Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JUNE 11, 2002
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 118266
ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN, a Minor;
ERNEST WARD MCCARN; PATRICIA
ANN MCCARN,
Defendants,
and
NANCY S. LABELLE, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
KEVIN CHARLES LABELLE, Deceased,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
This is an action for declaratory judgment. Allstate
Insurance Company seeks a determination of its obligation to
indemnify its insureds in connection with an underlying
wrongful death suit stemming from the shooting death of Kevin
LaBelle.
We hold that the shooting death of Kevin LaBelle was
“accidental” and, thus, an “occurrence” as defined in the
insurance policy at issue. Consequently, an “occurrence”
gives rise to Allstate’s liability under the policy.
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand to the Court of Appeals to decide whether the criminal
acts exception in this policy excludes coverage.
I
This case arises out of the death of sixteen-year-old
Kevin LaBelle on December 15, 1995, at the home of defendants
Ernest and Patricia McCarn, where their grandson, then
sixteen-year-old defendant Robert McCarn, also resided. On
that day, Robert removed from under Ernest’s bed a shotgun
Robert’s father had given him the year before. The gun was
always stored under Ernest’s bed and was not normally loaded.
Both Robert and Kevin handled the gun, which Robert believed
to be unloaded. When Robert was handling the gun, he pointed
it at Kevin’s face from approximately one foot away. Robert
pulled back the hammer and pulled the trigger and the gun
fired, killing Kevin.
2
Nancy LaBelle, representing Kevin’s estate, brought the
underlying action against Robert and his grandparents, Ernest
and Patricia McCarn, who had a homeowners insurance policy
with plaintiff Allstate. Allstate brought the present action,
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to
indemnify defendants Robert, Ernest, or Patricia McCarn.
Plaintiff and defendants moved for summary disposition in
the declaratory action. The trial court granted defendants’
motions for summary disposition and denied plaintiff’s,
holding that the events constituted an “occurrence” within the
meaning of Allstate’s policy. The trial court also held that
Robert McCarn’s conduct was not intentional or criminal within
the meaning of Allstate’s policy.
Allstate appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the trial court in an unpublished opinion.1 The Court
attempted to apply our recent decisions in Nabozny v
Burkhardt2 and Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters3 and concluded
that “Robert’s intentional actions created a direct risk of
harm that precludes coverage.”
Defendant LaBelle sought leave to appeal. We granted
leave.
1
Issued October 3, 2000 (Docket No. 213041).
2
461 Mich 471; 606 NW2d 639 (2000).
3
460 Mich 105; 595 NW2d 832 (1999).
3
II
In determining whether Allstate must indemnify the
McCarns, we examine the language of the insurance policies and
interpret their terms pursuant to well-established Michigan
principles of construction. Masters at 111.
An insurance policy must be enforced in accordance with
its terms. Id. If not defined in the policy, however, we
will interpret the terms of the policy in accordance with
their “commonly used meaning.” Id. at 112, 114.
The McCarns’ homeowners insurance policy provides in
pertinent part:
Subject to the terms, conditions and
limitations of this policy, Allstate will pay
damages which an insured person becomes legally
obligated to pay because of bodily injury or
property damage arising from an occurrence to which
this policy applies, and is covered by this part of
the policy.
According to the plain meaning of the policy, liability
coverage for damages arises from an “occurrence.” The term
“occurrence” is defined in the insurance policy as: “an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions during the
policy period, resulting in bodily injury or property damage.”
Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the case
before us involved an “accident.”
4
III
In the instant case, the policy defines an occurrence as
an accident, but does not define what constitutes an accident.
In similar cases where the respective policies defined an
occurrence as an accident, without defining accident, we have
examined the common meaning of the term. In such cases, we
have repeatedly stated that “‘an accident is an undesigned
contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out
of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not
anticipated and not naturally to be expected.’” Masters at
114, quoting Arco Ind Corp v American Motorists Ins Co, 448
Mich 395, 404-405; 531 NW2d 168 (1995)(opinion of Mallett,
J.); Auto Club Group Ins Co v Marzonie, 447 Mich 624, 631; 527
NW2d 760 (1994); Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins Co v
DiCicco, 432 Mich 656, 670; 443 NW2d 734 (1989).
Accidents are evaluated from the standpoint of the
insured, not the injured party. Masters at 114, n 6. In
Masters, we held that “the appropriate focus of the term
‘accident’ must be on both ‘the injury-causing act or event
and its relation to the resulting property damage or personal
injury.’” Id. at 115, quoting Marzonie at 648 (Griffin, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
We also stated that “‘an insured need not act
unintentionally’ in order for the act to constitute an
5
‘accident’ and therefore an ‘occurrence.’” Id.
