United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-20724
Summary Calendar.
Daniel Joseph LUKEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Wayne SCOTT, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Dec. 21, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Joseph Luken appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court dismissing
as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 his claim that his confinement in administrative segregation
violates his due process rights. We have jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I.
On April 25, 1995, Luken filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wayne Scott and
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Luken alleged that Scott willfully maintained false
information in Luken's prison file concerning Luken's membership in a prison gang, the Aryan
Brotherhood; that on the basis of that information, Luken was confined in administrative segregation;
and, that because of his custody status, he has been unable to accrue additional good-time credits to
accelerate his eligibility for parole.
On June 8, 1995, the district court ordered Luken to furnish a more definite statement of
facts. Responding to the court's order, Luken conceded that he received a hearing within ten days
after being placed in administrative segregation; that he was afforded the opportunity to make a
statement at the hearing; and, that a classification review board reviewed his status every ninety days.
In its order dismissing Luken's complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the district
court concluded that Luken had failed to demonstrate that he had a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest in his custody status. In addition, the district court held that, even if he did possess such a
interest, Luken had received all the process due him. This timely appeal followed.
II.
This case is not about the deprivation of good-time credits previously earned by Luken. Cf.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Gotcher v. Wood, 66
F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.1995). Rather, Luken contends that the mere opportunity to earn
good-time credits constitutes a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to trigger the
protection of the Due Process Clause. We disagree.
In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme
Court held that a prisoner's liberty interest is "generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while
not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2295, 132 L.Ed.2d at 430
(citations omitted). The Court held that the prisoner's "discipline in segregated confinement did not
present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty
interest." Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2295, 132 L.Ed.2d at 431. Sandin establishes that Luken's
administrative segregation, without more, does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally
cognizable liberty interest. See also Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir.1995)
(holding that no liberty interest is implicated by placement in administrative segregation); Gothcher,
66 F.3d at 1101 (remanding for determination whether placement in disciplinary segregation imposed
"atypical and significant" hardship on prisoner sufficient to create liberty interest).
Luken responds that the effect of his custodial status has been to reduce his opportunity for
earning good-time credits that could lead to a shortened time in prison, which is a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. In Sandin, the Court rejected a similar argument, noti ng that Conner's
confinement in disciplinary segregation would not "inevitably" affect the duration of his sentence since
the decision to release a prisoner on parole "rests on a myriad of considerations." Id. at ----, 115
S.Ct. at 2302, 132 L.Ed.2d at 431-32. Indeed, the Court concluded that the possibility that Conner's
confinement in disciplinary segregation would affect when he was ultimately released from prison "is
simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause." Id. at ----,
115 S.Ct. at 2302, 132 L.Ed.2d at 432.
The loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole, is
a collateral consequence of Luken's custodial status. Yet, such speculative, collateral consequences
of prison administrative decisions do not create constitutionally protected liberty interests. See
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2540 n. 8, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (noting
that possible effect on paro le decision does not create liberty interest in confinement in particular
prison). Any of a host of administrative or disciplinary decisions made by prison authorities might
somehow affect the timing of a prisoner's release, but such effects have never been held to confer a
constitutionally protected liberty interest upon a prisoner such that the prison authorities must comply
with the Constitutional requirements of due process. For example, in Bulger v. United States Bureau
of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir.1995), we held that the loss of a prison job did not implicate the
prisoner's liberty interest even though the prisoner lost the ability to automatically accrue good-time
credits as a consequence.
Finally, even if Luken possessed a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his custodial
status, we are not persuaded that Luken has been afforded constitutionally insufficient process.
Although Luken contends that his prison file contains false information regarding his gang
membership, Luken points to no denial of procedure for demonstrating the falsity of this information.
Indeed, Luken concedes that he received a hearing within ten days of being placed in administrative
segregation, Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that prisoner received
due process where informal review occurs within reasonable time after placement in administrative
segregation), and his custodial status is reviewed every ninety days.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Luken's complaint as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
AFFIRMED.