Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
April 9, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
135195 & (20) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Maura D. Corrigan
Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr.
SC: 135195 Stephen J. Markman,
Justices
v COA: 279702
Ottawa CC: 01-025254-FC
ANTOINE RAY THOMAS, 01-025255-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
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By order of January 8, 2008, the defendant’s former appellate counsel was
directed to file a supplemental brief. On order of the Court, the brief having been
received, the application for leave to appeal the August 21, 2007 order of the Court of
Appeals is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave
to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals and direct that court to decide
whether to grant, deny, or order other relief in accordance with MCR 7.205(D)(2). In its
August 21, 2007 order, the Court of Appeals “assume[ed]” that defendant’s motion for
resentencing was timely, in part, because the motion “was filed within 12 months of the
last counsel’s appointment.” Thus, the court appears to have restarted the 12-month
period prescribed by MCR 7.205(F)(3) from the date of appointment in light of
defendant’s otherwise untimely request for counsel under Halbert v Michigan, 545 US
605 (2005); the court similarly restarted the 12-month period from the date of
appointment in Halbert. People v Halbert, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
issued August 31, 2005 (Docket No. 244756) (Granting a period of 12 months from the
date of appointment “for filing any appropriate motions in the trial court or for filing an
application for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals.”). Appellate counsel filed both
the motion for resentencing and an application for late appeal within the 12-month
period. Accordingly, counsel did not need to adhere to the requirements of MCR
7.205(F)(4), which outlines exceptions to subrule (F)(3) that extend the 12-month period
for late appeal under certain circumstances. Because MCR 7.205(F)(4) was inapplicable
in this case, the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing defendant’s application for failure
to meet the requirements of this rule.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
April 9, 2008 _________________________________________
t0402 Clerk