Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway
FILED MARCH 10, 2010
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE and
MICHIGAN APPLE COMMITTEE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 137552
APPLETREE MARKETING, L.L.C., and
STEVEN KROPF,
Defendants-Appellees.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
YOUNG, J.
This case requires this Court to determine whether the remedies provided
for a breach of the Agricultural Commodities Marketing Act (ACMA) supersede
remedies provided by statute under the Revised Judicature Act (RJA) or abrogate
those traditionally available at common law. We must further decide whether the
member-manager of a limited liability company who causes his business to breach
common law and statutory duties may be held independently liable for his
personal torts.
We conclude that the ACMA does not provide the exclusive remedy for its
violation and thus does not supersede preexisting statutory remedies or abrogate
common law remedies. Therefore, plaintiffs may pursue cumulative remedies
provided by the ACMA as well as common law and statutory conversion.
Furthermore, Michigan law is well settled that a plaintiff may pursue an action
against a corporate official in his personal capacity when the plaintiff alleges that
the official’s own tortious conduct harmed the plaintiff. We hold that the trial
court erred by dismissing plaintiffs’ actions for conversion against defendant
Steven Kropf. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand this case to the Kent Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of the instant case are not disputed by any party. The Michigan
Legislature enacted the ACMA1 to provide “a procedure whereby marketing
programs could be established for a wide variety of Michigan’s agricultural
products.”2 In this case, the agricultural product is apples. Pursuant to the
ACMA, Michigan apple producers created plaintiff Michigan Apple Committee
(the Committee), an agency within plaintiff Michigan Department of Agriculture
(the Department). The Committee is funded through assessments placed on the
purchase price charged to apple distributors. Under the ACMA, apple distributors
1
MCL 290.651 et seq.
2
Dukesherer Farms, Inc v Dep’t of Agriculture Director (After Remand),
405 Mich 1, 9; 273 NW2d 877 (1979).
2
deduct the assessments from payments sent to producers, hold the funds in trust,
and remit the funds to the Committee on a periodic basis.3
Defendant Appletree Marketing, L.L.C. (Appletree), was an apple
distributor managed by defendant Steven Kropf, Appletree’s sole member.
Although Appletree collected assessments for 2004 and 2005, it failed to remit any
funds to the Committee. Instead, Appletree used the money to pay the company’s
other debts.
When a distributor fails to remit assessed funds, the ACMA allows the
Committee to file a written complaint with the director of the Department. The
director investigates and requests remittance; after 30 days, the director may file a
complaint in court.4 The Department and director each followed these procedures
in the instant case. When Appletree—by this time a bankrupt and defunct
corporation—failed to pay upon demand, plaintiffs filed a complaint against
Appletree and Kropf to recover the 2004 assessments ($26,305.98) and
subsequently amended the complaint to include the 2005 assessments
3
MCL 290.655(e) (“All assessments collected or deducted shall be
considered trust funds and be remitted quarterly or more frequently if required by
the marketing program to the appropriate committee.”).
4
MCL 290.655(f).
3
($28,878.66). Plaintiffs alleged that Appletree violated the ACMA,5 and that both
Appletree and Kropf committed common law and statutory conversion.6
Defendants consented to a judgment of $55,184.64 against Appletree to
settle plaintiffs’ ACMA claim. However, defendants sought summary disposition
on plaintiffs’ conversion claims, arguing that the ACMA provided the exclusive
remedies for the failure to remit the assessment funds because the act created new
rights and prescribed particular remedies. The trial court agreed and dismissed
with prejudice plaintiffs’ conversion claims against both Appletree and Kropf,
entering a final judgment against Appletree based on liability under the ACMA in
the amount of $77,051.23.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that any
claim that Appletree wrongfully spent the money held in trust was based entirely
on the duty imposed on Appletree by the ACMA. Because “plaintiffs’ common-
law and statutory conversion claims do not exist without the ACMA,” the ACMA
8
provided the exclusive remedies. Similarly, the Court reasoned that because
Kropf could not be liable under the ACMA, he could not be personally liable in
5
MCL 290.655.
