Filed 2/25/13 P. v. Jamison CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D060805
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD222182)
HOWARD JAMISON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura W.
Halgren, Judge. Affirmed.
A jury convicted Howard Jamison of the first degree murder of 83-year-old Ewing
Scroggs in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (undesignated statutory
references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified). The jury found true an
allegation that Jamison personally used a deadly weapon (a knife) within the meaning of
section 12022, subdivision (d), and also found true a special circumstance allegation that
he committed the murder while engaged in the commission of a burglary (§ 460) within
the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
At trial, the court denied a mistrial motion Jamison brought after a witness—Jim
Rapuano, Jamison's former probation officer in Connecticut—twice volunteered the
statement, in the presence of the jury, that Jamison had "an extensive criminal record."
After denying Jamison's new trial motion, which was also based on the probation
officer's volunteered statements about Jamison's criminal history, the court sentenced him
to life in prison without the possibility of parole plus a one-year prison term enhancement
for the true finding on the personal use of a knife allegation.
Jamison appeals, contending the court's denial of his mistrial motion "irreparably
damaged" his federal constitutional right to a fair trial and constituted reversible error
because Rapuano's improper disclosure that Jamison had an extensive criminal history
was "incurably prejudicial" as it was "too dramatic for jurors to ignore." We conclude
the court did not abuse its discretion or violate Jamison's federal constitutional right to a
fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The People's Case
On December 10, 1989, relatives went to Scroggs's home to check on him, as he
had not answered his phone or shown up for Sunday dinner. They found Scroggs dead
under a mattress in one of the bedrooms of his two-bedroom house in the Pacific Beach
area of San Diego. The relatives called the police and waited outside.
2
A deputy medical examiner for the County of San Diego testified that Scroggs had
been beaten in the face and chest and stabbed once in the back. Scroggs had suffered
significant internal injuries associated with the stab wound and the blunt force trauma of
the beating. All the injuries were inflicted at about the same time. The cause of death
was the loss of blood from a knife penetrating a kidney and the main vein returning to the
heart.
Scroggs's niece testified she tried to call her uncle over the weekend, but he did
not answer. She testified that Scroggs, who had been a widower for a couple of years,
was "pretty meticulous" and "kept everything in its place." She also said he always
carried cash in his wallet, put his car in the garage every night, closed the curtains of the
house, and locked the doors. At the time of his death he lived alone, and she never knew
him to take in boarders or transients.
The police found no sign of forced entry. Scroggs was found in the bedroom
floor, lying on his side with his head almost up against the wall by the top of the bed and
partially covered by the mattress, which was off the bed. Things in the bedroom were
knocked over, which a detective interpreted as evidence of a struggle. Drawers were
pulled out, the storage doors were open, and the room looked ransacked. Scroggs's front
right pants pocket was partially pulled out. The police found his wallet, which contained
no cash or credit cards, on a dresser. One of the relatives who discovered Scroggs told
the police she picked the wallet off the floor and placed it there. A red stain was on the
bedroom door, and another was on a dresser drawer.
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Police found a Marlboro cigarette butt on the floor of the rear bathroom. A
kitchen counter drawer with silverware was partially open, and a butcher knife with a
bloodstain was found in the kitchen sink. Blood samples were collected by evidence
technicians, as were the butcher knife, several latent fingerprints, and the Marlboro
cigarette butt.
The retired detective who had been in charge of the crime scene testified it looked
like someone had originally committed burglary by entering the house to steal property,
but confronted and killed Scroggs, making the crime a robbery and a murder. After some
investigation, however, the case went cold in early 1990.
In 2003 a detective in the cold case unit reviewed the case and submitted three
bloodstains from the crime scene for DNA analysis. A sample taken from the dresser
drawer in the second bedroom was found to be from an unknown male who was not
Scroggs. The DNA profile from that sample was entered into the national Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS) database to which every crime lab is connected.
In 2009 the blood sample from the dresser drawer was tested again, this time using
the most up-to-date DNA analysis that looked at 15 different markers. After the results
of this updated analysis were entered into CODIS, the DNA was determined to match
Jamison, whose DNA had been entered into the CODIS database by the Connecticut
Department of Public Safety. Additional testing showed that the blood on the butcher
knife was from Scroggs, and the DNA on the Marlboro cigarette butt matched Jamison.
