Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
January 20, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
130109-10 & (59) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
GLORIA JACKSON, Maura D. Corrigan
Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman,
Justices
v SC: 130109
COA: 261588
Oakland CC: 04-058216-CH
LAKER GROUP, L.L.C., and KROLL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________/
LAKER GROUP, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v SC: 130110
COA: 261594
Oakland CC: 04-058945-CK
GLORIA JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________/
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 3, 2005
judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The stay
previously entered by this Court on December 28, 2005 is DISSOLVED.
CAVANAGH, J., would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
this case to the circuit court for trial.
KELLY, J., dissents and states as follows:
The Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals majority and
remand this case for trial consistent with Judge White’s dissent. Otherwise, plaintiff
Gloria Jackson will lose the home in which she has lived and on which she has made
mortgage payments for the past ten years. This will occur on the basis of a record that
raises more questions than it answers.
2
The facts of the case are that plaintiff paid defendant Kroll Construction $5,000
and obtained financing from Kroll for an additional $3,300 so that Kroll would remodel
her bathroom. She executed a mortgage as security for the note. The record contains a
copy of the mortgage but no one can find the note. There is evidence that the note
required a “signed completion certificate” before payments were due.
Plaintiff claims that some of the remodeling was not done correctly, that she
complained to Kroll, but that Kroll sent no one to follow up as promised. Plaintiff never
signed a certificate of completion, nor was she asked to sign one. She did not pay off the
note. Kroll foreclosed on the property by advertisement, purchased the entire property at
the sheriff’s foreclosure sale for $4,200, and conveyed its interest to defendant Laker for
$7,000. Plaintiff asserts that the fair market value of the property is $125,000.
Laker sought summary eviction of plaintiff in the district court. Plaintiff opposed
the action and filed a quiet title action in the circuit court. The circuit court granted
summary disposition to Laker, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the statutory procedures were properly followed in the foreclosure sale. Plaintiff
appealed from the dismissal of her action to quiet title and from the adverse summary
disposition order. The Court of Appeals majority affirmed both orders.
I find Judge White’s Court of Appeals dissent persuasive. There are genuine
issues of fact regarding whether plaintiff defaulted on the promissory note and mortgage.
Arguably a signed certificate of completion would initiate her obligation to pay off the
note. But no signed certificate of completion exists. It is possible that plaintiff is not in
default.
Without a default, the power to sell property does not become operable. MCL
600.3204(1)(a). If there has been no default, the sheriff’s sale was improper and passed
no title. A sheriff’s deed on foreclosure of a mortgage that is not in default at the time of
the foreclosure passes no title to the purchaser. Bowen v Brogan, 119 Mich 218 (1899).
I would reverse the court orders below and remand the case for trial consistent
with Judge White’s dissent.
WEAVER, J., joins the statement of KELLY, J.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
January 20, 2006 _________________________________________
d0117 Clerk