Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
December 7, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
131823 & (58)(59)(61) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
JAMES J. CARTER, Robert P. Young, Jr.
Plaintiff-Appellant, Stephen J. Markman,
Justices
v SC: 131823
COA: 258282
Washtenaw CC: 04-000346-AW
ANN ARBOR CITY ATTORNEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the motions for leave to file brief amicus curiae are
GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the June 27, 2006 judgment of the Court
of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the
questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
MARKMAN, J., dissents and states as follows:
The veterans’ preference act states that “[i]n every public department and upon the
public works of the state and of every county and municipal corporation thereof[,]
honorably discharged veteran[s] . . . shall be preferred for appointment and
employment.” MCL 35.401 (emphasis added). However, to be “preferred,” a veteran
must possess “other requisite qualifications.” Id. This Court has never fully considered
the nature and extent of the veterans’ preference. Is a veteran to be preferred only if all
things are “equal and comparable” between applicants? Are things ever truly “equal and
comparable” between applicants when a public employer may consider subjective
factors and not merely objective factors such as test scores? If the preference pertains to
circumstances in which applicants are not “equal and comparable,” when would this be
so? How substantial would the preference be in such circumstances? Are “requisite
qualifications” to be viewed in an “either/or” sense, such that an applicant is either
qualified or not qualified, or are qualifications to be evaluated along a continuum, such
that an applicant may be viewed as being better or less qualified than another? If the
latter is the proper understanding, when would the preference apply and how substantial
would it be? Are standards required to ensure that the preference is given genuine effect,
or is it sufficient that courts defer to the judgments of individual public employers? Is
2
greater or lesser judicial scrutiny required of employment decisions implicating the
veterans’ preference than is required of other public employment decisions, such as those
pertaining to nondiscrimination laws? The veterans’ preference act is worthy of thorough
review and of an authoritative interpretation that gives it practical and effective meaning.
Accordingly, I would grant leave to appeal.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
December 7, 2007 _________________________________________
t1204 Clerk