6
MCL 600.2919a (statutory conversion).
7
This amount included the unpaid assessments, statutory interest pursuant
to MCL 290.672 (1 percent a month), attorney fees, audit expenses, and other
costs. See MCL 290.655(f).
8
Dep’t of Agriculture v Appletree Marketing, LLC, 280 Mich App 635,
645; 761 NW2d 277 (2008).
4
any regard; thus, the trial court did not err by dismissing the claims of conversion
against him.
We granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal, directing the parties
to address the following issues:
(1) whether the plaintiffs may simultaneously pursue claims against
Appletree Marketing, LLC for alleged violations of the Agricultural
Commodities Marketing Act, MCL 290.651 et seq., and for
common-law and statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a; and
(2) whether, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs may
pursue claims for common-law and statutory conversion against
Appletree’s principal, Steven Kropf.[9]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the ACMA provides plaintiffs’ exclusive statutory remedy is a
matter of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, our review is de novo.10 Whether
the ACMA abrogates claims for common law conversion is also a question of law,
which we likewise review de novo.11
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE ACMA DOES NOT ABROGATE CONVERSION CLAIMS
We must first determine whether the ACMA displaces other statutory and
common law causes of action. Plaintiffs urge this Court to recognize that the
9
Dep’t of Agriculture v Appletree Marketing, LLC, 483 Mich 1000, 1000-
1001 (2009).
10
See Detroit v Ambassador Bridge Co, 481 Mich 29, 35; 748 NW2d 221
(2008).
11
See Kaiser v Allen, 480 Mich 31, 35; 746 NW2d 92 (2008).
5
Legislature explicitly, and in unequivocal language, intended that any avenues for
relief that the ACMA provides are cumulative to traditional common law or
statutory remedies. Defendants and the courts below relied almost exclusively on
the proposition that “[i]f ‘a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies,
such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act
is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.’”12 Defendants
argue, and the courts below agreed, that this rule of statutory construction
displaces the plain reading advanced by plaintiffs. While the proposition is
generally a correct statement of law for construing statutes that create new causes
of action, it cannot be applied in a manner that conflicts with the plain language
prescribed by the Legislature.
1. STATUTORY CONVERSION
In interpreting statutory language, this Court’s primary goal is to give effect
to the Legislature’s intent. If the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent in the
language of a statute, that statute must be enforced as written, free of any
“contrary judicial gloss.”13
12
Dep’t of Agriculture, 280 Mich App at 642, quoting Monroe Beverage
Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997).
13
Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co (After Remand), 469 Mich 487, 490; 672
NW2d 849 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
6
In analyzing the relevant statutes, we turn first to the specific statutory
language of the ACMA. The ACMA’s enforcement provision provides, in
relevant part:
The director may institute an action necessary to enforce
compliance with this act, a rule promulgated under this act, or a
marketing agreement or program adopted under this act and
committed to his or her administration. In addition to any other
remedy provided by law, the director may apply for relief by
injunction to protect the public interest without being compelled to
allege or prove that an adequate remedy at law does not exist.[14]
The plain language of the statute does not limit the remedies the director may
pursue. Contrary to defendants’ argument that the ACMA provides the exclusive
remedies, the language provides that “any other remed[ies]” may be pursued “[i]n
addition” to those explicitly described. “Any” is defined as “every; all.”15
Clearly, this language is not exclusive of other remedies outside the ACMA.
While the emphasized text is an introductory clause to the statutory
authorization permitting the director to obtain an injunction, it is not solely a
limitation on the injunctive remedy. This statutory language contemplates both an
action necessary to enforce the ACMA and an injunction in addition to any other
remedy provided by law. Defendants read the ACMA as though the phrase “[i]n
addition to any other remedy provided by law” actually says “in addition to any
other remedy provided by the ACMA.” It clearly does not. Thus, to give meaning
14
MCL 290.669 (emphasis added).
15
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997).
7
to the phrase “any other remedy provided by law” we must conclude that it means
remedies in addition to those in the ACMA, such as those for conversion.
