Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 9, 2002
WARREN M. ROBERTSON, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116276
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MARKMAN, J.
In this worker’s compensation case, we must determine
whether the Court of Appeals properly vacated the Worker’s
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) order affirming the
magistrate’s decision denying worker’s compensation benefits.
In part, the magistrate considered plaintiff’s perceptions of
an actual work event in deciding whether plaintiff had
established a compensable mental disability injury under MCL
418.301(2). The Court of Appeals determined that such
considerations by the magistrate were irrelevant to a mental
disability analysis. We vacate the Court of Appeals order and
remand this matter to the magistrate for analysis under the
statutory framework as set forth below.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff began working for defendant employer in 1973,
working at various auto assembly plant locations. In 1984, he
began working at defendant’s Sterling Heights Assembly Plant.
Plaintiff worked on the assembly line in the paint department
on what he described as the “sealer deck or decking job.”
Because plaintiff was also artistically talented, he was
placed in the Product Quality Improvement Partnership (PQIP)
department and given the position of “artist.”
In the early part of 1994, plaintiff was assigned a new
supervisor, George Asher. According to plaintiff, Asher began
“needling” plaintiff to use his artistic abilities and “redo”
some paintings on Asher’s boat. Plaintiff stated that he told
Asher that he would do the work on his own time at his home.
However, according to plaintiff, Asher insisted that it be
done on company time. Plaintiff refused to do this.
Later that year, plaintiff, on his own time, worked on a
personal project for another executive employed by defendant.
Plaintiff completed this project for this executive before a
1995 New Year’s Eve party. According to plaintiff, that is
when “things got out of hand” with Asher. Plaintiff stated
2
that in February 1995, Asher disciplined plaintiff for having
improperly taken a personal day off two months earlier.
Several days later, plaintiff and a fellow employee, Al Sipes,
were called into Asher’s office. Asher informed the two men
that they would no longer be working in the PQIP department,
and that they were to return to their previous designated
positions. Plaintiff stated that he then “lost it.”
Specifically, plaintiff admitted that he and Asher exchanged
harsh words. Asher claimed that plaintiff backed him into a
corner with a 2 x 2 piece of wood and threatened him and his
family. Plaintiff left work following this incident.
Later that evening, plaintiff’s wife called the plant
manager, Frank Slaughter, to inquire into these events.
Slaughter informed plaintiff’s wife that the PQIP department
had been discontinued and that plaintiff had been asked to
return to his previous position. Slaughter further requested
that plaintiff’s wife have plaintiff return to work the
following Monday morning. However, when plaintiff returned to
work, he was escorted from the building. Plaintiff had been
given a five-day suspension for using abusive language and
disorderly conduct.
Plaintiff later stated that he then went “out of control”
and “would probably have killed someone” if he had not
received help. He admitted himself to an in-patient mental
3
health facility that same day, and remained in the facility
for about six weeks. Upon release, he continued receiving
psychiatric treatment, and never returned to work. In August
1995, plaintiff filed a claim for worker’s compensation
benefits.
At the hearing on plaintiff’s claim, he testified with
regard to several precipitating factors for his
hospitalization including: “Chrysler Commercial Art Supervisor
wanted me to do work on his boat on company time. I refused
and now I’m in trouble at work. I’m very depressed” and “I
worked hard to get the status and overnight this individual
[Mr. Asher] wiped it out.” Additionally, Dr. Dabbagh,
plaintiff’s mental health provider, concluded that the
conflict between defendant and Mr. Asher was the pivotal
reason for plaintiff’s depression and anger. In part, Dr.
Dabbagh stated that
there was a conflict between him and the
supervisor, and for that reason, he was removed
from his job and put on the line after about
eighteen [years], if I recall, from working on that
job, and that’s what really basically has
precipitated his episode of depression and anger.
Slaughter testified that plaintiff’s transfer from PQIP
to his previous position was the result of the department
having been shut down. Specifically, he stated that in late
1994 and early 1995, new car launches at defendant company
were going poorly. To compound this problem, employees were
4
working considerable overtime and there were significant
equipment problems. Thus, costs were high. To solve this
problem, defendant reduced overtime and cut “nonstandard”
positions. Plaintiff’s position was “nonstandard”; thus, he
was returned to his prior position. Slaughter asserted that
this decision was his own and that he did not consult with
Asher, who confirmed that he had not been consulted about
plaintiff’s transfer.
The worker’s compensation magistrate determined that
plaintiff “failed to establish that he is or was disabled as
defined by the act.” According to the magistrate, the
evidence showed that “any conflict between George Asher and
plaintiff was clearly the product of plaintiff’s expansive
mind and is a misperception.” The magistrate further stated
that the “credible” testimony of defendant’s witnesses
indicated that there had been no retaliatory intent behind
plaintiff’s reassignment, but instead that it represented a
“simple economic business decision by upper management.”
Because the actual event of plaintiff’s reassignment to the
assembly line could not be “seen as significantly contributing
to, aggravating, or accelerating plaintiff’s mental
disability,” the magistrate concluded that plaintiff had
failed to establish that he was disabled as defined by the
act. Upon review, the WCAC stated that the job transfer had
5
been the only actual event, and that there was no evidence of
any animus on Asher’s part directed toward plaintiff. Thus,
the WCAC affirmed the magistrate’s decision.
The Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the WCAC and
remanded the case to the magistrate. Robertson v Chrysler
Corp, unpublished order, entered January 11, 2000 (Docket No.
222363). The Court stated that the magistrate’s decision that
the actual work event did not significantly contribute to or
aggravate plaintiff’s mental disability was erroneous because
it “appears to have been influenced by his findings that the
plaintiff misperceived the reason for the reassignment, and
that the reassignment was the result of business
considerations and was not retaliatory.” In the view of the
Court of Appeals, “whether plaintiff correctly or incorrectly
perceived or interpreted the events at work is irrelevant, as
is the existence of a legitimate business reason for the
reassignment.” While such a conclusion is consistent with a
previous decision of this Court, we believe that decision
wrongly interpreted Michigan law and must be overruled.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a worker’s compensation claimant’s perceptions of
actual events of employment are to be considered in deciding
whether a claimant has established a compensable mental
disability under MCL 418.301(2) is a matter of statutory
6
interpretation. Matters of statutory interpretation are
questions of law. In re MCI Telecom, 460 Mich 396, 413; 516
NW2d 164 (1999). This Court reviews questions of law under a
de novo standard of review. DiBenedetto v West Shore
Hospital, 461 Mich 394, 401; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).
