Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JULY 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 116710
ABRAHAM SAFFOLD,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
WEAVER, J.
The question presented is whether the trial court’s
failure to comply with MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) in accepting
defendant’s guilty plea to one count of receiving and
concealing stolen property and fourth felony offender demands
reversal of defendant’s conviction. This undertaking is one
where we, as our predecessor courts have done for over a
quarter century, are interpreting and applying our own rules
concerning guilty pleas. MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) requires the
trial court to inform the defendant that he waived his right
at trial to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Here,
the trial court did not inform defendant of the presumption of
innocence during the guilty plea hearing. However, earlier in
the day defendant was present while the same judge instructed
the jury that convened for defendant’s trial—on the charge to
which he subsequently pleaded guilty—that the defendant was
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. In light of the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235
NW2d 132 (1975), the question is whether there was
substantial, not strict, compliance with the requirements of
MCR 6.302.
Despite the trial court’s omission of the presumption of
innocence during the plea hearing, we hold that defendant “was
informed of such constitutional rights and incidents of a
trial as reasonable to warrant the conclusion that he
understood what a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was
knowingly and voluntarily giving up his right to a trial and
such rights and incidents.” Guilty Plea Cases, supra, p 122.
We reverse the Court of Appeals decision and reinstate
defendant’s plea of guilty.
2
I
Jury selection for defendant’s trial1 began on the
morning of April 13, 1998. In the afternoon of the first day
of trial, after the first witness testified, the defendant
decided to accept the prosecutor’s plea bargain offer.
Pursuant to that offer defendant pleaded guilty to one count
of receiving and concealing stolen property, MCL 750. 535, and
to being a fourth felony offender, MCL 769.12. The trial
judge engaged in a lengthy hearing with defendant on his
guilty plea.2 However, during that hearing the trial judge
did not inform defendant that by pleading guilty he was giving
up the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.3 On
July 17, 1998, defendant was sentenced as an habitual
offender, fourth offense, to a prison term of twelve to forty
years.
On December 14, 1998, defendant moved to withdraw his
plea on the ground that the trial court failed to inform him
1
Defendant was charged with five counts: 1) home
invasion, second degree, MCL 750.110a(3), 2) home invasion,
second degree, MCL 750.110a(3), 3) receiving and concealing
weapons or firearms, MCL 750.535b, 4) receiving and concealing
stolen property in excess of $100, MCL 750. 535, and 5)
receiving and concealing stolen property in excess of $100,
MCL 750. 535.
2
The transcript for the hearing totals thirty-one pages.
3
MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c).
3
of the presumption of innocence. After a hearing on
January 25, 1999, the trial court denied the motion. On March
28, 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a memorandum opinion4
reversing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. The prosecution appealed to this
Court, and we granted leave to appeal. 463 Mich 906 (2000).5
II
The procedures governing the acceptance of a guilty plea
were first adopted by this Court in 19736 and are currently
set forth in MCR 6.302. MCR 6.302(A) provides that
[t]he court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere unless it is convinced that the plea is
understanding, voluntary, and accurate. Before
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the
court must place the defendant under oath and
personally carry out subrules (B)—(E).
In People v Shekoski, 393 Mich 134; 224 NW2d 656 (1974), this
Court had held that “strict adherence to those requirements7
is mandatory and that neither substantial compliance nor the
4
Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 28, 2000
(Docket No. 217802).
5
In granting leave, we directed the parties to “include
discussion of whether the alleged error is subject to harmless
error review and, if so, what is the appropriate harmless
error standard in this case.” Because we hold that the trial
court substantially complied with the requirements for taking
a plea, we do not reach the question of harmless error.
6
389 Mich lv-lvii
7
At that time, the requirements, which were substantially
similar to those of MCR 6.302, were found in GCR 1963, 785.7.
4
absence of prejudicial error will be deemed sufficient.”
However, one year later in Guilty Plea Cases, supra, this
Court renounced the Shekoski holding that “any failure of
strict adherence to the procedure and practice specified in
Rule 785.7 [now MCR 6.302] mandates reversal.” Guilty Plea
Cases, supra, p 113. Instead, the Court adopted a doctrine of
substantial compliance, holding that “[w]hether a particular
departure from Rule 785.7 justifies or requires reversal or
remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of
the noncompliance.” Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 113. Thus,
the question on appeal is whether it appears on the record
that the defendant was informed of such constitutional rights
and incidents of a trial as is reasonable to warrant the
conclusion that he understood what a trial is and that by
pleading guilty he was knowingly and voluntarily giving up his
right to a trial and such rights and incidents. Id. at 113,
122.
To determine if there was substantial compliance with the
court rule, the first question is whether the right omitted or
misstated is a “Jaworski right.” In People v Jaworski, 387
Mich 21; 194 NW2d 868 (1972), this Court held that a plea of
guilty must be set aside where the record of the plea
proceedings shows that the defendant was not advised of all
three constitutional rights involved in a waiver of a guilty
5
plea: 1) the right to trial by jury, 2) the right to confront
one’s accusers, and 3) the privilege against self
incrimination, relying on Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238; 89
S Ct 1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969). If a Jaworski right is
omitted from the plea proceedings, then reversal is mandated.
However, the omission from the plea proceedings of one or
another of the rights attendant to a trial, other than a
Jaworski right, or the imprecise recital of any such right,
including a Jaworski right, does not necessarily require
reversal. Guilty Plea Cases, supra, p 122.
Here, the trial court failed to inform the defendant of
the presumption of innocence. Informing defendant of his
right to be presumed innocent is required under MCR
6.302(B)(3)(c)8, but is not one of the three Jaworski rights.
We note that in some cases the Court of Appeals has stated or
assumed that the presumption of innocence had the same status
as the three Jaworski rights—that its omission mandates an
automatic reversal. See People v Russell, 73 Mich App 628,
629-630; 252 NW2d 533 (1977), and People v Bender, 124 Mich
App 571; 335 NW2d 85 (1983). In other cases, this Court and
the Court of Appeals have reversed a guilty plea, without
8
MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) requires the court to advise the
defendant and determine that the defendant understands that if
his plea is accepted the defendant will not have a trial and
gives up the rights he would have had at trial, including the
right “to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.”