The positive results from the drawer and the cigarette butt were later confirmed through a
mouth (buccal) swab DNA sample taken from Jamison in August 2009.
4
In August 2009 Jamison was arrested in Milford, Connecticut, by FBI Agent Allan
Vitkosky, who interrogated Jamison and obtained the buccal swab DNA sample from
him. After he was told why he was being arrested and after he waived his Miranda1
rights, Jamison admitted he was in San Diego about 20 years earlier, hanging out by
himself in the Mission Beach area and panhandling because he did not have a job, and
also admitted he turned himself in for "jump[ing] probation." He denied ever being in
Scroggs's home, and denied committing the murder. Agent Vitkosky testified that
Jamison later started going into some hypotheticals and told the agent that—if he (1) had
been in a house in San Diego where he was not supposed to be, (2) did not know whether
an old man lived there, (3) left his DNA there by touching or dropping something like a
cigarette butt, and (4) then ran out of the house after seeing "something gruesome"—that
would not mean he killed somebody.
B. The Defense Case
The defense presented no evidence.
DISCUSSION
Jamison's sole contention on appeal is that the court's denial of his mistrial motion
irreparably damaged his federal constitutional right to a fair trial and constituted
reversible error because Rapuano's improper disclosure that Jamison had an extensive
criminal history was "incurably prejudicial" as it was "too dramatic for the jurors to
ignore." This contention is unavailing.
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
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A. Background
Jamison had an extensive criminal history, including at least seven prior felony
convictions from various states. The prosecutor brought an in limine motion seeking to
introduce under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), evidence of some of those
prior convictions, including convictions for residential burglary and assault on an elderly
victim, to show identity, common plan or scheme, and intent to stab Scroggs. After
hearing argument and taking the matter under submission, the trial court excluded the
prior bad acts evidence. However, the court ruled that evidence of Jamison's outstanding
warrant was admissible to show he was in San Diego during the relevant time period and
to show he was extradited back to Connecticut.
Prior to the testimony of Jamison's half-brother, Jeff Jamison; his Connecticut
friend, Jay Sparks; and Rapuano, his former probation officer in Connecticut—all of
whom were familiar with Jamison's criminal past—the court told the prosecutor to
caution the witnesses not to volunteer information about Jamison's criminal history.
During the cross-examination of Rapuano, defense counsel asked him whether he
remembered a specific date, and Rapuano responded, "Counsel, I can't give dates. Mr.
Jamison has an extensive criminal record—." (Italics added.) The court interrupted
Rapuano's answer and admonished him to listen to the question asked and answer yes or
no.
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel asked Rapuano about a certain timeframe
following Jamison's extradition to Connecticut, and the following exchange took place:
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"Q: From the time that—between the time that he came from San
Diego and January 23rd of 1990, Mr. Jamison did not live at Orange
Avenue, correct?
"A: He lived intermittently at Orange Avenue.
"Q: I am asking you, from the period of December 12 to January 23
of 1990, did he live at Orange Avenue?
"A: That, I'm not certain of.
"Q: You know that he was brought back to Connecticut in custody,
right?
"A: Yes.
"Q: And he stayed in custody once he got back to Connecticut,
right?
A: Um-hmm.
"Q: Is that a 'yes'?
"A: Well, he made bond at one point. [¶] Your Honor, if I could
have some leverage [sic] on these questions because he has an
extensive criminal record—." (Italics added.)
Interrupting Rapuano again, the court asked him to "please stop" and immediately
sent the jury out of the courtroom. The court then inquired as to whether the prosecutor
had properly admonished Rapuano prior to his testimony, and the prosecutor replied that
she had "admonished him a hundred percent," just as she had admonished Jeff Jamison
and Sparks, and she specifically told Rapuano that if the only way he could truthfully
answer a question was to refer to Jamison's criminal history, he should say he needed to
refer to something in his report, and the prosecutor would then request a sidebar to get a
ruling from the court.
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Accepting the prosecutor's representation, the court admonished Rapuano that he
was in violation of the court's rulings and needed to refrain from volunteering such
information. The court then reiterated the specific areas that Rapuano could not address,
stating, "You must not refer to incarceration. You must not refer to prior convictions or
any other information relating to criminal history other than the limited portion relating to
the absconding and then extradition on the warrant."