III. DISCUSSION
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
From its inception in 1912, Michigan’s worker’s
compensation system has provided benefits for employees who
are injured in the course of their employment. The initial
worker’s compensation act, however, did not expressly provide
compensation for employees who suffered mental disabilities.1
Despite this, our Court determined that coverage existed for
mental disability injuries because such injuries were merely
a variant of personal injury within the scope of the act.
See, e.g., Klein v Len H Darling Co, 217 Mich 485; 187 NW 400
(1922).2 Thus, if the mental disability arose out of, and in
1
The initial version of the worker’s compensation
statute, compiled at 1915 CL 5431, provided in part:
If an employee . . . receives a personal
injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment by an employer . . . , he shall be paid
compensation in the manner and to the extent
hereinafter provided . . . .
2
Prior to Klein, this Court decided LaVeck v Parke,
Davis & Co, 190 Mich 604; 157 NW 72 (1916), and Schroetke v
Jackson-Church Co, 193 Mich 616; 160 NW 383 (1916), two cases
(continued...)
7
the course of, an employee’s employment, that employee would
be covered under the act.
This can first be seen in Klein where the employee died
as a result of severe emotional shock experienced after he
accidentally dropped a radiator on the head of a co-worker.
Id. at 487. The decedent believed, erroneously, that he had
killed the other worker, and this belief caused him such
mental strain that he lapsed into delirium and died. Id. at
488. This Court held that the shock received by the decedent
from witnessing this injury constituted an accidental personal
injury within the meaning of the worker’s compensation act and
2
(...continued)
that have sometimes been categorized as mental disability
cases. See Joseph, Causation in workers’ compensation mental
disability cases: The Michigan experience, 27 Wayne L R 1079,
1095 (1981). However, upon review, it appears that these
cases may be better viewed as physical disability cases. In
La Veck, the claimant suffered a cerebral hemorrhage resulting
in paralysis of one side of his body. This hemorrhage was
apparently caused by heat and overexertion, coupled with
arterial sclerosis. La Veck, supra, at 605. In Schroetke,
the deceased worked as a night watchman at the defendant’s
foundry and shops. Schroetke, supra at 617. His duties
included watching for accidental fires. On the night in
question, a fire broke out, and the decedent sounded the
alarm. Shortly thereafter he suffered a fatal heart attack.
It was determined that the physical exertion and excitement
occasioned by the fire produced a nervous shock that caused
his heart attack. Upon review, this Court determined that the
decedent’s injury was an accidental injury within the scope of
the worker’s compensation act. While it can be reasonably
argued that these cases involved some mental component
leading up to their respective injuries, the resulting
compensable injury was not a mental disability, but instead a
physical one.
8
that the claimant, the decedent’s wife, therefore was entitled
to compensation for his death. Id. at 494.
The next significant case in the development of
compensable mental disabilities is Rainko v Webster-Eisenlohr,
Inc, 306 Mich 328, 332; 10 NW2d 903 (1943). In Rainko, this
Court expanded the scope of compensability to cases in which
no outward physical injury occurred to either the employee or
to another employee as in Klein. Specifically, this Court
stated that “[i]t is not necessary to establish physical
injury (resulting in) outward evidence of violence or trauma
to justify an award of compensation.” Id. at 332.
In Carter v General Motors Corp, 361 Mich 577; 106 NW2d
105 (1960), this Court again extended the scope of mental
disability coverage. In Carter, the employee suffered an
emotional collapse, later diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia,
resulting from accumulated stress he experienced in trying to
perform his tasks on an assembly line. Upon review, this
Court held that compensation could be awarded for a mental
disability injury that arose out of and in the course of
employment as a result merely of the effects of work place
stresses on a preexisting mental weakness.
In 1978, worker’s compensation coverage for mental
disabilities was again broadened. In Deziel v Difco
Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1, 26; 268 NW2d 1
9
(1978), this Court adopted the “subjective causal nexus”
standard to determine the compensability of a mental
disability claim:
We hold, as a matter of law, that in cases
involving mental . . . injuries, once a plaintiff
is found disabled and a personal injury is
established, it is sufficient that a strictly
subjective causal nexus be utilized by referees and
the WCAB to determine compensability. Under a
“strictly subjective causal nexus” standard, a
claimant is entitled to compensation if it is
factually established that the claimant honestly
perceives some personal injury incurred during the
ordinary work of his employment “caused” his
disability. This standard applies where the
plaintiff alleges a disability resulting from
either a physical or mental stimulus and honestly,
even though mistakenly, believes that he is
disabled due to that work-related injury and
therefore cannot resume his normal employment.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Coleman criticized the
majority’s holding.3 Id. at 46. Justice Coleman believed
that the “subjective causal nexus” standard, in application,
afforded “no standard at all.” Id. at 48. In her view, “the
majority’s test for causal nexus would result in an award of
compensation for virtually all, if not all, claims based on
mental disorders.” Id. That was so because, “[i]f the
claimant perceived that the job caused the problem, even if
this were not true, the employer would be liable.”4 Id.
3
Justice Coleman was joined by Justices Fitzgerald and
Ryan.
4
See also Bentley v Associated Spring, 133 Mich App 15,
(continued...)
10
(emphasis added).
Thus, following Deziel, the controlling law was that
compensation for a mental disability claim would be permitted
if the claimant “honestly, even though mistakenly” perceived
that a disability was related to a precipitating work event.
Apparently, the Legislature was also dissatisfied with
Deziel’s “subjective causal nexus” standard. In 1980, it
reacted to Deziel by enacting, the statutory provision
currently at issue, MCL 418.301(2). Hurd v Ford Motor Co, 423
Mich 531, 534; 377 NW2d 300 (1985). Section 301(2) provides:
Mental disabilities and conditions of the
aging process, including but not limited to heart
and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable
if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by
the employment in a significant manner. Mental
4
(...continued)
20-21; 347 NW2d 784 (1984), in which the Court of Appeals
asserted that the “subjective causal nexus” standard of Deziel
unduly emphasizes the testimony of a lay person
with an admitted psychiatric disorder over expert
testimony about the actual cause of the disorder.
As long as the claimant perceives that his disorder
arises from his job, he is entitled to
compensation. In view of the financial
gain—sometimes very substantial—any person who
files a claim based on a psychiatric disorder will
have strong motives to lie about his perception.
. . . The question then becomes whether that
perception is “honest.” The defendants argue that,
under this loose standard for recovery, Michigan
employers are nearly becoming general health
insurers for psychiatric disabilities. This is an
alarming possibility.
11
disabilities shall be compensable when arising out
of actual events of employment, not unfounded
perceptions thereof.
