Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
Stephen J. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway
Mary Beth Kelly
Brian K. Zahra
FILED MAY 15, 2012
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
DOREEN JOSEPH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 142615
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, a/k/a A.C.I.A,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MARY BETH KELLY, J.
We granted defendant Auto Club Insurance Association’s bypass application for
leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision
of MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) of the
no-fault act. The one-year-back rule is designed to limit the amount of benefits
recoverable under the no-fault act to those losses occurring no more than one year before
an action is brought. Plaintiff here is seeking to recover no-fault benefits for losses
dating back 32 years before she brought her action. In denying defendant’s motion for
partial summary disposition, the circuit court relied on Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins
Co 1 to hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule. In
Regents, this Court held that a saving provision that tolls a statute of limitations also
prevents application of the one-year-back rule. Regents overruled Cameron v Auto Club
Ins Ass’n 2 and Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 3 which had held that the saving
provisions at issue only tolled a statute of limitations, not statutes limiting damages.
We once again hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses
only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-
back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered. These
distinctions were recognized in Michigan law both in Cameron as well as several
decisions of this Court that predate Cameron. Yet this Court’s decision in Regents
conflated these distinct concepts in order to effectuate what the Regents majority believed
was a broader social good served by expanding the right to recover benefits beyond those
allowed by law. We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and
take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But Regents
itself simply failed to apply our then recent decision in Cameron, resulting in a decision
that patently failed to enforce the requirements of the statutes that it interpreted. Because
the holding in Regents contravened the Legislature’s clear and unambiguous language in
MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Regents is overruled and we reinstate
1
Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010).
2
Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).
3
Liptow v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 272 Mich App 544; 726 NW2d 442 (2006).
2
Cameron. Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court for entry of an order
granting defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition on the basis of the one-year-
back rule.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 1977, then 17-year-old plaintiff, Doreen Joseph, was involved in an
automobile accident in which she suffered traumatic brain injury and quadriplegia. At
the time of the accident, plaintiff had automobile insurance coverage through the Detroit
Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, defendant’s predecessor. Defendant later
assumed responsibility for paying plaintiff’s personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits.
Since the date of plaintiff’s injury, defendant has paid more than $4 million in PIP
benefits for plaintiff’s care.
On February 27, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking additional PIP benefits
for allegedly unpaid case-management services provided by plaintiff’s family members.
The period for which plaintiff seeks recovery dates back to the date of plaintiff’s accident
in 1977. Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), arguing that the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) barred plaintiff’s
claim with respect to benefits sought for any period more than one year before the
February 27, 2009, commencement date of plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff responded that her
“insanity” over the past 32 years had operated to toll the one-year-back rule pursuant to
the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1). 4
4
The circuit court held that there exists a question of fact regarding whether plaintiff is
“insane” for purposes of MCL 600.5851(1). That determination is not at issue in this
appeal.
3
The circuit court denied defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, citing
Regents for the proposition that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-
back rule and, thus, if plaintiff is determined to be “insane,” her recovery will not be
limited to the year immediately preceding the filing of her complaint. Defendant filed an
interlocutory application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals and then filed a
bypass application for leave to appeal in this Court, arguing that the minority/insanity
tolling provision does not apply to the one-year-back rule and that Regents was wrongly
decided. We entered orders staying the circuit court proceedings 5 and granting
defendant’s bypass application to consider whether Regents was correctly decided. 6
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s decision whether to grant or deny
summary disposition. 7 Similarly, we review de novo issues of statutory interpretation as
questions of law. 8 Our primary goal when interpreting statutes is to discern the intent of
the Legislature. 9 To do so, we focus on the best indicator of that intent, the language of
the statute itself. 10 The words used by the Legislature are given their common and
5
Joseph v ACIA, 802 NW2d 351 (Mich, 2011).
6
Joseph v ACIA, 489 Mich 924 (2011).
7
Nastal v Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1
(2005).
8
Id.
9
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001).
10
Id.
4
ordinary meaning. 11 If the statutory language is unambiguous, we presume that the
Legislature intended the meaning that it clearly expressed, and further construction is
neither required nor permitted. 12
Defendant moved for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Because a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint,
the circuit court must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
other evidence submitted by the parties, MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion. 13 If the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine
issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. 14
11
MCL 8.3a; Veenstra v Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 160; 645 NW2d 643
(2002).
