Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 123760
TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
TAYLOR, J.
The issue presented in this case is whether first
degree child abuse1 requires the prosecution to establish
only that defendant intended to commit an act that causes
serious physical harm or whether it requires the
prosecution to prove not only that defendant intended the
act, but also that, by so acting, she intended to cause
1
MCL 750.136b(2). This statute provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the first degree if
the person knowingly or intentionally causes serious
physical harm or serious mental harm to a child. Child
abuse in the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than fifteen years.
serious physical harm or knew that serious physical harm
would be caused.
We hold that, pursuant to the current language of the
statute, first-degree child abuse requires the prosecution
to establish, and the jury to be instructed that to convict
it must find, not only that defendant intended to commit
the act, but also that defendant intended to cause serious
physical harm or knew that serious physical harm would be
caused by her act. Because the Court of Appeals reached
the same result, we affirm its decision, but for different
reasons.
FACTS2
On June 28, 2002, defendant left her two children,
Adonnis, age three, and Acacia, age ten months, in her car,
a black Dodge Neon, while she visited a beauty salon. The
children were belted in their seats, and defendant’s car
was parked some distance from the salon, in an unshaded,
asphalt parking lot. The temperature that day was in the
eighties. The child-safety locks on the car were engaged,
and the driver’s side window and possibly a rear window
were rolled down 1 to 1½ inches.
2
This case has not yet been tried; all facts are taken from
the preliminary examination transcript.
2
During her appointment, which lasted approximately 3½
hours,3 defendant had her hair washed, relaxed, and styled.
She also had a sit-up massage, tried on a sundress, and
purchased a snack. Defendant did not mention the children
to anyone in the salon and never left the salon to check on
the children.
When defendant returned to her car after the
appointment, her children were dead. Acacia was lying on
the floorboard near the back seat, and Adonnis was lying on
the back seat. The children had died of hyperthermia, or
heat exposure. After discovering the children in that
state, defendant drove around for several hours before
driving to a hospital emergency room around 11:00 p.m.
When initially questioned by the police, defendant
indicated that she had been abducted and raped and that her
children had been left in her car during the abduction.
But when confronted by the police, she admitted that she
had left her children in the car while she was at the
beauty salon. Defendant then provided a written statement
to the police. When asked why she made up the story about
the abduction, she responded, “So that I wouldn’t appear to
be a horrible person, someone who left their [sic] children
3
The appointment started about 4:00 or 4:20 p.m. and ended
about 7:30 or 7:50 p.m.
3
in a hot car.” She also stated, “I had never left them in
the car before and I didn’t know (was too stupid to know)
that they would die. I didn’t want them to die.”
Defendant was charged with two counts of felony
murder, with first-degree child abuse as the underlying
felony.
Following the preliminary examination, the district
court declined to bind defendant over on the felony-murder
charges and bound defendant over on two counts of
involuntary manslaughter. The district court concluded
that first-degree child abuse was a specific intent crime
and that there was not sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause to believe that defendant knowingly or
intentionally caused her children’s deaths. The district
court noted that defendant had stated that she did not
intend to hurt her children but that she was too stupid to
know that they would die, and that there was no evidence in
the record to negate this statement. Consequently, the
district court determined that there was insufficient
evidence of intent to establish the underlying felony of
first-degree child abuse.
The prosecution moved to have the circuit court
reinstate the felony-murder charges. The circuit court
granted the prosecution’s motion, reversing the district
court and reinstating the felony-murder charges. The
4
circuit court reasoned that first-degree child abuse was a
general intent, not a specific intent, crime. Thus, the
circuit court reasoned that the prosecution was required to
establish that defendant had the intent to perform the
physical act itself that resulted in the children’s death.
The circuit court concluded that the prosecution had
presented sufficient evidence that defendant intended to
leave her children alone in the car for several hours and
that there was probable cause to believe that defendant
committed the crimes of first-degree child abuse and
second-degree murder.
Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal in the Court
of Appeals. Although the Court of Appeals held, in a two
to-one decision, that first-degree child abuse was a
specific intent crime rather than a general intent crime,
it affirmed the circuit court’s decision to reinstate the
felony-murder charges because it determined that there was
sufficient evidence of intent to find probable cause to
believe that defendant had committed first-degree child
abuse and, consequently, to bind defendant over on the
felony-murder charges.4 In so concluding, the Court of
Appeals relied on the analysis of People v Gould, 225 Mich
App 79; 570 NW2d 140 (1997), and further explained that the
4
256 Mich App 238; 662 NW2d 468 (2003).
5
facts belied defendant’s claim of ignorance of the risks of
leaving her children in a hot car.