6
engaging in further analysis, when the trial court omitted the
presumption of innocence. See People v Lawrence, 413 Mich
866; 317 NW2d 856 (1982)9, People v Mitchell, 125 Mich App
475; 336 NW2d 31 (1983), and People v Heintzelman, 142 Mich
App 94; 368 NW2d 903 (1985).10 To the extent that these cases
9
The order in Lawrence, read, in its entirety:
On order of the Court, the defendant having
filed a request for review of his conviction, this
Court having issued an order to show cause why the
defendant’s conviction should not be reversed
because he was not advised of the presumption of
innocence as required by GCR 1963,
785.7(1)(g)(iii), and the prosecutor’s response to
that order having been considered by the Court,
now, therefore, it is ordered that the request for
review be treated as an application for leave to
appeal and, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), in lieu
of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the
defendant’s convictions because he was not advised
of the presumption of innocence. GCR 1963,
785.7(1)(g)(iii); Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96,
125; 235 NW2d 132 (1975). We remand the cases to
the Washtenaw Circuit Court for further
proceedings.
10
The dissent relies on the above-cited cases to assert
that this Court has established a precedent that where a
defendant is not informed of his right to be presumed
innocent, his conviction must be set aside, and that the Court
of Appeals has “followed this established precedent.” Slip op
at 8. We would note that in Russell, supra, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction despite the trial
court’s failure to “[speak] the precise words ‘presumed
innocent’.” 73 Mich App 631. In People v Jackson, 71 Mich
App 468; 248 NW2d 551 (1976), the Court of Appeals affirmed
the defendant’s conviction where, although he was not informed
of his right to be presumed innocent at the guilty plea
proceeding, he was informed of that right in a prior guilty
plea entered the preceding day before the same judge. Id. at
469-470.
(continued...)
7
10
(...continued)
We futher note that the decision of the Court of Appeals
in People v Ingram, 166 Mich App 433; 424 NW2d 19 (1988), did
not involve a failure to advise, but rather an imprecise
recital of the right to be presumed innocent. The trial court
stated that the defendant would be “presumed innocent of this
offense until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s guilty plea, finding
that “[i]t appears on the record that defendant was
sufficiently informed of his constitutional rights and the
incidents of trial to warrant a conclusion that he understood
what a trial is and that by tendering his plea he was
knowingly and intelligently giving up his right to a trial and
its consequent rights and protections.” Id. at 437-438.
In Heintzelman, supra, Mitchell, supra, and People v
Wilson, 78 Mich App 307; 259 NW2d 356 (1977), the Court of
Appeals reversed the defendants’ convictions where there was
a total absence of advice concerning the presumption of
innocence.
Finally, in Bender, supra, the defendant pleaded guilty
to an habitual offender charge after being tried and found
guilty by a jury on the accompanying substantive offenses.
The Court of Appeals observed that defendant was informed of
a number of his rights through the statement of those rights
by his counsel when the defendant expressed a desire to plead
guilty to the habitual charge while the jury was still
deliberating on the substantive charges. The Court of Appeals
stated: “Although defendant was not personally advised of a
number of his rights by the trial court, defense counsel’s on
the-record statement of some of defendant’s rights satisfies
the requirement that the trial court ‘personally address’ the
defendant as to those rights. . . . As long as defendant is
orally informed in open court of his rights and the trial
court can personally observe defendant’s demeanor and
responses, the purpose of the personally address requirement
is achieved. . . . Nor is it fatal to the plea that defendant
was informed of his rights before the jury returned a guilty
verdict on the principal charge.” Id. at 577 (citations
omitted). Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Bender supports this Court’s analysis in the present case in
determining that the recital of a right in open court at a
time other than the actual plea proceeding is sufficient to
(continued...)
8
held that the omission of the presumption of innocence from a
guilty plea proceedings requires an automatic reversal of the
guilty plea, we disapprove of them.11
In Guilty Plea Cases, we did recognize that the
presumption of innocence is “at the core of our criminal
process and fundamental to defendant’s understanding of a
trial.” Id. at 125. Nevertheless, the omission from a plea
proceeding of a right attendant to trial, other than a
Jaworski right, does not necessarily require reversal. Id. at
122. If from the record it appears that the defendant has
10
(...continued)
satisfy the “personally address” requirement; the Court
vacated the guilty plea only because there was a total absence
of advice concerning the presumption of innocence. We note,
of course, that under current practice, a defendant does not
plead guilty to an habitual supplementation.
Therefore, while we agree with the dissent’s view that
“[t]his line of precedent firmly establishes [that a complete
failure] to advise [a] defendant of his right to be presumed
innocent” will continue to result in reversal of a defendant’s
guilty plea, we conclude that the above precedent does not
stand for the ultimate proposition urged by the dissent: that
advise concerning the presumption of innocence delivered at an
in-court proceeding close in time to the guilty plea
proceeding is insufficient compliance with the court rule. In
our view, the above precedent fully supports our conclusion in
this case that the advice imparted earlier in the case by the
trial court was sufficient compliance with MCR 6.302(B).
11
We continue to emphasize the point we made in People v
Williams, 386 Mich 277; 192 NW2d 466 (1971), and Jaworski,
supra, that it is important for the trial court to make a full
and complete record of protecting all the defendant’s rights.
Although the trial court’s plea hearing with defendant in this
case was otherwise exemplary, the inadvertent omission of one
sentence gave rise to three years of appellate review.
9
been informed of his right to a trial and that this right is
being waived by his plea of guilty, reversal is not required
by the omission of any of the rights enumerated in the Court
rule, even the presumption of innocence. Id.
Here, defendant was not informed of the presumption of
innocence during the plea hearing. However earlier in the
day, while defendant was present, the same judge had given the
defendant’s jury, which was empaneled on the same charge to
which defendant pleaded guilty, a thorough explanation of the
presumption of innocence,12 stating:
A person accused of a crime is presumed to be
innocent. This means that you must start with the
presumption that the defendant is innocent. This
presumption continues throughout the trial, and
entitles the defendant to a verdict of not guilty
unless you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is.
Every crime is made up of parts called
elements. The prosecutor must prove each element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant is not required to prove his
innocence or to do anything.
12
Although we reversed in the Howell case for failure to
impart the presumption of innocence information, Guilty Plea
Cases, supra at 125, nothing in the opinion suggests that such
information was supplied by the judge, or any other
participant, at another stage of the proceedings. In other
words, Howell represents a complete failure to impart the
presumption of innocence information—not an “alternative”
impartation of the information as in this case. The same is
true of our summary order in People v Lawrence, 413 Mich 866
(1982).