12
Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999).
13
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
14
MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (G)(4); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547
NW2d 314 (1996).
5
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE ONE-YEAR-BACK RULE AND THE MINORITY/INSANITY
TOLLING PROVISION
This case requires that we again interpret the limitations on recovery of PIP
benefits set forth in the no-fault act. The relevant statutory provision of the no-fault act,
MCL 500.3145(1), provides in pertinent part:
An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits
payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be
commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the
injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to
the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has
previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the
injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action
may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent
allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred.
However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss
incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was
commenced.[15]
As early as 1984, this Court explained that this statutory provision contains
separate and distinct limitations periods that relate both to the timing in which an action
may be brought and the damages that may be recovered. 16 Specifically, we have noted
that MCL 500.3145(1)
contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one limitation on the
period for which benefits may be recovered:
“(1) An action for personal protection insurance [PIP] benefits must
be commenced not later than one year after the date of accident, unless the
15
Emphasis added.
16
Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 576; 365 NW2d 170 (1984).
6
insured gives written notice of injury or the insurer previously paid [PIP]
benefits for the injury.
“(2) If notice has been given or payment has been made, the action
may be commenced at any time within one year after the most recent loss
was incurred.
“(3) Recovery is limited to losses incurred during the one year
preceding commencement of the action.”[17]
Accordingly, a person filing a claim for PIP benefits must do so within a year of the
accident unless the insured gives written notice of injury or previously received PIP
benefits from the insurer. If notice was given or payment was made, the action can be
commenced within one year of the most recent loss. In any case, though, recovery is
limited only to losses that have been incurred during the year before the filing of the
action.
The final limitation provided in MCL 500.3145(1) is the limitation on damages
known as the one-year-back rule. In Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, we discussed the
significance of the legislative distinction between statutes of limitations and provisions
that limit damages, noting that
although a no-fault action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than
one year after the accident and more than one year after a particular loss has
been incurred (provided that notice of injury has been given to the insurer
or the insurer has previously paid PIP benefits for the injury), § 3145(1)
nevertheless limits recovery in that action to those losses incurred within
the one year preceding the filing of the action.[ 18]
17
Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), quoting
Welton, 421 Mich at 576.
18
Devillers, 473 Mich at 574; see also Howard v Gen Motors Corp, 427 Mich 358, 385-
387; 399 NW2d 10 (1986) (opinion by BRICKLEY, J.).
7
Our Legislature has also independently established, in the Revised Judicature Act
(RJA), 19 a general tolling provision in order to aid those who are minors or legally
insane. The minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) extends the time for
filing suit by tolling an otherwise applicable statute of limitations. 20 MCL 600.5851(1)
provides in relevant part:
[I]f the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under
this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim accrues, the
person or those claiming under the person shall have 1 year after the
disability is removed through death or otherwise, to make the entry or bring
the action although the period of limitations has run.
Notably, by its unambiguous terms, this provision concerns when a minor or person
suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the action,” and the provision is
entirely silent with regard to the amount of damages recoverable once an action has been
brought. 21
B. CAMERON AND ITS PROGENY
We first considered the interplay between the one-year-back rule and the
minority/insanity tolling provision in Cameron. 22 In Cameron, the plaintiffs’ minor son
sustained a closed head injury when an automobile struck his bicycle in 1996. Six years
19
MCL 600.101 et seq.
20
See Lambert v Calhoun, 394 Mich 179, 181, 192; 229 NW2d 332 (1975).
21
This is a point that is only relevant to statutes like the no-fault act that contain a unique
one-year-back rule, which limits the right of recovery to damages incurred during the
year before commencement of the action.
22
Cameron, 476 Mich 55.