Where an insured does act intentionally, “a problem
arises ‘in attempting to distinguish between intentional acts
that can be classified as “accidents” and those that cannot.’”
Id.
In Masters at 115-116, we applied the following standard
from Justice Griffin’s concurrence in Marzonie at 648-649.
[A] determination must be made whether the
consequences of the insured’s intentional act
“either were intended by the insured or reasonably
should have been expected because of the direct
risk of harm intentionally created by the insured’s
actions. When an insured acts intending to cause
property damage or personal injury, liability
coverage should be denied, irrespective of whether
the resulting injury is different from the injury
intended. Similarly, . . . when an insured’s
intentional actions create a direct risk of harm,
there can be no liability coverage for any
resulting damage or injury, despite the lack of an
actual intent to damage or injure.” [Emphasis in
original.]
What this essentially boils down to is that, if both the act
and the consequences were intended by the insured, the act
does not constitute an accident. On the other hand, if the
act was intended by the insured, but the consequences were
not, the act does constitute an accident, unless the intended
act created a direct risk of harm from which the consequences
should reasonably have been expected by the insured.
As to the perspective from which the analysis should be
made, the question is not whether a reasonable person would
6
have expected the consequences, but whether the insured
reasonably should have expected the consequences.
Accordingly, an objective foreseeability test should not be
used in the present context. Rather, the analysis must be
that, to avoid coverage, the consequence of the intended act,
which created a direct risk of harm, reasonably should have
been expected by the insured.
The policy language dictates whether a subjective or
objective standard is to be used.4 However, the policy
language here does not indicate whether a subjective or
objective standard is to be used. Because “[t]he definition
of accident should be framed from the standpoint of the
insured . . . ,” Masters at 114, and because, where there is
doubt, the policy should be construed in favor of the insured,
id. at 111, we conclude that a subjective standard should be
used here. Further, in Masters, this Court, faced with
similar policy language, concluded that there is no coverage
where the insured intended his action, and the consequences of
this intended action “either were intended by the insured or
4
For example, a policy that excludes coverage of bodily
injury that is expected “from the standpoint of the insured,”
dictates a subjective standard, Metropolitan Property &
Liability Ins Co v DiCicco, companion case to Allstate Ins Co
v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 709; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), just as a
policy that covers bodily injury not expected “by the
insured,” also dictates a subjective standard, Fire Ins
Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685; 545 NW2d 602 (1996).
7
reasonably should have been expected because of the direct
risk of harm intentionally created by the insured’s actions.”
Id. at 115.
In our judgment, the language “by the insured” modifies
both “intended” and “expected.” Therefore, there is no
coverage where the consequences of the insured’s act were
either “intended by the insured” or “reasonably should have
been expected by the insured.” The language, “by the
insured,” indicates that a subjective standard should be used
here. Fire Ins Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685; 545 NW2d
602 (1996). Although, “[n]egligence alone is not sufficient
to prevent the death from being an accident within the meaning
of the policy,” Collins v Nationwide Life Ins Co, 409 Mich
271, 277; 294 NW2d 194 (1980), when the acts of the insured
rise to the level of a “direct risk of harm intentionally
created”—a level of culpability only slightly lower than
intentionally acting to produce an intended harm–coverage is
precluded, where the insured reasonably should have expected
the harm, as the situation is virtually indistinguishable from
intentionally causing the harm.
Further, the “direct risk of harm” must have been
“intentionally created by the insured’s actions.” This
language shows that the Masters test is not objective. On the
contrary, the inquiry is entirely subjective–did the insured
8
intentionally create a direct risk of harm? In this case,
there was no intentional creation of a direct risk of harm
because of the undisputed evidence that Robert McCarn believed
he was pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun.
The dissent is incorrect in concluding that this Court
adopted an objective test in Masters. As previously stated,
in our judgment, the language “by the insured” modifies both
“intended” and “expected,” indicating a subjective test. A
subjective test is not only consistent with Masters and
Nabozny, it is the required test, based on the language the
Masters Court adopted from Marzonie. Accordingly, we are not
abandoning the rule established in Masters, as the dissent
contends; rather, we are simply adhering to this rule. See
post at 9, n 6.
Applying these principles to the present case, viewed
from the standpoint of the insured, we hold that Kevin
LaBelle’s death was an “accident,” thus an “occurrence,”
covered under the insurance policy. We agree with plaintiff
that Robert intended to point the gun at Kevin and pull the
trigger. However, Robert believed the gun was not loaded.
