Child’s educational well-being,
but to her emotional health as well. Accordingly, based on the
evidence and testimony provided, and consistent with pertinent
statutory and decisional law, we found that there was ample
evidence which clearly and convincingly compelled us to terminate
Mother's parental rights as to Child, pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2).
Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 17.
Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. Ms.
Mullen testified that when she began working on this case in 2019, the primary
objective of her fellow caseworkers and her was reunification. Most vital to
this objective was Mother’s need to accept responsibility for the abuse she
perpetrated upon Child and to develop an understanding of the impact it had
had upon Child. N.T., 11/5/21 at 72-73. While the testimony of therapist
Laura Reynolds (N.T., 3/30/22, at 68-173) suggests that Mother did make
some progress toward reunification with Child, we agree with the orphans’
court, sitting as the factfinder, that Mother has failed to demonstrate
consistent improvement.3
____________________________________________
3 The orphans’ Court stated:
Ms. Reynolds expressed her opinion that during therapy sessions
she facilitated with both Mother and Child present, trust and
communication had improved in 2020-2021. Given Ms. Reynold’s
apparent view of her role as an advocate for Mother, and given
the overwhelming evidence which contradicted her opinion, we
found her testimony to be unpersuasive.
Orphans Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 20, n. 13.
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At meetings which occurred on February 1, 2019; March 15, 2019; April
25, 2019; June 21, 2019; December 13, 2019; and in a letter in April of 2020,
the Agency, through various caseworkers, attempted to have Mother review
and execute the Family Service Plan, although she refused. Id. at 65, 76-83.
Indeed, Mother admits “there were times throughout the pendency of this
matter when Mother refused to sign the Agency’s Family Service Plans.”
However, Mother makes numerous excuses for her refusals, including being
upset at learning Child had threatened to harm herself in one instance and
suffering from a migraine at another time. See N.T. 3/30/22, at 176-199;
Brief for Appellant at 7-8.
Mother also admits she sees no need to apologize according to what she
characterizes as a “pre-written script,” and instead claims she stated
repeatedly to caseworkers that she would apologize in a “therapeutic setting.”
Brief for Appellant at 9-10. She also represents that she would only apologize
if Ms. Reynolds thought an apology was necessary. N.T. 11/5/21, at 94.
Notwithstanding, Mother does not deny that she never made atonement. This
evinces that Mother continues to see her noncompliance as nothing more than
a refusal to follow a “script”; however, her inaction is a barrier to her ability
to move forward in developing a trusting and loving relationship with Child.
The record further demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and continued
neglect and refusal to comply with the Agency’s permanency goals, as well as
her failure to accept responsibility for her role in Child’s physical, mental and
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emotional injuries, have resulted Child being without essential parental care,
control, or subsistence necessary for her physical or mental well-
being. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
at 1272. Further, the conditions and causes of Mother’s neglect and refusal
cannot or will not be remedied. See id. Ms. Mullen testified that she believes
she and her colleagues did everything they could to work towards reunification
between Mother and Child. N.T. 11/5/21, at 97.
Indeed, Mother’s refusal to accept responsibility for her past actions and
repair her relationship with Child is reflected in her own arguments before this
Court. Mother posits that Child’s difficulties most likely stem from the
behavior of others, including the Agency and Child’s current foster parents.
Additionally, Mother suggests that Child may have suffered physical abuse
from someone else when she was four years old and that this abuse is
responsible for her anxiety. Mother also complains she was not granted a
concession to attend the final hearing in this matter virtually, because she
feared she would be arrested on an outstanding warrant related to child
support, which resulted in many aspects of “her side of the story” lacking in
the record.4 Brief for Appellant at 10-11.
____________________________________________
4We note that Mother presented her direct testimony at the March 30, 2022.
The orphans’ court rightly explained its reasons for continuing with the hearing
as follows:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We also do not find persuasive or relevant Mother’s repeated references
to the fact that she is parenting her other two minor children. This Court’s
focus herein is on the needs and welfare of Child whom she has plead guilty
to abusing, a crucial fact Mother is unwilling to acknowledge. The manner in
which Mother parents Child’s siblings is inapposite to a determination of
whether Mother has taken the steps necessary for reunification with Child.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the
orphans’ court in concluding Mother’s conduct warranted termination pursuant
to Section 2511(a)(2).