8
later, in 2002, the plaintiffs filed suit against their no-fault insurer to recover PIP benefits
for attendant-care services rendered from 1996 to 1999. The plaintiffs argued that the
minority/insanity tolling provision applied to toll the one-year-back rule, rendering
recoverable the losses incurred between 1996 and 1999. We disagreed, holding that the
minority/insanity tolling provision does not operate to toll the one-year-back rule. We
explained in Cameron:
By its unambiguous terms, MCL 600.5851(1) concerns when a
minor or person suffering from insanity may “make the entry or bring the
action.” It does not pertain to the damages recoverable once an action has
been brought. MCL 600.5851(1) then is irrelevant to the damages-limiting
one-year-back provision of MCL 500.3145(1).[23]
That is,
the minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1), by its plain
terms, only addresses when an action may be brought. Therefore, it does
not apply to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because that
provision does not concern when an action may be brought but, instead,
limits the amount of PIP benefits a person injured in an automobile accident
may recover.[ 24]
In reaching this conclusion, we overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision in Geiger
v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 25 which held that MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one-
year-back rule. 26 The Geiger panel reasoned that reading the statute in a contrary fashion
23
Id. at 62.
24
Id. at 72.
25
Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch,114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982).
26
By overruling Geiger, the dissent contends that “the Cameron majority upended 25
years of settled law . . . .” Post at 2. Aside from the fact that such “settled law” was a
Court of Appeals decision and thus not binding on this Court, the dissent disregards the
fundamental principle that not all precedents are deserving of equal respect. Geiger
9
would “severely limit the utility” of the minority/insanity tolling provision “and could
deprive a person of benefits to which he would otherwise be rightfully entitled.” 27 This
Court held that Geiger’s conclusion was not supported by the statutory texts and
contravened the Legislature’s unambiguous directives, compelling its overruling. As
Cameron explained:
[W]e must assume that the thing the Legislature wants is best
understood by reading what it said. Because what was said in MCL
500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) is clear, no less clear is the policy.
Damages are only allowed for one year back from the date the lawsuit is
filed. We are enforcing the statutes as written. While some may question
the wisdom of the Legislature’s capping damages in this fashion, it is
unquestionably a power that the Legislature has under our Constitution.[ 28]
ignored the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1)
and was, instead, grounded on its own speculative policy considerations. Because
Cameron closely analyzed the actual statutory language and did not allow policy
considerations to dictate the result, it is simply deserving of more regard. Thus, Cameron
did not “upend 25 years of settled law”; stated in more accurate terms, the Cameron
majority was compelled to overrule nonbinding precedent premised on a faulty legal
analysis.
Contrary to the dissent, our conclusion that Cameron is “better reasoned” is not an
altogether subjective determination. Instead, it is based on a straightforward reading of
both Cameron and Geiger, which, even the dissent can hardly deny, would lead almost
any reader to conclude that Cameron is focused principally on the statutory language in
dispute, while Geiger is focused principally on policy considerations. Because such
statutory language constitutes the best indicator of legislative intent, we believe that
Cameron is “better reasoned.” Although we appreciate that our dissenting colleagues are
free to disagree with this assessment, judgments nonetheless must be made. And we have
sought to exercise our own best judgment in assessing the precedents before us.
27
Geiger, 114 Mich App at 291.
28
Cameron, 476 Mich at 63 (citation omitted).
10
After our decision in Cameron, the Court of Appeals in Liptow 29 applied
Cameron’s reasoning to hold that separate tolling provisions for state political
subdivisions 30 do not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule. The panel
reasoned that the plain statutory text of MCL 600.5821(4) indicates that the Legislature
intended to exempt the state from statutes of limitations when bringing an action to
recover public funds. As in Cameron, the Court recognized that the one-year-back rule is
not a statute of limitations, but a damages-limiting provision. Accordingly, because
MCL 600.5821(4) does not address damages limitations, the Court of Appeals
determined that it has no effect on the one-year-back rule. 31 Thus, Liptow held that while
a political subdivision may bring an action at any time pursuant to MCL 600.5821(4), it
cannot recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than one year before the
date on which the action was commenced.
C. REGENTS
Four years after Cameron and Liptow, in Regents, this Court again considered
whether a saving provision tolling a statute of limitations similarly tolls the one-year-
29
Liptow, 272 Mich App 544.
30
See MCL 600.5821(4), which provides in pertinent part:
Actions brought in the name of . . . any political subdivision of the
state of Michigan . . . for the recovery of the cost of maintenance, care, and
treatment of persons in hospitals . . . are not subject to the statute of
limitations and may be brought at any time without limitation, the
provisions of any statute notwithstanding. [Emphasis added.]
31
Liptow, 272 Mich App at 555-556.
