RENDERED: NOVEMBER 10, 2022; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2021-CA-1425-MR
JEREMY CARAWAY APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KENT HENDRICKSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CR-00182
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.
CETRULO, JUDGE: In this criminal post-conviction action, Appellant Jeremy
Caraway (“Caraway”), pro se, appeals from the Harlan Circuit Court order denying
his motion for relief pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 60.02.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. BRIEF HISTORY
In May 2011, Caraway was the pastor at Loyall Church of God in
Loyall, Kentucky. At that time, Sherry1 was a thirteen-year-old parishioner.
Members of Sherry’s family discovered inappropriate text messages on her cell
phone from Caraway, and her family contacted law enforcement. In July 2011, the
Harlan County Grand Jury indicted Caraway on nine counts involving allegations
of sexual misconduct. After a jury trial, one acquittal, varying dismissals, and
numerous appeals,2 only two counts survived: Caraway remains convicted of
Count III (sodomy in the second degree) and Count V (sexual abuse in the first
degree). He received a sentence of five years’ imprisonment on each count, served
consecutively, for a total sentence of 10 years. In May 2021, Caraway filed a
motion to vacate his judgment pursuant to CR 60.02 (d), (e), and (f).3 The trial
court denied the motion; Caraway appealed.
1
“Sherry” is the pseudonym given to the minor during the direct appeal. Caraway v.
Commonwealth, 459 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Ky. 2015).
2
Before a May 2013 trial, the court dismissed one count. At the close of evidence, the
prosecutor agreed not to pursue three other counts. Then, a jury found Caraway guilty of four
counts but acquitted him of one. Caraway’s direct appeal was unsuccessful, and the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Caraway, 459 S.W.3d 849. Caraway’s motion to
vacate pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 resulted in this Court
vacating and remanding two counts. Caraway v. Commonwealth, No. 2016-CA-001386-MR,
2017 WL 4464333 (Ky. App. Oct. 6, 2017). The trial court dismissed those two counts. This
appeal addresses Counts III and V.
3
Caraway also listed CR 60.03 in the header of the “Supplement To Be Added to the Civil
Complaint of Void Judgment And Motion to Vacate Sentence,” but he made no legal argument
relating to that rule. As a result, the trial court did not address CR 60.03, nor shall we.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
CR 60.02 motions are applicable to criminal cases pursuant to RCr
13.04, and criminal defendants may use this rule to present additional issues not
specifically available through direct appeals. Gross v. Commonwealth, 648
S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion under an
abuse of discretion standard. White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky.
App. 2000) (citation omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial
judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal
principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations
omitted). Absent a “flagrant miscarriage of justice[,]” we will affirm the trial
court. Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858.
III. ANALYSIS
Caraway presented a convoluted argument to the trial court, but he
essentially argued that the court should vacate his sentence because the charges
were based upon events that were separate and distinct from those events presented
to the grand jury for his indictment. Specifically, Caraway argued the grand jury
indictment was based upon sexual conduct that allegedly took place inside a room
at the church in Loyall, Kentucky, but the trial testimony and jury instructions
indicated that the illicit contact took place ten miles from the church in Cawood,
Kentucky. Additionally, he argued that his trial and appellate attorneys were
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ineffective for failing to challenge jury instructions and venue. Caraway sought
relief under CR 60.02, which states:
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just,
relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following
grounds: . . . (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other
than perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is
void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (f) any
other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.
In its order denying the CR 60.02 motion, the trial court found that (1)
the indictment met the requirements of RCr 6.10; (2) the varying locations
presented to the grand jury and at trial – Loyall and Cawood – are both in Harlan
County and therefore did not present a jurisdictional conflict for the trial court; and
(3) the CR 60.02 motion was untimely. On appeal, Caraway presents much of the
same argument that he presented to the trial court – essentially challenging the
validity of the indictment – but he fails to understand, apply, or properly defend the
procedural structure he is attempting to implement.4 While pro se litigants are
sometimes held to less stringent standards than lawyers in drafting formal
pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d
4
Caraway also includes a preservation argument based on his misinterpretation of the rules of
appellate procedure; under CR 76.12, the appellant must preserve an argument for appeal, but
the appellee does not need to preserve a counter argument.
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652 (1972), Caraway’s appeal fails mightily to meet the requirements of a CR
60.02 motion.
First, Caraway brought this CR 60.02 motion under subsections (d),
(e), and (f), which require that the “motion shall be made within a reasonable
time[.]” CR 60.02. What constitutes a reasonable time is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial court. Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858. Here, a final judgment was
entered against Caraway in 2013; Caraway filed the present motion in 2021. The
trial court found that Caraway waived his right to challenge the indictment by
failing to raise the issue sooner. We agree. Eight years does not constitute a
“reasonable time” under CR 60.02 (d), (e), and (f), especially considering Caraway
could have had access to the grand jury indictment during discovery and heard
Sherry’s testimony during the 2013 trial. See Graves v. Commonwealth, 283
S.W.3d 252 (Ky. App. 2009), where a seven-year delay between sentence and
motion for relief from judgment of conviction was unreasonable. See also Reyna
v. Commonwealth, 217 S.W.3d 274, (Ky. App. 2007), where a defendant’s motion
to vacate judgment of conviction on grounds of extraordinary circumstances that
he was not informed of deportation consequences of his guilty plea, four years
after he entered his guilty plea, was untimely. Caraway attempted to explain his
delay by stating that he did not receive the grand jury proceedings until June 2019.
However, we find that argument unpersuasive – even confusing – because he also
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argues that he relied on that grand jury evidence to his detriment; he stated when
Sherry testified at trial – as to the “new” location of the illicit actions – he was
“blindsided” and “unprepared.” If he did not receive the grand jury specifics until
2019, how did he rely on them to his detriment in 2013? Additionally, if Caraway
was “blindsided” at trial by the change in location, he should have raised the issue
at that time. “[A]t any time while the case is pending, the court may hear a claim
that the indictment or information fails to invoke the court’s jurisdiction or to state
an offense[.]” RCr 8.18(1)(b) (emphasis added). See also Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 931 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Ky. 1996) (“As [appellant’s] indictment
gave the court jurisdiction and charged an offense, he has waived any defects in
his indictment by not bringing those defects to the attention of the trial judge.”).
Further, “[t]he structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final
judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is
organized and complete.” Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856. A CR 60.02 motion may be
used to present additional claims not specifically available through direct appeals
or RCr 11.42 motions. Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856. On direct appeal, Caraway
challenged juror selection, the admissibility of additional character evidence, and
credit for time served. Caraway, 459 S.W. 3d 849. Then, Caraway appealed,
through a motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, ineffectiveness of counsel as it related to
jury instructions, jurisdiction, and venue. Caraway, 2017 WL 4464333. For an
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additional appeal to be successful under CR 60.02, Caraway needed to demonstrate
why he is entitled to special, extraordinary relief. CR 60.02. Also, he “must
affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further
allege special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.” McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997) (citing Gross, 648 S.W.2d at
856). Here, Caraway has not come close to this standard. Therefore, he does not
get another bite at that appellate apple.
Finally, the trial court should be afforded deference under the abuse of
discretion standard of review, and we discern no such abuse. See Brown v.
Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996) (citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the Harlan Circuit
Court denying relief under CR 60.02.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jeremy Caraway, pro se Daniel Cameron
West Liberty, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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