Next, we consider whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b). Section 2511(b)
focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best
serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child.” ... “Section 2511(b) does not explicitly
require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in
the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the
emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be
considered as part of our analysis.
____________________________________________
So I do want to say, though, it is very, very regrettable that
Mother chose—made an active choice not to be here today. And
at this point, everyone understand, the [c]ourt cannot be and will
not be complicit in the fugitive status of an individual, and that’s
what I was being asked to do, to allow her to testify virtually. That
would absolutely render the [c]ourt complicit in the fugitive
status. I will not do that.
N.T., 4/26/22, at 31.
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In re K.R., 200 A.3d at 969, 982 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation
omitted).
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, ... the
trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be
severed without detrimental effects on the child.
Id. (citation omitted).
The extent of any bond analysis necessarily depends upon the
circumstances of each, particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa.Super. 2008). A court should consider “whether a parent is capable of
providing for a child's safety and security or whether such needs can be better
met by terminating a parent’s parental rights.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d
517, 524 (Pa.Super. 2018).
In addition, our Supreme Court has stated “[c]ommon sense dictates
that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children
are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013). “In weighing the
difficult factors discussed above, courts must keep the ticking clock of
childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of years, and
we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” Id. at
269.
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Here, the orphans’ court found that Child has been in placement for over
three years and with her foster family since February of 2019. Child has
conveyed to her guardian ad litem a “steadfast desire” not to be returned to
Mother and a desire for her counsel to advocate for that outcome “any and
every way possible.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, filed 7/7/22, at 21 (citing N.T.,
11/05/21, at 30). Child considers her foster parents “mom and dad,” and
they support her in her schoolwork, ensure she receives medical treatments,
and enable her to build friendships. The orphans’ court also stressed the fear
Child harbors at the thought of being returned to Mother. Id. at 22. The
orphans’ court concluded:
Regrettably, the record is replete with clear and convincing
evidence that Mother has not made sufficient reasonable or
responsible strides toward adequately being able to parent Child.
Mother’s continued unwillingness and refusal to place Child’s
needs over her own, and to take the steps necessary to reunify
with Child, are of great concern. When these considerations are
taken into account, along with Child’s needs for permanence and
stability, this Court is constrained to firmly conclude that it is in
the best interests of Child to grant the Agency’s Petition to
Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights.
Opinion at 22-23.
The certified record supports the orphans’ court conclusion
that termination was proper under Subsection 2511(b). Mother admittedly
has refused to cooperate with the Agency in furthering the goals set forth in
the Family Service Plan, and instead she has made numerous excuses for her
refusal to apologize to Child for her past conduct. Rather than work toward
fostering a bond with Child, Mother’s words and actions have caused
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dissension as is evidenced by the profanity-laced exchange documented by
Ms. Samuel; during a supervised visit, Mother refused to purchase the snacks
for Child as she was buying for her other children, told Child that she is only
a source of money for her foster parents, and placed the blame for Child’s
situation and that of her siblings squarely on Child’s shoulders. N.T., 11/5/21,
at 54-62.
Furthermore, in lieu of ensuring Child’s educational potential is
maximized, Mother has inexplicably thwarted school officials’ attempts on
multiple occasions to put her in a proper placement, which would necessitate
testing her as a gifted child. N.T. 11/5/21, at 184-187.
Finally, Child is happy with her current foster family who has provided
for her educational, medical, physical, and emotional needs and has
attempted, unsuccessfully, to work with Mother to facilitate visitation and
phone calls. Id. at 192, 200, 204. The family continues to be an adoptive
resource for Child. Id. at 192; N.T., 3/30/22, at 7. On this record, we
conclude the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in
finding termination of Parents’ parental rights was consistent with Child's
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant
to Section 2511(b).
Accordingly, because we conclude that the orphans' court did not abuse
its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights to Child
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pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the Decree of the orphans’
court.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/4/2022
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