11
back rule. 32 In Regents, the plaintiffs brought an action seeking payment from the
defendant insurer for the full cost of medical treatment provided to the defendant’s
insured who had been treated at the university’s hospital following an automobile
accident. The circuit court held that the one-year-back rule barred the plaintiffs from
recovering any portion of the loss incurred more than one year before commencement of
the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In a narrowly divided decision, this Court
reversed the decisions of the lower courts and overruled the recent decisions in Cameron
and Liptow, holding, in part, that the minority/insanity tolling provision does, in fact, toll
the one-year-back rule. The Regents Court, essentially adopting the dissenting position
from Cameron, held that “the ‘action’ and ‘claim’ preserved by [the minority/insanity
tolling provision] include the right to collect damages” because “the right to bring an
action would be a hollow one indeed if a plaintiff could not recover damages.” 33
According to Regents, the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) is inapplicable to a
statute that preserves a plaintiff’s right to bring an action. That is, because MCL
600.5851(1) preserves the rights of minors and insane persons by granting them one year
after their disabilities have been removed to bring their civil actions, MCL 600.5851(1)
precludes application of the one-year-back rule.
Three justices strongly dissented from the decision to overrule Cameron and erase
the long-recognized distinction between statutes of limitations and the damages-limiting
32
Regents, 487 Mich 289.
33
Id. at 299.
12
provision of the no-fault statute. The dissenting justices explained that because the one-
year-back rule “serves only as a limitation on the recovery of benefits” and “does not
define a period within which a claimant may file a cause of action,” the one-year-back
rule “lies outside the scope of what is affected by the RJA’s minority/insanity tolling
provision.” 34 By holding to the contrary, the dissenting justices concluded that the
majority had failed to enforce as written the unambiguous language of the one-year-back
rule, and had attempted instead to “discern the purpose of the statute from something
other than its actual language.” 35
D. REGENTS WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
We believe that the ruling in Regents was erroneous for the simple reason that the
statutory texts of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) plainly do not support it.
MCL 600.5851(1) gives minors and insane persons one year after the removal of their
disabilities “to make the entry or bring the action.” By its very terms, the
minority/insanity tolling provision is a timing mechanism specifying when a minor or
insane person may bring his or her claim; it places no limitation on, and makes no
reference to, the amount of damages that can be recovered after the action has been
brought. The one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1), on the other hand, forecloses a
claimant from recovering “benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year
before the date on which the action was commenced.” By its very terms, then, the one-
34
Id. at 333 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting).
35
Id. at 336.
13
year-back rule is a damages-limiting provision because it limits a claimant’s recovery to
those losses incurred during the year before the filing of the action.
By concluding that the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1)
operates to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1), Regents failed to recognize
the critical distinction between having the general right to commence an action and the
limitation on the right to recover no-fault benefits for losses occurring more than one year
before the filing of the action. Indeed, Regents impermissibly interpreted the phrase
“bring the action” in MCL 600.5851(1) as conferring on a claimant the right to “bring the
action and recover an unlimited amount of damages,” an interpretation which cannot be
extracted from the plain and unambiguous statutory text. The dissenting justices in
Regents recognized this distinction, contrasting the one-year-back rule, which provides
that the claimant “may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than
1 year before the date on which the action was commenced,” with MCL 600.5821(4),
which provides that an action by the state or one of its political subdivisions “may be
brought at any time without limitation.” The dissenting justices in Regents properly
observed:
[W]hen these two provisions are read together, it is clear that while a
political subdivision may bring an action at any time, it cannot recover
benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the
date on which the action was commenced. In other words, MCL
600.5821(4), which pertains only to when an action may be commenced,
does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which only
limits how much can be recovered after the action has been commenced.[36]
36
Id. at 339.
14
This interpretation is merely an extension of the same legal rationale applied in Cameron,
in which the Court distinguished the plain language of the one-year-back rule from the
plain language of the minority/insanity tolling provision.
Again, the rules of statutory interpretation mandate that we give effect to the
Legislature’s intent, relying on the plain language of the no-fault statute itself. If the
statutory language is unambiguous, we must presume that the Legislature intended the
meaning it clearly expressed and further construction is neither required nor permitted. 37
As is evident from its holding, the interpretation advanced by Regents superseded the
Legislature’s explicit intent that recovery of PIP benefits be limited to losses incurred
within one year before the date on which an action is filed. The statutory provision
containing the one-year-back rule employs plain, clear, and simple language. The
minority/insanity tolling provision sets forth an equally simple concept, tolling the time
in which an action may be commenced after a person’s disability is removed. This
tolling provision, however, is silent regarding the amount of damages a claimant may
recover and, accordingly, there is no support for the conclusion that that minority/insanity
tolling statute precludes application of the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule. Because
Regents reached such a conclusion, it was wrongly decided.
