Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
May 30, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
133292 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Stephen J. Markman,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Justices
v SC: 133292
COA: 262404
Oakland CC: 2005-063349-AS
46TH DISTRICT COURT,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________/
On April 9, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to
appeal the January 16, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court,
the application is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting
leave to appeal, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and make the
following additional observations. MCR 3.101(D) requires compliance with MCR 2.114,
and MCR 2.114(E) permits the court to order “appropriate sanctions” when a party
violates MCR 2.114. The court’s authority to sanction parties cannot be delegated to the
court clerks. See In re Huff, 352 Mich 402, 415-416 (1958) (holding that the contempt
power is “inherent and a part of the judicial power of constitutional courts”); Const 1963,
art. 3, § 2; Const 1963, art 6, § 1 (“The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in
one court of justice . . . .”) (emphasis added). Here, Chief Judge Stephen C. Cooper sent
an internal memorandum authorizing court clerks to return deficient writs of garnishment
“where there has been a clear procedural or administrative error.” Acting on that
authorization, the defendant’s clerks rejected approximately 69 deficient writs submitted
by the plaintiff and requested that the plaintiff resubmit each writ with an itemized
statement of postjudgment interest, costs and payments. After the plaintiff’s second
submission was rejected, the Chief Judge sent the plaintiff’s counsel a letter explaining
that the writs were once again being returned and requesting that the plaintiff resubmit
legible writs with an itemized statement for each. Returning the plaintiff’s writs
constitutes an “appropriate sanction” for the plaintiff’s failure to provide a “statement
verified in the manner provided in MCR 2.114(A),” MCR 3.101(D), if properly ordered
by a judge under MCR 2.114(E). The court may also order on resubmission of those
writs additional documentation that it deems helpful in making a determination whether
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the writs are conforming. However, none of the court clerk’s communications rejecting
the plaintiff’s writs or requesting the itemized statements were ordered by the chief judge
or the judge assigned to each respective writ, and the chief judge’s letter to the plaintiff’s
counsel was not an order, see MCR 2.602. Indeed, the defendant expressly disclaimed
reliance on MCR 2.114(E) in a letter from the Deputy Court Administrator that stated:
“The Court’s position has been that it is reasonable to request documentation in these
instances rather than pursue possible violations and sanctions” (emphasis added).
Because the rejections were not ordered by a judge authorized to impose such sanctions,
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the judgment of the Oakland Circuit Court
should be reversed and that the plaintiff is entitled to a writ of superintending control.
We REMAND this case to the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this order.
CAVANAGH, J., would deny leave to appeal.
KELLY, J., would grant leave to appeal.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
May 30, 2008 _________________________________________
d0527 Clerk