In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-22-00079-CV
IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF TIMOTHY DANIEL RENSHAW
Original Habeas Proceeding
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After a jury determined that Timothy Daniel Renshaw was a sexually violent predator as
defined in Section 841.003 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 841.003, the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and committed
Renshaw for treatment and supervision, to begin upon Renshaw’s release from prison, see TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081. Renshaw appealed the trial court’s judgment. See In
re Commitment of Renshaw, 598 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (affirming
sexually-violent-predator finding). Renshaw has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
this Court claiming that his continued confinement is unlawful because his “‘behavioral
abnormality’ has changed to the extent that Renshaw is no longer likely to engage in a predatory
act of sexual violence.” Because we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over this original
proceeding, we dismiss the petition.
The jurisdictional provisions of the Texas Constitution relating to appellate courts are
found in Article V, Section 6(a), which provides, in pertinent part:
Said Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the
limits of their respective districts, which shall extend to all cases of which the
District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under
such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law. . . . Said courts
shall have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by
law.
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a). In accordance with Article V, Section 6(a), we have original
jurisdiction as prescribed by law. Our jurisdiction in original appellate proceedings seeking
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extraordinary relief—such as a writ of habeas corpus—is prescribed by Section 22.221(d) of the
Texas Government Code, which provides, in relevant part:
Concurrently with the supreme court, the court of appeals of a court of appeals
district in which a person is restrained in his liberty, or a justice of the court of
appeals, may issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that the restraint of
liberty is by virtue of an order, process, or commitment issued by a court or judge
because of the violation of an order, judgment, or decree previously made,
rendered, or entered by the court or judge in a civil case.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.221(d) (Supp.).
Because section 22.221(d) grants original habeas jurisdiction when a person is
restrained ‘by virtue of an order . . . issued by a court . . . because of the violation
of an order, judgment, or decree previously made . . . by the court or judge in a
civil case[,]’ we lack original habeas jurisdiction to consider an order that does
not involve a contemnor’s violation of a previous court order.
In re Wilson, No. 09-16-00140-CV, 2016 WL 3019289, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 26,
2016, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mem. op.); see Ex parte Hawkins, 885 S.W.2d 586, 588
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (appellate court’s “original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus is limited to those cases in which a person’s liberty is
restrained because the person has violated an order, judgment, or decree entered in a civil case”);
see In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 369–70 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (court lacked habeas
jurisdiction of judgment for constructive contempt under statute describing Texas Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction).
Because the allegations in Renshaw’s petition do not fall within the parameters of Section
22.221(d), we lack jurisdiction over this original proceeding.
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We dismiss for want of jurisdiction Renshaw’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Scott E. Stevens
Justice
Date Submitted: October 31, 2022
Date Decided: November 1, 2022
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