UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4622
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN CABRAL, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt,
Senior District Judge. (7:08-cr-00052-BR-1)
Submitted: February 5, 2013 Decided: February 27, 2013
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Cabral, Jr., appeals the twenty-four month
statutory maximum sentence imposed by the district court upon
revocation of his term of supervised release. On appeal, Cabral
contends that the district court’s sentence was procedurally
unreasonable. * Finding no error, we affirm.
The district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). Thus, we
assume “a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of [that] discretion,” United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and will affirm unless the sentence is “plainly
unreasonable” in light of the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors. 461 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We must “first decide whether the sentence is
unreasonable.” Id. at 438. In doing so, “we follow generally
the procedural and substantive considerations” employed in
reviewing original sentences. Id. A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court has considered the advisory
*
Cabral does not challenge the substantive reasonableness
of the sentence
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policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (USSG) and the applicable § 3553(a) factors,
id. at 439, and has adequately explained the sentence chosen,
though it need not explain the sentence in as much detail as
when imposing the original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
If we determine that the sentence is not unreasonable, we will
affirm. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
Applying our deferential standard of review, we
conclude that Cabral’s sentence was not unreasonable, much less
plainly so. A revocation sentence is designed not to punish the
defendant for the crime underlying the supervised release
revocation but to punish the defendant’s failure to abide by the
terms of his supervised release. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438; USSG
ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2012). Moreover, the
district court has “broad discretion to . . . impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its broad discretion in imposing
the statutory maximum of twenty-four months’ imprisonment upon
revocation of Cabral’s term of supervised release.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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