10
Should you find that the prosecutor has not
proven every element beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the defendant not guilty.
A reasonable doubt is defined as a fair,
honest doubt growing out of the lack of evidence or
the evidence in the case. It is, however, not an
imaginary or a possible doubt. Instead, it is a
doubt based upon reason, and common sense. It is a
doubt which is considered reasonable after a
careful and considered examination of all the facts
and circumstances in the case.
Before defendant pleaded guilty, his trial on the charge to
which he pleaded guilty had begun. Defendant had participated
in having his constitutional rights to a trial by jury
implemented, and specifically had witnessed the jury being
informed of the presumption of innocence to which he was
entitled.
In Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 114-115, we approved cases
where the trial judge did not personally address the defendant
by informing him of the maximum sentence (Courtney) or the
charge that the defendant was facing (Bauer). We concluded
that the prosecutor’s statement of that information in the
presence of the defendants was sufficient. We stated:
These departures do not justify reversal.
While it would be better for the judge to cover all
the points himself, as long as he assumes the
principal burden of imparting the required
information, as did the judges in Courtney and
Bauer, the purpose of requiring him personally to
address the defendant and in so doing observe his
demeanor and responses is achieved.
A guilty plea conviction will not be reversed
if the judge engages in the required colloquy but
11
fails to mention an item which the record shows was
established through, for example, an opening
statement of or interjection by the prosecutor or
defense counsel in the hearing of the judge and
defendant. It is proper for the prosecutor or the
clerk to read the information in the judge’s
presence. [Emphasis supplied.]
Here, the trial judge addressed defendant with respect to
every right contained in the court rules save one. That
failure was rectified by the judge’s earlier statement, in
defendant’s presence, that informed the jury—and defendant–at
length concerning the presumption of innocence. Thus, the
judge clearly assumed “the principal burden of imparting the
required information,” id. at 114.
In Courtney and Bauer, this Court approved the practice
of some of the required information being imparted by the
prosecutor—or, indeed, as we stated later, by “an opening
statement of or interjection by the prosecutor or defense
counsel in the hearing of the judge and defendant.” Id. at
114-115. In such situations the reviewing court will rely on
the defendant’s presence when the information regarding the
presumption of innocence is imparted to conclude that the
defendant is aware of that information and that, therefore,
his plea is knowing and understanding.13 The clear import of
13
As indicated by the court rules themselves, and also by
this Court’s discussion in Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 126
128, the voluntariness of a defendant’s guilty plea is
determined by his awareness of whether there have been any
(continued...)
12
our statements in Guilty Plea Cases is that observing the
demeanor and responses of the defendant when advice regarding
the “bulk” of the rights is imparted is sufficient to
establish compliance with the “personally address”
requirement.14
In contrast to the situations already approved by us in
the Courtney and Bauer cases, in this case it was the judge
who imparted the additional information. Thus, we conclude
that “the purpose of requiring [the judge] to personally
address the defendant and in so doing observe his demeanor and
responses [has been] achieved.” Id. at 114.
III
Apparently the dissent agrees with us on the legal
principles involved. Both opinions recognize that the
defendant’s plea must constitute a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the defendant’s rights. We also agree that reversal
of defendant’s conviction is not required if there is
13
(...continued)
plea or sentence agreements, whether he has been threatened or
otherwise coerced into pleading guilty, and whether it is his
own choice to plead guilty, MCR 6.302(C), not by whether he
has received the information concerning his trial rights.
14
There is nothing in the Guilty Plea Cases opinion from
which we could conclude that the trial judges in Courtney and
Bauer were observing the defendants’ demeanors when the
prosecutors imparted the “missing” information, and, of
course, the defendants would not have made any response to
statements by the prosecutors.
13
substantial compliance with the court rule.
The point of difference between the majority and the
dissent is in the dissent’s application of the concept of
“substantial compliance”. The majority abides by the
interpretation of our rules set forth in Guilty Plea Cases
that has held sway for over twenty-five years: there is
substantial compliance with the “personally address”
requirement if, even though the judge fails to recite a
specific right at the guilty plea proceeding, the omission is
rectified by recitation of the right in the defendant’s
presence at some other point during the in-court proceedings.
The dissent apparently would require strict compliance with
MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c), and mandate reversal whenever the
defendant was not instructed on the presumption of innocence
at the guilty plea hearing itself. In so doing, the dissent
would sub silentio overrule Guilty Plea Cases, and return to
the strict compliance rule of People v Shekoski. We believe
that the crucial question is whether the defendant’s plea was
knowing and voluntary, not whether the trial court has
engaged in a letter-perfect “talismanic chant.”15 Under the
court rule, a failure to state one of the rights at the plea
hearing does not require vacating the conviction where, as
15
People v Willsie, 96 Mich App 350, 353; 292 NW2d 145
(1980).
14
here, the court has directly addressed the defendant regarding
the enumerated rights generally and the defendant has
otherwise been informed adequately of the omitted right. The
dissent has not identified any basis in the rule to support
its contrary position. Thus, we decline the dissent’s
invitation to turn our backs on established precedent and re
interpret “substantial compliance” to require strict
compliance at the time of the plea-taking.
Finally, the dissent suggests that the presumption of
innocence has the same status as the three Jaworski
rights—that its omission mandates an automatic reversal. In
Jaworski this Court held that in order for there to be a valid
guilty plea, there must be an enumeration and a waiver on the
record of the three federal constitutional rights as set forth
in Boykin v Alabama, supra: the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right
to confront one’s accusers. The United States Supreme Court
has not held that the presumption of innocence is such a
right. See Johnson v Ohio, 419 US 924, 925; 95 S Ct 200; 42
L Ed 2d 158 (1974). Although we continue to recognize the
importance of the presumption of innocence, we decline to
elevate it to the status of the Boykin/Jaworski rights.
IV
On the basis of the whole record, including the beginning
15
of the jury trial earlier that same day, we find that the
trial judge’s initial determination that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily gave up his right to a trial and all
the attendant rights was correct.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating
defendant’s guilty plea, and reinstate defendant’s conviction
and sentence.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and TAYLOR and YOUNG , JJ., concurred with
WEAVER, J.
16
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF THE MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 116710
ABRAHAM SAFFOLD,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________
YOUNG, J. (concurring).