Section 301(2) constituted a direct response to the
articulation in Deziel of an extraordinarily broad standard
for determining compensability for mental disability claims,
a standard that was the culmination of more than sixty years
of judicial expansion of such claims. The Legislature’s swift
action in this realm following Deziel reflected an unequivocal
desire to address such expansion. As Farrington v Total
Petroleum Inc, 442 Mich 201, 216, n 16; 501 NW2d 76 (1993),
observed, the reason that the Legislature enacted MCL
418.301(2) was to “overturn or modify expansive
interpretations placed upon the act by this Court.”
B. GARDNER V VAN BUREN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
1. MAJORITY OPINION
The first case in this Court to address § 301(2) was
Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994).
Specifically, this Court granted leave to interpret, among
other things, the second sentence of § 301(2). In analyzing
this sentence, the Gardner majority explained that it was
faced with the problem of distinguishing between “actual
events of employment” and “unfounded perceptions thereof.”
Id. at 43. Unable to harmonize these two phrases, the
majority determined that the statute only meant that actual
12
events of employment must occur as a precondition to a claim,
rather than imaginary or hallucinatory ones. Id. at 44-46.
The Court rejected any perception analysis with regard to
determining the compensability of a mental disability injury.
The Court reasoned that such an analysis was
inappropriate because, in many instances, individuals with
mental disabilities can misperceive or altogether lose contact
with reality. Id. at 43-44. Because “many, if not all,
mental disabilities are based on ‘unfounded perceptions’ of
‘reality’ or ‘actual event[s],’” the majority concluded that
it would be “absurd” to prohibit “compensation for claims
based on unfounded perceptions of actual events, as opposed to
prohibiting compensation for claims based on imagined or
hallucinatory events.” Id. In the majority’s view, it would
make “little sense” to allow compensability for certain work
related disabilities, i.e., those arising out of actual events
of employment, only to then “exclude[] the vast majority of
all mental disabilities,” i.e., those based on unfounded
perceptions of actual events. Id. at 44. Thus, with regard
to its interpretation of the second clause of the second
sentence of § 301(2), the majority concluded that “[t]he
statute, by excluding ‘unfounded perceptions’ of the actual
events of employment, excludes [only] situations in which the
claimed events never occurred, i.e., where they are imagined,
13
hallucinatory or delusional.” Id. at 49.
As an additional rationale for this interpretation, the
Gardner majority opined that its conclusion was consistent
with the Legislature’s invalidation of Deziel, which had
expressly permitted compensation for imaginary or
hallucinatory events.
Courts and commentators alike realized that
Deziel’s honest perception test permit[ted] a
mental disability claim to be based on imagined,
hallucinatory, or delusional events. In other
words, the honest perception test permits
compensation to be based on “unfounded perceptions”
that actual events of employment did occur.
[Gardner, supra at 45.]
Thus, in the majority’s view, Deziel “established in this
state that even imagined, hallucinatory, or delusional events
could form the basis of a compensable mental disability
notwithstanding the fact that there was no causal connection
between the employment and the disability.” Id. at 46.
Thus, a claimant for mental disability benefits could
secure benefits on the basis of an employment event, no matter
how wrongly the event was perceived. That is, among the
countless events occurring in the course of any normal work
day—the interactions with supervisors and co-employees, the
conversations with customers and suppliers, the mundane tasks
and routines of work—any of these might serve as the basis for
a mental disability claim, no matter how ordinary or
14
unexceptional, and no matter how much they were misconstrued
or mischaracterized by the claimant.5
2. BRICKLEY DISSENT
In a separate opinion, Justice Brickley took issue with
the interpretation that the majority accorded the “not
unfounded perceptions thereof” language.6 Gardner, supra at
53. He observed that the majority had interpreted the “not
unfounded perceptions thereof” language as merely reiterating
the requirement that actual events of employment had to have
occurred. Id. at 53-54. In his view, such an interpretation
rendered the “unfounded perceptions” language “superfluous,
5
Gardner also addressed the first sentence of § 301(2),
commonly referred to as the “significant manner” inquiry,
which reads “[m]ental disabilities . . . shall be compensable
if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the
employment in a significant manner.” Id. at 46. According to
the majority, this sentence requires that the analysis of the
“significance of [the actual events of employment] to the
particular claimant must be judged against all the
circumstances to determine whether the resulting mental
disability is compensable.” Id. at 47. The majority surmised
that when assessing the reaction of a claimant to objectively
established events, an employer must take the employee as
found. Id. at 49, 50. We do not address this aspect of
Gardner’s analysis in this opinion.
6
Justice Riley wrote a separate dissenting statement, in
which Justice Griffin joined, taking issue with the majority’s
“causal nexus between work-related incidents and their
contribution to a mental disability . . . .” See Gardner,
supra at 63. In Justice Riley’s view, it was erroneous for
the majority to consider all actual employment-related events
under § 301(2). Rather, a claimant must establish not merely
an actual employment event, but a “traumatic” actual
employment event. Id. at 65.
15
nugatory, and without independent effect,” violating the well
established rule of statutory construction that every word of
a statute be given meaning. Id. at 54.
According to Justice Brickley, the “unfounded
perceptions” language referred “not to the existence of an
event, but to a claimant’s interpretation or perception of an
actual event.” This interpretation “does not reiterate the
‘actual events’ requirement, but instead demands, as an
independent matter and without unnecessary surplusage, that a
claimant’s perception of actual events not have been
unfounded.” Id. He also explained that
this conclusion is consistent with the
Legislature’s decision to abrogate the holding in
Deziel. The Deziel “subjective causal nexus” test
permitted recovery if a claimant honestly perceived
that mental injury resulted from an employment
event. While the majority explains that “Deziel’s
honest perception test permit[ted] a mental
disability claim to be based on imagined,
hallucinatory, or delusional events,” . . . in fact
Deziel did not address “events” but, rather, dealt
exclusively with “causation” determinations.
Accordingly, while the Legislature’s 1982 amendment
of MCL 418.301(2) . . . may have added an “actual
events” requirement, its motivation was to reverse
the causation standard created by Deziel. [Gardner,
supra at 55 (emphasis in original).]
Further, Justice Brickley stressed that analysis of the
second sentence of § 301(2) involved an objective inquiry. In
this regard, he stated:
Objective analysis is reflected in the
requirements that actual events of employment have
16
occurred and that a claimant’s perception or
interpretation of those events have been well
founded. This analysis demands both procedural and
substantive objectivity. The existence of actual
events and well-founded perceptions must be
discerned by an objective trier of fact, not by the
claimant. The standard of review is also
objective—did the event actually occur, and was
claimant’s perception of it well founded? [Id. at
57.]
