Order Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
December 15, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice
126795 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman,
KENNETH R. DEYO, Justices
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v SC: 126795
COA: 245210
Livingston CC: 01-030982-DM
VICKI E. DEYO,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________/
On November 10, 2005 the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave
to appeal the May 25, 2004 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the
application for leave to appeal is again considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in
lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE in part the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and REMAND this case to the Livingston Circuit Court for reconsideration of
the property division portion of the judgment of divorce. The Circuit Court properly
recognized that invasion of the plaintiff’s separate inherited property is permitted only if
the court specifically determines that the defendant “contributed to the acquisition,
improvement, or accumulation of the property[,]” MCL 552.401, or that defendant’s
award is insufficient for her suitable support and maintenance, MCL 552.23(1), see Dart
v Dart, 460 Mich 573 (1999), and Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490 (1997). However,
the circuit court’s finding was insufficient to support either statutory basis. If, upon
reconsideration, the Livingston Circuit Court alters the property division, it may, if
necessary, amend the spousal support award. The court may conduct additional
proceedings or evidentiary hearings as it deems appropriate.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
CORRIGAN, J., dissents and states as follows:
I would deny leave to appeal.
2
The parties married in 1977 and remained married for 25 years before they
divorced in 2001. During the marriage, plaintiff worked as a grave-digger and landscaper
and made approximately $25,000 a year. Defendant was primarily a homemaker during
the marriage.
In 1994, plaintiff’s father, Orville Quinney, became ill, and the parties began
caring for him. In 1996, plaintiff’s father moved into a new house with the parties, and
plaintiff quit his job to care for his father full time. Plaintiff was the conservator of his
father’s estate and apparently used those assets to substitute for his outside employment.
Plaintiff’s father died in 1997 and left a large inheritance1 to plaintiff alone. The
inheritance consisted primarily of securities, a bank account, and real estate in South
Lyon, Howell, Warren, Roseville, and Milford.
The trial court agreed with plaintiff that some of the real estate and securities
inherited by plaintiff had not been commingled with the marital estate and were part of
plaintiff’s separate estate. However, the court included this separate property in the
marital estate for distribution purposes because the court believed that defendant’s
“assistance in caring for [plaintiff’s] father as well as her continuation in the strained
marriage for so many years created a situation whereby she did contribute to the inherited
estate.” The court awarded defendant the entire marital estate of $714,6342 and half of a
piece of plaintiff’s inherited South Lyon property (the Eleven-Mile Road farm) worth
$798,400.3
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split unpublished opinion per curiam. The
majority concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the entire
inherited estate should be included in the marital estate because defendant contributed to
the acquisition of the inherited estate by assisting with the care of plaintiff’s father.
I favor denying leave to appeal, first, because this case presents absolutely no
issues of jurisprudential significance. The outcome of this case turns on its particular
facts. The law regarding the division of inherited property in divorce proceedings has
been thoroughly addressed by this Court. The only reason to interfere in the lower
courts’ rulings is to engage in error correction. Because I do not believe that the Court of
Appeals decision is “clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice,” MCR
7.302(B)(5), this Court should deny leave to appeal.
1
Plaintiff testified that the inheritance was worth $2,339,133.71 at the time of the divorce
proceedings.
2
The inherited property that was jointly owned or comanaged by the parties was included
in the $714,634 marital estate. Plaintiff agreed that this portion of the inheritance should
be included in the marital estate.
3
Defendant’s award totaled 36 percent of the total estate.
3
Additionally, I believe that the trial court properly included the inherited assets in
the marital estate for distribution purposes. First, plaintiff commingled the inherited
property with the marital property. “[P]roperty received by a married party as an
inheritance, but kept separate from marital property, is deemed to be separate property
not subject to distribution.” Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 584-585 (1999) (emphasis
added). “[T]he marital estate . . . include[s] the appreciation in value of the husband’s
separate assets that he actively managed during the marriage . . . .” Id. at 585 n 6.
Here, the parties used the inherited assets to make purchases to improve the
marital estate. When plaintiff’s father became ill, the parties used the father’s money to
purchase a new home, where the three of them lived together. After the father died,
plaintiff recorded a deed transferring that house to defendant and him. The parties used
inherited funds to buy another house next door, which they rented out. The parties also
used inherited funds to remodel the marital home, to pay joint credit card debts, and to
purchase fertilizer, a power washer, a truck, and lawn maintenance equipment for
plaintiff’s planned new business, as well as a car for their daughter. Plaintiff’s use of the
inherited assets in this manner shows that he treated certain of the inherited assets as
marital property.
Second, the trial court correctly concluded that the inheritance should be included
as part of the marital estate because defendant helped care for plaintiff’s sick father. A
spouse’s separate assets may be included in the marital estate if the award is “insufficient
for the suitable support and maintenance” of the other party, MCL 552.23(1), or the other
party “contributed to the acquisition, improvement, or accumulation of the property,”
MCL 552.401. Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 494-495 (1997). The parties
decided not to put plaintiff’s father in a nursing home because it was more economical to
care for him themselves. Plaintiff quit his regular job to care for his father, became the
conservator of his father’s estate, and the parties supported themselves with plaintiff’s
father’s money while he was alive. Defendant was involved in caring for plaintiff’s
father, which included bringing him meals and making him comfortable. By helping
with the care of plaintiff’s father, defendant assisted in keeping him out of a nursing
home. In Reeves, supra at 495, the Court of Appeals explained that a spouse’s separate
property can be invaded under these types of circumstances:
[I]n Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 294; 527 NW2d 792
(1995), this Court held that the defendant’s inherited stock in a family-
owned company was available for invasion because the plaintiff’s handling
of child-rearing and domestic duties had freed the defendant to concentrate
on building up that company. The Hanaway Court found that the
4
defendant’s stock had “appreciated because of defendant’s efforts,
facilitated by plaintiff’s activities at home.” Id. at 294.
Similarly here, defendant’s efforts to care for plaintiff’s father preserved the
father’s fortune by saving the costs associated with a nursing home. Additionally, the
money saved by caring for plaintiff’s father at home presumably accrued interest,
allowing the estate to appreciate in value. Thus, when plaintiff’s father died, the
inheritance was larger because of defendant’s efforts. Defendant thus “contributed to the
acquisition, improvement, or accumulation” of the inherited property under MCL
552.401.
WEAVER and KELLY, JJ., join the statement of CORRIGAN, J.
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the
foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.
December 15, 2005 _________________________________________
p1208 Clerk