Robert had no intention of firing a loaded weapon. No bodily
injury would have been caused by Robert’s intended act of
pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun.
9
The dissent states:
What is the direct risk of harm consonant with
pulling the trigger of a firearm? The obvious risk
is that the weapon, if loaded, might discharge and
cause an injury. In my view, the evidence adduced
at the summary disposition stage warrants the
conclusion that the insured should have reasonably
expected the consequences of his intentional act.
[Slip op at 13.]
We agree that this case does not present a question of
fact. The fact that Robert believed the gun was unloaded is
a matter about which there is no genuine issue of material
fact. This is because there is nothing in the record to
reasonably support a conclusion that, contrary to Robert’s
testimony that he believed the gun was unloaded, he
consciously believed the gun was loaded, or even contemplated
that there was any possibility that it was loaded when he
pulled the trigger. Even plaintiff, the insurer, acknowledged
that Robert believed the firearm was unloaded when he pulled
the trigger:
McCarn’s subjective, although erroneous,
belief that the firearm was not loaded does not
alter the fact that he picked up the gun, pointed
it, pulled back the hammer and pulled the trigger.
Further, Robert made statements at his deposition to
support his belief that the gun was not loaded: Robert and
Kevin were “horsing around” with the gun as they had done on
previous occasions; Robert was surprised when the gun actually
fired; and, immediately following the discharge of the gun,
10
Robert called 911. Thus, there is nothing to reasonably
indicate that Robert entertained knowledge that the gun might
have been loaded.
In short, it would be speculation to suggest that Robert
intentionally shot his friend or was conscious of a
nontheoretical possibility that a shell was in the gun when he
pulled the trigger. Clearly, such speculation cannot suffice
to establish even a genuine issue of material fact, let alone
to conclude that Robert’s intended act of pulling the trigger
of an unloaded gun intentionally created a direct risk of
harm.
The dissent goes to great lengths to show that under an
objective standard, the insured should have reasonably
expected the consequences. We simply cannot agree because the
language of the test adopted in Masters requires us to
subjectively analyze what Robert thought when he pulled the
trigger. Robert thought he was pulling the trigger of an
unloaded gun.5
5
The dissent asserts that this opinion makes “the
insured’s subjective belief regarding the status of the gun
definitive.” Post at 12. While this is not inaccurate, this
should not be confused with making the insured’s own
assertions of his subjective belief definitive. A subjective
test does not require courts to simply accept uncritically the
insured’s own assertions regarding his subjective belief.
Instead, courts must examine the totality of the
circumstances, including the reasonableness or credibility of
the insured’s assertions, evidence of "other acts," evidence
(continued...)
11
Robert McCarn may have been negligent in failing to see
if the gun was loaded before he pulled the trigger,
particularly because he was the last person to use the gun
weeks earlier for target practice. However, the issue of
negligence is not before us. As we stated in Collins, the
negligence of the insured in acting as he did is not enough to
prevent an incident from being an accident if the consequence
of the action (e.g., shot coming from a gun) should not have
reasonably been expected by the insured.6
While it may be considered quite obvious that Robert’s
conduct was careless and foolish, it was negligence that
5
(...continued)
concerning the faculties or the maturity of the insured,
evidence concerning relationships between an insured and a
victim of an injury, and so forth. In this case, there is
simply no evidence to suggest that the insured intended shot
to be discharged from this gun when he pulled its trigger.
Further, that the insured can now logically explain how
the accidental shooting most likely occurred, i.e., that the
insured forgot to unload the gun the last time he used it,
does not transform an otherwise accidental shooting into an
intentional creation of a direct risk of harm. Merely because
one can explain, after the fact, how an insured’s actions
inexorably led to certain consequences does not mean that that
insured reasonably should have expected those consequences.
If that were true, the only covered occurrences would be
inexplicable ones.
6
The dissent asserts that Robert’s prior use of the gun
should be considered in deciding whether Robert should have
reasonably anticipated the harm caused. However, at most, the
prior use of the gun would establish Robert was negligent. In
Michigan, the test is not whether the insured was negligent,
but whether the insured should have reasonably expected the
consequence.
