Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
April 16, 2010 Marilyn Kelly,
Chief Justice
140241 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
ALESIA HARRIS, Personal Representative of Diane M. Hathaway,
the Estate of Henry J. Harris, Deceased, Justices
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v SC: 140241
COA: 285426
WCAC: 06-000256
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 24, 2009
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
KELLY, C.J. (dissenting).
I would grant plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal. Plaintiff makes a
potentially meritorious distinction between different types of workplace falls. The
distinction could determine whether she is entitled to worker’s compensation benefits.
Plaintiff’s decedent fell in a bathroom at his place of employment. He died four
days later from his injuries. Plaintiff, his widow, filed a claim for benefits under the
Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA).1 At trial, there was conflicting
testimony about whether decedent’s fall occurred while he was moving or whether he
simply fainted, then fell. The parties also disputed whether decedent’s medical problems
caused the fall.
The magistrate denied plaintiff’s claim, concluding that she had failed to establish
any work connection for decedent’s injury. Consequently, the magistrate determined that
1
MCL 418.101 et seq.
2
plaintiff’s claim was barred under the Court of Appeals decisions in Ledbetter v
Michigan Carton Co2 and McClain v Chrysler Corp.3
The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed the
magistrate’s decision in a divided opinion. The majority found factual mistakes in the
magistrate’s opinion, but concluded that they were harmless.
The dissent disagreed that the magistrate’s errors were harmless. It noted the
distinction between “idiopathic” falls and “unexplained” falls. The dissent believed that
the former are purely personal to the employee and therefore non-compensable, whereas
the latter are falls of unknown origin and are generally compensable. The dissent cited
precedents from this Court where the cause of a workplace fall was unexplained and there
was no evidence that the employee had a medical problem causing the fall.4 In those
cases, this Court unanimously concluded that the unexplained nature of the fall gave rise
to a presumption that plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the course of his employment.5 The
dissent would have remanded the case to the magistrate to explain why he concluded that
the fall was idiopathic, rather than unexplained.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the WCAC, ignoring the distinction drawn by the
dissent. The court conflated the two types of falls, holding that “[a]n injury of unknown
or idiopathic origin is not compensable simply because it occurred while the employee
was in the course of employment on the employer’s premises.”6
2
Ledbetter v Michigan Carton Co, 74 Mich App 330 (1977).
3
McClain v Chrysler Corp, 138 Mich App 723 (1984).
4
See, e.g., Dulyea v Shaw-Walker Co, 292 Mich 570, 574 (1940) (“It is also undisputed
that the deceased had worked for defendant company for a period of 11 years, had lost no
time from his work because of sickness, was not subject to dizzy spells, and on the
morning of the accident had been performing his usual duties except for the time taken to
see the company doctor. It is also a fact that deceased was not suffering from any disease
which might cause him to collapse while going down stairs.”).
5
Woodburn v Oliver Machinery Co, 257 Mich 109, 111 (1932) (“The fact he left home
uninjured, went to defendant’s factory, was engaged in his usual and ordinary occupation
therein, was found at the factory, at the foot of the stairs, in the line of travel where the
discharge of his duties usually and ordinarily took him, severely injured about the head,
from which injuries it is probable he died, is, we think, sufficient to raise a presumption
the injuries to deceased rose out of and in the course of his employment.”).
6
Harris v Gen Motors Corp, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued November 24, 2009 (Docket No. 285426) at 4.
3
Notably, neither the WCAC majority nor the Court of Appeals addressed the cases
cited by the WCAC dissent. Ledbetter and McClain also ignored Dulyea, Woodburn, and
the other cases cited by the WCAC dissent. The Court of Appeals majority in McClain
simply announced, without citation, that unexplained falls were not compensable.7
I am not convinced that Ledbetter and McClain can be reconciled with Dulyea and
Woodburn. I would grant leave to appeal to consider whether a legal distinction exists
between “unexplained” and “idiopathic” falls, and if so, whether that distinction is
dispositive of entitlement to benefits under the WDCA.
CAVANAGH and HATHAWAY, JJ., would grant leave to appeal.
7
McClain, 138 Mich App at 730-732 (“We are not persuaded that Michigan has adopted
a rule requiring compensation to be paid simply because the injury occurred at the
workplace, where the nature of the cause is unknown. . . . We do not find that the WCAB
erred by failing to devise a more specific standard relating to idiopathic falls. Plaintiffs’
arguments for compensation for injuries of unknown causal relationship to their
employment have merit, but are not a recognized theory in this state.”).
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
April 16, 2010 _________________________________________
0413 Clerk