We next turn to the specific language used in the statutory conversion
provision. MCL 600.2919a(2) provides that relief for a claim of statutory
conversion “is in addition to any other right or remedy the person may have at law
or otherwise.”16 This clear, unambiguous language explicitly indicates the
cumulative nature of statutory conversion claims. Furthermore, as noted, the
16
In full, MCL 600.2919a provides:
(1) A person damaged as a result of either or both of the
following may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages
sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees:
(a) Another person’s stealing or embezzling property or
converting property to the other person's own use.
(b) Another person’s buying, receiving, possessing,
concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or
converted property when the person buying, receiving, possessing,
concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or
converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or
converted.
(2) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any
other right or remedy the person may have at law or otherwise.
MCL 600.2919a became effective in its present form on June 16, 2005, after
amendment by 2005 PA 44. Before its amendment, MCL 600.2919a applied only
to third parties who aided another’s act of conversion or embezzlement, and did
not apply to the person who directly converted or embezzled, as it does now.
While the parties dispute which version of the RJA applies, for present purposes,
the current version is substantially similar to the former version given that, in both,
the statutory remedy provided is “in addition to” other remedies at law.
8
ACMA does not contain an exclusive remedy provision that would explicitly
prevent such cumulative claims.17 The Legislature has used expansive language
indicating an intent to provide the broadest possible application, and thus allow
cumulative remedies.
Thus, we conclude from a plain reading of both statutes that the cumulative
nature of the remedies each permits is undeniable. Both the ACMA and MCL
600.2919a provide remedies that are in addition to other remedies at law and thus
do not conflict. Therefore, the statutes should be applied as written, and the
remedy in MCL 600.2919a must be allowed in addition to the remedy provided in
the ACMA.
On examination, these statutory provisions appear relatively
straightforward: they allow cumulative remedies. However, because the lower
courts relied so heavily on the cases applying an interpretative proposition stated
in Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co18 to contradict the actual
language of the statutes, it behooves us to examine this proposition to illustrate
why it was misapplied.
17
For example, the Legislature explicitly created this type of provision in
the dramshop act, MCL 436.1801(10): “This section provides the exclusive
remedy for money damages against a licensee arising out of the selling, giving, or
furnishing of alcoholic liquor.”
18
454 Mich 41; 559 NW2d 297 (1997).
9
In Monroe Beverage, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the
former Liquor Control Act (LCA)19 when it failed to consider transferring
distribution rights to the plaintiff. The defendant had no such obligation at
common law, and the LCA limited enforcement to “‘a wholesaler with which the
supplier has an agreement.’”20 Because the plaintiff conceded that it did not have
an agreement with the defendant, the Court held that the plaintiff could not recover
under the LCA.21 On these facts, this Court concluded that “[i]t is well established
that ‘[w]here a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such
remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is
confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.’”22
Most significant for the purposes of this case, this Court remanded to the
Court of Appeals to consider whether the plaintiff could pursue its common law
negligence claim against the defendant. The Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiff’s negligence claim failed because the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a
duty to review its transfer request independent of the LCA.23 Thus, the LCA
19
MCL 436.1 et seq., repealed by 1998 PA 58; see MCL 436.2301(a).
20
Monroe Beverage, 454 Mich at 44, quoting MCL 436.30b(28).
21
Id. at 44.
22
Id. at 45, quoting Lafayette Transfer & Storage Co v Michigan Pub
Utilities Comm, 287 Mich 488, 491; 283 NW 659 (1939).
23
Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co (On Remand), 224 Mich
App 366, 369; 568 NW2d 687 (1997).
10
provided the exclusive remedy for such a failure, but excluded the plaintiff from
its protections.