12
simply did not rise to the level that he should have expected
to result in harm. Otherwise, liability insurance coverage
for negligence would seem to become illusory. We must be
careful not to take the expectation of harm test so far that
we eviscerate the ability of parties to insure against their
own negligence.7
The problem, as we see it, with the dissent’s opinion is
that it undermines the ability of insureds to protect
themselves against their own foolish or negligent acts. If
courts are to review the acts of insureds for “objective
reasonableness,” as the dissent proposes, the very purpose of
insurance would be compromised as insureds would find it
increasingly difficult to recover on claims arising from
injuries set in motion by foolhardy conduct on their own part
or on the part of their families. However, the impetus for
insurance is not merely, or even principally, to insure
oneself for well thought out and reasoned actions that go
7
The dissent refers to Robert’s nolo contendere plea to
manslaughter. Slip op at 3. However, given that such a no
contest plea does not have the effect of an admission for any
other proceeding than the one in which it is entered, MCR
2.111(E)(3), that plea has no legal relevance to this case.
Regardless, even if we assume Robert’s guilt of manslaughter
in connection with this case, that does not change the fact
that the shooting was an accident. Similarly, the dissent
refers to Robert having smoked marijuana, slip op at 3, n 3,
but this has no serious relevance to the issues at hand.
Smoking marijuana did not affect the establishment of intent
by Robert.
13
wrong, but to insure oneself for foolish or negligent actions
that go wrong. Indeed, it is obviously the latter that are
more likely to go astray and to precipitate the desire for
insurance. Under the dissent’s approach, however, only the
former actions would be clearly covered “accidents,” or, at
least, would clearly avoid disputes over coverage with
insurers
Further, under the dissent’s approach, only occurrences
that were truly unexplainable would be covered “accidents.”
For, in retrospect, a sufficiently diligent insurer could
almost always determine the physical cause of an accident,
tracing it back to some prior conduct by the insured that
should have been performed differently. Actions have
consequences, and with sufficient effort, a connection between
an occurrence and a prior action on the part of the insured
can invariably be identified. However, merely because, in
retrospect, an insurer is able to identify such a connection,
does not mean that what took place was not an “accident.” If
one is driving too fast on a highway, not intending to but
nonetheless causing an accident, it can hardly be denied that
what has resulted is an accident despite the fact that it
might be traceable to “objectively unreasonable” conduct by
the insured, i.e. driving too fast on a highway.
14
IV
Contrary to what our dissenting colleagues state, we are
not abandoning or calling into question the rule from Masters
in any way. The facts of this case are distinguishable from
Masters and Nabozny, where we held that specific acts failed
to qualify as accidents under the respective insurance
policies. In Nabozny, the plaintiff broke his ankle during a
fight when the insured tripped him. The insured, while not
intending to break the plaintiff’s ankle, did intend to fight
with him. This and the effort to trip during the fight was
the creation of a direct risk of physical harm that should
have caused the insured to reasonably expect the consequences
that ensued. Thus, we concluded that the injury was not an
accident.
In Masters, the insured and his son intentionally set a
fire, intending to cause damage in their clothing store only,
but that ultimately destroyed not just their store, but also
a neighboring building. We held that the applicable insurance
policy, which precluded coverage for intentional acts, did not
provide coverage under the circumstances. Our reason was
that, when the insured acted by starting a fire, it is
irrelevant that the consequence, which was burning property,
was different in magnitude from that intended.
15
The difference between this case and Nabozny and Masters,
however, is that here, while the act was intended, the result
was not.8 Thus, unlike in Nabozny, Robert should not have
reasonably expected the consequences that ensued from his act
because his intended act was merely to pull the trigger of an
unloaded gun. Similarly, unlike Masters, where the
consequence of the act was intended, here the consequence—shot
leaving the gun—was not intended. Furthermore, even if one
used some variation on a foreseeability test, no bodily harm
could have been foreseen from Robert’s intended act, because
he intended to pull the trigger of an unloaded gun, and, thus,
it was not foreseeable, indeed it was impossible, under the
facts as Robert believed them to be, that shot would be
discharged. Therefore, we cannot say Robert should have
expected the unfortunate consequences of his act. The
8
The dissent contends that “[t]here is no such
‘difference’ among these three cases. Rather, in both Masters
and Nabozny, the insureds made precisely the same claim as
presented here–that they did not intend the result of their
deliberate acts.” Post at 8 (emphasis in original). What the
dissent is missing is that the insureds in Masters and Nabozny
did intend the results of their deliberate acts–the fire and
the tripping; they just did not intend the magnitude of those
results–the burning down of the neighboring building and the
broken ankle. So, again, this case is different from Masters
and Nabozny because there the insureds did intend the results
of their deliberate acts, while here the insured did not
intend the result–the firing of shot–of his deliberate act–the
shooting of a gun that he believed to be unloaded.
16
discharge of the shot was an accident and entitled to coverage
unless a policy exclusion applies.
