Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice Justices
Opinion
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED MARCH 9, 2004
THE TITLE OFFICE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v Nos. 121077, 121078
VAN BUREN COUNTY TREASURER,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
ALLEGAN COUNTY TREASURER, BRANCH
COUNTY TREASURER, HILLSDALE
COUNTY TREASURER, IONIA COUNTY
TREASURER, JACKSON COUNTY
TREASURER, KALAMAZOO COUNTY
TREASURER, AND LIVINGSTON COUNTY
TREASURER,
Defendants.
_______________________________
THE TITLE OFFICE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v Nos. 121177, 121178
ALLEGAN COUNTY TREASURER, BRANCH
COUNTY TREASURER, HILLSDALE
COUNTY TREASURER, IONIA COUNTY
TREASURER, JACKSON COUNTY
TREASURER, KALAMAZOO COUNTY
TREASURER, AND LIVINGSTON COUNTY
TREASURER,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
VAN BUREN COUNTY TREASURER,
Defendant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine
whether the fees for copies of property tax records
requested from a county treasurer are computed according to
the fee schedule provided in the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq., or that provided in the
transcripts and abstracts of records act (TARA), MCL
48.101. The unambiguous language of both statutes leads us
to conclude that the fees are to be computed according to
the fee schedule provided in TARA.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On February 27, 1998, plaintiff, The Title Office,
Inc., requested an electronic copy of Van Buren County’s
property tax records and delinquent tax records for 1996
2
and 1997.1 Defendant, Van Buren County Treasurer, used the
TARA fee schedule, MCL 48.101, to calculate the fee for
providing the copies and provided an estimate of $26,700.
Plaintiff filed mandamus actions in several counties
asking the courts to direct the counties to compute the fee
under FOIA, rather than TARA. The cases against eight
county treasurers were consolidated in Livingston County.
The circuit court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition.
Defendants filed two appeals with the Court of
Appeals, which that Court consolidated.2 Because it was
bound by Oakland Co Treasurer v Title Office, Inc, 245 Mich
App 196; 627 NW2d 317 (2001), the Court of Appeals
affirmed. Title Office, Inc v Van Buren County Treasurer,
249 Mich App 322; 643 NW2d 244 (2002). The Court of
Appeals panel requested that the Chief Judge convene a
special conflict panel to address the issue, but the
request was denied. 249 Mich App 805 (2002). Defendant,
Van Buren County Treasurer, filed a timely application for
leave to appeal. The remaining defendants filed a delayed
1
At the same time, plaintiff made similar requests in
the counties of Allegan, Branch, Hillsdale, Ionia, Jackson,
Kalamazoo, and Livingston.
2
The Van Buren County Treasurer filed one appeal and
the remaining county treasurers filed the other.
3
application for leave to appeal. We consolidated the
applications and granted leave.3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition on the basis of its interpretation of FOIA and
TARA. This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of
summary disposition. American Federation of State, Co and
Municipal Employees v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 398; 662 NW2d
695 (2003). Similarly, questions of statutory
interpretation are reviewed de novo. Omelenchuk v City of
Warren, 466 Mich 524, 527; 647 NW2d 493 (2002).
III. DISCUSSION
The issue in this case is one of statutory
construction. We must determine whether the fees for
copies of property tax records are to be computed according
to the fee schedule in FOIA or TARA. “The primary goal of
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of
the Legislature.” In re MCI, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d
3
The order granting leave directed the parties to
address
the meaning, at the time of enactment, of
“transcript” in 1895 PA 161 as amended, MCL
48.101, and whether by use of “transcript of any
paper or record on file” the Legislature
originally intended the act to cover subsequently
developed means of document reproduction. [468
Mich 881 (2003).]
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164 (1999). To discern the legislative intent, this Court
must first examine the language of the statute itself. If
the statute is unambiguous it must be enforced as written.
Id.
Section 4 of FOIA sets forth the fees a municipality
may charge a party requesting public records:
(1) A public body may charge a fee for a
public record search, the necessary copying of a
public record for inspection, or for providing a
copy of the record. Subject to subsections (3)
and (4), the fee shall be limited to the actual
mailing costs, and to the actual incremental
costs of duplication or publication including
labor, the cost of search, examination, review,
and the deletion and separation of exempt from
nonexempt information as provided in Section 14.
[MCL 15.244.] A search for a public record may
be conducted or copies of the public record may
be furnished without charge or a reduced charge
if the public body determines that a waiver or
reduction of the fee is in the public interest
because searching for or furnishing copies of the
public record can be considered as primarily
benefiting the general public. A public record
search shall be made and a copy of public records
shall be furnished without charge for the first
$20 of the fee for each request to an individual
who is entitled to information under this act and
who submits an affidavit stating the individual
is then receiving public assistance or if not
receiving public assistance, stating facts
showing inability to pay the cost because of
indigency.