I join in the majority opinion and fully concur that an
omission from the plea proceedings of one or another of the
rights attendant to trial, other than a Jaworski right, does
not necessarily require reversal. However, I write separately
because I wish to clarify that, in my view, there was no
omission of the “presumption of innocence,” and thus, no error
under MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) occurred in this case.
The trial court, during the plea proceeding, advised
defendant that he had a right to a trial by jury and that he
had a right to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Specifically, the trial judge directly said the
following to defendant:
The Court: You obviously know what a jury
trial is. You’ve been sitting here during jury
selection, and you’ve seen witnesses testify so you
understand that you’re here because you have the
right to be here. Meaning you have the right to
have this trial, and you have the right to have the
jury decide the facts, and decide whether or not
your guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
And you’ve seen cross-examination so you understand
you have the right to see, hear and cross-examine
the State’s witnesses. Am I correct in inferring
that? [Emphasis added].
* * *
The Court: Do you understand that you give up
those rights, and give up the right to a trial if
you change your plea to guilty?
In my view, advising defendant that he had a right to
have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt necessarily
encompassed the advice that he would have been presumed
innocent. The presumption of innocence is “nothing more than
an amplification of the prosecution’s burden of persuasion.”
See 2 McCormick, Evidence (5th ed), § 342, p 437. If the
presumption of innocence adds anything, it is merely “a
warning not to treat certain things improperly as evidence.”
9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 2511, p 409.
The court did not recite literally the court rule
terminology. However, when defendant was told that he had a
right to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he
necessarily learned that he would be considered innocent in
the absence of such proof of his guilt. In my view, this
advice adequately informed defendant of the “presumption of
innocence.” No single method of recital is required. Guilty
2
Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 119-120; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
I believe that the phrase “presumption of innocence” is
merely a shorthand way of referring to the right to have a
jury find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, I believe defendant was in fact informed of the
“presumption of innocence” and that no omission of advice as
required by the rule occurred in this case.
CORRIGAN , C.J., concurred with YOUNG , J.
3
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 116710
ABRAHAM SAFFOLD,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The issue before this Court is
whether the trial court’s failure to comply with MCR 6.302 in
accepting defendant’s guilty plea (to a charge of receiving
and concealing stolen property) requires the reversal of his
conviction.1 Contrary to the requirement of MCR 6.302, the
1
MCR 6.302, in pertinent part, provides:
(A) Plea Requirements. The court may not
accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless
it is convinced that the plea is understanding,
voluntary, and accurate. Before accepting a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must place
the defendant under oath and personally carry out
subrules (B)–(E).
(B) An Understanding Plea. Speaking directly
to the defendant, the court must advise the
defendant and determine that the defendant
understands:
(continued...)
trial court failed to inform the defendant, at his guilty plea
hearing, of his right to be presumed innocent. The trial
court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on
this ground. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed,
asserting that the rule required the trial court “to directly
advise a defendant of the presumption of innocence on the
record before accepting a guilty plea.” Unpublished
memorandum opinion, issued March 28, 2000 (Docket No. 217802),
at 2.
I. PURPOSE AND GOAL OF GUILTY PLEA HEARING
The primary purpose of MCR 6.302’s mandate that the
defendant be personally addressed with the required statements
is grounded in the principle that the defendant’s plea must
constitute a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of his
constitutional rights. McCarthy v United States, 394 US 459,
465; 89 S Ct 1166; 22 L Ed 2d 418 (1969). To that end, the
rule: (1) provides the court accepting the guilty plea the
opportunity to observe the defendant’s demeanor and the manner
1
(...continued)
* * *
(3) if the plea is accepted, the defendant
will not have a trial of any kind, and so gives up
the rights the defendant would have at a trial,
including the right:
* * *
(c) to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty . . . . [Emphasis added.]
2
in which he responds to the court’s statements and questions;
(2) impresses upon the defendant the full gravity and import
of his plea, and that, in so pleading, he waives the right to
a trial and all of his other related constitutional rights;2
and (3) creates a record of factors relevant to ascertaining
the voluntariness of defendant’s plea.3 People v Napier, 69
Mich App 46, 48; 244 NW2d 359 (1976), see also Guilty Plea
Cases, 395 Mich 96, 122; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
II. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The principle of the presumption of innocence is an
essential foundation of our adversarial system of criminal
justice. In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L
2
McCarthy, supra at 465. See also McMann v Richardson,
397 US 759, 774; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 2d 763 (1970); North
Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25, 31; 91 S Ct 160; 27 L Ed 2d 162
(1970) (stating that a voluntary plea is one made with
knowledge of fundamental constitutional rights and an
understanding of the nature of the crimes charged); People v
Siebert, 450 Mich 500, 511-515; 537 NW2d 891 (1995); People v
Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 95; 506 NW2d 547 (1993), citing Brady
v United States, 397 US 742, 747-748; 90 S Ct 1463; 25 L Ed 2d
747 (1970) (stating that “a guilty plea is the most serious
step a defendant can take in a criminal prosecution [and]
[f]or that reason, the plea ‘not only must be voluntary but
must be [a] knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.’”).
3
An equally important, albeit more pragmatic, reason
for requiring an on-the-record recitation of defendant’s
rights is to avoid, or at least discourage, numerous and
sometimes frivolous post conviction attacks on the
constitutional validity of the plea. See Orfield, Pleas in
federal criminal procedure, 35 Notre Dame Lawyer 1, 31-32
(1959); Hoffman, What next in federal criminal rules? 21 Wash
& Lee L R 1, 8 (1964).
3
Ed 2d 368 (1970), see also Coffin v United States, 156 US 432,
453; 15 S Ct 394; 39 L Ed 481 (1895). The presumption of
innocence is “the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration
of our criminal law.” Coffin, supra at 453.4 “The accused
during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose
his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that
he would be stigmatized by the conviction.” Id.
A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the fundamental
right to a jury trial. Parke v Raley, 506 US 20, 29; 113 S Ct
517; 121 L Ed 2d 391 (1992). It is because of the waiver of
4
“One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is
that the (prosecution) has the burden of establishing guilt
solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under
circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair
procedure. Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 729; 81 S Ct 1639; 6 L
Ed 2d 751 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). One of these
safeguards is the presumption of innocence. See also Abraham,
The Judicial Process (7th ed), pp 104-105, stating:
It is a cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon justice
that an accused is presumed innocent unless and
until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Few, if any, concepts are more deeply rooted in our
traditions. . . . The layperson may quite
naturally be quick to adjudge an accused guilty in
his or her own mind and be sometimes joined by the
press, particularly in America, but the Anglo-Saxon
legal profession on both sides of the Atlantic
Ocean, and throughout the English-speaking world,
has done its best to adhere to the time-honored
principle that an accused person is presumed to be
innocent until proved otherwise beyond a reasonable
doubt by due process of law.