V
Allstate maintains that Robert McCarn’s actions
constitute a criminal act that, under the policy’s criminal
acts exclusion, negates Allstate’s duty to indemnify the
insureds. The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue
because it concluded that Robert’s actions created a direct
risk of harm that precluded coverage. We remand this case to
the Court of Appeals to decide this issue.
VI
We hold today that Kevin LaBelle’s death was an
“accident,” and thus an “occurrence,” covered under the policy
because Robert did not intend or reasonably expect that his
actions, pointing and pulling a trigger of an unloaded gun,
would cause any bodily injury to Kevin LaBelle. We reverse
the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Court
of Appeals to decide whether the criminal-acts exception in
this policy excludes coverage.
KELLY , TAYLOR , and MARKMAN , JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH , J.
17
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 118266
ROBERT DANIEL MCCARN, a Minor;
ERNEST WARD MCCARN; PATRICIA
ANN MCCARN,
Defendants,
and
NANCY S. LABELLE, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
KEVIN CHARLES LABELLE, Deceased,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
YOUNG, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that this case should be
remanded to the Court of Appeals so that the applicability of
the intentional act and criminal act policy exclusions can be
decided. However, I respectfully dissent from that portion of
the majority opinion that concludes that the policy provides
indemnity coverage because the majority finds that the
shooting incident here constituted an “accident” and thus an
“occurrence” under the policy. The majority essentially
adulterates any consistent or coherent application of the
standards set forth by this Court just two terms ago in
Masters1 and later applied in Nabozny2 concerning the
differentiation between an accident and an intentional act.
The majority’s effort to distinguish the facts of this case
from Masters and Nabozny are hollow and simply debases the
clear standard set forth in those opinions.
I believe that the application of the definition of the
term “accident” we recently announced in Masters and Nabozny,
in which we construed identical policy language, requires an
objective view of the insured’s actions.
Under the facts of this case, the insured should have
reasonably expected the consequences created by pointing a gun
at another and pulling the trigger without checking to verify
that it was unloaded. Accordingly, I would affirm summary
disposition in favor of plaintiff.
I. ADDITIONAL FACTS
According to Robert McCarn’s deposition testimony, he and
Kevin LaBelle went to McCarn’s house after school. At some
point in the afternoon,3 McCarn retrieved his .410 shotgun
1
Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105; 595
NW2d 832 (1999).
2
Nabozny v Burkhardt, 461 Mich 471; 606 NW2d 639 (2000).
3
Before retrieving the shotgun, McCarn testified that
(continued...)
2
from under his grandfather’s bed. Both boys handled the
weapon.
LaBelle and McCarn argued over crackers; LaBelle had the
crackers and refused to share them with McCarn when asked to
do so. Attempting to frighten LaBelle into sharing the
crackers,4 McCarn intentionally pointed the shotgun at LaBelle
with the barrel being approximately one foot away from
LaBelle’s face. McCarn again asked LaBelle for the crackers,
but LaBelle declined to share them. McCarn pulled the hammer
back, pretended to pull the trigger “a couple” times, and then
actually pulled the trigger. The weapon discharged and
LaBelle was killed. As a result of the death, McCarn pleaded
nolo contendere to manslaughter, MCL 750.321.
In both his statement to the police and his deposition
testimony, McCarn stated that he thought the gun was unloaded
and would simply “click” when the trigger was pulled. McCarn
acknowledged, however, that he did not check the gun to verify
3
(...continued)
he and LaBelle got something to eat after school, went to a
friend’s house for ten minutes, smoked “[o]ne joint and a
bowl” of marijuana, watched videos, and played with a guinea
pig and a hedgehog.
4
While earlier in his testimony, McCarn denied pointing
the gun at LaBelle with the intention of frightening him,
stating that he was “just playing,” he also admitted that he
thought the anticipated clicking sound “would be frightening”
to LaBelle. Later on in his testimony, McCarn admitted that
he was “attempting to frighten” LaBelle “into giving [him] the
crackers.”
3
that it was unloaded before pulling the trigger. McCarn
stated that he had owned the gun “for at least a year” before
the shooting and had successfully completed a gun safety
course. He also admitted that he had last used the gun
without his grandparent’s permission for target practice weeks
before the shooting. On this prior occasion, McCarn was “in
a hurry” to put the gun away because he did not want his
grandparents to catch him using the weapon without their
supervision. McCarn could not recall if he had unloaded the
shotgun in his hurry to put the weapon away.
II. MASTERS AND NABOZNY
The policy language in this case and in Masters and
Nabozny are identical. Each policy provided coverage for an
“occurrence,” which was later defined as an “accident.”
Accident was not further defined.