Application of the Regents Court’s interpretation of the one-year-back rule to this
case illustrates how that decision defeats the very purpose of the rule. Under Regents,
plaintiff would be permitted to recover PIP benefits for those losses incurred during the
32 years predating the filing of her action on February 27, 2009, in addition to those
37
Sun Valley Foods, 460 Mich at 236.
15
losses incurred after that date and continuing for the remainder of her life. Permitting
recovery in that manner ignores the plain language of the one-year-back rule, which
limits plaintiff’s recovery to those losses incurred within one year before February 27,
2009, while still allowing additional recovery for all losses incurred after that date.
Although the minority/insanity tolling provision may certainly toll myriad statutory
provisions that contain a statute of limitations, it cannot toll the one-year-back rule of
MCL 500.3145(1) because the one-year-back rule is not a statute of limitations in that it
does not limit the period of time within which a claimant may file an action; rather, the
one-year-back rule places a limitation on the amount of damages a claimant is entitled to
recover. Furthermore, the one-year-back rule does not serve those purposes typically
associated with a statute of limitations because it does not operate to cut off a claim or
bar the action or the recovery; it simply limits the compensation available to the
claimant. 38 Because the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule and the RJA’s
38
The dissent characterizes our interpretation of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL
600.5851(1) as “tend[ing] toward the absurd.” Post at 4.
There is no need for this Court to address the “absurd results” doctrine in this case
because there is simply no result here that is absurd. Indeed, the dissent’s argument that
this construction produces an absurd result was fully considered and rejected in Cameron.
As reiterated by the dissenting justices in Regents, “‘[i]n choosing to make no-fault
insurance compulsory for all motorists, the Legislature has made the registration and
operation of a motor vehicle inexorably dependent on whether no-fault insurance is
available at fair and equitable rates.’” Regents, 487 Mich 346-347, (MARKMAN, J.,
dissenting), quoting Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 599; 267 NW2d 72
(1978) (alteration in original). It therefore bears repeating that it is certainly quite
possible that in a system that provides mandatory unlimited lifetime benefits, the
Legislature intended to impose a limitation on recovery of no-fault benefits in order to
make no-fault insurance affordable. This limitation is not only sensible, but necessary for
the survival of no-fault system.
16
minority/insanity tolling provision serve manifestly different purposes and function
independently of each other, the one-year-back rule is not the subject of tolling under the
minority/insanity tolling provision. And this proper interpretation comports both with the
plain language of the statute and the legislative purpose of keeping insurance premiums
at affordable rates while providing victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate,
and prompt reparation for certain economic losses. 39
E. STARE DECISIS
Having concluded that Regents was wrongly decided, we must decide whether
stare decisis nevertheless compels our adherence to its holding. The test for determining
whether stare decisis compels the continued adherence to a precedent is set forth in
Robinson v Detroit 40 and calls for us to examine, among other factors, “(a) whether the
Insofar as the dissent asserts that it “defies common sense” to think “[t]hat the
Legislature wanted to grant a minor or insane person the right to prove his or her
damages in a court of law while lacking any opportunity to be awarded them,” post at 4,
we note that the statutory language plainly does not confer on a claimant a right to prove
and recover an unlimited amount of damages. Instead, the plain language merely confers
a right, under certain circumstances, to bring an action despite the period of limitations
having expired. The dissent utterly fails to recognize that the one-year-back rule does not
operate to preclude a claimant from recovering any damages; rather, a claimant will find
himself or herself without any recovery as a result of the one-year-back rule’s operation
only if the claimant has not suffered any losses within the one year immediately
preceding the filing of the action. Contrary to the dissent, “that this result will occur
‘only’ in some circumstances,” post at 4 n 11, hardly constitutes our only response to its
claim of “absurdity.” As previously explained, it is possible that the Legislature chose to
impose a limitation on the recovery of no-fault benefits to ensure the financial integrity of
the no-fault system. See also Regents, 487 Mich at 346-347 (MARKMAN, J. dissenting).