4
these rights and because a guilty plea is itself effectively
a self-imposed conviction, that the process “demands the
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing
the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its
consequence.” Boykin v Alabama, 395 US 238, 243-244; 89 S Ct
1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969). It is with this principle in
mind that a court must review a guilty plea and determine
whether the accused has been informed of all the rights that
he is waiving.
III. MCR 6.302
MCR 6.302 states that the defendant is entitled during
the guilty plea hearing to a direct and explicit statement
from the court concerning the rights set forth in the rule.
It is expressly required that the court “speak[] directly to”
the defendant, and that the court “must advise” the defendant
and “determine that the defendant understands” that he has the
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. MCR 6.302.
Clearly, the omission in this case was more than merely
an imprecise recital of the rights to which defendant was
entitled and which he was surrendering by virtue of his plea.
See People v Russell, 73 Mich App 628, 631; 252 NW2d 533
(1977), asserting that “[t]he determinative question . . . is
whether the trial judge omitted advice on that subject or
merely gave an imprecise recital.” The flaw in procedure in
5
the instant case was not that the wrong formulation or the
wrong articulation of defendant’s rights was provided, but
rather that no formulation and no articulation were provided.
As the majority recognizes, I agree that substantial
compliance with MCR 6.302, with regard to the right to be
presumed innocent, is all that is required. However, the
question in the instant case is whether there was any
compliance with the rule. I can only answer this in the
negative because the statement required by the rule was not
made, precisely or imprecisely, perfectly or imperfectly, at
the guilty plea hearing.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority cites the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96,
113; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), and states that “[w]hether a
particular departure from [the rule] justifies or requires
reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on
the nature of the noncompliance.” Slip op at 5. The majority
then asserts that the inquiry on appeal “is whether it appears
on the record that the defendant was informed of such
constitutional rights and incidents of a trial as is
reasonable to warrant the conclusion that he understood what
a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was knowingly and
voluntarily giving up his right to a trial and such rights and
incidents.” Id., citing Guilty Plea Cases, supra at 122. The
actual rule itself appears to be little more than a bit actor
6
in this process.
While it is true that the Guilty Plea Cases established
that the determination whether MCR 6.302 was “substantially
complied with” was to be part of a case-by-case inquiry, this
Court also made clear at the time that the rule requires that
a defendant be advised of his right to be presumed innocent,
because such right is “at the core of our criminal process and
fundamental to defendant’s understanding of a trial.” Id. at
125. In Guilty Plea Cases, this Court reversed a conviction
entered on a plea of guilty where the trial court had failed
to inform the defendant, during the guilty plea hearing, of
his right to be presumed innocent. Id.
Further, this Court has had subsequent occasion to
address whether a defendant must be advised of this right, and
has concluded that a trial court’s failure to advise the
defendant, at the guilty plea hearing, that he has the right
to be presumed innocent is error requiring reversal of the
conviction. In People v Allen, 396 Mich 829 (1976), the
defendant was not advised of the presumption of innocence,
and, as a result, had his conviction set aside. In People v
Lawrence, 413 Mich 866 (1982), there was an omission of any
statement to the defendant that he had the right to be
presumed innocent and, as a result, his conviction was
reversed.
The Court of Appeals has also followed this established
7
precedent. In People v Ingram, 166 Mich App 433, 437-438; 424
NW2d 19 (1988), the Court of Appeals held that a defendant
must be advised at the guilty plea hearing, however
imprecisely, that he is relinquishing his right to be presumed
innocent. In People v Heintzelman, 142 Mich App 94, 95; 368
NW2d 903 (1985), the defendant’s conviction was reversed where
the trial court had failed to advise him of his right to be
presumed innocent. In People v Mitchell, 125 Mich App 475,
477; 336 NW2d 31 (1983), the Court of Appeals reversed the
defendant’s conviction where the trial court did not advise
him of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty.
In People v Bender, 124 Mich App 571, 578; 335 NW2d 85 (1983),
the Court of Appeals held that “[t]he right to be presumed
innocent is of preeminent importance and, therefore, a
defendant must be informed of this right on the record or his
plea is constitutionally defective.” The Court proceeded to
reverse the defendant’s conviction where the record did not
disclose that he was “personally informed, precisely or
imprecisely, of his right to be presumed innocent.” Id. In
People v Wilson, 78 Mich App 307, 308; 259 NW2d 356 (1977),
the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction where
the record did not establish that the trial court had advised
him of his right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This line of precedent firmly establishes that, where a
8
trial court has completely failed to advise the defendant of
his right to be presumed innocent at the guilty plea hearing,
the defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction, and
either to replead or proceed to trial. In this case,
defendant was not informed, in any manner, of his right to be
“presumed innocent until proved guilty.” MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c).
A waiver of the constitutional right set forth by the
rule is supposed to be “an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v Zerbst,
304 US 458, 464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938)(emphasis
added); see also People v Siebert, 450 Mich 500, 510; 537 NW2d
891 (1975). In this case, it is impossible to conclude that
defendant made an intentional relinquishment of his right at
trial to be presumed innocent. People v Scott, 381 Mich 143,
147-48; 160 NW2d 878 (1968). This is simply because defendant
was never informed at all of this right. Obviously, it could
not be determined that he understood that this right was being
“forever relinquished” with respect to the charges to which he
pleaded guilty. Given the circuit court’s omission in this
case, we cannot conceivably determine whether the purpose of
MCR 6.302 was fulfilled, i.e., whether the defendant’s pleas
constituted a “knowing and voluntary” waiver of his
constitutional rights.5
5
Indeed, it appears that one fundamental difference
(continued...)
9
I am unpersuaded by the argument of the majority that,
while this Court has previously stated that a failure to
advise the defendant of his right to be presumed innocent at
the guilty plea hearing is error requiring reversal, it is not
error if the omitted statements concerning the presumption of
innocence were made at some point during the criminal justice
process, although not, as expressly required, at the guilty
plea hearing itself.