A. MASTERS
Masters involved an intentionally set fire that had the
unintended result of destroying nearly a block of business
establishments. As in this case, the policy in Masters
provided coverage for an “occurrence,” which was later defined
in the policy as “an accident.” 460 Mich 113. The insureds
claimed that the event was an accident because, although the
fire in their business premises was deliberately set, they did
not intend to damage the adjoining buildings.
4
The Court of Appeals applied a subjective standard in
assessing whether the insured arsonists expected or intended
to burn properties other than their own. This Court reversed.
We first gave “accident” its customary, ordinary meaning as an
“undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance,
something not anticipated, . . . and not naturally to be
expected.” Id. at 114. Having defined accident, we
nevertheless recognized the difficulty of categorizing cases
in which the action giving rise to the harm was intended even
though the consequences were not. We unanimously held that an
insured’s intentional actions precluded coverage even though
the insureds claimed not to have intended the consequences of
their actions where the insured “reasonably should have
expected” the harm the insured’s acts created. We adopted
this objective standard from Justice GRIFFIN’S concurrence in
Auto Club Group Ins Co v Marzonie, 447 Mich 624, 648-649; 527
NW2d 760 (1994):
In such cases, a determination must be made
whether the consequences of the insured’s
intentional act either were intended by the insured
or reasonably should have been expected because of
the direct risk of harm intentionally created by
the insured’s actions. When an insured acts
intending to cause property damage or personal
injury, liability coverage should be denied,
irrespective of whether the resulting injury is
different from the injury intended. Similarly,
. . . when an insured’s intentional actions create
a direct risk of harm, there can be no liability
coverage for any resulting damage or injury,
despite the lack of an actual intent to damage or
5
injure. [Masters, 460 Mich at 115-116 (Emphasis
added.)]
Granting summary disposition to the insurer, this Court
held that, because the Masters intended to cause harm, “[i]t
is irrelevant whether the harm that resulted, damage to the
clothing store and surrounding businesses, was different from
or exceeded the harm intended, minor damage to the clothing
inventory.” Id. at 116-117. We later applied this same
objective test in Nabozny.
B. NABOZNY
Similarly, in Nabozny, the plaintiff was injured in a
fight with the insured. The policy at issue was identical to
the one in Masters and this case, and provided coverage for an
“occurrence,” which, in turn, was defined as “an accident”.
461 Mich 474. As in the present case, the insured claimed
that the injury he caused was a covered occurrence because he
did not intend to break the plaintiff’s ankle. We unanimously
rejected that argument, holding:
In this case, Mr. Burkhardt apparently did not
intend to break Mr. Nabozny's ankle. However, it
is plain that in tripping someone to the ground in
the course of a fight, Mr. Burkhardt reasonably
should have expected the consequences of his acts
because of the direct risk of harm created. This
precludes a finding of liability coverage under the
terms of this policy. In other words, the injury
did not result from an "accident."
Moreover, Mr. Burkhardt's testimony that he
did not intend to "break any bones" does not assist
him. In our quote from Marzonie, Justice GRIFFIN
6
cited Piccard, which explained:
“[W]here a direct risk of harm is
intentionally created, and property damage or
personal injury results, there is no liability
coverage even if the specific result was
unintended. It is irrelevant that the character of
the harm that actually results is different from
the character of the harm intended by the insured.”
It is clear from the facts, as stated by the
insured, that injury reasonably should have been
expected. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the
broken ankle was not the specific harm intended by
the insured. [Id. at 480-481 (citations omitted).]
It is worth reemphasizing that in both Masters and
Nabozny the policy language we construed was identical to the
policy language contained in the present case. Here, like
Masters and Nabozny, the insured engaged in a deliberate act
but claimed that the resulting unintended consequences
rendered the event an accident. In both Masters and Nabozny,
this Court rejected this argument and held that there was no
covered “occurrence” because the insured reasonably should
have expected the consequences of his intentional actions—even
when the insured himself did not anticipate such consequences.
Thus, in Masters and Nabozny we declined to view the
expectation of the injury from the subjective perspective of
the insureds in making the determination whether an accident
occurred.
C. THE MAJORITY’S MISAPPLICATION OF MASTERS AND NABOZNY
The majority erroneously states that the “difference”
7
between the present case and Masters and Nabozny “is that
here, while the act was intended, the result was not.” Slip
op at 16. There is no such “difference” among these three
cases. Rather, in both Masters and Nabozny, the insureds made
precisely the same claim as presented here—that they did not
intend the result of their deliberate acts. Robert intended
to pull the trigger of his shotgun, but he testified that he
did not intend to cause any physical injury to his friend.
