Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
May 21, 2010 Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice
140630 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Stephen J. Markman
Plaintiff-Appellant, Diane M. Hathaway,
v SC: 140630 Justices
COA: 288540
Grand Traverse CC: 08-010586-FH
MICHAEL JAMES PERREAULT,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal January 19, 2010
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals for
the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion. In addition, we are not
persuaded by the defendant’s separate argument, made in the Court of Appeals, that the
conduct of the police rendered this a police search, subject to the probable cause standard,
rather than a school search, subject to the reasonable suspicion standard. We
REINSTATE the defendant’s conviction and sentence.
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).
I write separately only to explain why the search in this case did not violate
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. In my judgment, the anonymous tip in this case
provided “sufficient indicia of reliability to support reasonable suspicion” that defendant
was selling marijuana on school grounds. People v Faucett, 442 Mich 153, 169 (1993).
Thus, the search conducted by school officials of defendant’s vehicle that was parked on
school grounds was a valid search.
While police may search a vehicle without a warrant only if they have probable
cause to believe that there is evidence of a crime in the vehicle, People v Kazmierczak,
461 Mich 411, 418-419 (2000), school officials may search a student or a student’s
property on school grounds under the lesser standard of ‘reasonable suspicion.’ New
Jersey v TLO, 469 US 325, 341-342 (1985). “Reasonable suspicion entails something
more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of
suspicion required for probable cause.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98 (1996),
citing United States v Sokolow, 490 US 1 (1989). In cases involving an anonymous tip,
the test to determine whether there is reasonable suspicion is based on “the totality of the
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circumstances with a view to the question whether the tip carries with it sufficient indicia
of reliability to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Faucett, 442 Mich
at 169, citing Alabama v White, 496 US 325 (1990). An anonymous tip that provides
sufficient detail may provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, especially, though
not necessarily, when there is independent corroboration of relevant facts. Faucett, 442
Mich at 170-172.
Here, the search of defendant’s vehicle was prompted by an anonymous tip
received by the Grand Rapids Silent Observer, a local ‘crime-stopper’s’ organization,
concerning the sale of illegal drugs at a Traverse City high school. The tip identified four
students who were selling drugs on school grounds, one of whom was defendant. The tip
indicated that the tipster himself had been involved in the drug activity with one of the
students and that he had seen all four students selling drugs. Although greater detail was
provided regarding one of these students, the tipster provided identifying details of each
of the four students, including their names, grades at school, the vehicles they drove, the
drugs that were being sold, and how they were being sold. In particular, the tipster
asserted that defendant had been selling drugs from his truck on school grounds. This tip
was forwarded to the school and a police officer acting as a liaison officer at the school
verified that the vehicles identified by the tipster were registered to the students. The
assistant principal knew that defendant drove a truck, and was also aware of defendant’s
association with some drug-related problems at a local junior high school. Thus, there
was corroborating information to indicate that the tipster’s information was reliable. In
my judgment, the tip and the corroborating information were sufficient for school
officials to form a particularized suspicion that defendant was, in fact, selling drugs from
his truck in the school’s parking lot. Therefore, the search of defendant’s vehicle
conducted by school officials on school property did not violate defendant’s
constitutional rights. Rather, it was an entirely reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.
WEAVER, CORRIGAN, and YOUNG, JJ., join the statement of MARKMAN, J.
KELLY, C.J. (dissenting).
I would not take peremptory action in this case, but would instead grant leave to
appeal. Unlike the majority, I think that this case presents a close call regarding whether
reasonable suspicion existed to warrant the search of defendant’s truck.
CAVANAGH, J., joins the statement of KELLY, C.J.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
May 21, 2010 _________________________________________
0518 Clerk