Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
November 21, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
137258 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
LAURA E. TAYLOR, Stephen J. Markman,
Plaintiff-Appellant, Justices
v SC: 137258
COA: 281555
Oakland CC Family Div:
2003-675784-DM
DAVID E. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
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On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 29, 2008
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
YOUNG, J. (concurring.)
I concur in the order denying leave to appeal. According to the record, the “lynch
pin” of the trial court’s decision to send the minor child to a public school was MCL
722.23(j), which considers the “willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate
and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the
other parent . . . .”
The record amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that the two parents simply
“do not communicate,” and that the mother’s desire to homeschool the child would result
in the father being precluded from having any “say or involvement in his child’s
education.” While regrettable, I do not view the stray remarks of the trial court, which
appear to reflect a view of homeschooling as less beneficial than a public school, as
altering the legitimacy or primacy of the trial court’s best interests determination.
TAYLOR, C.J., WEAVER and CORRIGAN, JJ., join the statement of YOUNG, J.
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting.)
I respectfully dissent. Instead of denying leave to appeal, I would remand to the
trial court for reconsideration of its order resolving the parties’ dispute concerning their
child’s education. The trial court resolved this dispute in favor of the public schooling
preferred by the father and in opposition to the homeschooling preferred by the mother.
Although I take no position on the merits of the trial court's ultimate decision, I believe
that the court erred by at least appearing to take improper factors into account in reaching
this decision.
2
In particular, I believe that the trial court erred by appearing to substitute its own
generally unfavorable attitudes concerning homeschooling for the public policies of this
state, which accord no preference for either public schooling or homeschooling. While
the trial court is entitled to its own views concerning the respective merits of these
educational approaches, it is not entitled to replace the policies of Michigan with such
personal views.
Here, the court concluded with regard to the parties’ six-year-old daughter’s
educational prospects that “she doesn't seem to have a problem, I don’t believe, in being
able to succeed anywhere,” but then terminated the daughter’s homeschooling, asserting
that her interests would be best served by public schooling, in which both parents could
be involved. In the course of rendering this decision, the trial court made the following
observations:
• Public schools would offer the child a “wider exposure” than she
would receive with homeschooling.
• Public schools would offer “much more diversity, many more
opportunities with respect to the things that she would be able to
do.”
• Although the court “appreciate[d] and respect[ed] [the mother’s]
desire to have a religious-based schooling, we live in a very diverse
society and it is not beneficial for children to be raised in a bubble
where they do not have exposure to other people’s cultures and other
people’s religion.”
• Public schooling would make the child “a more well-rounded
person.”
Each of these observations may or may not be true, or relevant. However, taken as
a whole, they evince an attitude toward homeschooling (and public schooling) that is
simply not reflected in the laws and policies of this state. Taken as a whole, these
observations suggest a predisposition by the trial court that, everything else being equal,
3
public schooling is invariably preferable to homeschooling, a predisposition that would
presumably also counsel in favor of public schooling in future disputes in which parents
disagreed on approaches to their children’s education.
Upon remand, I would direct the trial court to resolve the instant dispute in a
manner that is not grounded on a predisposition toward either public schooling or
homeschooling. I would require the trial court, as it has done with regard to the other
statutory factors set forth in MCL 722.23(h), to assess the best interest of this child in
terms of her particular educational needs. While there conceivably may be
circumstances-- pertaining either to the child, her parents, her parents’ relationship, or the
available schools-- that would counsel in favor of public schooling or homeschooling in
the instant case, these need to be set out with specificity and without reference to any
predisposition toward either public schooling or home schooling.1
1
Although it may be true, as the Court of Appeals suggests, that the trial court’s decision
on the child’s education was “not based on a bias against home schooling,” such
conclusion entails speculation and conjecture in light of what was actually stated.
Similarly, it is conjecture and speculation that these statements constituted mere “stray
remarks,” as the concurring statement asserts. If the Court of Appeals, and the
concurring statement, are correct in these assessments, the trial court, on remand, could
make this clear. I am comfortable that this matter can be remanded to the same judge for
further consideration.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
November 21, 2008 _________________________________________
p1118 Clerk