Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:
Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2005
COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF
MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
and
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v o. 125665
N
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,
STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM.
This case involves the authority of the Governor,
exercised in Executive Order No. 2001-9, to reduce the
Legislature’s allocation of general sales taxes to the
Comprehensive Transportation Fund (CTF) by $12,750,000 for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and to transfer
those revenues to the state’s general fund. Appellants
claim that the general sales tax revenues allocated to the
CTF are “constitutionally dedicated” funds within the
meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9, and therefore immune to
the Governor’s power to balance the budget, Const 1963, art
5, § 20.
The Court of Appeals concluded that art 9, § 9, which
it found to be ambiguous, does not dedicate any portion of
the general sales tax revenues for comprehensive
transportation purposes. 260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340
(2004). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
revenues at issue are not constitutionally dedicated and
that the Governor had the authority to reduce the
Legislature’s allocation of general sales tax revenues to
the CTF in EO 2001-9. We disagree, however, that art 9, §
9 is ambiguous. In affirming the Court of Appeals, we rely
on the plain meaning of the constitutional provision.
2
I. Facts and Procedural History
To alleviate a budget shortfall for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2002, the Governor implemented EO
2001-9. The order transferred $12,750,000 in general sales
tax revenues from the CTF to the general fund.
Plaintiffs sought and obtained a preliminary
injunction from the Ingham Circuit Court to enjoin the
transfer. Plaintiffs maintained that the general sales tax
revenues allocated to the CTF were “constitutionally
dedicated” within the meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9 and
immune to the Governor’s power to reduce the expenditure
and balance the budget under Const 1963, art 5, § 20.
In a published decision, the Court of Appeals
reversed. 260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340 (2004). The
Court of Appeals found the language of the constitutional
provision ambiguous, and examined the historical
development of art 9, § 9 in determining whether the
allocation to the CTF was “constitutionally dedicated.” We
granted oral argument on the application. 471 Mich 887
(2004).
II. Standard of Review
Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Wayne Co
v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 455; 684 NW2d 765 (2004).
3
Our first inquiry, when interpreting constitutional
provisions, “is to determine the text’s original meaning to
the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.”
Id. at 468. This is accomplished by “applying each term’s
plain meaning at the time of ratification.” Id. at 468-
469. See also Silver Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Div,
Inc, 468 Mich 367, 375; 663 NW2d 436 (2003).
III. Analysis
The Governor’s authority to reduce state expenditures
is found in art 5, § 20, which states:
No appropriation shall be a mandate to
spend. The governor, with the approval of the
appropriating committees of the house and senate,
shall reduce expenditures authorized by
appropriations whenever it appears that actual
revenues for a fiscal period will fall below the
revenue estimates on which appropriations for
that period were based. Reductions in
expenditures shall be made in accordance with
procedures prescribed by law. The governor may
not reduce expenditures of the legislative and
judicial branches or from funds constitutionally
dedicated for specific purposes. [Emphasis
added.]
The disputed issue in this case is whether the general
sales tax revenues that the Legislature allocated to the
CTF are “constitutionally dedicated for specific purposes,”
and therefore immune from the Governor’s authority to
reduce expenditures. The answer to this question is found
in art 9, § 9, which states, in relevant part:
4
All specific taxes, except general sales and
use taxes and regulatory fees, imposed directly
or indirectly on fuels sold or used to propel
motor vehicles upon highways and to propel
aircraft and on registered motor vehicles and
aircraft shall, after the payment of necessary
collection expenses, be used exclusively for
transportation purposes as set forth in this
section.
* * *
Amount used for transportation purposes.
The balance, if any, of the specific taxes,
except general sales and use taxes and regulatory
fees, imposed directly or indirectly on fuels
sold or used to propel motor vehicles upon
highways and on registered motor vehicles, after
the payment of necessary collection expenses;
. . . and not more than 25 percent of the general
sales taxes, imposed directly or indirectly on
fuel sold to propel motor vehicles upon highways,
on the sale of motor vehicles, and on the sale of
the parts and accessories of motor vehicles . . .
shall be used exclusively for the transportation
purposes of comprehensive transportation purposes
as defined by law. [Emphasis added.] [1]
While construing the wording of art 9, § 9 might
require effort, the provision’s meaning is clear. The
provision limits the amount of general sales taxes that the
Legislature can allocate to comprehensive transportation to
1
The manner in which any funds allocated under this
provision to “comprehensive transportation purposes” will
be distributed is set forth in the General Sales Tax Act,
MCL 205.51 et seq. For fiscal year 2001-2002, MCL
205.75(4) apportioned only 27.9 percent of the 25 percent
of revenues to the CTF. The balance of the general sales
tax revenues described in art 9, § 9 was directed to the
state general fund.
5
“not more than 25 percent of the general sales taxes . . .
.” In doing so, it places a ceiling on the amount of
general sales tax revenues that can be used “exclusively
for . . . comprehensive transportation purposes . . . ,”
but does not dedicate any specific amount of general sales
taxes to be used for comprehensive transportation purposes.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from art 9, § 9 is
that the general sales tax revenues described in that
provision are not constitutionally dedicated funds.
When construing art 9, § 9, the Court of Appeals
mistakenly found that the constitutional provision was
subject to alternative interpretations, and then
unnecessarily considered its history and purpose and the
circumstances under which it was written and later amended.
See 260 Mich App 307-311. As described above, the Court
should have looked no further than the plain language of
art 9, § 9 to determine that the general sales tax revenues
allocated by the Legislature to the CTF were not
constitutionally dedicated funds. Our obligation is to
give the words of our Constitution a reasonable
interpretation consistent with the plain meaning understood
by the ratifiers. Hathcock, 471 Mich at 468-469. Text
that may require reasonable effort to parse is not for that
reason ambiguous.
6
IV
In sum, we conclude that art 9, § 9 is unambiguous,
and we agree with the Court of Appeals that, with respect
to the reduction of the general sales tax revenues
allocated to the CTF by EO 2001-9, the executive order was
a lawful exercise of the Governor’s constitutional
authority under art 5, § 20.
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals resolution of
this issue in favor of the defendants. In all other
respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not
persuaded that the remaining questions should be reviewed
by this Court. This case is remanded to the trial court
for entry of a judgment in favor of defendants on the
merits.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
CAVANAGH, J.
I concur in the result only.
Michael F. Cavanagh
7
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF
MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
and
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 125665
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,
STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring). I concur in the result of the
opinion per curiam because I agree that the revenues at
issue are not constitutionally dedicated and that the
Governor had the authority to reduce the Legislature’s
allocation of general sales tax revenues to the
Comprehensive Transportation Fund. As noted by the
majority opinion, Const 1963, art 9, § 9 places a ceiling
on the amount of general sales tax revenues that can be
used for comprehensive transportation purposes, but it does
not dedicate any specific amount of general sales tax
revenues to be used for comprehensive transportation
purposes. I also agree with the majority that art 9, § 9
is not ambiguous.
I write separately because I cannot join some of the
principles of constitutional interpretation, as they are
articulated and applied in the opinion per curiam,
including the standard of review section of the opinion,
which relies on cases in which I concurred in part and
dissented in part. See Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445,
485; 684 NW2d 765 (2004) (Weaver, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part), and Silver Creek Drain Dist v
Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 382; 663 NW2d 436 (2003)
(Weaver, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
each of these cases, I disagreed with the method by which
the majority attempted to carry out our mandate that we
2
interpret a constitutional provision according to the
“common understanding” that the people would give it.1
Further, although I agree that the Court of Appeals
was wrong to conclude that art 9, § 9 is ambiguous, I would
not be unduly critical of the Court of Appeals for
considering the history and purpose of the amendment. Ante
at 6. A court may “also consider the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and
the purpose sought to be accomplished by it” when the
common understanding of the provision is questioned. Wayne
Co, supra at 487 (citing Traverse City School Dist, supra
1
As described by Justice Cooley, the rule of “common
understanding” means:
“A constitution is made for the people and
by the people. The interpretation that should be
given it is that which reasonable minds, the
great mass of the people themselves, would give
it. ‘For as the Constitution does not derive its
force from the convention which framed, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not
to be supposed that they have looked for any dark
or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but
rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and
ratified the instrument in the belief that that
was the sense designed to be conveyed.’”
[Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General,
384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), quoting
Cooley’s Const Lim 81 (emphasis in Traverse City
School Dist).]
3
at 405). Moreover, when interpreting a constitution, “the
technical rules of statutory construction do not apply.”
Traverse City School Dist, supra at 405.
For these reasons, I concur in the result of the
opinion per curiam.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
4
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY ROAD ASSOICATION OF MICHIGAN
and CHIPPEWA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
CAPITAL AREA TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, and SUBURBAN MOBILITY
AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 125665
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSORTATION, DIRECTOR
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR, STATE
TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
SECRETARY OF STATE, and STATE OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (concurring in the result only).
I concur with the majority that general sales tax
revenues are not constitutionally dedicated funds for the
reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The
Governor has the authority to reduce the Legislature’s
allocation of general sales tax revenues to the
Comprehensive Transportation Fund.
I write separately because, unlike the majority on
this Court, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Const
1963, art 9, § 9 is ambiguous. It is ambiguous because it
reasonably has “several possible meanings or
interpretations.”1
The Court of Appeals panel accurately explains the
nature of the ambiguity:
[The section] unequivocally exempts all
general sales taxes from the restrictions imposed
on specific taxes but then simultaneously
subjects up to twenty-five percent of general
sales taxes to the very same restrictions.” [260
Mich App 299, 306; 677 NW2d 340 (2004) (emphasis
in original).]
When interpreting an ambiguous constitutional
provision, it is proper for a court to consider its history
and purpose. The Court of Appeals did not err when it
looked outside the text to the section’s history and
purpose to determine which of the text’s several possible
meanings was intended. The majority’s criticism of this
approach is misplaced.
For these reasons, I concur only in the result of the
majority opinion.
Marilyn Kelly
1
This is the first definition of “ambiguous” found in
the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001).
2