Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
September 26, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
135594 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
JAMES A. BECKES, Robert P. Young, Jr.
Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephen J. Markman,
Justices
v SC: 135594
COA: 270791
WCAC: 03-000210
DETROIT DIESEL CORPORATION
and NATIONAL UNION FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.
______________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 27, 2007
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals opinion in part with
regard to its application of Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144 (2002), and the
Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission’s determination that Sington is
inapplicable, and we REMAND this case to the Board of Magistrates for further
proceedings regarding disability consistent with the standards set forth in Stokes v
Chrysler LLC (Docket No. 132648), 481 Mich 266 (2008). In all other respects, leave to
appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented
should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction.
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).
I concur in this Court’s order vacating the Court of Appeals opinion in part and
remanding to the magistrate in light of Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 481 Mich 266 (2008). I
write separately only to reaffirm what I stated in Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm,
477 Mich 197 (2007) (Markman, J., concurring), in response to the incessant criticisms of
the dissenting justices concerning the majority justices’ alleged lack of regard for
precedent. See, e.g., Rowland, supra at 257 n 13 (Kelly, J., dissenting). As I observed in
Rowland, that the majority justices have overruled precedent more often than the
dissenting justices is less a function of the former respecting precedent any less than the
latter, than it is a function of the reality that the dissenting justices, unlike the majority
justices, believe that these precedents were rightly decided. This point is once again
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reinforced by what the dissenting justices are doing in the instant case, as well as in
Bessinger v Our Lady of Good Counsel (Docket No. 128870), __ Mich __ (2008); Diot v
Dep’t of Corrections (Docket No. 130702), __ Mich __ (2008); Kohler v Mercy Mem
Hosp Corp (Docket No. 135949), __ Mich __ (2008); Malloy v DSI Acoustical Co
(Docket No. 136561), __ Mich __ (2008); Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp (Docket
No. 134805), __ Mich __ (2008); Innes v Allied Automotive Group, Inc (Docket No.
134319), __ Mich __ (2008); and Jones v Comerica, Inc, 482 Mich 890 (2008).
CAVANAGH and KELLY, JJ., would deny leave to appeal.
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).
I dissent from the order partially vacating the Court of Appeals judgment with
regard to Sington v Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144 (2002), and the Workers’
Compensation Appellate Commission’s determination that Sington is inapplicable, and
remanding this case to the magistrate for further proceedings regarding disability
consistent with the standards set forth in Stokes v Chrysler LLC, 481 Mich 266 (2008).
Because I dissented from the majority opinion in this Court’s decision in Stokes v
Chrysler LLC, I vote to grant leave to appeal in this case to consider whether a majority
of this Court reached the correct decision in Stokes.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
September 26, 2008 _________________________________________
d0923 Clerk