Case: 20-60429 Document: 00516496893 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/05/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 5, 2022
No. 20-60429 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Rafael Gomez-Vargas,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A205 635 840
Before Clement, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
This immigration case presents two issues: First, whether the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in concluding that additional
evidence proffered by Petitioner Rafael Gomez-Vargas was not likely to
change the outcome regarding his application for cancellation of removal.
Second, whether this court has jurisdiction to review Gomez-Vargas’s
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-60429
challenge to the BIA’s determination that he was ineligible for cancellation
of removal. We hold that the BIA did not err in denying the motion to remand
to consider the new evidence and that this court does not have jurisdiction to
review the BIA’s cancellation of removal determination.
I.
Gomez-Vargas, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United
States in 1989 near Hidalgo, Texas, without being admitted or paroled by an
immigration officer. In 2012, he was served with a notice to appear charging
him with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He admitted
the allegations and conceded he was removable as charged. Gomez-Vargas
then filed an application for cancellation of removal, claiming that his
removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for his five
United States citizen children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). 1
The immigration judge (“IJ”) held a hearing on Gomez-Vargas’s
application for cancellation of removal. To demonstrate hardship, Gomez-
Vargas discussed his three children who still lived at home, detailing their
academic performances, their struggles with his pending removal, and his
desire to provide for them as the sole breadwinner of his family. He explained
that his detention was especially difficult for his youngest child and that his
children would suffer hardship if he were removed because they have never
been cared for by another person. Gomez-Vargas worried that his family
would lose their home if he were removed. He also testified that he was
responsible for part of his older son’s college tuition and indicated his belief
that his removal would make it impossible for his children to continue their
1
In order to be eligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1), a petitioner
must demonstrate “that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”
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studies. Finally, Gomez-Vargas expressed concern regarding his children
visiting him in Mexico since he believes the country is dangerous and
children are frequently kidnapped. Gomez-Vargas’s 18-year-old son testified
about his father’s support and the hardship he would suffer if his father were
removed.
The IJ issued a written decision denying Gomez-Vargas’s application.
While the IJ found that he had been present in the United States for the
requisite time, had proved he was of good moral character, and had no
disqualifying convictions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), she ultimately
determined that Gomez-Vargas was ineligible for cancellation because he
failed to prove that his children would experience exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship if he were removed. The IJ acknowledged that his children
“would suffer on some level,” but determined that Gomez-Vargas did not
show that the hardship would be substantially beyond the hardship ordinarily
associated with any departure. The IJ noted that Gomez-Vargas’s children
are healthy and do not currently suffer from medical issues, though she
acknowledged that Gomez-Vargas’s youngest child was “especially
impacted” by the removal proceedings. Additionally, the IJ found that
Gomez-Vargas failed to demonstrate that he could not support his family by
working in Mexico, that he could not communicate with them by telephone,
or that his children could not visit him in Mexico. Accordingly, the IJ denied
the application for cancellation of removal and ordered Gomez-Vargas
removed to Mexico.
Gomez-Vargas appealed the IJ’s order to the BIA, asserting that the
IJ legally erred by failing to consider all of the evidence and that the evidence
established his family would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship if he were removed. Additionally, he moved to remand to allow the
IJ to consider new evidence of his daughter’s enlistment in the military and
more recent information about crime and violence in Mexico. He asserted
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that these changed circumstances would likely change the outcome of the
case by demonstrating the requisite hardship.
The BIA adopted the decision of the IJ, dismissed the appeal, and
denied the motion to remand. The BIA agreed that Gomez-Vargas failed to
demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children,
noting that the “hardship standard is a high threshold.” In denying the
motion to remand, the BIA determined that Gomez-Vargas had not
established how the new evidence would specifically impact his children
upon his removal and therefore had not demonstrated that the additional
evidence was likely to change the outcome of the case. Gomez-Vargas filed
a timely petition for review following the BIA’s decision. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(1).
II.
A. Motion to Remand
This court reviews the denial of a motion for remand under the highly
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Milat v. Holder, 755 F.3d 354, 365
(5th Cir. 2014). The BIA abuses its discretion if its decision is “capricious,
racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so
irrational that it is arbitrary.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Gomez-Vargas contends that the BIA abused its discretion in
determining that the new evidence presented in his motion to remand would
not change the outcome in his case. He asserts that the evidence of his
daughter’s enlistment in the military and the dangerous conditions in Mexico
were substantial factors that would likely change the outcome. Gomez-
Vargas suggests that the IJ’s conclusion that his daughter could visit him in
Mexico is “now untenable” considering her enlistment. He states that she
would be a target for violence if she traveled to Mexico. He also asserts that
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the State Department’s travel advisories regarding danger in Mexico show
that his children would not be able to visit the area where he would reside.
Although the evidence of his daughter’s enlistment in the United
States military and the new travel advisories concerning his home region in
Mexico could prevent his children from visiting him, these facts would not
establish a finding of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his
children beyond the disruption of family relationships that would occur in the
ordinary case. See In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 61–62 (BIA
2001). Accordingly, the BIA’s decision is not utterly without foundation,
and the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Gomez-Vargas’s motion
to remand. See Zhao, 404 F.3d at 303–04.
B. Jurisdiction
Next, we turn to Gomez-Vargas’s contention that the BIA erred in
holding that he failed to meet his burden to show that his removal would
cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for his five children.
Congress has circumscribed judicial review of the discretionary relief process
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which strips the court of jurisdiction to
review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under § 1229b.
Recently, the Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction-stripping
provision “prohibits review of any judgment regarding the granting of relief
under § 1255 and the other enumerated provisions.” Patel v. Garland, 142
S. Ct. 1614, 1622 (2022). Because § 1229b is one of the enumerated
provisions, this court has no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination
that Gomez-Vargas’s removal would not result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship for his children. Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland, 43 F.4th 477,
481 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (“Patel makes clear that the [Board’s]
determination that a citizen would face exceptional and extremely unusual
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hardship is an authoritative decision which falls within the scope
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and is beyond our review.”).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the petition for review for
lack of jurisdiction as to whether Gomez-Vargas met his burden under
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) for cancellation of removal. We otherwise DENY the
petition.
Respondent’s pending motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is
DENIED AS MOOT.
DISMISSED IN PART; DENIED IN PART.
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