The concurring Court of Appeals judge stated that he
would have concluded that first-degree child abuse is a
general intent crime rather than a specific intent crime.
This Court granted the prosecution leave to appeal
“limited to the issue whether it is sufficient to instruct
the jury using the statutory language regarding intent
(‘. . . knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical
or serious mental harm to a child’), MCL 750.136b(2), or
whether it is also necessary to instruct the jury regarding
‘specific intent.’”5
Standard of Review
We review de novo any question of the proper
interpretation of the underlying criminal law, including
the intent required. People v Perkins, 468 Mich 448, 452;
662 NW2d 727 (2003).
Analysis
When construing a statute, this Court’s goal is to
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. We begin by
construing the language of the statute itself. Where the
language is unambiguous, we give the words their plain
5
468 Mich 946 (2003).
6
meaning and apply the statute as written. People v
Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).
The child abuse statute, MCL 750.136b(2), provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first degree if the person knowingly or
intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child. Child abuse in
the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
[Emphasis added.]
The prosecution contends that the italicized language only
requires the prosecution to prove that defendant intended
to leave her children in the car, not that she intended to
seriously harm them by leaving them in the car. We
disagree with this argument because it is contrary to the
plain language of the statute.
The plain language of the statute requires that to be
convicted of first-degree child abuse, a person “knowingly
or intentionally causes serious physical harm or serious
mental harm to a child.” MCL 760.136b(2). The phrase
“knowingly or intentionally” modifies the phrase “causes
serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.” Thus,
this language requires more from defendant than an intent
to commit an act. The prosecution must prove that by
leaving her children in the car, the defendant intended to
cause serious physical or mental harm to the children or
that she knew that serious mental or physical harm would be
caused by leaving them in the car. The recommended
7
standard jury instruction for first-degree child abuse,
CJI2d 17.18, correctly focuses the jury by directing it to
this method of analysis.6 We find it is unnecessary for the
jury to be given further instruction on “specific intent,”
6
CJI2d 17.18 states:
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime
of first-degree child abuse. To prove this
charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
[Choose (2) or (3):]
(2) First, that [name defendant] is the
[parent/guardian] of [name child].
(3) First, that [name defendant] had care
or custody of or authority over [name child] when
the abuse allegedly happened.
(4) Second, that the defendant either
knowingly or intentionally caused [serious
physical harm/serious mental harm] to [name
child].
[Choose (a) or (b):]
(a) By “serious physical harm” I mean any
physical injury to a child that seriously impairs
the child’s health or physical well-being,
including, but not limited to, brain damage, a
skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or
hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury,
poisoning, burn or scald, or severe cut.
(b) By “serious mental harm” I mean an
injury to a child’s mental condition that results
in visible signs of an impairment in the child’s
judgment, behavior, ability to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life.
(5) Third, that [name child] was at the time under
the age of 18.
8
such as that found in CJI2d 3.9. The need to draw the
common-law distinction between “specific” and “general”
intent is not required under the plain language of the
statute, as long as the jury is instructed that it must
find that defendant either knowingly or intentionally
caused the harm. Moreover, the enactment of MCL 768.37,
which abolished the defense of voluntary intoxication
except in one narrow circumstance, has significantly
diminished the need to categorize crimes as being either
“specific” or “general” intent crimes.
Conclusion
We conclude that the charge of first-degree child
abuse in this case requires the prosecution to establish,
and the jury to be instructed that to convict it must find,
not only that defendant intended to leave her children in
the car, but also that, by doing so, defendant intended to
cause serious physical harm or that she knew that serious
physical harm would be caused. Accordingly, we affirm the
Court of Appeals decision affirming the circuit court’s
reinstatement of the felony-murder charges against
defendant and remand this case to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
9
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 123760
TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but
write separately because the majority fails to state
whether first-degree child abuse1 is a general intent crime
or a specific intent crime.2 The failure to address this
aspect of the case will cause confusion in the lower courts
when attorneys and trial judges attempt to determine what
1
MCL 750.136b(2). This statute provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first degree if the person knowingly or
intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child. Child abuse in
the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years.
2
The Court also declined to reach this issue in People v
Sherman-Huffman, 466 Mich 39, 40; 642 NW2d 339 (2002),
because we concluded that there was sufficient evidence in
that case to convict the defendant of third-degree child
abuse regardless of whether the crime was a specific intent
crime or a general intent crime.
instructions must be provided to the jury. Contrary to the
majority’s assertion, the standard jury instruction for
first-degree child abuse, CJI2d 17.18, does not clearly
explain that the prosecution must establish both that
defendant intended to leave her children in the car and
that by doing so, she intended to cause harm or knew that
serious physical harm would be caused. Consequently,
attorneys and trial judges will be at a loss about how the
proper burden of proof can be explained to the jury.