The question for the purpose of coverage is whether the
shooting can be considered an accident because Robert should
not have reasonably expected the consequences when he
intentionally aimed his shotgun at the head of his friend,
cocked the hammer, and pulled the trigger.
The purported difference between this case and Masters
and Nabozny has been created by the majority, which has
imposed a different construction of the phrase “intentional
act.” As stated in Masters, this Court unanimously adopted an
objective test of intentionality: an intentional act causing
injury is not an accident if the insured actually intended the
harm or if the harm should reasonably have been expected.5
5
To reiterate, the Masters standard is as follows: “[A]
determination must be made whether the consequences of the
insured’s intentional act ‘either were intended by the insured
or reasonably should have been expected because of the direct
risk of harm intentionally created by the insured’s actions.’”
The majority attempts to avoid applying an objective standard,
(continued...)
8
Here, the majority fails to apply the objective Masters
test of intentionality, instead substituting a subjective
one.6 The majority states that “[w]e agree with plaintiff
that Robert intended to point the gun at Kevin and pull the
trigger.[7] However, Robert believed that the gun was not
loaded. Robert had no intention of firing a loaded weapon.
No bodily injury would have been caused by Robert’s intended
act of pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun.” Slip op at 9
(emphasis added). What the majority must justify, but cannot,
5
(...continued)
urging that, in the Masters standard, “by the insured”
modifies both “intended” and “expected.” This is
grammatically incorrect. In fact, grammatically speaking, the
phrases “intended by the insured” and “reasonably should have
expected” modify “consequences.” Therefore, the Masters
standard unqualifiedly and grammatically requires an inquiry
into the reasonableness of the insured’s expectations
concerning the consequences of his intentional acts. This is
an objective inquiry, not, as the majority contends, a
subjective one.
It appears to me that this Court wisely chose to use an
objective definition of accident in Masters because it creates
a disincentive for collusion between an insured and a
plaintiff. See Nabozny, supra at 479, n 10.
6
This Court is free to abandon for sufficient reason its
own precedent. When it does so, it should do it openly and
provide justification. Here the majority abandons the rule it
established in Masters after years of contradictory precedent
without acknowledging (1) that it has done so or (2) why it is
justified in doing so.
7
I note that the majority would have no factual or legal
basis for concluding otherwise, because defendant admitted
that he intentionally aimed the gun, engaged the hammer and
pulled the trigger in order to frighten his friend during
their dispute over crackers.
9
is why we must consider his act of pointing a shotgun at
another person and pulling the trigger from Robert’s
subjective perspective.8 Under the Masters test, the question
is whether the insured “reasonably” should have expected the
consequence because of the direct risk of harm he
intentionally created. However, the majority tautologically
concludes as a matter of law that “Robert should not have
reasonably expected the consequences that ensued from his act
because his intended act was merely to pull the trigger of an
unloaded gun.”9 Slip op at 16 (emphasis added). However,
8
This insistence on viewing Robert’s act from his
subjective perspective represents a critical flaw in the
majority opinion. The majority declares that it must employ
a subjective standard because this, as opposed to an objective
standard, aids in construing the policy in favor of coverage.
“[W]here there is doubt, the policy should be construed in
favor of the insured . . . .” Slip op at 7.
This is contrary to the rules of contract interpretation.
Contracts, even insurance contracts, are construed according
to their unambiguous terms. It is only when there is an
ambiguity in the policy language that provides a basis for
using a rule of construction favoring coverage. Masters,
supra at 111. Because we considered the very contract term at
issue here, “accident,” in Masters and Nabozny and found no
ambiguity, the majority has no warrant to “construe” that term
in any different fashion in this case.
9
Yet another flaw in the majority opinion is that it
attempts to divide the “intentional act” into components.
Rather than view the act from the required perspective—the
consequences reasonably expected when a direct risk of harm is
created—the majority focuses on whether the insured intended
to pull the trigger of an unloaded gun. Without basis, the
majority subdivides the intentional act into two components,
the voluntary act and the chain of events that the volitional
(continued...)
10
what Robert’s reasonable expectations should have been, not
what his actual subjective beliefs may or may not have been,
are the focus of the Masters standard.
The majority erroneously maintains that the test we
articulated in Masters and Nabozny is a subjective one.