The majority observes, in this regard, that “earlier in
the day defendant was present while the same judge instructed
the jury that convened for defendant’s trial—on the charge to
which he subsequently pleaded guilty—that the defendant was
presumed innocent until proven guilty . . . .” Slip op at 2.
The majority accords greater weight to this happenstance than
to the fact that the judge failed to comply with its
obligation that it “must . . . personally” advise defendant of
his constitutional rights, and that it must do so at the
guilty plea hearing. The majority opinion continues in this
regard:
In light of the Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich
5
(...continued)
between “imprecise recitals,” which we have deemed appropriate
in most instances, and no recital at all, is that, with
respect to the former, it can still be determined, however
imperfectly, on the appellate review whether a defendant’s
plea has been made knowingly and voluntarily, whereas with the
latter, it is impossible to conclude similarly because there
is simply no record evidence at all.
10
96; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), the question is whether
there was substantial, not strict, compliance with
the requirements of MCR 6.302.[6]
Despite the trial court’s omission of the
presumption of innocence during the plea hearing,
we hold that defendant “was informed of such
constitutional rights and incidents of a trial as
reasonable to warrant the conclusion that he
understood what a trial is and that by pleading
guilty he was knowingly and voluntarily giving up
his right to a trial and such rights and
incidents.” [Slip op at 2, quoting Guilty Plea
Cases, supra at 122 (emphasis added).]
One could hardly imagine a trial proceeding where the jury has
not been informed that the defendant has a right to enjoy the
presumption of innocence. Is it the majority’s new rule that
where, as might commonly occur, a guilty plea is taken after
a defendant has decided to abort a trial, the court need not
comply with those aspects of MCR 6.302 that were touched upon
in any manner during such trial? Does such a partial trial
effectively nullify the requirement that a pleading defendant
be apprised of his presumption of innocence? Is the explicit
requirement of the rule that the trial court “speak directly”
6
While I agree that the proper inquiry is whether the
trial court has “substantially complied” with the court rule,
I disagree that a complete failure to make the required
statements can nonetheless be characterized as “substantial”
compliance. It is not as if, for example, the court had
advised the defendant that he had a right to be presumed “not
guilty” as opposed to being presumed “innocent.” Rather,
there has been no compliance at all. As noted, our
jurisprudence clearly articulates that there is a substantial
difference between “imprecise recitals” and situations in
which the required statement advising the defendant of his
rights is not made at all. See Russell, supra at 631; Ingram,
supra at 437-438; Bender, supra at 578.
11
to the defendant satisfied where the court instead “speak[s]
directly” to the jury? Is the explicit requirement of the
rule that the trial court advise the defendant of his rights
during the guilty plea hearing satisfied when the defendant
overhears these words in the court’s statement to the jury?
Is the purpose of the rule, that the defendant be advised of
his rights when he is most focused upon the implications of
his nearly irrevocable decision to convict himself by a guilty
plea, fulfilled where he overhears these rights in a context
far removed from this moment of irrevocability?7
To all of these questions, I answer that it is the
defendant, not the members of the jury, who must ultimately
consider the gravity of an admission of guilt. And it is
unwarranted to equate, as the majority does here, the
defendant’s possible awareness of these rights when they were
brought to the attention of the jury with the defendant
himself being personally advised of these rights at the guilty
plea hearing, after he has chosen to acknowledge the crime for
which he has been charged.8 It is not during the jury trial
7
“[A] guilty plea is more than an admission of conduct:
it is a conviction.” Boykin, supra at 242.
8
I emphasize the “possible” awareness of the defendant
because, of course, there is no certainty that the defendant
was even paying attention to, much less apprehending, any
particular statement by the trial court to the jury.
Defendant, at the time, may instead have been daydreaming or
distracted or confused or consulting with his lawyer. The
(continued...)
12
that the defendant has made the momentous decision to admit
guilt, and, thus, it is not at that juncture that he must be
impressed with the import of his decision to plead guilty and
be apprised of the consequences of his decision. Indeed, as
this Court stated in the Guilty Plea Cases:
That a defendant may have been tried by a jury
in another case or learned of his rights in an
earlier plea-taking proceeding would no more negate
his right to be informed of the right to and
incidents of a trial at the time a plea of guilty
is offered than would proof that he had seen Perry
Mason on television or read Erle Stanley Gardner.
Many defendants have been made aware at one
time or another of the right to an incidents of a
trial and the consequences of a plea of guilty.
Nevertheless, whatever the personal history of the
accused and the quality of his representation, the
appearance of justice and the integrity of the
process by which pleas of guilty are offered and
accepted require, in the solemn moment of passage
from presumed innocence to conviction and potential
imprisonment, that the judge apprise every
defendant of the rights he is waiving and the
consequences of his plea and make the other
determinations required by the rule. However, a
recital of rights to one defendant by one judge on
one day, may suffice as a recital of rights to that
same defendant by the same judge on that same day
in another case. [Id. at 121-122 (emphasis
added).][9]
8
(...continued)
virtue of MCR 6.302 is that, because the court must personally
address the defendant and take into consideration the nature
of his response in determining whether to accept the guilty
plea, appellate courts can be reasonably confident that a
defendant has intelligently relinquished the full panoply of
rights attendant to a jury trial. The appellate courts can
have no similar assurance in the instant circumstance.
9
The implication of the majority’s reasoning is that the
(continued...)
13
That is, a recital of rights at a previous guilty plea hearing
in the same case of the rights that a defendant is waiving may
suffice to satisfy the requirements of MCR 6.302. However,
this Court has never before subscribed to the proposition that
the mere fact that a jury, in a partial trial, has been
instructed on a defendant’s right to be presumed innocent is
sufficient to obviate the specific requirements of the court
rules.10
The fundamental error that pervades the majority opinion
is in its reading of Guilty Plea Cases and its holding that
“there is substantial compliance with the ‘personally address’
9
(...continued)
“habitual offender,” or the defendant who has previously been
involved in the criminal justice system, has something less
than a full right to be informed, at the guilty plea hearing,
of his constitutional rights in accordance with MCR 6.302, by
virtue of his presumed familiarity with such rights. Would
the majority also conclude that no compliance with the rule is
required for the defendant-lawyer or the defendant-judge
because of his presumed knowledge of constitutional law?
Simple adherence to the express requirements of the rule would
avoid this Court having to determine which class of defendants
possessed alternative means by which to become informed of the
rights that they were relinquishing by a plea of guilty.