Later, in South Haven v Van Buren Co Bd of Comm’rs,24 the plaintiff city
sought restitution after the defendant presented a road millage proposal in
violation of a statute requiring such proposals to provide for the distribution of the
tax levies to the city. This Court concluded that the defendant had violated the
statute. However, after quoting Monroe Beverage, the Court held that “[b]ecause
nothing in the statute indicates any legislative intent to allow plaintiff to pursue a
claim for restitution of misallocated funds, and the Legislature explicitly granted
such authority to the Attorney General alone, plaintiff cannot seek restitution of
the misallocated funds in this case.”25 This Court added, however, that the
plaintiff could have obtained injunctive relief enjoining the collection of the
millage or refunding collected taxes to taxpayers because “this Court has
permitted [such relief] when a government official does not conform to his or her
statutory duty to distribute funds in a specified manner.”26 Thus, the plaintiff was
limited by the remedy provided in the statute, but could have obtained an equitable
24
478 Mich 518; 734 NW2d 533 (2007).
25
Id. at 530-531.
26
Id. at 531, citing Thomson v City of Dearborn, 347 Mich 365; 79 NW2d
841 (1956) (injunctive relief against misappropriation of funds), and City of
Jackson v Revenue Comm’r, 316 Mich 694, 719; 26 NW2d 569 (1947)
(constitutional amendment was “self-executing” and could be enforced by
mandamus to compel the distribution of levied funds).
11
injunctive remedy that preexisted and was independent of the statutory remedy. It
was critical to the Court’s analysis that the Legislature granted the Attorney
General the exclusive right to vindicate the violation at issue there. This Court
held that the previously permitted injunctive relief remained available, and thus
the proposition stated in Monroe Beverage was not applied to abrogate preexisting
claims.
A review of these cases makes clear that neither is controlling under the
facts presented here. In Monroe Beverage, there was no preexisting civil action
for the claimed wrongful conduct; rather, the relevant statutory provisions
provided the sole legal obligation and thus remedy. Here, in contrast, converting
another’s property was actionable by statute prior to the ACMA’s enactment.
Once defendants’ original duty to hold plaintiffs’ funds in trust arose, defendants
had an independent fiduciary duty not to convert the trust funds they held. The
proposition articulated in Monroe Beverage does not serve to eliminate preexisting
duties, rights, and remedies. In this case, independent of the ACMA, defendants
owed plaintiffs a duty not to convert their property. Accordingly, plaintiffs’
conversion claim did not arise “under the act” and Monroe Beverage is not
dispositive. More important, the ACMA explicitly states that its remedies are not
exclusive.
Ultimately, the proposition articulated in Monroe Beverage should not be
applied as a general statement concerning statutes that provide new rights and
remedies irrespective of the specific language of such statutes. It should not, in
12
other words, be applied outside the facts that give rise to its application or in a
manner that is contrary to the plain meaning of statutory language. This is
because the Legislature is capable of permitting cumulative remedies, as is the
case with the statutory language present here. We therefore hold that the ACMA
and MCL 600.2919a clearly permit cumulative remedies.
2. COMMON LAW CONVERSION
These same principles—particularly our conclusions regarding the
language of the enforcement provision of the ACMA—are equally applicable
when determining whether the common law conversion claim was abrogated. We
note that under our constitution, “[t]he common law and the statute laws now in
force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by
their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.”27
Common law conversion existed before the ACMA and consists of any
“distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in
denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.”28 Conversion may occur when a
27
Const 1963, art 3, § 7.
28
Foremost Ins Co v Allstate Ins Co, 439 Mich 378, 391; 486 NW2d 600
(1992); see also Thoma v Tracy Motor Sales, Inc, 360 Mich 434, 438; 104 NW2d
360 (1960); Nelson & Witt v Texas Co, 256 Mich 65, 70; 239 NW 289 (1931).
