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Schmaltz v. Troy Metal Concepts, Inc

Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Date filed: 2003-12-23
Citations: 673 N.W.2d 95, 469 Mich. 467
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5 Citing Cases

                                                                 Michigan Supreme Court 

                                                                 Lansing, Michigan 48909 


                                   Chief Justice                    Justices




Opinion
                                   Maura D. Corrigan                Michael F. Cavanagh
                                                                    Elizabeth A. Weaver
                                                                    Marilyn Kelly
                                                                    Clifford W. Taylor
                                                                    Robert P. Young, Jr.
                                                                    Stephen J. Markman




                                                   FILED DECEMBER 23, 2003



 THOMAS SCHMALTZ,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v                                                                  No. 123865

 TROY METAL CONCEPTS, INC., and
 WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY,

      Defendants-Appellees.

 _______________________________

 PER CURIAM

      In    this   worker’s   compensation          case,    this     Court      is

 asked to determine whether a disabled employee’s average

 weekly wage at the time of injury can be recalculated or

 redetermined to include discontinued fringe benefits when

 that employee’s subsequent employment produces a partial

 benefit rate.      We conclude that the average weekly wage

 that is used to establish benefit entitlement is determined

 at   the   time   of   injury   and       may      not     be   subsequently

 recalculated.      Postinjury employment does not affect the
time of injury average weekly wage calculation.                                This was

the decision reached by the Worker’s Compensation Appellate

Commission (WCAC), a decision which we affirm.

                                           I

        This case comes to us on stipulated facts, which we

will review after setting forth the applicable provisions

of law.         From this case’s inception, the sole question

posed    by     the    parties      is   whether,        and     to     what    extent,

plaintiff’s discontinued fringe benefits can be included in

his “average weekly wage” when determining his entitlement

to wage-loss benefits.

        To    answer    this     question,        we     must     examine       several

provisions in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL

418.101 et seq.          The act compensates workers for wage loss

due     to    work-related       injuries,        but     it     also     establishes

limits for such compensation.                   Since 1982, disabled workers

have    been     entitled      to   receive        eighty       percent        of    their

after-tax average weekly wage.                    MCL 418.351(1).              However,

this compensation is subject to a statutory maximum, which

is     ninety     percent      of    the        state    average        weekly        wage

applicable at the time of injury.                  MCL 418.355(2).

        The     after-tax      wages       used     to        determine     wage-loss

benefit       entitlement        are     calculated            pursuant         to     MCL

418.313(1),           which    establishes              how      the      “after-tax”


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determination is made, and MCL 418.371, which establishes

how the “average weekly wage” is calculated.               The critical

provision for purposes of this case is § 371(2), which

provides:

            As used in this act, “average weekly wage”
       means the weekly wage earned by the employee at
       the time of the employee's injury in all
       employment, inclusive of overtime, premium pay,
       and cost of living adjustment, and exclusive of
       any fringe or other benefits which continue
       during the disability. Any fringe or other
       benefit which does not continue during the
       disability shall be included for purposes of
       determining an employee's average weekly wage to
       the extent that the inclusion of the fringe or
       other benefit will not result in a weekly benefit
       amount which is greater than 2/3 of the state
       average weekly wage at the time of injury. The
       average weekly wage shall be determined by
       computing the total wages paid in the highest
       paid 39 weeks of the 52 weeks immediately
       preceding the date of injury, and dividing by 39.

       The plaintiff in this case was injured in 1997.                   At

the time of his injury, his weekly wage (or “cash” wage)

was $983.59.       His fringe benefits, which were discontinued,

were   valued     at   $273.96.      The    applicable    state   average

weekly wage in 1997 was $591.18, two-thirds of which is

$394.12.          Plaintiff’s     “cash”   weekly   pay   therefore     far

exceeded    the    amount   under   which    fringe   benefits    may   be

included in the calculation of plaintiff’s “average weekly

wage” under § 371(2).        In short, plaintiff’s average weekly

wage at the time of his injury was $983.59.