10
See also People v Jackson, 71 Mich App 468, 471-72;
248 NW2d 551 (1976) (BURNS , J., dissenting), disagreeing with
the majority’s holding that advisement of a defendant’s rights
at a guilty plea hearing earlier in the day constituted
sufficient waiver of his rights at a subsequent hearing, and
citing the Guilty Plea Cases, noting that while the
presumption of innocence is not a Jaworski right, this Court
“has deemed it necessary to continue to require reversal in
cases where the guilty-pleading defendant is not advised of
that incident of trial.”
14
requirement . . . even though the judge fails to recite a
specific right at the guilty plea hearing . . . .” Slip op at
13. The focus of the majority opinion in this regard is on
the language found at 114-115 of Guilty Plea Cases. There,
the Court addressed the requirement of the rule that the judge
“personally address[] the defendant” at the guilty plea
hearing. The Court concluded in one of the twenty-four
consolidated cases, Courtney, that the judge did not
“personally advise the defendant of the maximum sentence but
in moving to add a second count the prosecutor stated the
maximum penalty of five years.” Id. at 114. The Court next
addressed Bauer, a case in which “the judge did not state the
charge but the prosecutor read the information on the plea
record.” Id.(emphasis added).11 This Court stated:
These departures do not justify reversal.
While it would be better for the judge to cover all
the points himself, as long as he assumes the
principal burden of imparting the required
information, as did the judges in Courtney and
Bauer, the purpose of requiring him personally to
address the defendant and in so doing observe his
demeanor and responses is achieved.
A guilty plea conviction will not be reversed
if the judge engages in the required colloquy but
fails to mention an item which the record shows was
established through, for example, an opening
statement of or interjection by the prosecutor or
defense counsel in the hearing of the judge and
11
Courtney and Bauer were the only two cases among the
twenty-four cases consolidated in Guilty Plea Cases that
specifically concerned the “personally address” requirement of
MCR 6.302.
15
defendant. It is proper for the prosecutor or the
clerk to read the information in the judge’s
presence. [Id. at 114-115 (emphasis added).]
Both Courtney and Bauer involved the assessment of
statements occurring during the guilty plea hearing itself in
order to determine whether there had been substantial
compliance with the rule. Contrary to the majority opinion,
Guilty Plea Cases does not rely upon statements or events
occurring outside the four corners of the guilty plea
hearing.12 Therefore, I reject its assertion that “twenty-five
years” of precedent establish that the required statements do
not have to be made at the guilty plea hearing. Rather, the
precedent cited in this opinion establishes that for twenty
five years, since the Guilty Plea Cases, Michigan courts have
adhered to the principle that a defendant must be informed at
the guilty plea hearing that he has a right to be presumed
innocent. The majority’s extrapolation from focusing upon
substantial compliance at the guilty plea hearing to focusing
upon substantial compliance over some indeterminate period
surrounding the hearing runs counter to this well-established
precedent. It also runs counter to the principle that, in
order for a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, a
defendant must be informed of the rights he is surrendering at
12
One of the reasons for requiring that a guilty plea
hearing be conducted in a discrete proceeding is to preserve
the overall integrity of the defendant’s decision to plead
guilty.
16
that time, at that hearing at which he finally decides to
admit guilt.13
The majority seeks to distinguish the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty from the rights
identified in Jaworski of which a defendant must be informed.14
However, the mere fact that the Jaworski rights have not
encompassed the presumption of innocence does not indicate
that this right is of any less consequence or should be
treated in any different fashion, nor does the majority
suggest any rationale for such treatment. In Russell, supra
at 629-630, the Court of Appeals noted that, in the Guilty
Plea Cases, this Court “elevated the presumption of innocence
to the same status as the three Jaworski rights.”15 See also
13
Further, contrary to the majority’s statement at 14
that “[t]he dissent has not identified any basis in the rule
to support” its position that trial judges must personally
advise the defendant at the guilty plea hearing concerning the
right to be presumed innocent, I believe that my position is
adequately supported by the language of MCR 6.302(B). This
rule requires the court to “[s]peak[] directly to the
defendant, . . . advise the defendant and determine that the
defendant understands . . . .” Only by a great stretch can
this rule be read to authorize a situation where, as here, the
defendant was never directly addressed in regard to the
presumption of innocence.
14
See People v Jaworski, 387 Mich 21, 28-29; 194 NW2d
868 (1972), holding that a defendant must be advised of the
three constitutional rights enumerated in Boykin: (1) the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (2) the right
to trial by jury, and (3) the right to confront one’s
accusers.
15
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he
(continued...)
17
Johnson v Ohio, 419 US 924, 926; 95 S Ct 200; 42 L Ed2d 158
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), in which one justice, in
dissenting to a denial of certiorari, observed that “[t]he
Boykin enumeration [of rights to which a pleading defendant is
entitled to be advised] was illustrative, not exhaustive.”16
V. RESPONSE TO THE CONCURRENCE
I also respectfully disagree with the concurrence that
15
(...continued)
presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the
Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our
system of criminal justice.” Estelle v Williams, 425 US 501,
503; 96 S Ct 1691; 48 L Ed 2d 126 (1976). See also Abraham,
note 4 supra at 105, stating:
[T]he presumption of the innocence of the
accused is transformed into courtroom procedure in
the Anglo-Saxon countries. Essential to it are the
ancient, basic safeguards inherent in that
philosophy of the law, safeguards which, to a
greater or lesser degree, are fundamental to the
notions of liberty and justice that pervade the
political system of the liberal democratic West.
Among these are the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination; the right to cross-examine
witnesses; the writ of habeas corpus . . . perhaps
the most basic right of all, dating at least to the
Magna Carta (1215)—and many others in the same
general category.
Notably, the rights referred to in this passage along with the
presumption of innocence, are the Jaworski rights.
16
It is not my view that the trial court is required
during the guilty plea hearing to “strictly” comply with the
obligation that a defendant be advised of his right to be
presumed innocent, or with regard to any other particular
obligation, beyond what is required by Jaworski. I do
believe, however, that the extent of a court’s compliance with
the requirements of MCR 6.302 must be assessed in terms of
what has occurred at the guilty plea hearing.