I would hold that pursuant to the current language of
the statute, first-degree child abuse is a crime of
specific intent, requiring the prosecution to establish not
only that defendant intended to leave her children in the
car, but also that by doing so, defendant intended to cause
serious physical harm or that she knew that serious
physical harm would be caused. Additionally, I would hold
that, because first-degree child abuse is a specific intent
crime, it is appropriate to provide the jury with an
instruction on specific intent. For these reasons, I
would affirm the Court of Appeals decision affirming
reinstatement of the felony-murder charges3 against
defendant.
3
MCL 750.316(1)(b). This statute provides in part that a
person commits murder in the first-degree if the murder is
(continued…)
2
When construing a statute, this Court’s primary goal
is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. We
begin by construing the language of the statute itself.
Where the language is unambiguous, we give the words their
plain meaning and apply the statute as written. In re MCI,
460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
Traditionally, general intent crimes involve merely
the intent to do the physical act, while specific intent
crimes involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act
done. People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 574; 339 NW2d 461
(1983). Black’s Law Dictionary further explains that
“general intent” is “the intent to do that which the law
prohibits. It is not necessary for the prosecution to
prove that the defendant intended the precise harm or the
precise result which eventuated.” Black’s Law Dictionary
(6th ed). Specific intent is “[t]he mental purpose to
accomplish a specific act prohibited by law.” Id.
Specific intent designates “a special mental element which
is required above and beyond any mental state required with
respect to the actus reus of the crime.” Id.
The child abuse statute provides:
(…continued)
committed “in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate
. . . child abuse in the first degree. . . ."
3
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
first degree if the person knowingly or
intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child. Child abuse in
the first degree is a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years. [MCL
750.136b(2) (emphasis added).]
The prosecution contends that the italicized language only
requires a general intent on defendant’s part—that is, the
prosecution must only prove that defendant intended to
leave her children in the car, not that she intended to
seriously harm them by leaving them in the car. I disagree
with this argument because it is contrary to the plain
language of the statute.
The plain language of the current statute requires
that to be convicted of first-degree child abuse, a person
“knowingly or intentionally causes serious physical harm or
serious mental harm to a child.” MCL 760.136b(2). In
People v Whitney, 228 Mich App 230, 255; 578 NW2d 329
(1998), the Court of Appeals concluded that MCL 15.272,
which addresses violations of the Open Meetings Act, was a
specific intent crime because the word “intentionally”
modified the word “violates.” Similarly, in the first
degree child abuse statute, the words “knowingly or
intentionally” modify the phrase “causes serious physical
or mental harm to a child.” Thus, this language requires
more from defendant than a general intent to commit an act.
The prosecution must prove that by leaving her children in
4
the car, the defendant intended to cause serious physical
or mental harm to the children or that she knew that
serious mental or physical harm would be caused by leaving
them in the car.
Contrasting the language of the first-degree child
abuse provision with the language of the second-degree
child abuse provision further demonstrates that first
degree requires more than simply an intent on the part of
defendant to leave her children in the car. The language
of the second-degree child abuse provision provides:
A person is guilty of child abuse in the
second degree if any of the following apply:
(a) The person’s omission causes serious
physical harm or serious mental harm to a child
or if the person’s reckless act causes serious
physical harm to a child.
(b) The person knowingly or intentionally
commits an act likely to cause serious physical
or mental harm to a child regardless of whether
harm results.
(c) The person knowingly or intentionally
commits an act that is cruel to a child
regardless of whether harm results. [MCL
750.136b(3) (emphasis added).]
In the second-degree child abuse provision, the words
“knowingly” and “intentionally” modify the phrase “commits
an act.” Thus, to establish second-degree child abuse, the
prosecution must prove only that a defendant intended to
commit an act likely to cause harm. The prosecution does
5
not have to prove that a defendant intended serious
physical or mental harm.
Had the Legislature intended that it be enough to
sustain a conviction for first-degree child abuse by
proving only that the person intended to commit the act
that caused harm, the Legislature could have included
language similar to the language used in the second-degree
child abuse provision and stated: it is first-degree child
abuse to “knowingly or intentionally commit an act that
causes serious physical or mental harm to a child.” But
the Legislature chose not to include this phrasing, and I
will not usurp the Legislature’s role by reading this
additional language into the statute.4
Because I would hold that first-degree child abuse is
a specific intent crime, I would further conclude that it
4
Several house bills have been introduced to amend the
child abuse statute. See HB 4327, HB 4468, and HB 4583.