However, Justice Brickley emphasized that his
interpretation of MCL 418.301(2) was not a purely objective
approach. Id. He observed that § 301(2) also encompassed a
subjective element of inquiry. He stated that a “subjective
analysis is proper in examining a claimant’s reaction to
actual employment events, perceived in a well-founded manner.
A claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to
react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner
entirely consistent with that of a normal, healthy
individual.” Id. at 57-58. In other words, “[w]hile a
claimant’s perception of the event must be objectively well
founded, that same claimant’s reaction to the event can be
very atypical.” Id. at 58. In Justice Brickley’s view, the
subjective component of § 301(2) “insures continued
recognition of employers’ general obligation to ‘take
employees as they find them.’” We believe that Justice
Brickley’s analysis of the statutory language is correct.
17
C. ANALYSIS OF § 301(2)
When reviewing matters of statutory construction, this
Court’s primary purpose is to discern and give effect to the
Legislature’s intent. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich
22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). The first criterion in
determining intent is the specific language of the statute.
DiBenedetto, supra at 402. The Legislature is presumed to
have intended the meaning it has plainly expressed, and if the
expressed language is clear, judicial construction is not
permitted and the statute must be enforced as written. Id.
Additionally, it is important to ensure that words in a
statute not be ignored, treated as surplusage, or rendered
nugatory. Hoste v Shanty Creek Management, Inc, 459 Mich 561,
574; 592 NW2d 360 (1999). Unless defined in the statute,
every word or phrase of a statute will be ascribed its plain
and ordinary meaning. See MCL 8.3a. See also Western Mich
Univ Bd of Control v Michigan, 455 Mich 531, 539; 565 NW2d 828
(1997).
Analyzing the language of the second sentence of §
301(2), we note that it contains two principal clauses. The
first clause states that “[m]ental disabilities shall be
compensable when arising out of actual events of employment.”
A review of this clause reveals that the subject, “mental
disabilities,” shall be compensable when they arise out of the
18
object “actual events of employment.” The noun in the phrase
“actual events of employment” is “events.” This noun is
qualified by two adjectives–“actual” and “employment.” This
indicates that the “events” being described cannot be any sort
of events. Rather, they must be actual events, existing in
“fact” or “reality,” not delusional or imaginary, Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001), and they must be
connected to the claimant’s employment.
However, the sentence does not end there. It goes on to
state “not unfounded perceptions thereof.” This second clause
expressly sets forth an additional precondition that must be
satisfied by claimants under § 301(2), namely, that the
claimant’s personal perception of the actual events of
employment described in the preceding clause is not
dispositive of his claim, but that such perception must not be
“unfounded.” The word “perception” means “the act or faculty
of apprehending by means of the senses or the mind; cognition;
awareness,” and “a single unified awareness derived from
sensory processes while a stimulus is present.” Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). In turn, “apprehend”
means “to grasp the meaning of; understand, esp. intuitively.”
Id. Before one can have an awareness or understanding there
must be a stimulus present. The stimulus is a condition
precedent to the perception. For purposes of mental
19
disability claims under § 301(2), that stimulus must be the
actual events of employment. Perception follows from the
event, and involves separate and distinct matters of inquiry.
The specific “perception” on claimant’s part required by
the statute is one that cannot be “unfounded.” Stated without
the double negative, the perception must be “founded”.
“Found,” the present tense of this word, means “to base;
ground.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001).
In turn, “base” and “ground” mean “to establish as a fact or
conclusion” and “[to have] rational or factual support for
one’s position” respectively. Id. Assimilating these
definitions, it is reasonable to conclude that a worker’s
compensation claimant’s perception must be based or grounded
in fact.
The final word in § 301 (2), “thereof” is also
instructive of the statute’s meaning. The word “thereof” is
defined as “of that or it.” Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary (2001). The “of that or it” in this case refers to
the proceeding antecedent word “events.” As already noted,
these “events” are not any sort of events; rather, they are
actual employment events. Thus, it can also be reasonably
concluded that “thereof” is a reference to the preceding
phrase “actual events of employment.”
20
By focusing on the words “thereof” and “perceptions” in
the second clause of the second sentence of § 301(2), we
believe that the plain language of this provision requires a
distinct analysis concerning a claimant’s perception or
apprehension of the actual events of employment. If the
Legislature only intended that the actual events of employment
be inquired into (without consideration of the claimant’s
perceptions of those events), then it could have simply
inserted a period at the end of the first clause. It did
not.7
7
We also agree with Justice Brickley that this
conclusion is consistent with the Legislature’s intent to
abrogate the Deziel holding. As stated in note 1, Deziel
adopted the so-called ‘subjective causal nexus’ standard.
This standard, according to the Deziel Court, was to be
utilized only in deciding the third prong of a mental
disability analysis, i.e., “whether the claimant’s employment
combined with some internal weakness or disease to produce the
disability.” This prong was to be analyzed after it was
determined that: 1) the claimant was disabled, and 2) the
disability resulted from a personal injury in the form of “a
precipitating, work-related event.” Deziel, supra at 37
(emphasis added). Thus, Deziel held that a claim could be
based upon an honest though mistaken perception that a work
event caused the disability. The Gardner majority, however,
stated that Deziel permitted compensation on the basis of
“imaginary” or “hallucinatory” events. This is patently not
the case. Deziel’s second prong clearly requires that the
disability be predicated upon “a precipitating, work-related
event.” Thus, the Gardner majority, at best, merely stated a
standard, the existence of actual employment events, that was
already required by Deziel. By doing so, it did not
accomplish what the Legislature intended—the invalidation of
a standard that permitted compensation on the basis of
unfounded perceptions of actual events.
21
In rejecting any perception analysis, the Gardner
majority observed that, in many instances, individuals with
mental disabilities misperceive or altogether lose contact
with reality.
“In finding solutions to their unconscious
problems, psychoneurotics and psychotics develop
personality problems which make it difficult for
them to adapt to reality as it is encountered by
so-called ‘average’ or ‘normal’ individuals. This
failure of the psychoneurotic or psychotic’s
reactions and adjustment mechanisms can either
distort his perception of reality or, in the worst
psychotic cases, cause the individual to lose
contact with reality . . . .” [Id. at 43-44,
quoting from Deziel, supra at 29 (Riley, J.,
dissenting).]
As stated previously, the Gardner majority surmised that it
would be “absurd” to allow compensation for a mental
disability injury resulting from an actual event of employment
only to subsequently “exclude[] the vast majority of all
mental disabilities, those based on unfounded perceptions of
actual events.” Id. at 44. Although it may be true in many
instances that mentally disabled individuals will misperceive
or lose contact with reality because of some underlying
cognitive weakness, the Legislature clearly has the ability to
define coverage under its statutes as it deems appropriate.
