[J-27-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WESTERN DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 18 WAP 2021
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the
: Superior Court entered November
: 20, 2020 at No. 1734 WDA 2019,
v. : reversing the Order of the Indiana
: County Court of Common Pleas
: entered October 15, 2019 at No.
NATHANIAL RAY PRICE, : CP-32-CR-0001267-2016, and
: remanding.
Appellant :
: ARGUED: April 13, 2022
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: OCTOBER 19, 2022
On October 26, 2016, victims Timothy Gardner and Jacqueline Brink were
murdered in their home. The Pennsylvania State Police quickly identified Nathanial Price
(Appellant), Justin Stevenson, and Isiah Scott as suspects in the murders. As part of their
investigation, the State Police applied for a search warrant for Appellant’s cell phone
records. The Affidavit of Probable cause in support of the search warrant application
stated, in relevant part, “[i]nvestigators learned [Appellant’s] phone number, and he was
later taken into custody. The phone number listed on this Search Warrant Application is
724-762-3802 and is the number that is associated to Nathaniel PRICE.” Omnibus
Pretrial Mot. for Relief, 9/1/17, Ex. D. The trial court issued the search warrant, and the
State Police obtained the cell phone records. Appellant filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion
for Relief requesting, inter alia, the trial court suppress the records on the grounds that
the Affidavit failed to state probable cause. In response, the Commonwealth argued, inter
alia, that even if the Affidavit lacked probable cause, the cell phone records should not be
suppressed due to the inevitable discovery doctrine. Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s Omnibus
Pretrial Mot., 3/15/19, at 30 (“the contents of such records should not be suppressed
because such information was obtained via multiple lawful sources.”). After a hearing,
the trial court, who was also the issuing authority, suppressed the cell phone records,
finding the Affidavit “did not provide the issuing authority with a substantial basis to
conclude that probable cause existed” to obtain the records. Op. and Order of Ct.,
10/15/19, at 29-30 (footnote omitted).
The Commonwealth filed an appeal of the trial court’s suppression order pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of issues complained of on
appeal, the Commonwealth set forth its issue as:
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law and abused its
discretion in granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress when
the Trial Court ruled that “the Affidavit did not provide probable
cause for issuance of the Search Warrant …” (See paragraph
10 of Order of Court dated 10/15/2019 and page 29 of the
Opinion and Order of Court dated 10/15/2019).
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 12/9/19, at 1. In its brief to the Superior Court, the
Commonwealth argued, inter alia, that, even though the Affidavit inadvertently omitted
information explaining how the police obtained Appellant’s phone number, the police in
fact possessed that information at the time of the issuance of the “allegedly deficient”
warrant (namely a post-murder interview with Appellant). Thus, the Commonwealth
argued that the recovery of Appellant’s cell phone records was inevitable.
Commonwealth v. Price, 244 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal granted, 259
A.3d 888 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam). The Superior Court agreed, determining that, “even if”
the Affidavit did not provide sufficient probable cause, Appellant’s cell phone records were
“nonetheless admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery.” Id. at 1254. The
court held that, even though the Commonwealth’s 1925(b) statement did not specifically
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mention the inevitable discovery doctrine, it constituted a “subsidiary issue to its probable
cause issue” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v) and was, therefore, not waived. Id. at
1253 n.1.
This Court granted allocatur to address the following issue:
Did the Superior Court err in reversing the order entered on
October 15, 2019, at paragraph 10 thereof, relating to the
suppression of the search warrant issued on October 28,
2016, at 1:15 P.M., which search warrant failed to state
probable cause within the four-corners of its affidavit, on the
basis of inevitable discovery, inasmuch as inevitable
discovery was outside of that raised in the concise statement
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 and, by so doing, the Superior
Court went outside the four-corners of such search warrant
affidavit?
Commonwealth v. Price, 259 A.3d 888 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam). The Majority answers
this question in the affirmative, determining that “[t]he Superior Court erred in ruling that
inevitable discovery was a ‘subsidiary issue’ under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(4).” Maj. Op. at
18. As I believe the Commonwealth’s 1925(b) Statement properly includes the inevitable
discovery issue, I respectfully dissent.
If, after an appellant files a notice of appeal, a judge requires clarification of the errors
complained of, the judge may direct the appellant to file a statement of matters
complained of on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The Rule 1925(b) statement shall
“concisely identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to
identify the issue to be raised for the judge” but “should not be redundant or provide
lengthy explanations as to any error.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(ii), (iv). The purpose of a Rule
1925(b) statement is to “facilitate appellate review and to provide the parties and the
public with the legal basis for a judicial decision.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 250 A.3d
1209, 1224 (Pa. 2021).
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In Rogers, this Court addressed the Superior Court’s finding that a defendant
waived his weight of the evidence claim for lack of development in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. Id. at 1222. In reviewing the defendant’s claim that the Superior Court erred,
we reviewed the defendant’s post-sentence motion, where he set forth his weight of the
evidence claim in detail. Id. We observed that the defendant’s weight of the evidence
claim was clear from the record and the trial court had no difficulty understanding the
issue and addressed it in its opinion. Id. at 1225. Thus, we determined that the
defendant’s 1925(b) Statement was a good faith attempt to comply with the rule and did
not prevent meaningful appellate review. Id. Accordingly, we concluded the Superior
Court erred in finding the issue waived and remanded for the court to address the
substance of the defendant’s claim.