However, the majority fails to explain our objective
application of the test in both cases. In addition, the term
“reasonably” has consistently been construed as indicating an
objective rather than a subjective standard. In Allstate Ins
Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), six justices,
including the author of the current majority opinion, agreed
that “‘reasonably be expected’ is unambiguous” and “requires
application of an objective standard of expectation.” 432
Mich 688. In Fire Ins Exchange v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685;
545 NW2d 602 (1996), the Court held that injury “‘neither
expected nor intended by the insured’” required a subjective
standard of expectation where the policy language did “not
employ the term ‘reasonably.’” (Emphasis added.) The
majority simply refuses to acknowledge that the test adopted
in Masters and Nabozny utilizes the same language that has
been construed by this Court as requiring an objective
9
(...continued)
act sets into motion—the consequences. The intentional act
committed by Robert was that of pulling the trigger of a gun.
That the gun was or was not loaded does not transform the
nature of the insured’s volitional act.
11
standard of inquiry.
Without offering any rationale for doing so, the majority
makes the insured’s subjective belief regarding the status of
the gun definitive, as though no contrary conclusion were
possible. The issue is whether, in intentionally creating a
direct risk of harm—pulling the trigger of a shotgun without
ascertaining if it was loaded—the insured should have
reasonably expected the consequences. Given that the
applicable standard is objective, the insured’s subjective
belief is not controlling.
Inexplicably, under the standard adopted by the majority,
neither the holding nor the outcome in Masters or Nabozny
could be sustained today.
III. APPLICATION OF MASTERS AND NABOZNY
In the present case, it is uncontested that Robert McCarn
intentionally aimed the weapon at the victim, engaged the
hammer, and pulled the trigger.10 Because he denied intending
the actual injury, the event is an “occurrence” only if he
should not have reasonably expected the consequences in light
of the direct risk of harm intentionally created.
The scope of the direct risk of harm created by an
insured’s act is necessarily dependent upon the nature of the
10
As such, the acts admitted by the insured constitute
felonious assault, MCL 750.82.
12
intentional act and the facts and circumstances surrounding
the event. The direct risk of harm created by intentionally
throwing knives, for example, is far greater than the direct
risk of harm created by intentionally throwing cotton balls.
In each instance, the natural result of the voluntary act must
be considered. See 9 Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 126:27, p 126
53.
What is the direct risk of harm consonant with pulling
the trigger of a firearm? The obvious risk is that the
weapon, if loaded, might discharge and cause an injury. In my
view, the evidence adduced at the summary disposition stage
warrants the conclusion that the insured should have
reasonably expected the consequences of his intentional act.
In his deposition testimony, McCarn testified that he
consumed marijuana before taking the weapon out of storage. He
also testified that he believed that the gun was unloaded and
that he was “just playing” when he pulled the trigger of the
weapon. However, he later admitted that he intended to
frighten LaBelle into parting with crackers.11
11
The majority would prefer to minimize the insured’s
admitted intent to cause harm—to commit a felonious assault.
I do not. As we stated in Nabozny, “‘where a direct risk of
harm is intentionally created, and property damage or personal
injury results, there is no liability coverage even if the
specific result was unintended. It is irrelevant that the
character of the harm that actually results is different from
the character of the harm intended by the insured.’” 461 Mich
(continued...)
13
In addition, McCarn admitted that he did not check the
status of the gun before pulling the trigger. He also
testified that the last time he used the gun, he put it away
hurriedly and could not recall whether he unloaded the weapon
before putting it away. Further, the insured admitted that he
deliberately aimed the weapon one foot away from the victim’s
face, engaged the hammer, and pulled the trigger in an effort
to assault the victim.12
As we noted in Nabozny, “it can be in the interest of an
insured defendant to provide testimony that will allow an
injured plaintiff to recover from the insurer rather than
directly from the defendant.” Id., at 479, n 10. As stated,
I do not believe that reasonable jurors could conclude that
Robert’s stated beliefs about the harm he was creating were
reasonable. Inasmuch as the reasonableness of Robert’s
expectations about the harm he created is the critical issue
for the purpose of coverage under this policy, summary
disposition in favor of plaintiff is appropriate. Therefore,
I believe that the majority errs in holding that the event was
11
(...continued)
481, quoting Marzonie.
12
The majority attempts to explain why Robert’s later
testimony about his prior use of the shotgun is not
dispositive. However, I cannot think of a single reason why
all the defendant’s admissions should not be considered in
deciding whether Robert should have reasonably anticipated the
harm he caused in using his weapon.
14
an accident as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Because I believe that Robert reasonably should have
expected the consequences of his actions in light of the
direct risk of harm he created, I would affirm summary
disposition in favor of plaintiff.13
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , J., concurred with YOUNG , J.
13
As to the issue of how direct a harm the insured’s
actions created, this would be a much closer question—and one
requiring a trial—if evidence were presented that the insured
had checked the gun and mistakenly (or negligently) determined
that it was unloaded before pulling the trigger.
15