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       Plaintiff subsequently found new employment, at wages

less than he earned from defendant.                  In accordance with MCL

418.361(1), he is entitled to weekly compensation equal to

“80%   of     the    difference      between       the    injured        employee’s

after-tax average weekly wage before the personal injury

and the after-tax average weekly wage which the injured

employee is able to earn after the personal injury, but not

more   than    the    maximum       weekly   rate        of   compensation,        as

determined     under    [MCL    418.355].”           There      is   a   companion

statement      of    entitlement      in     the     reasonable          employment

provisions     of     the   act,     specifically         MCL    418.301(5)(b),

which states that if a disabled employee “is employed and

the average weekly wage of the employee is less than that

which the employee received before the date of injury, the

employee shall receive weekly benefits under this act equal

to 80% of the difference between the injured employee’s

after-tax weekly wage before the date of injury and the

after-tax weekly wage which the injured employee is able to

earn   after    the    date    of    injury,       but    not   more      than    the

maximum weekly rate of compensation, as determined under

[MCL 418.355].”

       Plaintiff proposes that, if the differential benefit

entitlement discussed in §§ 361(1) and 301(5)(b) is below

two-thirds     of     the   applicable       state       average     weekly      wage


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($394.12), his discontinued fringe benefits should now be

included in his average weekly wage, to the extent that

such inclusion does not result in a weekly benefit amount

greater   than      $394.12.                  The   worker’s         compensation

magistrate,     relying        on     prior     decisions       by     the        WCAC,

rejected plaintiff’s proposal, and the WCAC affirmed the

magistrate’s decision.              2002 Mich ACO 326.1          We agree with

these authorities.

                                        II

     Findings      of   fact    made     or     adopted    by    the    WCAC       are

conclusive    on    appeal,         absent     fraud,     if    there        is    any

competent supporting evidence in the record, but a decision

of the WCAC is subject to reversal if the WCAC operated

within the wrong legal framework or if its decision was

based on erroneous legal reasoning.                     DiBenedetto v West

Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).                          Questions

of law arising in any final order of the WCAC are reviewed

by this Court under a de novo standard of review.                            Mudel v

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691; 614 NW2d 607

(2000).   Unless clearly erroneous, the Courts are to give

great weight to the interpretation of a statute placed upon



     1
       Leave to appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals in
an unpublished order, entered April 24, 2003 (Docket No.
245945).


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it by the administrative body whose job it is to apply the

statute.      Hoste v Shanty Creek Mgmt, Inc, 459 Mich 561; 592

NW2d 360 (1999).

                                        III

       The    statutory        restriction         on     the    inclusion        of

discontinued      fringe     benefits         in   the    calculation        of   an

employee’s average weekly wage, MCL 418.371(2), reflects

the Legislature’s intent that fringe benefits should only

be included to increase the weekly benefit amount available

to   employees    whose     other    earnings,           exclusive     of    fringe

benefits, are too low to yield a weekly benefit amount that

is equal to or above two-thirds of the applicable state

average      weekly    wage.       In     the      leading      WCAC   decision,

Karczewski v Gen Motors Corp, 1994 Mich ACO 613 (1995), the

WCAC    adopted       the   following         analysis      provided        by    the

magistrate in that case:

            Defendant asserts that discontinued fringe
       benefits are includable in the calculation of
       average weekly wage only to the extent necessary
       to bring the full rate up to two-thirds of the
       state average weekly wage. I agree.

            Section 418.371(2) of the Act provides that
       discontinued fringe benefits are includable in
       the computation of the average weekly wage only
       to the extent necessary to yield a rate up to
       two-thirds of the state average weekly wage for
       the year of injury.    If the cash wage yields a
       rate that meets or exceeds two-thirds of the
       state average weekly wage, discontinued fringes
       are not includable. The prior section of the Act


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provided for inclusion of discontinued fringe
benefits in the average weekly wage computation
under all circumstances. Obviously, a change was
intended.

     The present version was part of the large
package of reforms that became effective in 1982.
The whole thrust of the reform package was to
tighten up eligibility requirements and, at the
same time, improve the level of benefits for
those who do qualify. Subject to maximum rates,
the prior rate provisions were based on two-
thirds of an employee’s gross earnings.     At the
higher income levels, claimants are better off at
the 80% after tax rate.        At certain income
levels, employees were better off with a rate
based on two-thirds of their gross income,
inclusive of fringe benefits.       In permitting
addition of discontinued fringes up to the point
necessary to reach a rate equal to two-thirds of
the state average weekly wage, I believe the
Legislature   intended  to   reduce  the   overall
economic loss for claimants at that income level.
It was not intended that eligible claimants be
“worse off” under the new schedule of benefits.