“[O]ur judicial role precludes imposing different policy
choices than those selected by the Legislature . . . .”8
8
Further, contrary to Gardner’s sense of “absurdity”,
(continued...)
22
People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764
(2001).
We conclude that, to satisfy the mental disability
requirements of the second sentence of § 301(2), a claimant
must demonstrate: (a) that there has been an actual employment
8
(...continued)
it is altogether possible that the Legislature’s differing
treatments of physical and mental injuries, reflected
principally by its separate coverage of the two under the
provisions of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, §§
301(1) and 301(2), are a rational means of limiting an
employer’s worker’s compensation exposure for unique types of
injuries resulting from unique types of diseases. While a
mental disability may be equally as disabling as a physical
disability, such disabilities nonetheless may be distinctive
in certain respects. An employee with a susceptibility to
physical disability, for example, may be more likely to
exhibit outward manifestations of his vulnerabilities, or he
may be more aware of the extent of his own vulnerabilities.
As a result, an employer may be in a better position to
undertake reasonable precautions in an effort to protect such
an employee from unsafe or threatening working conditions. On
the other hand, an employee with a susceptibility to mental
disability may not exhibit the same outward manifestations of
his vulnerabilities, or he may be less cognizant of the extent
of his vulnerabilities. By what conceivable means could an
employer ever undertake to protect such an impaired employee
from any employment event, no matter how innocuous or trivial,
that comes to be misconstrued? Problems of proof may also
conceivably have influenced the Legislature in its crafting of
the statute.
The Gardner majority is correct that some, but not all,
mental disabilities are covered by § 301(2). That the members
of that majority would have drawn this coverage differently,
however, is not a warrant for it to rewrite this provision.
Further, it is, at the very least, subject to debate whether
Gardner’s rendering of § 301(2), in which the employer may be
held responsible for even the most trivial and ordinary
workplace events, produces a less or a more “absurd” result
than that produced by the statute’s plain words.
23
event leading to his disability, that is, that the event in
question occurred in connection with employment and actually
took place; and (b) that the claimant’s perception of such
actual employment event was not unfounded, that is, that such
perception or apprehension was grounded in fact or reality,
not in the delusion or the imagination of an impaired mind.9
9
One must be mindful that, while an incorrect
perception of an actual event would not be sufficient to
satisfy this portion of the statute, a correct perception of
a relatively innocuous event could potentially be enough to
satisfy it. This result, as already stated, is compelled by
the language of § 301(2). This, however, does not mean that
an innocuous or ordinary event will often be sufficient to
satisfy the remaining portion of § 301(2). As Justice
Brickley’s dissent noted:
While I acknowledge the probable and
understandable frustration of the Court of Appeals
with “ordinary daily conditions and minutiae of
employment” serving as the basis for a mental
disability claim, it is nevertheless clear that the
Legislature has only demanded that “actual”
employment events, not objectively significant,
abnormal, or uncommon incidents, serve as the basis
for a mental disability claim. The concerns
expressed by the Court of Appeals are more properly
infused and analyzed under the “significant manner”
causation requirement, not the “actual events”
demand of MCL 418.301(2) . . . . [Gardner, supra
at 61, n 8.]
Indeed, there is no indication that Justice Brickley and
the majority were in disagreement with regard to what he
asserts in this final sentence. The majority stated that
“[o]nce actual employment events have been shown to have
occurred, the significance of those events to a particular
claimant must be judged against all circumstances to determine
whether the resulting mental disability is compensable.” Id.
at 47. Additionally, one cannot overlook that an employee’s
testimony concerning an actual event, as a precipitating event
(continued...)
24
To the extent that Gardner is inconsistent with this
interpretation of § 301(2), we overrule it.
D. OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Moreover, in determining whether there has been an actual
employment event leading to a mental disability, and a
perception of that event that is not unfounded, the inquiry
must be conducted under an objective standard.10 The second
9
(...continued)
for a mental disability, must always satisfy traditional
standards of truthfulness. When an employee seeks
compensation for an injury arising out of an innocuous or
ordinary event, that employee will, of course, be required to
demonstrate to the worker’s compensation factfinder that such
event indeed contributed to his injury in a “significant
manner.”
10
An objective standard of inquiry focuses on how a
reasonable person, under like circumstances, would have viewed
the actual events that occurred. Lowe v Estate Motors Ltd,
428 Mich 439, 456; 410 NW2d 706 (1987). This is different
from a subjective standard in which the focus is on how a
particular individual viewed such events. Fire Ins Exchange
v Diehl, 450 Mich 678, 685; 545 NW2d 602 (1996).
Additionally, although the perception inquiry is to be
undertaken pursuant to an objective standard, we emphasize in
an effort to dispel potential confusion that the “reaction”
inquiry,” i.e., how a potential claimant “reacts” to actual
events of employment, is to be undertaken pursuant to a
subjective standard. As Justice Brickley observed, “[a]
claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to
react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner
entirely consistent with that of a normal healthy individual.
. . . While a claimant’s perception of the event must be
objectively well-founded, that same claimant’s reaction to the
event can be very atypical.” Gardner, supra at 58. In sum,
a claimant’s perception is evaluated objectively under the
second sentence of § 301(2), while his subsequent reaction is
evaluated subjectively under the first sentence of this
(continued...)
25
sentence of § 301(2) modifies “events” with the term “actual,”
and modifies “perceptions” with the term “not unfounded” (or
“founded”). These modifying terms implicate objective
considerations. See, e.g., Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368,
386-387; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). As explained previously,
“actual” means existing in “fact” or in “reality,” not
delusional or imaginary, and “founded” means “to be based in;
to be grounded in.” In turn, “based” and “grounded”
respectively mean “to establish as a fact or conclusion” and
“[to have] rational or factual support for one’s position.”
By the Legislature’s use of these terms in the second sentence
of § 301(2), it is clear, that in determining whether actual
events occurred and whether a claimant’s perceptions were
“founded,” the factfinder must assess the factual
circumstances in terms of how a reasonable person would have
viewed them.11
10
(...continued)
provision.
11
Application of an objective standard is also
consistent with the underlying purpose of the WDCA, as
reasonably inferred through its text. These have been
invariably understood to be to compensate those who are
injured in the workplace if the injury arose out of the work.
Hills v Blair, 182 Mich 20, 25; 148 NW 243 (1914) (“Under the
provisions of this act, only that employee is entitled to
compensation who ‘receives personal injuries arising out of
and in the course of his employment.’ It is to be borne in
mind that the act does not provide insurance for the employed
workman to compensate any other kind of accident or injury
(continued...)
