Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
June 29, 2012 Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice
144360 Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
Stephen J. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway
____________________________________ Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra,
CITY OF ROOSEVELT PARK, Justices
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v SC: 144360
COA: 302674
Muskegon CC: 10-047282-AA
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
SYSTEM OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2011
order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).
I concur in the majority’s order denying leave to appeal. I write separately only to
note that I find Malleis v Employment Security Comm, 340 Mich 78 (1954), which
plaintiff relies on heavily, to be of questionable value. Indeed, Hajduk v Revere Copper
& Brass, Inc, 268 Mich 220 (1934), an opinion that Malleis quoted with approval, was
expressly overruled by Autio v Proksch Constr Co, 377 Mich 517, 526, 535 (1966)
(describing Hajduk as a “blatantly erroneous interpretive decision”). Malleis judicially
created a six-year limitations period where the Legislature had created none. More
recently, this Court has consistently applied statutes as they are written and has declined
to add statutory-like provisions when the Legislature has not created such provisions. As
this Court has explained, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is
not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute
itself.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63, 66 (2002) (declining to add a
requirement to object to any deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed
in a medical malpractice action because “[i]n the absence of such a statutory requirement,
we do not have the authority to create and impose an extrastatutory affirmative duty on
the defendant”); see also People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 121 (1999) (declining to add a
2
requirement to conduct a blood alcohol test within a “reasonable time” because
“[n]owhere does the [pertinent statute] impose a requirement concerning the interval of
time in which the test must be given”). Therefore, I question the continuing validity of
Malleis.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
June 29, 2012 _________________________________________
h0626 Clerk