39
See, e.g., Tebo v Havlik, 418 Mich 350, 366; 343 NW2d 181 (1984); Celina Mut Ins
Co v Lake States Ins Co, 452 Mich 84, 89; 549 NW2d 834 (1996); O’Donnell v State
Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 547; 273 NW2d 829 (1979).
40
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464-468; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
17
earlier decision was wrongly decided, and (b) whether overruling such decision would
work an undue hardship because of reliance interests or expectations that have arisen.” 41
First, as discussed previously, Regents was wrongly decided for the simple reason
that it ignored the Legislature’s clear and unambiguous directives in MCL 500.3145(1)
and MCL 600.5851(1) by failing to enforce these statutory provisions as written. Rather
than grounding its analysis on the proper and historically accepted interpretation of the
one-year-back rule, the Regents decision appears to have focused on the majority’s
concern that a plaintiff allowed to bring a suit under the minor/insanity tolling provision
would be precluded by the one-year-back rule from recovering all the damages that might
otherwise be permitted outside the no-fault context. However, it is the Legislature’s
enactment of the no-fault act’s one-year-back rule that operates to limit the recovery of
damages incurred more than one year before an action is commenced, not our
interpretation of the minority/insanity tolling provision.
With regard to reliance interests, “the Court must ask whether the previous
decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s
expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-
world dislocations.” 42 In discussing this factor, the Regents Court explained: “Cameron
is of recent vintage, having been decided a mere four years ago. Hence, reliance on its
41
Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757; 641 NW2d 567 (2002), citing
Robinson, 462 Mich at 464-468; see also Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600, 627-628;
94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
42
Robinson, 462 Mich at 466.
18
holding has been of limited duration.” 43 Regents is of even more recent vintage than was
Cameron, having been decided a mere 21 months ago. Certainly, Regents has not
“become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone’s expectations that to
change it would produce . . . practical real-world dislocations” 44 such that reliance
interests will be disrupted. While we view the duration of a decision from this Court as
important, we believe the foremost indicator that reliance interests weigh in favor of
overruling Regents is the plain language of the statutes because it is the unambiguous
statutory text that guides the citizenry and their behavior. “This is the essence of the rule
of law: to know in advance what the rules of society are.” 45 As we have explained:
[I]f the words of the statute are clear, the actor should be able to
expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried out by all in society, including
the courts. In fact, should a court confound those legitimate citizen
expectations by misreading or misconstruing a statute, it is that court itself
that has disrupted the reliance interest. When that happens, a subsequent
court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of
stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s misconstruction. The
reason for this is that the court in distorting the statute was engaged in a
form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to the bedrock principle of
American constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power is reposed in
the people as reflected in the work of the Legislature, and, absent a
constitutional violation, the courts have no legitimacy in overruling or
nullifying the people’s representatives.[ 46]
43
Regents, 487 Mich at 305.
44
Robinson, 462 Mich at 466.
45
Id. at 467.
46
Id.
19
Because Regents strayed considerably from the statutory language, it undermined
the reliance interest that the people of this state have with regard to that language and
with regard to a Court that is committed to upholding such language. As a result, it is this
Court’s duty to restore such reliance interests by restoring the law to mean what its
language plainly states—a no-fault “claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of
the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was
commenced.” 47
The one-year-back rule codifies an integral part of the legislative compromise that
is the no-fault act, and invalidating that compromise will threaten the continued fiscal
soundness of our no-fault system. Given that Michigan is the only state with a no-fault
automobile-injury reparations scheme with mandatory, unlimited, lifetime medical
benefits, the Legislature adopted a unique approach to defining the temporal limitations
for filing suit without allowing open-ended liability or time-barring claims before they
accrue. The Legislature addressed this problem by enacting the one-year-back rule,
which limits recovery to losses incurred within one year before suit was filed. Thus, the
creation of MCL 500.3145(1) was the Legislature’s reasonable and simple approach to
resolving the problem of allowing a reasonable amount of time for pursuing a claim while
protecting the fiscal integrity of the no-fault system. However, under the Regents
interpretation of the one-year-back rule, not only is a claimant permitted to recover those
losses incurred after the date on which the action was filed, but recovery also extends to
those losses incurred any number of years before the filing date. Permitting a claimant to
47
MCL 500.3145(1).
