IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
PINE RIVER LANE TRUST, A NEVADA No. 83703
TRUST,
Appellant,
vs.
HSBC BANK USA N.A., AS TRUSTEE ON
FILED
BEHALF OF ACE SECURITIES CORP. oui 11 2012
HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2007-HE1
ELWABETH DRO,NN
ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH F SU
CERTIFICATES, A NATIONAL DEPU lERX
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion
to dismiss in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Gloria
Sturman, Judge. Reviewing the order de novo, Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N.
Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008), we affirm.'
In dismissing appellant's complaint, the district court assumed
that a February 2010 Notice of Default was sufficient to trigger NRS
106.240's 10-year limitations period but concluded that an October 2010
Notice of Rescission effectively reset that period. After this appeal was
docketed, this court decided SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank,
'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument
is not warranted.
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N.A., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d 194 (2022), which, as appellant
acknowledges, is consistent with the district court's reasoning.2
Nonetheless, appellant contends that it should have been
allowed to conduct discovery into whether respondent's predecessors
accelerated the loan either before or after the October 2010 Notice of
Rescission. We are not persuaded that the district court abused its
discretion in denying appellant's request. See Aviation Ventures, Inc. v.
Joan Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005) (reviewing a
district court's refusal to allow discovery for an abuse of discretion).
Contrary to appellant's interpretation SFR, we held that a Notice of
Rescission was effective to reset any acceleration that may have occurred
before the Notice of Default. See SFR, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d at
197 ("Thus, we reject SFR's argument that some prior unidentified
acceleration remained intact after the bank rescinded the notice of
default."). And to the extent that appellant articulated its desire to conduct
discovery into whether there was an acceleration after the Notice of
Rescission that would have also implicated NRS 106.240's 10-year time
frame, the district court was well within its discretion to deny that request.
See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) ("District
courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing
2 InSFR, the deed of trust beneficiary made a superpriority tender,
such that the deed of trust remained as an encumbrance following the
HOA's foreclosure sale. 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d at 196. In this case,
the record is unclear why the HOA's foreclosure sale did not extinguish the
deed of trust.
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expeditions." (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.3
Parraguirre
j. Sr.J.
Herndon Gi
cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge
Persi J. Mishel, Settlement Judge
Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd.
Houser LLP
Eighth District Court Clerk
3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the
decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.
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