* * *
(3) In calculating the cost of labor
incurred in duplication and mailing and the cost
of examination, review, separation, and deletion
under subsection (1), a public body may not
charge more than the hourly wage of the lowest
paid public body employee capable of retrieving
the information necessary to comply with the
request under this act. Fees shall be uniform
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and shall not be dependent upon the identity of
the requesting person. A public body shall
utilize the most economical means available for
making copies of public records. A fee shall not
be charged for the cost of the search,
examination, review, and the deletion and
separation of exempt from nonexempt information
as provided in Section 14 unless failure to
charge a fee would result in unreasonably high
cost to the public body because of the nature of
the request in the particular interest and the
public body specifically identifies the nature of
these unreasonably high costs. A public body
shall establish and publish procedures and
guidelines to implement this subsection. [MCL
15.234.]
Subsection 4 excludes certain records:
This section does not apply to public
records prepared under an act or statute
specifically authorizing the sale of those public
records to the public, or if the amount of the
fee for providing a copy of the public record is
otherwise specifically provided by an act or
statute. [MCL 15.234(4).]
Thus, FOIA makes it clear that if TARA is “an act or
statute specifically authorizing the sale” of public
records or if TARA specifically provides the amount of the
fee for providing a copy of the public record, the FOIA fee
provisions do not apply. MCL 15.234(4).
It is clear from the text of TARA that it specifically
provides the amount of the fee for providing a copy of “any
paper or record on file in the treasurer’s office.” MCL
48.101(1). TARA provides:
(1) A county treasurer shall make upon
request a transcript of any paper or record on
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file in the treasurer’s office for the following
fees:
(a) For an abstract of taxes on any
description of land, 25 cents for each year
covered in the abstract.
(b) For an abstract with statement of name
and residence of taxpayers, 25 cents per year for
each description of land covered by the abstract.
(c) For list of state tax lands or state
bids, 25 cents for each description of land on
the list.
(d) For 1 copy of any paper or document at
the rate of 25 cents per 100 words.
(e) For each certificate, 25 cents. [MCL
48.101.]
Because TARA specifically provides the amount of the
fee for providing a copy of a public record it falls within
MCL 15.234(4), and the FOIA fee provisions do not apply.
But plaintiff argues that each electronic copy it requested
is not a “transcript” of the property tax records and,
therefore, TARA is not applicable and the FOIA fee
provisions should govern. We disagree. TARA does not
define “transcript.” Accordingly, we are required to give
the term its plain and ordinary meaning. When determining
the common, ordinary meaning of a word or phrase,
consulting a dictionary is appropriate. Stanton v Battle
Creek, 466 Mich 611, 617; 647 NW2d 508 (2002).
At the time of the enactment of TARA in 1895, the term
“transcript” was defined in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (New
ed by Rawle, 1897), as “[a] copy of an original writing or
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deed.” Likewise, Webster’s International Dictionary
(1890), defined “transcript” as:
1. That which has been transcribed: a
writing composition consisting of the same words
as the original a written copy.
2. A copy of any kind; an imitation.
We believe the Legislature intended this ordinary meaning
of “transcript” at the time of the enactment of TARA to
apply, rather than the strained definition plaintiff urges.
Plaintiff’s argument is based on its assertion that
TARA governs only written or paper copies. Plaintiff
attempts to draw a line at some point during the twentieth
century by excluding all technological advances postdating
the copy machine from the definition of “transcript.”
Plaintiff argues that photocopies are transcripts, but
electronic copies are not. This argument disregards many
of the technological advances made in the last century and
ignores the fact that TARA does not contain the term
“written,” nor does it refer to “paper copies.” We decline
to adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Oakland
Co Treasurer v Title Office, Inc, 245 Mich App 196; 627
NW2d 317 (2001), and we decline to confine TARA to paper or
written copies. “Transcript,” as used in the statute, is a
much broader term, intended to apply to any reproduction of
a record on file in the treasurer’s office. An electronic
8
copy of property tax records qualifies as a “transcript”
for purposes of TARA. Plaintiff has clearly requested a
“transcript” of records on file in the treasurer’s office.
Because Oakland Co Treasurer conflicts with this
holding, it is overruled. Rather than examining the plain
meaning of “transcript,” the panel in Oakland Co Treasurer
based its holding on the notion that the 1895 Legislature
did not contemplate electronic copies when enacting TARA.
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that electronic copies of property tax records
are “transcripts” within the meaning of TARA and, thus, the
fees for their reproduction are those delineated in TARA,
not FOIA. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
9