Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice Justices
Opinion
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v No. 120107
JOSEPH CARL WEEDER,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
This case presents the question whether a driver
charged with second-degree murder following an auto-related
death must receive a negligent homicide instruction.
Following People v McIntosh, 400 Mich 1; 252 NW2d 779
(1977), the Court of Appeals answered yes. We overrule
McIntosh and remand to the Court of Appeals for further
review.
Defendant seeks to appeal the Court of Appeals
affirmance of two convictions for operating a vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor and thereby
causing death, MCL 257.625(4); two convictions for first
degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 750.479a(5); and one
conviction for operating a motor vehicle while license
suspended, subsequent offense, MCL 257.904(3)(b). Defendant
was also convicted on two counts of involuntary
manslaughter, MCL 750.321, which convictions the Court of
Appeals reversed. The prosecutor seeks to appeal the
reversal of the involuntary manslaughter convictions. The
significant question presented is whether defendant was
entitled to an instruction on negligent homicide, MCL
750.324, as the Court of Appeals concluded. Because the
Court of Appeals relied on People v McIntosh, supra, which
we believe does not properly construe MCL 750.325, we vacate
the Court of Appeals reversal of defendant's involuntary
manslaughter convictions and remand the case to that Court
for further consideration in light of this opinion. We are
not persuaded that the questions presented by defendant in
his application merit further review; therefore, except as
discussed below, defendant's application is denied.
I
While intoxicated, defendant fled from a police officer
who was attempting to effectuate a traffic stop. Defendant
fled at high speeds, at times through residential areas,
failed to stop at a stop sign and a traffic signal, almost
2
struck two vehicles, and eventually struck another vehicle,
killing its two occupants. Defendant was charged with two
counts of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; two counts of
operating under the influence and causing death; two counts
of first-degree fleeing and eluding; and operating a motor
vehicle with a suspended license, second or subsequent
offense.
In connection with the second-degree murder charge,
defendant requested jury instructions on involuntary
manslaughter and negligent homicide, MCL 750.324. The trial
court instructed on involuntary manslaughter as defendant
requested, but refused to instruct on negligent homicide
because the court did not view the evidence in the case as
supporting that instruction. The jury convicted defendant
of two counts of involuntary manslaughter rather than
second-degree murder, and otherwise convicted defendant as
charged.
The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant's lead issue
on appeal that he was denied a fair trial because of the
trial court's refusal to instruct on negligent homicide.
The Court found McIntosh, to be dispositive.1 The Court
1
The Court of Appeals quoted the following from People
v McIntosh:
“[I]f the jurors are or should be permitted
to consider manslaughter committed with a motor
3
reversed defendant's manslaughter convictions and ordered
that they be replaced with negligent homicide convictions,
while giving the prosecutor the option of retrying defendant
on the manslaughter charges. The Court rejected the rest of
defendant's claims on appeal.
II
In this appeal we are concerned with the construction
of MCL 750.325, which reads:
The crime of negligent homicide shall be
deemed to be included within every crime of
manslaughter charged to have been committed in
the operation of any vehicle, and in any case
where a defendant is charged with manslaughter
committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the
jury shall find the defendant not guilty of the
crime of manslaughter, it may render a verdict of
guilty of negligent homicide.
The proper construction of a statute is an issue that
we review de novo. People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304; 651
NW2d 906 (2002). Our goal in construing a statute is "to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature." People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d
275 (2002). If the statute's language is clear and
unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its
plain meaning and we enforce the statute as written.
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). In
vehicle, then, pursuant to MCLA 750.325; MSA
28.557, they also should be permitted to consider
negligent homicide.” [Unpublished opinion per
curiam, issued July 31, 2001 (Docket No. 217454),
quoting McIntosh, at 7].
4
other words, when statutory language is unambiguous,
judicial construction is not required or permitted because
the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it
plainly expressed. Id.
III
We find MCL 750.325 clear and unambiguous. The statute
plainly deems the crime of negligent homicide (MCL 750.324)
to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to
have been committed in the operation of any vehicle.