     Traditionally,     average   weekly    wage   is
established, once and for all, as of the date of
injury. Circumstances arising subsequent to that
date   (with    the   exception   of   later   ending
includable fringes) may affect the rate of
compensation, but not the average weekly wage.
Post-injury earnings, during periods of partial
disability,    operate    as   a   credit,   and   in
mitigation of, an employer’s wage indemnity
liability.    The differential is created by the
difference between the pre-injury and reduced
post-injury earnings.     Traditionally, and in the
present statutory scheme, there is no indication
that the Legislature intended to increase the
differential     by   adding   discontinued    fringe
benefits to the cash average weekly wage merely
because the differential payment falls below two-
thirds of the state average weekly wage.         That
concept     runs     counter     to    the     entire
mitigation/favored work doctrine.




                          7

            Since   plaintiff’s  pre-injury  cash   wage
       yields a full rate in excess of two-thirds of the
       state average weekly wage, he is not entitled to
       add fringe benefits to the wage calculation.
       Therefore, plaintiff’s claim for rate adjustment
       has been denied.

       We agree with this analysis and note that it has been

consistently followed by the WCAC each time this question

has come up.

       The   calculation      of     a    worker’s      compensation       average

weekly    wage    at    the   time       of    injury   involves     a   two-step

process that occurs “at the time of the employee’s injury.”

First, the worker’s gross weekly wages in “cash” alone are

applied      to   the    annual         benefit     rate   tables        published

pursuant to MCL 418.313(2).                   If the resulting benefit rate

indicated on the tables does not meet or exceed two-thirds

of the applicable state average weekly wage, the second

step is to add in the value of the worker’s fringe benefits

(without regard to whether they discontinue on the date of

injury or at some later date), up to the point at which the

resulting benefit rate indicated in the tables equals two-

thirds of that state average weekly wage.                   It is only after

this   two-step        process     is     completed     that   the       resulting

average weekly wage figure is used to determine the weekly

benefit amount that worker is actually entitled to receive.

According to Karczewski, this is the “full” weekly benefit




                                          8

amount that is indicated in the benefit rate tables and

that is based upon the worker’s earnings at the time of

injury, without any offsets for postinjury wages, continued

wage-earning        capacity,         or   any    other     type     of   benefit

reductions and limitations, that is the focus of the two-

thirds limitation on the inclusion of fringe benefits in

the     calculation        of   the    average     weekly     wage    under    MCL

418.371(2).2

        Here, plaintiff’s earnings at Troy Metal Concepts were

well above the kind of low income level that the inclusion

of fringe benefits in § 371(2) was designed to address.

Because plaintiff’s gross weekly wages, exclusive of fringe

benefits, were more than sufficient to result in a full

weekly benefit amount under the applicable rate tables that

exceeded two-thirds of the applicable state average weekly

wage,       his   fringe    benefits       may   not   be    included     in   the

calculation of his average weekly wage.                     The mere fact that

plaintiff         may   presently          be    entitled     to     receive    a

differential weekly benefit amount that is less than the


        2
       Plaintiff’s reliance on Taylor v Second Injury Fund,
234 Mich App 1; 592 NW2d 103 (1999), is misplaced.      The
issue there involved calculation of total and permanent (or
“T&P”) disability benefits.       Those benefits may be
increased   (with  the   Second  Injury  Fund   paying  the
difference) to the extent an employee would qualify for
higher benefit rates in later years after injury.       MCL
418.521(2).


                                           9

full weekly amount set forth in the tables and that is less

than two-thirds of the state average weekly wage for the

applicable year of injury, does not provide an occasion for

now including the value of discontinued fringe benefits in

the determination of his average weekly wage.              That average

weekly wage was fixed at the time of injury and may not be

recalculated.         Plaintiff’s     underlying       entitlement,    or

“full” benefit, has never changed.

     The decision of the WCAC is affirmed.

                                     Maura D. Corrigan
                                     Elizabeth A. Weaver
                                     Clifford W. Taylor
                                     Robert P. Young, Jr.
                                     Stephen J. Markman


     CAVANAGH   and    KELLY,   JJ.       We   would   grant   leave   to

appeal.

                                     Michael F. Cavanagh
                                     Marilyn Kelly




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