13
party properly in possession of property uses it in an improper way, for an
improper purpose, or by delivering it without authorization to a third party.29
This Court’s recent ruling in Cooper v Auto Club Ins Ass’n30 provides
additional guidance. In Cooper, the plaintiffs asserted a common law fraud claim
against their no-fault insurer, alleging that the defendant fraudulently induced
them to accept unreasonably low compensation for attendant-care services
provided by their mother. The Court held that “the no-fault act, which provides
the remedy for injuries arising out of ‘the ownership, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle,’ MCL 500.3105(1), does not abrogate actions arising out of the
breach of other common-law duties.”31 This Court held that the plaintiffs’ fraud
action was distinct from an action claiming that an insurer refused to pay no-fault
benefits to its insured because:
(1) a fraud action requires an insured to prove several elements that
are different from those required in a no-fault action; (2) a fraud
action accrues at a different time than a no-fault action; and (3) a
fraud action permits an insured to recover a wide range of damages
that are not available in a no-fault action.[32]
29
Foremost, 439 Mich at 391; Thoma, 360 Mich at 438; Johnston v
Whittemore, 27 Mich 463, 468-469 (1873).
30
481 Mich 399; 751 NW2d 443 (2008).
31
Id. at 411.
32
Id. at 407.
14
Comparing the two claims, this Court stated that
[u]nlike a no-fault claim, a fraud claim does not arise from an
insurer’s mere omission to perform a contractual or statutory
obligation, such as its failure to pay all the [personal protection
insurance] benefits to which its insureds are entitled. Rather, it
arises from the insurer’s breach of its separate and independent duty
not to deceive the insureds, which duty is imposed by law as a
function of the relationship of the parties.[33]
Furthermore, the Court observed that a first-party no-fault claim arises when the
insurer fails to pay, but a fraud claim arises when the fraud is perpetrated.34
Finally, in a first-party no-fault action, the insured may only recover no-fault
benefits, but in a fraud action the insured may recover attorney fees, emotional-
distress damages, and exemplary damages.35
Similarly, a conversion claim can be distinct from an ACMA claim. First,
unlike an ACMA claim, a conversion claim does not arise from a distributor’s
mere “fail[ure] to deduct or remit any assessment due to the committee . . . .”36
Indeed, “‘refusal to deliver possession pursuant to a lawful demand is not
conversion but only evidence of a conversion.’”37 A conversion claim arises from
33
Id. at 409.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
MCL 290.655(f).
37
Bush v Hayes, 286 Mich 546, 551; 282 NW 239 (1938), quoting
Guarantee Bond & Mortgage Co v Hilding, 246 Mich 334, 344; 224 NW 643
(1929); see also 2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 335, p 519 (“The refusal to surrender
15
the distributor’s breach of its separate and independent duty not to exert wrongful
dominion over the Committee’s personal property. Second, an ACMA claim
arises when the distributor fails to collect or remit assessments when they are due,
but a conversion claim arises whenever the distributor wrongfully exerts dominion
over the Committee’s property; this can occur at any time, before or after the
remittance is due. Third, in an ACMA action, the Committee can recover the
assessments plus costs and expenses, but in a conversion action the Committee can
recover exemplary damages.
Although the ACMA collection scheme is new, the obligation to maintain
another’s property held in trust is not.38 While it is true that plaintiffs’ ownership
of the assessments arises under the ACMA—and thus the property right that
plaintiffs seek to enforce exists only due to the ACMA—the alleged wrongful
conduct was actionable at common law and is distinct from the wrongful conduct
addressed in the ACMA. Moreover, because an action for conversion existed at
common law, this case is significantly distinct from Monroe Beverage, in which
there was no prior existing common law action.
We cannot conclude, as defendants urge, that the ACMA remedies must be
exclusive because defendants would not have had any duty to remit the funds
possession in response to a demand is not of itself a conversion; it is only evidence
of a conversion, and like other inconclusive acts is open to explanation.”).
38
See, e.g., Bd of Fire & Water Comm’rs of Marquette v Wilkinson, 119
Mich 655; 78 NW 893 (1899).
16
absent the ACMA. As plaintiffs note, one’s duty as a trustee must arise from
agreement or, as here, by law. The common law then delineates that duty and
provides remedies to the rightful possessor in the event of misuse of the property.