Rapuano explained to the court he had made the statement because it was
extremely difficult to answer questions regarding specific dates as Jamison had multiple
probation violations and escapes from custody and from mental health institutions, and
the document to which Rapuano had access was not specific as to dates of dispositions.
The court instructed Rapuano he should answer that he did not have the information.
1. Denial of Jamison's mistrial motion
Following further discussion, defense counsel requested a mistrial. The trial court
denied the request but informed defense counsel it would give a cautionary instruction to
the jury and stated it believed it had already stricken the testimony.
Stating, "[J]ust so we don't get into more issues," the court permitted defense
counsel to examine Rapuano at an Evidence Code section 402 hearing so that counsel
could ask him any remaining questions and elicit whether he knew the answers. During
the hearing, Rapuano was unable to clearly testify as to defense counsel's previous
question regarding whether Jamison was in custody during a particular timeframe. The
court ruled that further questioning as to that issue would open the door to details about
Jamison's criminal history during the time period of December 1989 through 1991, which
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included a burglary, contempt of court, and escape from custody. The court then asked
defense counsel whether it should say anything further about striking Rapuano's reference
to Jamison's criminal history or give a cautionary instruction at the end of trial instead.
Defense counsel requested a cautionary instruction at the end of trial, stating, "I don't
want to draw further attention to the issue."
When the jurors returned, the court told them, "The last answer of the witness
prior to excusing the jury will be stricken. The jury is to disregard that."
Later, shortly before the lunch break and out of the presence of the jury, the court
invited defense counsel to craft a suggested limiting instruction for the court to read to
the jury at the close of trial.
2. Renewal and denial of Jamison's mistrial motion
When the proceedings recommenced after the lunch break, defense counsel
renewed the motion for a mistrial, claiming a curative instruction would not fix the
problem but, instead, would highlight the issue and further prejudice Jamison. The
prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that "the situation was rectified" when the court
interrupted Rapuano, whose answer "tailed off" following his reference to Jamison's
criminal record, and when the court "quickly cured to the jury and stated 'please disregard
anything.' "
The court again denied Jamison's mistrial motion, indicating that some sort of
limiting instruction might be appropriate. The court suggested adding to the instruction
regarding the limited use of the evidence pertaining to Jamison's absconding from
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probation, an instruction that any other information relating to criminal history be
disregarded.
3. Limiting instruction
During the discussion regarding jury instructions, defense counsel changed his
mind and requested a limiting instruction. The court later instructed the jury with the
following modified version of CALCRIM Nos. 303 and 375:
"During the trial, certain evidence related to Defendant's connection
with the criminal justice system was admitted for the limited purpose
of proving his presence in San Diego on December 11, 1989, and
subsequent extradition back to Connecticut. [¶] Do not consider
this evidence for any other purpose. Do not conclude from this
evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to
commit crime. [¶] This evidence is not sufficient by itself to prove
that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime or allegations. The
People must still prove the charge and allegations beyond a
reasonable doubt. [¶] Do not consider any other evidence of
criminal history for any purpose." (Italics added.)
4. Denial of Jamison's new trial motion
At the sentencing hearing, the court addressed the issue again in the context of a
defense motion for a new trial. In denying the motion, the court stated that Rapuano's
reference to Jamison's extensive criminal history was "essentially nonresponsive[]"
during defense questioning that was "a difficult area for [Rapuano] to correctly testify to
without addressing [Jamison's] criminal history." The court added:
"[U]nder the circumstances and the way it developed, by
immediately sending the jury out, discussing the matter with the
witness, then striking the testimony and later giving a curative
instruction at the end of the case, I feel that the court did everything
it could do, and I don't think that those statements were prejudicial
given the overall context of the case and the evidence." (Italics
added.)
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B. Applicable Legal Principles
"'A motion for mistrial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court [and
]should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice [it deems] incurable by admonition
or instruction.'" (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 953.) "'Whether a particular
incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is
vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.'" (People v. Jenkins
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 986.)
Thus, "[w]hether in a given case the erroneous admission of [evidence of the
defendant's prior criminality] warrants granting a mistrial or whether the error can be
cured by striking the testimony and admonishing the jury rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court." (People v. Harris (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1575, 1581, citing People v.
McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 113.)
