J-A26013-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EDWARD UNRATH :
:
Appellant : No. 1966 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 19, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008350-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2022
Edward Unrath appeals from the judgment of sentence of forty to
eighty-four months of imprisonment imposed following his convictions of
aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person
(“REAP”), and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). We affirm.
The trial court offered the following summary of the facts underlying
Appellant’s convictions:
[The victim, Jason Gotwalt,] left his home to go to work at
approximately 7:00 a.m. on August 12, 2019. He left through the
front door of the house, which faces the street, and walked
towards his driveway via the front walkway. [An] assailant
approached Mr. Gotwalt holding a taser. This prompted Mr.
Gotwalt to flee towards the front steps of his home, where he fell
to the ground. While on the ground, Mr. Gotwalt was tased twice
on the back of his shoulder. Mr. Gotwalt then turned over, and
the assailant punched Mr. Gotwalt’s face and upper body
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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repeatedly (approximately 15 times). The attacker then ceased
his attack, and ran down the front lawn toward the street as a
pickup truck pulled up near the house. The attacker got into the
truck, and it [sped] away. Mr. Gotwalt sustained injuries of a
broken nose, skin lacerations to his shoulders and arms, and
bruising on the back of his shoulder. All parties agree that the
assault occurred as described by Mr. Gotwalt, and that the
assailant fled as a passenger in the vehicle.
Mr. Gotwalt identified [Appellant] as the driver of the
getaway vehicle. Mr. Gotwalt knew [Appellant] prior to the assault
because [Appellant] is Mr. Gotwalt’s ex-girlfriend’s uncle. Mr.
Gotwalt had previously met [Appellant] in this context on five or
six occasions. On these occasions, Mr. Gotwalt also observed
[Appellant]’s vehicle, which he found memorable because it is a
silver pickup truck with mismatched doors and fenders. Mr.
Gotwalt identified the getaway vehicle as that same silver pickup
truck with mismatched doors and fenders.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/4/22, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
Appellant was charged with the above-referenced offenses along with
criminal conspiracy. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court found
Appellant guilty of all charges.1 Appellant filed a pre-sentence motion for
extraordinary relief contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his convictions and the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The
trial court granted the motion as to conspiracy, changing the verdict on that
count to a judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the motion in all other
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1 The man charged with being the assailant was acquitted based upon
insufficient identification evidence.
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respects, and imposed the sentence indicated above on the remaining
convictions.2
Although Appellant indicated at sentencing his desire to file an appeal,
trial counsel failed to do so. Appellant’s direct appeal rights were subsequently
reinstated through a Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, and this
appeal was timely filed. Counsel failed to timely comply with the trial court’s
order to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court nonetheless addressed the issues raised
in Appellant’s late filing in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, rendering the issues ripe
for our review.3 Appellant raises the following question for our consideration:
“Was there sufficient evidence to prove aggravated assault, [PIC], simple
assault and [REAP] beyond a reasonable doubt?” Appellant’s brief at 3.
The following principles guide our review:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for a
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
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2Specifically, the court sentenced Appellant to forty to eighty-four months for
aggravated assault and imposed no penalties for the other convictions.
3 See Commonwealth v. Williams, 245 A.3d 710, 715 (Pa.Super. 2021)
(“‘When counsel has filed an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement and the trial
court has addressed those issues, we need not remand [pursuant to Rule
1925(c)(3)] and may address the merits of the issues presented.’
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 39 A.3d 335, 340 (Pa.Super. 2012).”).
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possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered.
Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hobel, 275 A.3d 1049, 1069 n.8 (Pa.Super. 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Appellant does not dispute that the Commonwealth proved that Mr.
Gotwalt’s assailant committed aggravated assault, simple assault, REAP, and
PIC.4 Appellant’s challenge is to the evidentiary support for a finding that he
was vicariously liable for the assailant’s criminal conduct. Specifically,
Appellant argues that there was no evidence offered to prove that he had prior
knowledge of the assault or that he was present during its commission. See
Appellant’s brief at 5. He maintains that his lone act of driving the assailant
away was not itself enough to establish his culpability. Id.
Appellant was legally accountable for the conduct of the assailant if he
acted as his accomplice. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(a), (b)(3). One is culpable as
an accomplice if, “with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense, he . . . aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in
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4The trial court’s opinion details the evidence that proved each element of
each crime. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/4/22, at 5-8.
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planning or committing it[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c)(1)(ii). “Accomplice liability
requires only aid, not an agreement.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d
91, 95 (Pa.Super. 2019). “An accomplice’s conduct does not have to result in
and of itself in the criminal offense, but rather an accomplice’s conduct must,
with the intent to promote or facilitate, aid one whose conduct does causally
result in the criminal offense.” Commonwealth v. Bridges, 381 A.2d 125,
128 (Pa. 1977). Similarly, the accomplice’s intent need not be to cause a
particular result, only to aid in the principal’s commission of the offense. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 32 A.3d 613, 624 (Pa. 2011).
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish
accomplice liability. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010,
1024 (Pa.Super. 2002). Rather, the Commonwealth’s burden is to prove that
the defendant had some slight participation in the crime. See
Commonwealth v. Wagaman, 408, 627 A.2d 735, 740 (Pa.Super. 1993).
However, “[t]he least degree of concert of collusion is sufficient to sustain a
finding of responsibility as an accomplice.” Commonwealth v. Coccioletti,
425 A.2d 387, 390 (Pa. 1981).
Direct evidence of an accomplice’s intent to aid the perpetrator of a
crime is unnecessary. As with any element of a crime, “the Commonwealth
may rely wholly upon circumstantial evidence.” Jordan, supra at 95. As our
Supreme Court has explained, “a shared criminal intent between the principal
and his accomplice may be inferred from a defendant’s words or conduct or
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from the attendant circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960,
969 (Pa. 2019). Inferences may not be based upon mere suspicion, but must
be logical conclusions drawn from proven facts. See Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa.Super. 2008).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence at issue in the
case sub judice. The trial court rejected Appellant’s claim that the
Commonwealth failed to offer sufficient evidence that he acted as an
accomplice, explaining as follows:
For purposes of a criminal conviction as an accomplice, the
amount of aid rendered may be insubstantial, provided it was
rendered in support of a criminal act. Commonwealth v.
Murray, 83 A.3d 137 (Pa. 2013). A person who waits in the
vicinity of a criminal act for the purpose of acting as a getaway
driver is as guilty of the underlying crime as is the main criminal
actor. Commonwealth v. Coyle, 203 A.2d 782 (Pa. 1964).
Acting merely as a driver is not sufficient to demonstrate that a
person was an accomplice—there must be some evidence, or
inference from [the] evidence, which suggests that the driver was
aware they were facilitating a crime by providing a getaway.
Commonwealth v. Finley, 383 A.2d 1259, 1260 (Pa. 1978)
(citing Commonwealth v. Lowry, 98 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1953) (“If
he watched for his companions, in order to prevent surprise, or
remained at a convenient distance in order to favor their escape
. . . he was aiding and abetting.”)).
The facts of the present case are sufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was the driver of the pickup
truck and was acting as an accomplice to the assault and related
crimes by acting as the getaway driver. The fact that the pickup
truck drove up to the house to pick up the assailant just as the
assault was complete is consistent with the pattern of a person
acting as a getaway driver. . . . The facts of this case strongly
support the inference that the getaway driver not only waited
while the assault was occurring, but also watched the assault in
progress to know when to pick up the assailant. Mr. Gotwalt
positively identified the driver as [Appellant] and the pickup truck
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with unique mismatched paint as the vehicle known to be driven
by [Appellant].
Trial Court Opinion, 5/4/22, at 4-5.
Appellant attempts to distinguish the cases relied upon by the trial court
by noting that they each involved direct evidence that the accomplice had
either provided more assistance to the perpetrator, or had been with the
primary actor before or during the commission of the crimes. See Appellant’s
brief at 9-11. However, our review of the certified record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, confirms that the Commonwealth
proffered sufficient circumstantial evidence to allow the fact-finder to
reasonably infer that Appellant was not a mere bystander who innocently
stumbled onto the scene.
In addition to the circumstantial evidence highlighted by the trial court,
the Commonwealth further established that Appellant “had motive to attack
because [Appellant’s] niece and Mr. Gotwalt were engaged in a contentious
custody battle over their son at the time of the incident.” Commonwealth’s
brief at 9 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/24/21, at 47). The Commonwealth offers the
following succinct explanation why Appellant’s claim is meritless:
[The] circumstantial evidence demonstrates that [Appellant]
acted as an accomplice because he acted with the intent to
facilitate the attack. The attack was completed in seconds, and
. . . the assailant knew to run to the exact area where [Appellant]
would appear to pick him up moments later. . . . Had [Appellant]
not intended to promote or facilitate the crime, it is highly unlikely
he would have stopped to pick up an unknown man running down
a hill toward him at that time of day. It is even more unlikely that
he would let this man enter his car and then immediately speed
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away from this seemingly random location at the bottom of a hill
if he did not know that he was absconding from a crime scene.
Id. at 8-9 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/24/21, at 37, 52, 78).
As discussed above, the Commonwealth’s evidence does not have to
preclude any possibility of innocence, but rather must prove sufficient facts to
surpass mere surmise and establish a foundation for logical inferences made
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hobel, supra at 1069 n.8; Jackson, supra
at 444. We hold that it did so in this case. The verdict is the product of the
logical, factually-supported determination that Appellant did not just happen
to drive by the home of the opposing party in his niece’s custody battle in the
early morning hours, at the exact time that the assailant had run to the road,
and then opt to pick up a stranger and speed away, unintentionally aiding the
assailant in fleeing from a crime scene. Accord Commonwealth v. Causey,
833 A.2d 165, 173 (Pa.Super. 2003) (“The evidence at trial showed that
appellant, at the very least, was the getaway driver of the vehicle from which
his brother shot at the victim. We conclude that the evidence, if believed, was
sufficient for the jury to find that all the elements of aggravated assault had
been proven against appellant under a theory of accomplice liability beyond a
reasonable doubt.”). Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/7/2022
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Com. v. Unrath, E.
Combined Opinion