Case: 22-30262 Document: 00516526119 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/28/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-30262 FILED
Summary Calendar October 28, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Kimberly Ross,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:20-cv-629
Before Clement, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Kimberly Ross appeals a denial of Social Security disability benefits.
We AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 22-30262
I
In June 2018, Ross applied for disability benefits, alleging that she had
been disabled since August 29, 2016. She asserted that she had a tethered
spinal cord, spinal bifida, diastematomyelia, disturbed sleep, cognitive
impairments, pain in her back and legs, chronic fatigue, anxiety issues,
incontinence, and numbness and tingling in her extremities. The Social
Security Administration denied her claim a few months later.
Ross requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ),
but she fared no better there. The ALJ denied Ross’s claim, finding that
while the medical record indicated Ross had severe back disorders, Ross
could nevertheless perform the full range of light work, and could thus
continue to perform her light or sedentary past relevant work. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). The ALJ also denied Ross’s
subsequent motion to reconsider. Ross asked the Appeals Council to review,
but it declined to do so, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner.
Ross appealed to the district court. The court, after recommendation
of a magistrate judge but upon full review of the record, found for the
Commissioner. It explained that the Commissioner did not violate Ross’s
right to due process; that the ALJ properly found that Ross lacked severe
lumbar, thoracic, or cervical impairments; and that the ALJ did not abuse its
discretion in how it represented and relied upon the opinions of Ross’s
doctors, statements she made to those doctors, or her course of treatment.
She now seeks our review.
II
But our review is limited. We look only to whether “the final decision
[of the Commissioner] is supported by substantial evidence” and whether
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“the Commissioner used the proper legal standards to evaluate the
evidence.” Whitehead v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 776, 779 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (quotations and citation omitted). We only find a Commissioner’s
decision unsupported by substantial evidence when “no credible evidentiary
choices or medical findings support the decision.” Id. (quotations and
citation omitted). The decision must rest on “more than a scintilla [of
evidence], but it need not be a preponderance.” Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d
558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotations and citation omitted).
Ross argues that the ALJ erred in two ways. First, says Ross, the ALJ
failed to consider all relevant evidence. Ross points to scientific literature
she submitted, as well as certain comments made by Ross’s doctors, that
went undiscussed in the ALJ’s ultimate opinion. But as we have noted time
and again, an “ALJ is not always required to do an exhaustive point-by-point
discussion” of the evidence he reviews. Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448
(5th Cir. 2007). The ALJ here explained that his findings came only “[a]fter
careful consideration of the entire record . . . .” Just because the ALJ did not
mention Ross’s proffered literature or any specific physician commentary
“does not necessarily mean that he failed to consider [them],” Hammond v.
Barnhart, 124 F. App’x 847, 851 (5th Cir. 2005), especially where, as here,
he wrote that he did. We find no error.
Second, Ross contends that the ALJ took other evidence out of context.
She first faults the ALJ for noting that one of her doctors wrote “that [her
MRI] results were interesting but did not explain her pain syndrome.” Ross
takes this to insinuate that the ALJ believes doctors failed to determine a
cause for her pain, something she claims untrue. But the doctor did make
that note, and the ALJ saying so isn’t a misrepresentation. And elsewhere,
the ALJ agrees with Ross’s argued diagnosis, noting that “[t]he objective
medical evidence supports a finding that . . . [Ross] had limitations due to her
tethered spinal cord and diastematomyelia.”
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Next, Ross challenges the ALJ’s claim that she “did not have the sort
of treatment that one would expect from an individual with disabling pain.”
She saw eight doctors, says Ross, and underwent months of physical therapy
and trials of medications. But the ALJ doesn’t disagree—he acknowledges
that she saw multiple doctors, underwent physical therapy, and tried
medication. What Ross seems to want is for the ALJ to have weighed that
evidence differently and concluded her course of treatment was more
involved. But that is not for us to say—we do not reweigh the evidence. See
Garcia v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 2018) (“We will not re-weigh
the evidence nor, in the event of evidentiary conflict or uncertainty, will we
substitute our judgment for the Commissioner’s, even if we believe the
evidence weighs against the Commissioner’s decision.” (quotations and
citation omitted)).
After that, Ross disputes the ALJ’s assertion that surgery was not
recommended, claiming she was recommended surgery. Missing from her
argument, however, is who recommended it. She points first to the fact that
Dr. Greenfield gave her the option of surgery. But an option is not a
recommendation—the record does not support that Greenfield advised Ross
to get surgery. Ross’s second doctor, Dr. Soleau, also does not seem to have
recommended surgery. He wrote that he believed “the risk of surgical
treatment of this process far outweighs the benefit.” Nor does her third
doctor, Dr. Sigler, appear to have recommended surgery. Though he writes
that Ross “has been recommended to have surgery,”—seemingly referring
to a recommendation by a different doctor—he notes that he has little
experience with this condition and is “skeptical [that] surgery would help
significantly with [Ross’s] pain.” All told, that the ALJ believed this record
summed to the conclusion that Ross was not recommended surgery is not
error. Rather, it was supported by significant evidence and lay within the
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ALJ’s discretion to resolve evidentiary conflicts. See Selders v. Sullivan, 914
F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
Ross next disagrees that while she sought treatment for her symptoms,
she “contemporaneous[ly]” informed doctors that she valued exercise and
would continue to do it as best she could. Ross argues that these statements
were months before her ultimate diagnosis, and that she ultimately had to
reduce the exercise she could do. Maybe so, but the ALJ was not wrong that
during the period under review, Ross told her doctors that she was doing
yoga, got some symptomatic relief through exercise, and would continue to
walk (even if that was all she could manage). Saying so is not
misrepresentation.
To sum up, the ALJ did not misrepresent the record and committed
no error.
AFFIRMED.
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