The lower courts erred by focusing on how defendants came into possession of the
property rather than on defendants’ actions after possession of the property was
lawfully gained. The ACMA assigns distributors the role of statutory trustees of
the assessments due to the Committee. The Legislature included no language
suggesting that it intended to avoid the imposition of common law liability for
conversion in violation of the fiduciary duties created by the ACMA. Therefore,
just as for claims of statutory conversion, we hold that the ACMA did not abrogate
common law claims for conversion.
B. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF KROPF
The final issue before this Court is whether plaintiffs may pursue claims for
common law and statutory conversion against Appletree’s principal, Steven Kropf.
Plaintiffs allege that Kropf, as the sole member and manager of Appletree,
converted the unremitted funds for a use other than the one for which they were
held in trust.
Michigan law has long provided that corporate officials may be held
personally liable for their individual tortious acts done in the course of business,
regardless of whether they were acting for their personal benefit or the
17
corporation’s benefit.39 Moreover, as Michigan courts have recognized,
“[o]fficers of a corporation may be held individually liable when they personally
cause their corporation to act unlawfully.”40 Indeed, this Court held a corporate
official individually liable for a conversion claim in Bush v Hayes.41 There, a
supervisor was held liable for conversion for his personal tortious misconduct
when the plaintiff’s products (beans) over which the supervisor had control were
moved and never returned. On appeal of a directed verdict in favor of the
defendants, the Court explained:
The trial judge erred in instructing the jury that to hold the
defendants liable there must be evidence showing that they
converted the beans to their own use. If there has been a conversion
in which they participated they are liable. It is of no consequence
whether they acted for the corporation or acted for themselves if they
were active participants in converting beans which belonged to
39
See, e.g., Allen v Morris Bldg Co, 360 Mich 214, 218; 103 NW2d 491
(1960) (“The proofs show that [defendant] was the majority stockholder,
president, and in control of defendant corporation’s activities, and that he
personally supervised the operations of which complaint is made herein. He
participated in the tort and is liable with the corporate defendant.”), citing Wines v
Crosby & Co, 169 Mich 210; 135 NW 96 (1912); Moore v Andrews, 203 Mich
219, 232-233; 168 NW 1037 (1918) (holding that an action for conversion may lie
against directors, officers, or agents of a corporation to a person injured by their
torts); see also 2 Restatement Agency, 3d, § 7.01, p 115 (“An agent is subject to
liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s tortious conduct. Unless an
applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability although
the actor acts as an agent or an employee, with actual or apparent authority, or
within the scope of employment.”).
40
Livonia Bldg Materials Co v Harrison Constr Co, 276 Mich App 514,
519; 742 NW2d 140 (2007).
41
Bush, 286 Mich at 548-549.
18
plaintiff. They are liable for the torts which they commit, be it for
themselves or for another.[42]
Defendants further argue that plaintiffs must “pierce the corporate veil” in
order to hold Kropf personally liable. However, we have never required that a
plaintiff pierce the corporate veil in order to hold corporate officials liable for their
own tortious misconduct, and thus it is unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil in
this case. Conversion is an intentional tort,43 and piercing the corporate veil is not
necessary to a determination of personal liability for intentional torts: regardless of
the corporate form, officers remain personally liable for their intentional and
criminal conduct.
There is no question that, if the facts prove either common law or statutory
conversion, Kropf can be held personally liable and may not hide behind the
corporate form in order to prevent liability for his active participation in the tort.44
Moreover, plaintiffs need not allege a violation of the ACMA in relation to Kropf
in order to hold him personally liable for the separate personal tort of conversion.
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that the ACMA does not supersede claims of statutory conversion
or abrogate claims of common law conversion, and thus plaintiffs may pursue
42
Id. at 549-550.
43
Foremost, 439 Mich at 391.
44
We note that any conversion claims against defendants are not currently
before this Court, and thus we refrain from any comment or judgment on their
merits.
19
remedies under the ACMA cumulative to remedies for conversion. We further
hold that Steven Kropf may be held personally liable for any intentional torts he is
proved to have committed in the course of operating his business. Accordingly,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Marilyn Kelly
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Stephen P. Markman
Diane M. Hathaway
20