26
Thus, in applying the proper statutory test, the
factfinder must first determine whether actual events of
employment indeed occurred. Then, in analyzing whether a
claimant’s perception of the actual events of employment had
a basis in fact or reality, i.e., the claimant’s perception
was “founded”, the factfinder must apply an objective review
by examining all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
actual employment events in question to determine whether the
claimant’s perception of such events was reasonably grounded
in fact or reality.12
E. STARE DECISIS
In partially overruling Gardner, we have considered the
principles of stare decisis. Although application of the
11
(...continued)
which may befall him.”). It would be inconsistent with this
purpose to award compensation to those whose injuries were
merely coincident with a period of employment, but whose
injuries did not “arise out of” that employment. Thus, it is
not surprising that the Legislature that enacted § 301(2)
sought to limit compensation to mental disabilities that arose
out of actual events of employment, not to those that were
attributable to the mere imaginings of the employee.
12
This standard of review varies slightly from that
articulated by Justice Brickley, namely, that a claimant’s
perception of the actual employment events must be “well
founded.” Gardner, supra at 57. We find nothing in the
language of § 301(2) that qualifies “perception” in this way.
“Well-founded” evinces a standard that may be construed as
more demanding than a reasonableness standard. Thus, we do
not agree that the perceptions at issue must be “well
founded.” Instead, all that is required is that the
claimant’s perception of the actual employment events be
reasonably founded.
27
doctrine of stare decisis is generally the preferred course of
action by this Court for it “‘promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,’” it
is not an inexorable command. Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich
439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v United States,
524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998).
Indeed, these same values are also furthered by judicial
decisions that are neutrally grounded in the language of the
law, by a legal regime in which the public may read the plain
words of its law and have confidence that such words mean what
they say and are not the exclusive province of lawyers.13
13
We discussed in Robinson the importance of the
public’s interest in being able to rely on the language of
statutes as written:
[I]t is well to recall in discussing reliance,
when dealing with an area of the law that is
statutory . . . , that it is to the words of the
statute itself that a citizen first looks for
guidance in directing his actions. This is the
essence of the rule of law: to know in advance what
the rules of society are. Thus, if the words of
the statute are clear, the actor should be able to
expect, that is, rely, that they will be carried
out by all in society, including the courts. In
fact, should a court confound those legitimate
citizen expectations by misreading or misconstruing
a statute, it is that court itself that has
disrupted the reliance interest. When that
happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to
the distorted reading because of the doctrine of
(continued...)
28
Stare decisis is not to be “applied mechanically to forever
prevent the Court from overruling earlier erroneous decisions
interpreting the meaning of statutes.” Id. at 463.
Before this Court overrules a decision, we must make two
inquiries: (a) whether the earlier decision was wrongly
decided, and (b) whether overruling such decision would work
an undue hardship because of reliance interests or
expectations that have arisen. Id. at 464-68.
With regard to the first inquiry, we believe that
Gardner, in relevant part, was wrongly decided, clearly
misconstruing the plain language of § 301(2) and rendering
superfluous the entire second clause of the second sentence in
violation of the cardinal rule of interpretation that effect
shall be given to every word, phrase, or clause of a statute.
Hoste, supra; People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 285;
13
(...continued)
stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court’s
misconstruction. The reason for this is that the
court in distorting the statute was engaged in a
form of judicial usurpation that runs counter to
the bedrock principle of America n
constitutionalism, i.e., that the lawmaking power
is reposed in the people as reflected in the work
of the Legislature, and, absent a constitutional
violation, the courts have no legitimacy in
overruling or nullifying the people’s
representatives. Moreover, not only does such a
compromising by a court of the citizen’s ability to
rely on a statute have no constitutional warrant,
it can gain no higher pedigree as later courts
repeat the error. [Id. at 467-68.]
29
597 NW2d 1 (1999).
With regard to the second inquiry, we believe that
overruling that erroneous portion of Gardner will not result
in any interference with legitimate reliance or expectation
interests. Here, we examine “whether the previous decision
has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to
everyone’s expectations that to change it would produce not
just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations.”
Robinson, supra at 466. The reliance must be the sort that
“causes a person or entity to attempt to conform his conduct
to a certain norm before the triggering event.” Id. at 467.
This Court’s previous interpretation of § 301(2) could hardly
have caused any person to conform their conduct to a
particular norm. Mental disability injuries of the sort
compensated by this provision arise without planning or
preparation. Instead, persons entitled to compensation under
§ 301(2) become aware of this Court’s interpretations only
after they have suffered injury. Such an after-the-fact
awareness does not implicate the kind of reliance or
expectation interest contemplated by our stare decisis
inquiry.
IV. RESPONSE TO DISSENT
We agree with the dissent that “fundamental principles”
are at issue here that distinguish our two opinions. Unlike
30
the dissent, however, we do not view these principles as
relating to our alleged disregard for stare decisis, see Part
III(E), but rather as relating to the dissent’s determination
to perpetuate a plainly flawed reading of the law apparently
because it disagrees with the policies that are actually
reflected in such law. Contrary to the dissent, the
“fundamental principles” that we see at stake here implicate
the role of this Court in the constitutional separation of
powers. That is, we believe that it is the constitutional
duty of this Court to interpret the words of the lawmaker, in
this case the Legislature, and not to substitute our own
policy preferences in order to make the law less “illogical”.
In the present case, the dissent reads the second
sentence of § 301(2) in a manner that utterly ignores the
words “not unfounded perceptions thereof.” The dissent
interprets section § 301(2) as if these words did not exist,
as if they were not there at all. The dissent ignores these
words apparently because it disagrees with the limitations
that these words impose upon worker’s compensation benefits.
Thus, the dissent chooses to amend § 301(2) by summarily
reading these words out of the law. In doing so, the dissent
ignores the compromises and the negotiations that may have
preceded the inclusion of these words in the law, it ignores
the concerns of the Legislature in avoiding abuse of the
31
worker’s compensation system that may have motivated such
language, and it ignores the majorities of each house of the
Legislature, and the Governor, who approved these words, not
those that the dissent prefers. However, our judicial role
“precludes imposing different policy choices than those
selected by the Legislature . . . .”14 People v Sobczak-
Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).
Nor is the dissent’s stare decisis analysis persuasive.
It is premised upon little more than the argument that the
misreading of § 301(2) occurred eight years ago and must
therefore be maintained in perpetuity. In support, the
dissent merely reiterates its view that the words of the
statute must be subordinated to what the dissent believes are
better policy choices, in other words, its policy choices.
The dissent offers no argument that the four words that he
would strike from the law are read unreasonably by this
majority, or that a reasonable alternative interpretation
exists.