20
recover all losses incurred both before and after an action is filed, without any limitation,
would nullify this legislative compromise and render the no-fault system unsustainable.
For these reasons, we overrule Regents and “return the law, as is our duty, to what
we believe the citizens of this state reading these statutes at the time of enactment would
have understood [them] to mean.” 48 We are mindful of the importance of stability and
continuity in the law and approach with great caution a decision to overrule precedent,
but to allow the interpretation of MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1) set forth in
Regents to stand would result in the endorsement of a decision that utterly failed to
enforce the requirements of the very statutes it purported to interpret.
Because the plain and unambiguous language of MCL 500.3145(1) can only be
interpreted as limiting the amount of PIP benefits recoverable to those losses incurred
within one year before the date the lawsuit is filed, which was the same interpretation
advanced by the Cameron majority, we reinstate our previous decision in Cameron.
F. APPLICATION
In this case, plaintiff filed her complaint on February 27, 2009, seeking recovery
of PIP benefits for losses dating back 32 years. While plaintiff contends that, in light of
her alleged insanity, the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule,
rendering any losses incurred from the date of plaintiff’s 1977 accident recoverable, we
conclude otherwise. The minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1), which
concerns when an action may be commenced, does not render inoperable the one-year-
back rule, which only limits how much can be recovered after the action has been
48
Robinson, 462 Mich at 468.
21
commenced. Consequently, the one-year-back rule does not fall within the purview of
what is intended to be tolled by the minority/insanity tolling provision. Accordingly,
plaintiff’s recovery is limited to losses incurred on or after February 27, 2008.
IV. CONCLUSION
The minority/insanity tolling provision in MCL 600.5851(1) does not apply to toll
the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because the one-year-back rule is a damages-
limiting provision and does not concern when an action may be brought. These two,
distinct statutory provisions serve different purposes and by their express language
operate separately. Because the decision in Regents ignored the plain statutory directive,
it is hereby overruled and Cameron is reinstated. 49 Accordingly, we reverse the decision
of the circuit court denying defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition and
remand this case to that court for entry of partial summary disposition in defendant’s
favor.
Mary Beth Kelly
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Brian K. Zahra
49
The Regents Court overruled Liptow on the sole basis that it relied on Cameron.
Because Cameron has now been reinstated, the justification for overruling Liptow is no
longer controlling law.
22
STATE OF MICHIGAN
SUPREME COURT
DOREEN JOSEPH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 142615
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, a/k/a A.C.I.A.,
Defendant-Appellant.
MARILYN KELLY, J. (dissenting).
Today’s decision is this Court’s third ruling on the same issue in six years. Yet
nothing accounts for its going back and forth on the issue—no new or revised legislation
or social upheaval—except changes in the composition of the Court itself.
The majority overrules Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co 1 and reinstates the
rule from Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n. 2 Cameron changed 25 years of settled law 3
and held that the saving provision in MCL 600.5851(1) for minors and insane persons
does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1). I
authored the majority opinion in Regents and continue to believe that it correctly decided
this issue. Thus, I would reaffirm our decision in Regents and respectfully deplore its
demise.
1
Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich 289; 791 NW2d 897 (2010).
2
Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).
3
See Geiger v DAIIE, 114 Mich App 283; 318 NW2d 833 (1982).
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, MCL 600.5851(1) is not “entirely silent
with regard to the amount of damages recoverable once an action has been brought.” 4
Rather, as I stated in Regents:
MCL 600.5851(1) does not create its own independent cause of
action. It must be read together with the statute under which the plaintiff
seeks to recover. In no-fault cases, for example, MCL 600.5851(1) must be
read together with MCL 500.3145(1). Doing so, the statutes grant infants
and incompetent persons one year after their disability is removed to “bring
the action” “for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits . . . for
accidental bodily injury . . . .” On the basis of its language, MCL
600.5851(1) supersedes all limitations in MCL 500.3145(1), including the
one-year-back rule’s limitation on the period of recovery.[ 5]
The majority correctly asserts that our decisions predating Cameron recognized
that MCL 500.3145(1) contains two limitations on the time for filing suit and one
limitation on the period of recovery. 6 It attempts to use that uncontroversial point,
however, to characterize Cameron as an uncontroversial, predetermined, and
straightforward application of our precedent. The characterization is inaccurate.