18
advising the defendant at his guilty plea hearing that he was
relinquishing the right to have the jury decide whether his
guilt could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt sufficiently
imparted the idea that he was also relinquishing his right to
be presumed innocent. MCR 6.302(B)(3)(c) requires a statement
to the defendant that the judge, jury, and prosecutor are to
presume his innocence until his guilt is proven. MCR
6.302(B)(3)(d) requires a separate statement informing the
defendant that it is the prosecutor’s burden to prove his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, subrules (c) and (d)
are distinct requirements of the guilty plea hearing.17
17
In note 10, the majority, perhaps inadvertently, adopts
the premises of the concurrence that the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” instruction embodied in subrule (3)(d) is sufficiently
equivalent to the “presumption of innocence” instruction
contained in subrule (3)(c) to warrant a finding that the
former instruction suffices in lieu of the latter. This is
because Russell approved the instruction given to the
defendant, during the guilty plea hearing, that the
“[p]rosecutor must prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”
even though, as the majority observes, the judge “never spoke
the precise words ‘presumed innocent.’” Russell, supra at 631.
Yet, as explained here, the two instructions clearly are
distinct, both conceptually and in the specific context of the
language of MCR 6.302. As Guilty Plea Cases made clear, and
as evidenced by the change in the court rules, see GCR 1963,
785.7(1)(d)(ii) (which combined the two instructions), and GCR
1963, 785.7(1)(g)(iii), (iv) (which separated the two
instructions), the presumption of innocence is a distinct
right that should always be stated in advising the defendant
at the guilty plea hearing.
Concerning the other cases referenced by the majority in
that note, as the dissent has already observed, (a) in
Jackson, the defendant was informed of his right to be
presumed innocent at a guilty plea hearing; (b) in Ingram,
(continued...)
19
The distinction between the presumption of innocence and
the “reasonable doubt” standards has been extensively
discussed by the United States Supreme Court. Coffin v United
States, supra at 460-461 (holding that a trial judge’s failure
to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence required
reversal, notwithstanding the adequacy of instructions
provided on the closely related reasonable doubt standard).
In Coffin, the Court traced the “presumption of innocence”
back to ancient law, and stated of the argument that “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt” and “presumption of innocence” are
equivalent:
To say that the one is the equivalent of the
other is therefore to say that legal evidence can
be excluded from the jury, and that such exclusion
may be cured by instructing them correctly in
regard to the method by which they are required to
reach their conclusion upon the proof actually
before them; in other words, that the exclusion of
an important element of proof can be justified by
correctly instructing as to the proof admitted.
The evolution of the principle of the presumption
of innocence, and its resultant, the doctrine of
reasonable doubt, make more apparent the
correctness of these views, and indicate the
necessity of enforcing the one in order that the
17
(...continued)
defendant was instructed on the presumption of innocence at
his guilty plea hearing; (c) in Bender, supra at 579,
defendant’s conviction was reversed because the defendant “was
not personally informed of his right to be presumed innocent”;
and (d) in Heintzelman, Mitchell, and Wilson, the Court of
Appeals held that a defendant must be given the required
instruction.
20
other may continue to exist. [Id. at 460.][18]
Subsequently, in Taylor v Kentucky, 436 US 478, 484; 98 S Ct
1930; 56 L Ed2d 468 (1978), the Supreme Court observed:
[T]he requirement that a jury be informed both
of the presumption of innocence and of the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt]
derives from a perceived salutary effect upon lay
18
See also Chambers, Reasonable certainty and reasonable
doubt, 81 Marq L R 655, 671, 674 (1998), stating:
The reasonable doubt standard and the
presumption of innocence work in tandem to help
assure that defendants are convicted fairly.
Reasonable doubt requires that jurors be thoroughly
convinced of a defendant’s guilt before conviction.
The presumption of innocence effectively requires
that jurors begin and end their inquiry with a
skeptical mindset.
* * *
That reasonable doubt and the presumption of
innocence are related is undeniable. Understanding
the relationship between them requires recognizing
that the pairing of the two concepts forces a juror
to move from a subjective state of disbelief
regarding the prosecution’s claims of defendant’s
guilt to a subjective state of justified certainty
regarding defendant’s guilt. That the juror must
be so transformed ensures that the evidence used to
convict a defendant will be powerful. Reasonable
doubt requires only that a juror be subjectively
certain that defendant committed the crime before
voting for guilt. A juror can reach a subjective,
but possibly unjustified, state of certainty in the
absence of a presumption of innocence. The
presumption of innocence requires that jurors think
more deeply than they otherwise would about whether
all reasonable doubts have been eliminated before
convicting a defendant
See also Diamond, Note, Reasonable doubt: To define, or not to
define, 90 Colum L R 1716, 1730-1731 (1990).
21
jurors. While the legal scholar may understand
that the presumption of innocence and the
prosecution’s burden of proof are logically
similar, the ordinary citizen well may draw
significant additional guidance from an instruction
on the presumption of innocence.
In my judgment, this reasoning applies with equal force to the
guilty plea hearing, where a criminal defendant is faced with
the decision to admit or deny guilt. Omitting the instruction
on the presumption of innocence deprives such a defendant of
an opportunity to fully assess his own circumstances and
intelligently reflect upon his options.
While a scholar of the law may well recognize the close
philosophical and constitutional connection between (indeed
the inextricability of) the right to be presumed innocent and
the right to be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, MCR
6.302 understandably sets these apart as discrete rights to be
explained to the pleading defendant. The rules do so because,
considered together, these formulations explain more
thoroughly and more clearly to the nonscholar, to the
defendant, the full measure of the rights that he is
relinquishing by his guilty plea.19
CONCLUSION
The Guilty Plea Cases established that a trial court’s
19
By the concurrence’s analysis, the trial court could
just as well advise the defendant that he is entitled to “due
process” of law, and have such an instruction suffice to
satisfy MCR 6.302 in lieu of instructions concerning the
individual components of due process set forth in the rule.
22
failure to comply with MCR 6.302 and advise the defendant of
his right to be presumed innocent constituted error requiring
reversal. Until today, this Court has not wavered from
adherence to this principle. In my judgment, the trial court
is obligated under the Michigan rule to inform the defendant
of his presumption of innocence at the guilty plea hearing,
and the extent to which there has been “substantial
compliance” with this obligation must be assessed in terms of
what occurred at such hearing. Because there was a complete
failure on the part of the trial court in this case to comply
with MCR 6.302 by advising defendant, at his guilty plea
hearing, of his right to be presumed innocent, I would affirm
the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant’s
conviction.
CAVANAGH and KELLY , JJ., concurred with MARKMAN , J.
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