(concurring.) In announcing my concurrence in the opinions of the circuit justice and the circuit judge in this matter, I do not deem it necessary to review at any length the questions by them so ably and satisfactorily discussed and decided. In this application to the court to issue its subpoena, and compel answers to be made to the various questions propounded, the court is called upon to exercise no judicial function or power, unless it be the very slight duty of determining whether or not the questions propounded are within the scope of the inquiry authorized by the act of congress creating the commission. The act itself 'is most broad and comprehensive in its terms, and imposes little, if any, restraint upon the commission in the field of its inquiry. It scarcely needs the ruling of a court to determine whether the questions propounded, or any questions which may be propounded, by this commission, are within the scope and purview of the act creating the commission. But, aside from this most simple and limited duty, if duty it may be, the court has no judicial function to perform in this matter. It is simply called upon by the commission to execute its will; to compel the‘attendance and obedience of witnesses, — a purely ministerial duty, — to serve as a convenient adjunct to the commission. I cannot think that the courts were organized for any such purpose, or that they can be called upon to perform any such duty.
I need not advert to the nature and character of many of the questions propounded by the commission, as appears from the record of this proceeding, answers to which the court is asked to compel. They seem to, be quite in keeping with some of the extraordinary powers claimed and exercised by the commission, and to fully confirm their assumed right to disregard the usual and established rules of evidence and principles of law in conducting their investigations. And this court is seriously asked to lend its aid in furtherance of such purpose. Many of ■the questions propounded would seem, from the record, to have been answered as fully as it was possible for the witness to answer them. I do not, however, press this consideration, as I think this decision should rest, not upon the simple fact as to whether or not the questions have been fully answered, but upon- the broader and more important principles which underlie this whole subject, to-wit: Has this commission *269lawful right to hold this investigation; to propound these questions, and compel answers thereto; to inquire into the private affairs of this respondent, or of the Central Pacific Railroad Company, or of any individual, and invoke the powers of this court to carry out such purpose? These questions are so fully and ably discussed in the opinions rendered that further comment thereon seems unnecessary.
[t is not claimed that this is a “case” or a “controversy” between any parties to which the judicial power extends, and over which it has proper jurisdiction. Neither the United ¡hatos nor any other person is making complaint against this respondent, or against said railroad company, in any form or manner known to judicial proceedings. No charges are made against the one or the other, by any one, of duties neglected or obligations unfulfilled. In regard to the very account immediately under consideration by the commission, and in reference to which many of the questions were propounded, to which we are asked to compel answers, it is shown that this account was fully settled and adjusted by and between the United States and said company long ago. Upon pago 21 of the argument of the United Stales attorney, submitted in support of this motion, it is stated:
“Some question was made as to whether, as a matter of fact, the moneys covered by Mr. Stanford’s vouchers had been included in the account rendered to the government for the purpose of ascertaining the net earnings of the company. The commissioners do not desire a decision based upon this question, and therefore concede, for the purpose of this motion, that biro amounts in question have not been charged as against the United States, to the end that this mailer may be disposed of entirely on its merits.”
If this be true, what interest, then, is it to the United Slates, even if it had a right so to do, to inquire how, or in what manner, this account accrued or was paid? It concerns the United States in no manner, — affects no pecuniary right or interest claimed by it, due or not matured. What interest, then, lias the United States in this inquiry beyond that of any third party whoso curiosity might prompt him to inquire into that concerning which lie has no right or interest? Is not this, then, a mere idle inquiry, not made in the interest of, or to preserve or establish the rights of, the government or any person? lias not any third person, to gratify an' idle curiosity, the same right to institute these inquiries, and invoke the aid of the courts in support thereof? Courts do not entertain such investigations or inquiries, or lend their aid thereto. If this power of unlimited, inquisitorial investigation into the a (fairs of private corporations or companies, or of individuals,- — and it concerns all alike, — shall he once established, who can say where it will end, or what will be its limit of injustice at all times, but more especially when called into exercise in times of political excitement, or under the influence of partisan zeal or passion? In the close adherence to well-settled principles of law, founded upon the just observance of the rights of all parties, will we not find, the greatest safety alike to public and private rights?
Without further discussion of the subject, I fully concur in the opinions read, and in the order made.