The significant point is that Cameron was the first decision in which this Court
recognized the distinction between the limitations in MCL 500.3145(1) and applied them
differently. In so doing, the Cameron majority upended 25 years of settled law and drew
a distinction that even the defendant did not initially ask it to draw. 7 These simple facts
4
Ante at 8.
5
Regents, 487 Mich at 298.
6
See ante at 6-7, citing Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 574; 702 NW2d
539 (2005), and Welton v Carrier Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 576; 365 NW2d 170 (1984).
7
See Cameron, 476 Mich at 88-90 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant
initially argued that MCL 600.5851(1) should not apply to any of the limitations in MCL
2
call into doubt the majority’s contentions that Cameron was “compelled to overrule
nonbinding precedent” 8 and that Regents “ignored the Legislature’s clear and
unambiguous directive[] in MCL 500.3145(1) . . . .” 9 If the Legislature’s directive were
truly so clear and unambiguous, why did the prevailing interpretation of MCL
500.3145(1) go unchallenged for nearly 25 years?
500.3145(1), but that the defendant eventually devised the alternative argument that, even
though MCL 600.5851(1) saved the plaintiff’s right to file suit, the one-year-back rule
nevertheless prevented the plaintiff from recovering any damages that were incurred
more than a year before the date of filing suit).
8
Ante at 10 n 26. The majority also repeats a theme originating from Justice
MARKMAN’s concurrence in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 226;
731 NW2d 41 (2007) (MARKMAN, J., concurring), that “not all precedents are built alike”
because some are “better reasoned.” See ante at 9 n 26. I have no doubt the majority
believes that all of its decisions overruling previous cases are better reasoned than its
predecessors’; otherwise, overruling those cases would seem foolish indeed. But any
establishment of a hierarchy of precedents is inherently flawed because whether one
decision is better reasoned than another is “undoubtedly in the eye of the beholder.”
Regents, 487 Mich at 303 n 28. Given the subjective nature of this “better reasoned”
inquiry, such an approach would serve no purpose other than to shield the majority’s
allegedly better-reasoned precedents from scrutiny.
The majority claims that this inquiry is not subjective because, given that
Cameron focused principally on the statute’s language, not “policy considerations,” it is
objectively “better reasoned” than Geiger. Even accepting the majority’s
characterization, this assertion is flawed. An objective person reading an absurd decision
that is based on a seriously strained reading of statutory language (Cameron) might
reasonably find a contrary decision primarily focused on “policy considerations” (Geiger)
to be “better reasoned.” The majority’s disdain for policy considerations in favor of a
focus on statutory language that it inevitably determines is “clear and unambiguous”—
even when it is not—does not an objective determination make.
Finally, it appears that, unlike the majority, the Legislature did not consider
Geiger to be “premised on a faulty legal analysis.” Ante at 10 n 26. It did not supersede
Geiger by amending the applicable statutes from 1982 to 2006.
9
Ante at 18.
3
As observed by the dissenting opinions in Cameron, the majority’s interpretation
of MCL 600.5851(1) and MCL 500.3145(1) in Cameron and this case tends toward the
absurd. 10 That the Legislature wanted to grant a minor or insane person the right to prove
his or her damages in a court of law while lacking any opportunity to be awarded them
defies common sense. Yet under the Cameron regime restored today, many claims
supposedly “saved” by MCL 600.5851(1) will be disposed of in precisely that fashion.11
This result creates a false promise. I cannot conclude that the Legislature intended such a
promise.
I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule Regents and reinstate the rule
from Cameron that MCL 600.5851(1) does not preclude application of the one-year-back
rule in MCL 500.3145(1). I would hold that MCL 600.5851(1) saves a minor or insane
person’s “claim,” which includes the right to recover all of his or her personal protection
insurance benefits.
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
Diane M. Hathaway
10
Cameron, 476 Mich at 103 n 12 (CAVANAGH, J., dissenting); id. at 109-130 (KELLY, J.,
dissenting).
11
The majority’s response to this obvious absurdity is that it will “only” occur if the
injured person has suffered no losses in the year preceding the filing of the action. The
majority’s speculation that this result will occur “only” in some circumstances does
nothing to undercut its absurdity. And it will provide cold comfort for those caught in
this judicially created trap.
4