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 1058 (Pa. 2007), this Court
reversed the Superior Court’s finding of waiver of a defendant’s weight of the evidence
claim. We held that the Superior Court should have substantively reviewed the issue as
the evidentiary issue was relatively sparse, the case was relatively straightforward, and
the trial court readily apprehended the defendant’s claim and addressed it in substantial
detail. Laboy, 936 A.2d at 1060. The factors the Court took into consideration were all
outside of the text of the defendant’s 1925(b) statement. See also Commonwealth v.
Smyser, 195 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2018) (applying Laboy to an appellant’s boiler
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plate 1925(b) statement).1,2 Based on the Courts holdings in Rogers and Laboy,
appellate courts have looked beyond the face of a 1925(b) statement in determining if an
appellant has waived an issue.
Unlike in Rogers and Laboy, here the Majority refuses to look beyond the face of
the Commonwealth’s 1925(b) Statement. Instead, the Majority quotes the
Commonwealth’s 1925(b) statement as raising a single issue of whether the trial court
“erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion …. [when it] ruled that the Affidavit did
not provide probable cause for issuance of the Search Warrant.” Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting
Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/9/19, at 1). The Majority thus frames the issue as
“whether an application of the inevitable discovery doctrine is ‘included’ within the issue
of the existence of sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant and is
thus a subsidiary issue not waived on appeal.” Id. at 15. By framing the Commonwealth’s
issue so narrowly, the Majority interprets the Commonwealth’s 1925(b) Statement as
solely challenging the suppression court’s probable cause finding. When read as a whole,
however, it is clear the Commonwealth was challenging the suppression court’s grant of
Defendant’s motion to suppress generally and not solely the court’s probable cause
1The Majority rejects the Commonwealth’s reliance on Rogers and Laboy because neither
case involved the interpretation of the definition of a subsidiary issue under Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(v) and instead focused on the question of whether the brevity of an Appellant’s
1925(b) statement hindered meaningful appellate review. Maj. Op. at 12 n.4. I
respectfully disagree and find our holdings in those cases informative to our analysis of
the case sub judice. The core issue in all three cases is whether an appellant’s 1925(b)
statement was so deficient that it resulted in an issue being waived. As such, it is
appropriate for the Court to consider similar factors.
2While the trial courts in Rogers and Laboy addressed the respective defendant’s weight
of the evidence claim in their 1925(a) opinions, the trial court’s decision to address or not
address an issue in its 1925(a) opinion is not determinative of the question of waiver. See
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 700 (Pa. 2020) (“[T]he mere fact that a court
has authored an opinion addressing potential appellate issues does not excuse an
appellant from complying with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).”).
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determination. See Pa.R.A.P. Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/9/19, at 1 (“The Trial Court
erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in granting Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress when the Trial Court ruled that ‘the Affidavit did not provide probable cause for
issuance of the Search Warrant . . .’”) (emphasis added).
In its brief filed in opposition to Appellant’s suppression motion, the Commonwealth
argued the inevitable discovery doctrine applied to Appellant’s cell phone records. It
argued that even if the suppression court found that probable cause for the search warrant
was lacking, the court should not suppress the records because they “would have
inevitably been recovered from both the Defendant’s physical phone and the cell phone
records of Codefendant-2 recovered via valid search warrant.” Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s
Omnibus Pretrial Mot., 3/15/2019, at 30. In front of the suppression court, the
Commonwealth further argued that the records should not be suppressed because they
were “obtained via multiple lawful sources.” Id. As the Commonwealth raised the
inevitable discovery issue in front of the suppression court, the court was aware of the
Commonwealth’s position that the court should have denied Appellant’s motion to
suppress on that basis. Therefore, when the Commonwealth filed its notice of appeal,
the suppression court was on notice that the inevitable discovery question was a potential
issue. When taking this background into consideration, the Commonwealth’s 1925(b)
Statement constituted a “good-faith attempt to comply with Rule 1925’s concision
requirement, and that it did not prevent meaningful appellate review.” Rogers, 250 A.3d
at 1225. The Superior Court therefore correctly addressed the substance of the
Commonwealth’s inevitable discovery argument.
In a concurring opinion in Rogers, I expressed concern that “[i]f the question of
waiver is going to be a subjective one where appellate courts look beyond the face of an
appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement and consider other parts of the record . . . then the
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bright line waiver rules we set out in [prior cases] are unnecessary and unfair.” Id. at
1226-27 (Mundy, J., concurring). I suggested that we should set out an objective standard
for when appellate courts should look beyond the face of a Rule 1925(b) statement when
determining waiver. Id. at 1227. The Majority’s focus on only part of the Commonwealth’s
1925(b) statement and failure to look at the record as a whole in the case sub judice is
the type of situation I was concerned of in Rogers. The failure of the Court to set out
specific objective standards for when it will look beyond the face of a 1925(b) statement
creates unpredictability in the appellate process. An appellant will be unable to determine
if they complied with the rule until the appellate court makes its determination, by which
time it will be too late for the appellant to correct any omissions. Further, the apparent
arbitrariness of the Court’s decision of whether or not to look beyond the face of a Rule
1925(b) statement breeds a sense of unfairness in the appellate process, with the Court
granting some appellants this consideration while denying it to others, in this case the
Commonwealth, without explanation. In my view, if the Court is willing to look beyond the
face of a 1925(b) statement in some instances, we should do so in every case. As the
Majority does not grant the Commonwealth the same consideration it granted the
defendant in Rogers, I respectfully dissent.
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