In support of its stare decisis argument that there are
14
The dissent “question[s] whether, under the majority’s
approach, compensability for any mental disabilities would
ever exist.” To say the least, we respectfully disagree, see
note 9. Compensability would exist where the Legislature has
deemed there to be compensability, and it would not exist
where the Legislature has not deemed there to be
compensability. Whether such coverage is too broad or too
narrow is not for us to decide.
32
“reliance” interests that must be considered, the dissent
presents nothing to show that anyone in Michigan, in the eight
years since Gardner, has conducted personal affairs in a
manner that would make it unfair to overrule Gardner. Of
course, such a showing is hardly possible, for the onset of a
mental disability is unlikely to be a function of whether
Gardner was reigning law. Rather, in lieu of such a showing,
the dissent offers the novel argument that a “reliance”
interest has arisen here, not because anyone has ever
conducted personal affairs in accord with Gardner, but because
lawyers will have to relearn the law. That, of course, would
be true of any overruling of precedent, but this has never
before been viewed as raising a “reliance” interest sufficient
to preclude a plainly flawed reading of the law from being
corrected. Further, we are confident that it will not take
long for the legal profession in our state to comprehend an
interpretation of § 301(2) in which its words mean what they
say.15
15
The dissent raises a similar non sequitur in its
observation that Gardner should not be overruled because it
engaged in the “exact debate” that we undertake in this
opinion. Needless to say, a precedent would never have to be
overruled if a court had not engaged in the “exact debate” at
an earlier juncture. Similarly, the dissent’s “legislative
acquiescence” argument is merely another way of sustaining
forever any precedent, no matter how wrongly decided. Such an
“acquiescence” argument has been squarely rejected by this
Court because it misunderstands the legislative process, and
(continued...)
33
The dissent is also badly confused in its expressions of
concern about the “unwelcome practice of changing judicially
established statutory interpretations with the makeup of the
Court.” While such a practice is indeed unwelcome, it is only
through the majority’s judicial approach that this practice is
avoidable. It is only when words are interpreted in accord
with their plain meaning, when words are not “written on
water,” in the words of Thomas Jefferson, that the law avoids
interpretations that are a function of shifting judicial
majorities and the ebb and flow of the political process. In
contrast, the dissent’s judicial approach, that courts may
correct laws that they view as inadequate, is a prescription
for “interpretations” of the law that follow the personal
predilections of judges. As judges change in their views of
the substantive merits of laws, so too will their
“interpretations.” It is only by interpretations of the law
that are in accord with the words of the lawmaker—that is,
interpretations in which judges look outside themselves for a
source of law—that the decisions of courts are truly removed
from the realm of politics and policymaking.
The debate between the dissent and the majority is
15
(...continued)
because it would accord greater weight to the silence of a
subsequent Legislature than to the actual product of the
Legislature that enacted a law. Donajkowski v Alpena Power
Co, 460 Mich 243, 258-261; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).
34
perhaps best encapsulated by the dissent’s characterization as
“strange” the majority’s observation that stare decisis values
are furthered by
judicial decisions that are neutrally grounded in
the language of the law, by a legal regime in which
the public may read the words of its law and have
confidence that such words mean what they say and
are not the exclusive province of lawyers.
The dissent is “puzzled” by this observation since, in its
judgment, the majority here is making the words of the law the
“‘exclusive province’ of the makeup of the bench.” In
response, we can offer little more than to ask the reader, and
the citizens of Michigan, in evaluating these opinions, to
reflect upon which circumstances are more conducive to the law
becoming the “exclusive province of the makeup of the
bench”—when the words, all the words, of the law are
interpreted according to their reasonable meanings, or when
the words of the law are discarded when they do not suit the
personal preferences of judges.
The dissent may be correct that worker’s compensation
benefits for mental disabilities ought to be awarded on a more
liberal basis than the Legislature has chosen. The dissent
may also be correct that the four words that the Legislature
placed in § 301(2), “not unfounded perceptions thereof,” have
narrowed coverage for mental disabilities more than is wise or
prudent. Finally, the dissent may be correct that the law
35
could be enhanced by omitting these four words. However, if
any of this is so, the dissenting justice has the same rights
as any other citizen to “petition the government” for the
redress of his grievances. As a justice, though, he is not
entitled to usurp the prerogatives of the Legislature by
altering the words of a statute to mean something other than
what they plainly mean.
V. CONCLUSION
We conclude that, to satisfy the mental disability
requirements under the second sentence of § 301(2), a claimant
must demonstrate: (a) that there has been an actual employment
event leading to his mental disability, that is, that the
event in question occurred in connection with employment and
actually took place; and (b) that the claimant’s perception or
apprehension of the actual employment event was not unfounded,
that is, that such perception or apprehension was also
grounded in fact or reality, not in the delusion or the
imagination of an impaired mind. In analyzing whether a
claimant’s perception of the actual events of employment had
a basis in fact or reality, the factfinder must apply an
objective review, that is, examine all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the actual employment events in
order to determine if the claimant’s perception of the actual
events was reasonably grounded in fact or reality. Insofar as
36
Gardner is inconsistent with these requirements, we overrule
it.
Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals order that
vacated the WCAC’s decision and remand this matter to the
magistrate for analysis under the proper statutory framework.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and TAYLOR , and YOUNG , JJ., concurred with
MARKMAN , J.
37
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
WARREN M. ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116276
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I join all but part IV of the opinion. Because part III
already clearly explains how the Gardner majority1 incorrectly
construed the statute by reading the phrase “not unfounded
perceptions thereof” out of the statute, I find part IV to be
unnecessary.
1
Gardner v Van Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1
(1994)
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
WARREN M. ROBERTSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116276
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation
that this Court analyzed and decided eight years ago: the
correct interpretation of MCL 418.301(2). In Gardner v Van
Buren Pub Schs, 445 Mich 23; 517 NW2d 1 (1994), this Court
interpreted § 301(2) in accordance with the applicable rules
of statutory construction and held that a compensable mental
disability claim arises when an actual event of employment,
not an imaginary or hallucinatory one, significantly
contributes to, aggravates, or accelerates a mental
disability. The majority in this case does not disturb the
latter “significantly contributes” portion of the Gardner
holding; however, it erroneously concludes that the Gardner
Court wrongly decided the former “actual event of employment”
portion and thus overrules Gardner in part. In so doing, the
majority once again fails to abide by the fundamental
principles of stare decisis. I, therefore, respectfully
dissent.
In myriad decisions, this Court has expressed the
fundamental principles of stare decisis. In Boyd v W G Wade
Shows, 443 Mich 515, 525, n 15; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), this
Court stated that “[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis,
principles of law deliberately examined and decided by a court
of competent jurisdiction should not be lightly departed.”
