IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 94-60807
_____________________
WILLIAM F. HANKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DATAPLEX CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
(3:93-CV-16-BN)
_________________________________________________________________
December 22, 1995
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dataplex Corporation appeals an adverse judgment on a jury
verdict in favor of William Hankins, who sued Dataplex for age
discrimination. The jury returned a verdict finding discrimination
and a willful violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and the trial court denied Dataplex's motions for judgment as
a matter of law and remittitur of damages. We affirm the finding
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
of age discrimination, but REVERSE the finding of willfulness, and
reduce the damages awarded by $205,480.50.
I
A
Dataplex first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding of age discrimination. We review the district
court's denial of a motion for a judgment as a matter of law in an
age discrimination suit "with the duty of determining whether, upon
the record, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that age was
a determinative factor in the action complained of." Atkin v.
Lincoln Property Co., 991 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 865 F.2d 1461,
1465 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842, 110 S.Ct. 129 (1989)).
Because the case was fully tried on the merits, we "need not
address the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] prima facie case, and
may instead proceed directly to the ultimate question whether [the
plaintiff] has produced sufficient evidence for a jury to find that
discrimination has occurred." Atkin, 991 F.2d at 271. We focus on
the record as a whole to determine the sufficiency of the evidence.
Purcell v. Sequin State Bank, 999 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1993).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, we
find sufficient evidence to support Hankins's ADEA claim. Hankins
provided statistical evidence--albeit weak and controverted--in
support of his attempt to show a pattern of discharging employees
within the protected age group. He also testified that Dataplex's
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president had told him that Dataplex needed a "younger and more
aggressive sales force." Finally, he submitted proof that he was
replaced by a younger employee at a higher salary when, Hankins
alleges, the supposed justification for his termination was as a
cost-saving measure.
We will only set aside a jury finding of age discrimination
where "`the facts and inferences point so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that
reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.'" Atkin,
991 F.2d at 270. Although it is clear that neither Hankins's
statistical evidence nor the evidence of discriminatory statements,
standing alone, was sufficient to support his age discrimination
claim, we conclude that such evidence, taken together and in the
context of the whole record, allowed a jury to determine that
unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in Hankins's
discharge. We therefore must affirm the jury's finding of age
discrimination, as well as the award of compensatory damages.1
B
Mindful that a simple finding of an ADEA violation does not
necessarily warrant a finding of willfulness so as to merit
1
Dataplex also asks this court to set aside the damages
awarded as back pay as plainly excessive, because they included a
$50,000 bonus payment to Hankins "that was speculative and
unsupported by the evidence, and because they were incorrectly
calculated on a pre-tax basis." After reviewing the record, we
find support for the award in the record and, finding no merit in
Dataplex's argument on this issue, we will not disturb the damages
awarded as backpay.
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liquidated damages,2 we find insufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding of a willful violation of the ADEA in this case.
The record demonstrates that Hankins did not prove that Dataplex
had a policy of discrimination against its older employees. Even
though a jury may impose liquidated damages for a willful ADEA
violation "where age has entered into the employment decision on an
ad hoc, informal basis rather than through a formal policy," Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1709 (1993),
the employee must still prove "that the employer either knew or
showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was
prohibited by the statute." Id. at 1708 (quoting McLaughlin v.
Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 1681 (1988)).
Our review of the record does not uncover proof of knowledge
or reckless disregard by Dataplex for whether its conduct was
prohibited by the ADEA. We instead find that the statistical
evidence alone in this case would not have supported a finding of
discrimination; that Dataplex employed people in positions similar
to Hankins's in their sixties, seventies and even eighties; that a
majority of the company's work staff is over fifty-five; and that
the incriminating remarks made to the plaintiff in this case were
made by an individual in the company who did not actually fire him.
While we can conclude--even if with some difficulty--that a
2
See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, U.S. , , 113 S.Ct.
1701, 1708 (1993) (observing that Congress intended to create a
"two-tiered liability scheme," under which some, but not all, ADEA
violations would give rise to liquidated damages).
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reasonable juror could decide that age entered into the decision of
one of Dataplex's managers "as an undisclosed factor motivating the
employer on an ad hoc basis," we find that Hankins adduced no proof
amounting to reckless disregard for the ADEA by Dataplex.
Consequently, Hankins failed to prove a willful violation of the
ADEA, and we therefore reduce the damages by $205,480.50, the
amount of the award representing liquidated damages.
II
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the award of damages
based on a finding of age discrimination, and REVERSE the award of
liquidated damages based on a finding of a willful violation of the
ADEA.
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.
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