Interestingly, one of these bills, HB 4468, would add an
additional means for establishing first-degree child abuse:
it is child abuse in the first degree if “the person
knowingly or intentionally commits an act that causes
serious physical or serious mental harm to a child.”
(Emphasis added.) On April 1, 2004, consideration of HB
4468 was postponed temporarily. 2004 Journal of the House
of Representatives 623 (No. 30, April 1, 2004).
A House Bill has also been introduced that would make it a
crime to leave a child unattended in a vehicle. See HB
4499.
6
is appropriate to provide the jury with the instruction on
specific intent, CJI2d 3.9, which states:
(1) The crime of __________ requires proof
of a specific intent. This means that the
prosecution must prove not only that the
defendant did certain acts, but that [he / she]
did the acts with the intent to cause a
particular result.
(2) For the crime of __________ this means
that the prosecution must prove that the
defendant intended to [state the required
specific intent].
(3) The defendant's intent may be proved by
what [he / she] said, what [he / she] did, how
[he / she] did it, or by any other facts and
circumstances in evidence.[5]
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the standard
jury instruction for first-degree child abuse, CJI2d 17.18,6
5
I note that because MCL 750.136b(2) makes it a crime to
“knowingly or intentionally” cause harm, I would instruct
the trial court to include both aspects—intentionally
causing harm and knowingly causing harm—when it states the
required specific intent in § 2.
6
CJI2d 17.18 provides:
(1) The defendant is charged with the crime
of first-degree child abuse. To prove this
charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the
following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
[Choose (2) or (3):]
(2) First, that [name defendant] is the
[parent/ guardian] of [name child].
(3) First, that [name defendant] had care
or custody of or authority over [name child] when
the abuse allegedly happened.
(continued…)
7
is sufficient instruction regarding intent. As is
evidenced by this case, CJI2d 17.18 offers no clear
explanation of intent for the jury. Accordingly, providing
a specific intent instruction is necessary to guide the
jury regarding what the prosecutor must prove under MCL
750.136b(2)—in this case, that defendant not only intended
to leave her children in the car, but also that, by doing
so, she intended to cause serious physical harm or knew
(…continued)
(4) Second, that the defendant either
knowingly or intentionally caused [serious
physical harm / serious mental harm] to [name
child].
[Choose (a) or (b):]
(a) By “serious physical harm” I mean any
physical injury to a child that seriously impairs
the child’s health or physical well-being,
including, but not limited to, brain damage, a
skull or bone fracture, subdural hemorrhage or
hematoma, dislocation, sprain, internal injury,
poisoning, burn or scald, or severe cut.
(b) By “serious mental harm” I mean an
injury to a child’s mental condition that results
in visible signs of an impairment in the child’s
judgment, behavior, ability to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of
life.
(5) Third, that [name child] was at the
time under the age of 18.
8
that serious physical harm would be caused.7 The majority’s
conclusion that such an instruction is not necessary will
only result in confusion at the trial court level.
Conclusion
I would conclude that first-degree child abuse is a
crime of specific intent, requiring in this case that the
prosecution establish not only that defendant intended to
leave her children in the car, but also that, by doing so,
defendant intended to cause serious physical harm or knew
that serious physical harm would be caused. Additionally,
I would conclude that because first-degree child abuse is a
7
I also note that I agree with the Court of Appeals
that there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could
conclude that defendant acted with the requisite intent for
first-degree child abuse. In the present case, defendant
left her children, ages ten months and three years, in a
car for approximately 3½ hours on a day in late June, when
temperatures were in the eighties. Defendant admitted that
she made up the story about being abducted so that people
would not think that she was a horrible person “who left
[her] children in a hot car.” She also explained that she
had never left her children alone in the car before. These
statements suggest that defendant was aware of the risks to
her children if they were left alone in a hot car.
Additionally, the fact that at least one of the car windows
was rolled down an inch or two suggests that defendant had
knowledge that the inside of the car would become hot while
it sat in an unshaded, asphalt parking lot on a hot June
day. Moreover, given the children’s very young ages,
leaving these children unattended anywhere for 3½ hours
could be considered questionable conduct that might harm
the children. Although defendant left the salon to
purchase a snack, she did not check on her children during
the 3½ hours that she was in the salon. From all this
evidence, a jury could infer that, by leaving her children
in a hot car for 3½ hours, defendant intended to cause harm
or knew that harm would be caused to her children.
9
specific intent crime, it is appropriate to provide the
jury with an instruction on specific intent. Accordingly,
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, which
affirms the Court of Appeals decision affirming the circuit
court’s reinstatement of the felony-murder charges against
defendant.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
10