"A trial court should grant a mistrial only when a party's chances of receiving a
fair trial have been irreparably damaged, and we use the deferential abuse of discretion
standard to review a trial court ruling denying a mistrial." (People v. Silva (2001) 25
Cal.4th 345, 372.)
C. Analysis
We are guided by the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Bolden
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 515 (Bolden). At trial in that murder case, the prosecutor asked a
police officer a question about the defendant's address, and the officer answered, "It was
at the Department of Corrections parole office located at—." (Id. at p. 554.) The
prosecutor interrupted the officer's testimony and redirected his attention to the question
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the prosecutor had asked. (Ibid.) Later, outside the presence of the jury, the defense
moved for a mistrial on the ground the witness's reference to a parole office was very
prejudicial to the defendant because it implied he had suffered at least one prior felony
conviction for which he had served a state prison sentence. (Id. at pp. 554-555.) At the
hearing on the motion, the prosecutor assured the trial court he had warned the witness on
three occasions not to refer to the parole office, and he was "taken by surprise" when the
witness mentioned the parole office. (Id. at p. 555.) In denying the mistrial motion, the
trial court found there was insufficient prejudice to warrant a mistrial because the
reference to the parole office was unlikely to make a lasting impression on the jury. (Id.
at p. 555.) The Supreme Court held in Bolden that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that the defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial had not been
irreparably damaged because the witness's reference to the parole office was brief, the
prosecutor interrupted the witness's testimony before he could complete the answer, and
"[t]he incident was not significant in the context of the entire guilt trial." (Ibid.)
Similarly here, like the officer who testified in Bolden, Rapuano briefly answered
a question in a manner that allowed the jury to learn that Jamison had a criminal record.
As in Bolden, the prosecutor had admonished the witness not to divulge such
information. When Rapuano twice referred briefly to Jamison's criminal history, the
court took steps above and beyond those taken in Bolden to cure any possible prejudice to
the defense. Specifically, when Rapuano first mentioned Jamison's criminal history, the
court immediately interrupted his answer and admonished him to listen to the question
asked and answer yes or no.
12
When Rapuano briefly mentioned Jamison's criminal history a second time, the
court again immediately cut him off, excused the jury, admonished Rapuano, held an
Evidence Code section 402 hearing to prevent any additional references to Jamison's
criminal record in front of the jury, and then brought the jurors back and told them
Rapuano's "last answer" was stricken and they were to "disregard" it.
In addition to the foregoing effective steps the court promptly took to cure any
potential prejudice to the defense, the court later instructed the jury not to consider
evidence of Jamison's criminal history "for any purpose" except for "the limited purpose
of proving his presence in San Diego on December 11, 1989, and subsequent extradition
back to Connecticut." " 'A jury is presumed to have followed an admonition to disregard
improper evidence particularly where there is an absence of bad faith. [Citations.] It is
only in the exceptional case that "the improper subject matter is of such a character that
its effect . . . cannot be removed by the court's admonitions." ' " (People v. Olivencia
(1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1391, 1404, quoting People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 924,
934-935; see also People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 953 [upholding the trial court's
denial of a defense mistrial motion, explaining that "[i]n the context of erroneously
offered polygraph evidence, we have held that a trial court's timely admonition, which the
jury is presumed to have followed, cures prejudice resulting from the admission of such
evidence"], disapproved on another point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421,
fn. 22.)
We are persuaded this case is not exceptional. The record is devoid of any
showing of bad faith. As noted, the court took many curative measures and, in any event,
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the jury permissibly knew from the testimony of Jamison's former probation officer in
Connecticut—Rapuano—that he had some sort of criminal record and had absconded
from probation before he was arrested in San Diego in December 1989. We conclude the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jamison's mistrial motion.
Even if we were to conclude the court erred, we would also conclude any such
error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Jamison's guilt discussed,
ante, in the factual background. For example, the evidence showed Jamison's DNA was
found both in a bloodstain on Scroggs's dresser and on the Marlboro cigarette butt
collected from Scroggs's home. In addition, Jamison's half-brother, Jeff Jamison,
testified that Jamison had told him he had murdered someone in California. Jeff Jamison
also testified that Jamison smoked Marlboro cigarettes, the brand of the cigarette found at
the crime scene. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NARES, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
McDONALD, J.
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