Additionally, this Court has said that “[s]tare decisis is
usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right. . . . This is commonly true even where
the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction
can be had by legislation.” Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 452
Mich 354, 365, n 17; 550 NW2d 215 (1996), quoting Burnet v
Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406; 52 S Ct 443; 76 L Ed
815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Furthermore, as the
majority correctly notes, this Court has explained that it
“will not overrule a decision deliberately made unless [it] is
convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but
2
also that less injury would result from overruling than from
following it.” Brown at 365, quoting Boyd at 524.
The majority first holds that overruling in part the
Gardner Court’s interpretation of § 301(2) is permitted
because Gardner was wrongly decided. One would hope the
majority would not jettison precedent it believed to be
correctly decided, but, then again, one never knows! The
majority claims that the Gardner interpretation makes the
statutory language mere surplusage, as the partial
concurrence/dissent in Gardner argued. The Gardner majority,
however, engaged in the exact debate brought by this case and
clearly rejected the dissent’s viewpoint for numerous reasons.
First, the Gardner Court noted it was faced with
distinguishing between “actual events of employment” and
“unfounded perceptions thereof.” Id. at 43. Explaining that
almost all mental disabilities are based on unfounded
perceptions of actual events, this Court correctly concluded
that reading the statute as the dissent, and the majority
here, suggested would lead to an absurd result.
Thus if one reads MCL 418.301(2) as
prohibiting compensation for claims based on
unfounded perceptions of actual events, as opposed
to prohibiting compensation for claims based on
imagined or hallucinatory events, then one is left
with a statute that makes little sense. Where the
first part of the provision states that certain
work-related mental disabilities shall be
compensable, the last part excludes the vast
3
majority of all mental disabilities, those based on
unfounded perceptions of actual events. What the
legislative right hand gives, the left hand takes.
This is an absurd result. This Court has
consistently attempted to construe statutes so as
to avoid absurd results, and our construction of
this statute will be no different. [Id. at 44,
emphasis in original.]
Second, the Gardner Court addressed what Deziel v Difco
Laboratories (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978),
established and § 301(2), therefore, invalidated. The Gardner
decision noted that Deziel’s honest perception test had two
major flaws that the Legislature intended to change: (1) it
allowed a compensable disability to be based on imagined
events, and (2) it did away with any need to prove a factual
causal connection between the disability and the employment
events. Id. at 45. Clearly, then, as the Gardner Court
concluded, the Legislature intended to eliminate this test by
requiring objective actual events, not imagined, and a
significant causal connection. I question whether, under the
majority’s approach, compensability for any mental
disabilities would ever exist. It is completely illogical to
conclude that an individual with a mental disability must
comply with an objective reasonableness test when the entire
basis of a mental disability is the inability to reason.
Third, the interpretation of § 301(2) in Gardner supports
the basic premise that employers take employees as they are.
See Sheppard v Michigan Nat’l Bank, 348 Mich 577, 584; 83 NW2d
4
614 (1957) (Smith, J., concurring). The Gardner Court
correctly recognized that “[a]bsent an explicit legislative
mandate” not only should this premise be followed for physical
infirmities, but for mental disabilities as well. Id. at 48
49.
Accordingly, the Gardner Court deliberately held that the
relevant inquiry under § 301(2) is, “Given actual events and
a particular claimant, with all the claimant’s preexisting
mental frailties, can the actual events objectively be said to
have contributed to, aggravated, or accelerated the claimant’s
mental disability in a significant manner?” Id. at 50. I
continue to adhere to this Court’s sound Gardner decision and
am unconvinced that the majority’s adoption of the dissent’s
approach to compensation for mental disabilities under the
Worker’s Disability Compensation Act is the correct one.1
Not only does the majority err by adopting the Gardner
concurrence/dissent as the correct interpretation of § 301(2),
1
Because I conclude that Gardner was not wrongly
decided, that would end the stare decisis analysis and further
analysis of whether greater harm would exist if precedent
change is unnecessary. However, I refute the majority’s
argument that no harm will occur by overruling Gardner in
part. Those needing to follow § 301(2) for mental disability
compensation and those practicing in that area are likely well
versed in the Gardner analysis, as it has been the established
interpretation of § 301(2) for the past eight years. I,
therefore, fail to see how no harm will result from overruling
Gardner in part and instead assert that less harm would result
by keeping it intact.
5
the majority also errs by failing to address the legislative
response aspect of stare decisis. As mentioned, this Court in
Brown affirmed the principle that courts should abide by
precedent when the Legislature has not refuted it. The Brown
Court stated:
“When, over a period of many years, the
Legislature has acquiesced in this Court’s
construction of a statute, the judicial power to
change that interpretation ought to be exercised
with great restraint. On more than one occasion
our Court has quoted with approval the statement
that stare decisis ‘is especially applicable where
the construction placed on a statute by previous
decisions has been long acquiesced in by the
legislature, by its continued use or failure to
change the language of the statute so construed,
the power to change the law as interpreted being
regarded, in such circumstances, as one to be
exercised solely by the legislature.’” [Id. at
367-368 (citations omitted).]
The Legislature has not reacted to the Gardner Court’s
interpretation of § 301(2) in the eight years since it was
decided. Thus, I would conclude that the Legislature is
satisfied with the Gardner interpretation and the majority’s
new interpretation is not only incorrect, but unnecessary.2
For these reasons, the doctrine of stare decisis mandates
Gardner’s reaffirmance. The majority’s noble quest to right
the alleged wrongs of the Gardner decision serves to foster an
unwelcome practice of changing judicially established
2
The majority opinion's section entitled, "Response to
Dissent" presents no relevant or novel analysis that
contradicts the sound position I stand behind today.
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statutory interpretations with the makeup of the Court. Also,
it fosters the undesired practice of rehashing settled debates
simply because the majority concludes that someone had a
better argument. This is clear because legally, nothing has
changed since Gardner was decided, and no new arguments were
presented to refute its analysis that were not already debated
eight years ago. Strangely, the majority states that stare
decisis values are furthered “by judicial decisions that are
neutrally grounded in the language of the law, by a legal
regime in which the public may read the plain words of its law
and have confidence that such words mean what they say and are
not the exclusive province of lawyers.” Slip op at 24. I am
puzzled by this statement because I question whether the
majority can ascertain any distinction between frowning upon
decisions grounded in the plain meaning of words, but are the
“exclusive province of lawyers,” and supporting decisions that
change an already established plain meaning, and thus are the
“exclusive province” of the makeup of the bench.
Accordingly, I would abide by the Gardner decision and
would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
KELLY , J., concurred with CAVANAGH , J.
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