Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED DECEMBER 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 132887
MICHAEL WILLIAM STAMPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
At issue in this case is whether a four-year-old injured child can be
sufficiently aware of his impending death so that a statement given when death
was imminent qualifies for admission as evidence under the dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule, MRE 804(b)(2). In lieu of granting leave to appeal,
we affirm defendant’s convictions and hold that a child may have the capacity to
be conscious of his own impending death for purposes of the dying declaration
exception.
We adopt the facts as set forth by the Court of Appeals:
The victim in this case is Jake Logan, the son of defendant’s
girlfriend, Gloria Ann Logan, who is also the mother of defendant’s
child. During the late afternoon or evening of September 8, 2004,
defendant gave the victim a bath. Gloria heard the victim crying
during the bath. After the bath, the victim was “passing out,” and
defendant put him in the bathtub to revive him. The victim later lay
on the bed with Gloria. When Gloria asked him to open his eyes, he
responded, “Mom, I can’t, I’m dead.” Defendant’s daughter, Jamie,
indicated that the victim stated, “don’t bother me, I’m already dead.”
Gloria called her father, who came over and eventually called 911.
The victim was admitted to the hospital that evening with
bruises on his neck, arms, chest, abdomen, groin, testicles, and legs.
Nurse Hillary Hart asked the victim how he got his bruises, and the
victim responded, “from ‘Mike.’” Nurse Lisa Blanchette asked the
victim who Mike was, and the victim responded, “Mom’s wife.”
The victim died shortly thereafter.
According to Dr. Leigh Hlavaty, an expert in forensic
pathology, the victim had 88 bruises on his body as well as anal
injuries. Hlavaty testified that the anal injuries were consistent with
anal penetration. Hlavaty opined that all of the victim’s bruises and
injuries were sustained within twenty-four hours of his death and
that the victim’s internal injuries were likely sustained within the
two to six hours preceding the victim’s admission into the hospital.
He stated that an adult male fist or being struck with a blunt object in
the abdomen likely caused the victim’s injuries. [Unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 16,
2006 (Docket No. 263436), pp 1-2.]
The trial court admitted Jake’s statements implicating defendant under the dying
declaration exception. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Hearsay is an unsworn, out-of-court statement that is offered to establish
the truth of the matter asserted. MRE 801(c). It is generally inadmissible unless it
falls under one of the hearsay exceptions set forth in the Michigan Rules of
Evidence. MRE 802. One of these exceptions is MRE 804(b)(2), commonly
known as the dying declaration exception, which provides that a statement by a
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declarant is admissible if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the
statement was made “while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent,
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be
impending death.” We review a trial court’s admission of evidence under a
hearsay exception to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion.
People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 485; 550 NW2d 505 (1996).
Before admitting a statement as a dying declaration, the trial court must
make a preliminary investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
statement. People v Johnson, 334 Mich 169, 173-174; 54 NW2d 206 (1952);
People v Fritch, 210 Mich 343, 346-347; 178 NW 59 (1920). The trial court, in
advance of the proof of the declaration itself, may “‘allow evidence as to the
circumstances under which the dying declaration was taken to show whether it
was really taken when the declarant was under the conviction of approaching and
inevitable death . . . .’” Fritch, supra at 347, quoting People v Christmas, 181
Mich 634, 646; 148 NW 369 (1914). If the surrounding circumstances clearly
establish that the declarant was in extremis and believed that his death was
impending, the court may admit statements concerning the cause or circumstances
of the declarant’s impending death as substantive evidence under MRE 804(b)(2).
Johnson, supra at 173.
Here, we conclude that the requirements for admissibility have been met.
Jake was clearly unavailable as a witness. MRE 804(a)(4). His statement to his
mother, “Mom, I can’t, I’m dead,” when considered along with his injuries, clearly
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indicated his belief that his death was imminent. Johnson, supra at 173. And his
statements to the nurses that he received his injuries from “Mike” and that Mike
was “Mom’s wife” clearly concerned the circumstances of what Jake believed to
be his impending death. MRE 804(b)(2).
We reject defendant’s argument that a four-year-old child cannot be aware
of impending death. Whether a child was conscious of his own impending death
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As with an adult, if the facts show, as
they do here, that the child believed that he was about to die, statements he made
may be proffered as dying declarations. A declarant’s age alone does not preclude
the admission of a dying declaration. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals
decision to uphold the trial court’s admission of the victim’s statements.
The remainder of defendant’s application is denied, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Affirmed.
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
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