Further, the statute clearly and unambiguously allows for
the conviction of negligent homicide in any case in which a
defendant is charged with manslaughter committed in the
operation of any vehicle. The Legislature twice uses the
word "charged." Accordingly, for the statute to apply, a
defendant must be charged with manslaughter committed in
connection with the operation of a vehicle. Here, however,
defendant was not charged with manslaughter. Defendant was
charged with second-degree murder. It follows that MCL
750.325 does not apply in this case.2
To the extent our conclusion is inconsistent with
McIntosh, we overrule that case. McIntosh concluded that
because the jury had been given instructions on manslaughter
2
We recognize that we reach the same result reached in
People v Jordan, 347 Mich 347; 79 NW2d 873 (1956), which
was overruled in McIntosh, supra.
5
as a lesser offense of murder, the jury should also have
been instructed on negligent homicide under MCL 750.325.
The McIntosh Court reached this conclusion by concluding
that the "better view" of MCL 750.325 "is that manslaughter
committed with a motor vehicle does not have to be formally
pled in an information charging murder in order for the jury
to consider negligent homicide as a possible lesser
offense." 400 Mich 7. In light of the clear and
unambiguous use of the word “charged” in the statute, it was
unnecessary for the McIntosh Court to consider what it
thought was the “better view.” However, we agree with
McIntosh to the extent that it held that a defendant charged
with the crime of murder is entitled to an instruction on
manslaughter if there is the necessary evidentiary support
for the instruction. Although not based on McIntosh, our
decision in People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527; 664 NW2d 685
(2003), arrived at the same result.
IV
This is not the end of the analysis, however. The
result reached in McIntosh will still obtain if negligent
homicide, MCL 750.324, is an inferior, or necessarily
included lesser, offense of the charged offense of second
degree murder, and if there is the necessary evidentiary
support for an instruction on negligent homicide. People v
Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); MCL 768.32(1).
6
The Court of Appeals did not reach these issues because it
relied on McIntosh. Accordingly, we vacate the Court of
Appeals reversal of the manslaughter convictions, and we
remand this case to that Court for reconsideration of
defendant's argument in light of this opinion and the
principles established in Cornell. If, on remand, the Court
of Appeals concludes that an instruction on negligent
homicide was warranted in this case, it must additionally
consider, pursuant to Cornell, whether the trial court
committed error requiring reversal in failing to give the
instruction.3
V
The foregoing discussion resolves the prosecutor's
cross-appeal. In addition to that appeal, we have
considered the issues in defendant's appeal. Except as
discussed below, we conclude that defendant's arguments lack
merit for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals.
If on remand the Court of Appeals affirms defendant's
convictions for involuntary manslaughter, it must also
consider defendant's challenge to his sentences of 15 to 22½
3
The circuit court considered defendant's request for
an instruction on negligent homicide, but determined that
the evidence did not support such an instruction. We note
that an appellate court must find substantial evidence in
support of a requested instruction that was not given in
order to reverse. See Cornell, supra at 365-366.
7
years, which the Court did not consider in light of its
reversal of the manslaughter convictions. Further, because
the Court rejected defendant's supplemental argument for a
new trial (based on new evidence involving a witness's
testimony in a subsequent civil proceeding), in part because
it reversed defendant's manslaughter convictions, this issue
should be reconsidered on remand if the Court of Appeals
affirms defendant's manslaughter convictions.
VI
The Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant's
manslaughter convictions is vacated, and this matter is
remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of
defendant's manslaughter convictions consistent with this
opinion. Defendant's remaining convictions and sentences
are affirmed, except as otherwise indicated in this opinion.
MCR 7.302(G)(1).
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
8
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v No. 120107
JOSEPH CARL WEEDER,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I would not decide this case by an opinion per curiam.
Because this case offers the opportunity to address a
jurisprudentially significant issue, I prefer to grant leave to
appeal so that we might avail ourselves of full briefing and
argument by the parties.
Preferences aside, however, I would limit the Court of
Appeals reconsideration of defendant’s argument to the issue
whether there was the necessary evidentiary support for the
negligent homicide instruction. The majority once again extends
the obiter dictum from People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d
127 (2002). I remain committed to the view that, when
requested, a jury may be instructed on offenses inferior to the
charged offense if such an instruction is supported by the
evidence. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 549; 664 NW2d 685
(2003) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring). Because the trial court
previously determined that the evidence did not support a
negligent homicide instruction, the only relevant inquiry is
whether such a determination was erroneous.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly