Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 123491
EDMUND McGEHEE BARBEE, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
We granted leave to appeal to determine if a
defendant’s conduct that occurs before criminal charges are
filed can form the basis for an assessment of points under
offense variable 19 (OV 19) for interference with the
administration of justice.1 Because we find that conduct
occurring before criminal charges are filed can form the
1
MCL 777.49 details the conduct that warrants points
under OV 19. Points assessed are used in conjunction with
other factors to produce a sentencing guidelines range
within which a defendant’s minimum sentence must fall
unless the sentencing court identifies substantial and
compelling reasons for deviating from the range.
basis for interference, or attempted interference, with the
administration of justice, we affirm the trial court’s
scoring of ten points for OV 19.
I. FACTS
Defendant was stopped when a law enforcement officer
observed the car defendant was operating cross the fog line
twice. The officer also observed that it was dark and the
car did not have its headlights on. Defendant told the
officer his name was Christopher Noble Barbee. Defendant’s
name is actually Edmund McGehee Barbee, Jr. Defendant’s
fianceé gave the officer defendant’s correct name.
A Breathalyzer test determined defendant’s blood
alcohol content was 0.29 grams per 210 liters of breath.
Defendant pleaded guilty of operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, third offense, MCL 257.625, in exchange for
the dismissal of two charges related to driving while his
license was suspended, MCL 257.904. Because defendant gave
the law enforcement officer a false name, the trial court
scored OV 19 at ten points and imposed a prison sentence of
twenty-nine to sixty months. Defendant objected to the
assessment of ten points under OV 19, arguing that giving
the law enforcement officer his brother’s name was not
interference with the administration of justice because the
officer would have learned his true identity in due course.
2
Defendant’s motion for resentencing, which challenged the
scoring of OV 19, was denied. The Court of Appeals denied
defendant’s application for leave to appeal for lack of
merit in the grounds presented. This Court granted
defendant’s application for leave to appeal. 469 Mich 966
(2003).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation.
People v Krueger, 466 Mich 50, 53; 643 NW2d 223 (2002).
III. ANALYSIS
The issue in this case is one of statutory
interpretation. The statute at issue, MCL 777.49, states,
in pertinent part, the following:
Offense variable 19 is a threat to the
security of a penal institution or court or
interference with the administration of justice
or the rendering of emergency services. Score
offense variable 19 by determining which of the
following apply and by assigning the number of
points attributable to the one that has the
highest number of points:
(a) The offender by his or her conduct
threatened the security of a penal institution or
court ..................................25 points
(b) The offender used force or the threat of
force against another person or the property of
another person to interfere with, attempt to
interfere with, or that results in the
interference with the administration of justice
or the rendering of emergency services
................................15 points
3
(c) The offender otherwise interfered with
or attempted to interfere with the administration
of justice .............................10 points
(d) The offender did not threaten the
security of a penal institution or court or
interfere with or attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice or the rendering of
emergency services by force or threat of force
................0 points[2]
Because the language of the statute is plain and
unambiguous, we enforce the statute as written and follow
its plain meaning, giving effect to the words used by the
Legislature. See In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d
164 (1999).
While “interfered with or attempted to interfere with
the administration of justice” is a broad phrase that can
include acts that constitute “obstruction of justice,” it
is not limited to only those acts that constitute
“obstruction of justice.”3 The Legislature specifically
chose to use the phrase “interfered with or attempted to
interfere with the administration of justice.” If the
2
The statute has been amended twice since the date of
defendant’s offense. The amendments, however, do not
affect the issue or the outcome in this case.
3
In People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448, 458; 475 NW2d 288
(1991), this Court determined that the defendant’s conduct
—making a false statement in a police report—was a
“substantial impediment to the administration of justice,”
but was not an obstruction of justice.
4
Legislature had meant for OV 19 to apply only in cases
dealing with the obstruction of justice, it could have
easily used that phrase. “Obstruction of justice” is a
well-known term of art. In People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448,
457-458; 475 NW2d 288 (1991), this Court stated that
common-law obstruction of justice is comprised of various
offenses. To the contrary, conduct that “interfered with
or attempted to interfere with the administration of
justice” does not have to necessarily rise to the level of
a chargeable offense because it is merely being used as one
of various factors to determine a defendant’s sentencing
guidelines range.
The Court of Appeals in People v Deline, 254 Mich App
595, 597; 658 NW2d 164 (2002), ignored the significance of
the words used by the Legislature in MCL 777.49 and equated
“interfered with or attempted to interfere with the
administration of justice” with “obstruction of justice.”4
Because the Legislature chose not to use the phrase
“obstruction of justice,” this Court cannot interpret the
4
Notably, in an opinion issued one week after Deline,
the Court of Appeals essentially reached the opposite
conclusion. In People v Cook, 254 Mich App 635; 658 NW2d
184 (2003), the Court of Appeals held that it was proper
for the trial court to score ten points under OV 19 for
defendant’s conduct in attempting to flee from the police.
5
statute as if it had. In reaching this decision, we are
merely applying basic rules of statutory interpretation and
giving effect to the words used by the Legislature. See
Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 65; 503 NW2d 435 (1993).
While the Deline panel held that OV 19 could only be
scored when the conduct interfered with the judicial
process, we find that the phrase “interfered with or
attempted to interfere with the administration of justice”
encompasses more than just the actual judicial process.
Law enforcement officers are an integral component in the
administration of justice, regardless of whether they are
operating directly pursuant to a court order. In Hewitt v
White, 78 Mich 117, 119; 43 NW 1043 (1889), this Court
referred to the sheriff’s duties as relating to “the
administration of civil and criminal justice.” Similarly,
in White v East Saginaw, 43 Mich 567, 570; 6 NW 86 (1880),
this Court referred to the sheriff’s duties as “'more or
less directly connected with the administration of
justice,’” quoting People v Edwards, 9 Cal 286 (1858). It
is certainly interference with the administration of
justice to provide law enforcement officers with a false
name.
The investigation of crime is critical to the
administration of justice. Providing a false name to the
6
police constitutes interference with the administration of
justice, and OV 19 may be scored, when applicable, for this
conduct. Therefore, to the extent that it is inconsistent
with this opinion, an order will be issued disapproving the
reasoning of Deline.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conduct that occurs before criminal charges are filed
can form the basis for interference, or attempted
interference, with the administration of justice, and OV 19
may be scored for this conduct where applicable.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s assessment of ten
points for OV 19 because defendant’s conduct constituted
interference with the administration of justice.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
7