UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4784
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT FINCH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00644-MBS-1)
Submitted: February 14, 2013 Decided: February 28, 2013
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kimberly
H. Albro, Research & Writing Specialist, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Jamie Lea Schoen, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Finch appeals the life term of supervised
release, to include substance abuse and mental health treatment,
imposed on remand for resentencing for failing to register as a
sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). We affirm.
A term of supervised release is reviewed for
reasonableness. United States v. Preston, F.3d , ,
2013 WL 431951, at *12 (9th Cir. 2013). Finch first argues that
his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
court failed to explain its imposition of the term of supervised
release. We disagree. A district court must provide an
individualized assessment of its selected sentence; failure to
do so constitutes procedural error. United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328-29 (4th Cir. 2009). The explanation is
sufficient so long as it permits this court to conduct a
meaningful review. United States v. Bell, 667 F.3d 431, 442
(4th Cir. 2011). The district court here provided sufficient
explanation to permit meaningful appellate review. We thus
conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable.
Finch next asserts that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable because it subjects him to the possibility of
substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment for life.
Because “[d]istrict courts have broad latitude to impose
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conditions on supervised release,” we review those conditions
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182,
186 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
district court may impose any condition that is “reasonably
related” to the applicable sentencing factors. Id. at 186. The
conditions must not, however, “involve[] [a] greater deprivation
of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3583(d)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012); United States v. Dotson,
324 F.3d 256, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2003). We conclude that,
contrary to Finch’s arguments, both conditions are reasonably
related to the applicable sentencing factors and neither
involves a greater deprivation of liberty than that which is
reasonably necessary. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s judgment subjecting Finch to a life term of
supervised release, including the conditions that he participate
in substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment, as
directed.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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