Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED JULY 27, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116660
MARK JOHN VASQUEZ, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
MARKMAN, J.
We granted leave to consider whether defendant’s alleged
conduct of lying to a police officer about his name and age,
constituted an “obstruction” within the meaning of Michigan’s
“resisting and obstructing” statute. MCL 750.479. Michigan’s
“resisting and obstructing” statute does not proscribe any
manner of interference with a police officer, and it also does
not proscribe only conduct that poses a threat to the safety
of police officers; rather, it proscribes threatened, either
expressly or impliedly, physical interference and actual
physical interference with a police officer. Therefore, we
would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing the charge
against defendant.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
While investigating a complaint about a loud party, a
police officer found defendant urinating on the front lawn of
a private residence. The officer approached defendant and
asked him whether he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant
responded, “Yes, but not very much.” The officer suspected
that defendant was an intoxicated minor. When the officer
asked defendant his name and age, defendant said that his name
was “John Wesley Chippeway” and that he was sixteen years old.
In fact, defendant’s name was Mark John Vasquez, Jr., and he
was seventeen years old.
The officer arrested defendant for being a minor in
possession of alcohol. MCL 436.1703(1). During the booking
process, the officer learned from another officer, who
recognized defendant, that he was actually Mark John Vasquez,
Jr. When confronted about the officer’s knowledge of who he
actually was, he admitted his true name and age.
2
The prosecutor charged defendant with being a minor in
possession—second offense and “resisting and obstructing” a
police officer. The trial court quashed the “resisting and
obstructing” charge, relying on People v Philabaun, 234 Mich
App 471; 595 NW2d 502 (1999)(Philabaun I), which this Court
subsequently reversed, 461 Mich 255; 602 NW2d 371 (1999)
(Philabaun II). The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed and
remanded, 240 Mich App 239; 612 NW2d 162 (2000), relying on
our decision in Philabaun II, that a defendant’s mere refusal
to obey an order for a blood sample could constitute resisting
or opposing.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case requires us to construe Michigan’s “resisting
and obstructing” statute. Questions of statutory construction
are reviewed de novo. Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich
243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).
III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTE
“The primary goal of judicial interpretation is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”
McJunkin v Cellasto Plastic Corp, 461 Mich 590, 598; 608 NW2d
57 (2000). “The first step in that determination is to review
the language of the statute itself.” In re MCI
3
Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
The “resisting and obstructing” statute states in relevant
part:
Any person who shall knowingly and willfully .
. . obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or
wound . . . any person or persons authorized by law
to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful
acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve
and keep the peace shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
. . . . [MCL 750.479.]
This statute proscribes conduct that “obstruct[s]” a police
officer while the officer is attempting to “keep the peace.”
A. “KEEP THE PEACE ”
The “resisting and obstructing” statute proscribes
certain conduct encountered by a law enforcement officer while
the officer is attempting to “keep the peace.” Therefore, the
first issue is whether the police officer, in this case, was
attempting to “keep the peace” when defendant lied to him.
“[A]n officer’s efforts to ‘keep the peace’ include ordinary
police functions that do not directly involve placing a person
under arrest.” People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 759; 456 NW2d
237 (1990). “[T]he broad statutory clause ‘maintain, preserve
and keep the peace’ includes all of the duties legally
executed by a police officer.” People v Weatherspoon, 6 Mich
App 229, 232; 148 NW2d 889 (1967).
In this case, the officer was responding to a complaint
about a loud party when he found defendant urinating on the
4
front lawn of a private residence. Because the officer
suspected that defendant was an intoxicated minor, the officer
asked defendant for his name and age. Defendant told the
officer that his name was “John Wesley Chippeway” and that he
was sixteen years old. In fact, defendant’s name was Mark
John Vasquez, Jr. and he was seventeen years old. Defendant
was arrested for being a minor in possession of alcohol. MCL
436.1703(1). It is clear that, at the time defendant lied to
the officer, the latter was responding to suspected criminal
activity, which constitutes an ordinary police function.
Because the officer was performing such a lawfully assigned
function when he questioned defendant, the officer was
attempting to “keep the peace” within the meaning of the
“resisting and obstructing” statute, when defendant lied to
him.
B. “OBSTRUCT ”
The next issue is whether defendant “obstructed,” within
the meaning of the “resisting and obstructing” statute, the
police officer when he lied to him. “[T]he meaning of
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.” King
v St Vincent’s Hosp, 502 US 215, 221; 112 S Ct 570; 116 L Ed
2d 578 (1991). “Contextual understanding of statutes is
generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: ‘[i]t
is known from its associates,’ see Black’s Law Dictionary (6th
5
ed), at 1060. This doctrine stands for the principle that a
word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.”
Tyler v Livonia Pub Schs, 459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560
(1999). “[I]n seeking meaning, words and clauses will not be
divorced from those which precede and those which follow.”
Sanchick v Michigan State Bd of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559;
70 NW2d 757 (1955). “It is a familiar principle of statutory
construction that words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning.” Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd,
Inc, 432 US 312, 322; 97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).
In the present case, the statute uses the word “obstruct”
as part of a list containing five other words, namely,
“resist, oppose, assault, beat [and] wound.” The meaning of
the word “obstruct” should be determined in this particular
context, and be given a meaning logically related to the five
surrounding words of the statute. “Resist” is defined as “to
withstand, strive against, or oppose.” Random House Webster’s
College Dictionary (1991) at 1146. “Resistance” is
additionally defined as “the opposition offered by one thing,
force, etc.” Id. “Oppose” is defined as “to act against or
furnish resistance to; combat” Id. at 949. “Assault” is
defined as “a sudden violent attack; onslaught.” Id. at 82.
“Beat” is defined as “to strike forcefully and repeatedly;
. . . to hit repeatedly as to cause painful injury.” Id. at
6
120. “Wound” is defined as “to inflict a wound upon; injure;
hurt.” Id. at 1537. Each of these words, when read together,
clearly implies an element of threatened or actual physical
interference.
The accompanying term “obstruct” is susceptible to
several potential meanings. “Obstruct” is defined as: “1. to
block or close up with an obstacle. 2. to hinder, interrupt,
or delay the passage, progress, course, etc. of. 3. to block
from sight; be in the way of (a view, passage, etc.).” Id. at
935. Accordingly, we understand the dissent’s definition of
“obstruct,” which defines it as including both physical and
nonphysical conduct. Although we understand that “obstruct”
can be defined in such a manner, when read in context, we
believe that the more reasonable interpretation is one that
communicates an actual, or a threat of, physical
interference.1
1
An Iowa statute, very similar to Michigan’s “resisting
and obstructing” statute, provides:
A person who knowingly resists or obstructs
anyone known by the person to be a peace officer
. . . in the performance of any act which is within
the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that
officer . . . commits a simple misdemeanor. [Iowa
Code § 719.1.]
The Iowa Supreme Court has said “[t]he language of
section 719.1 was chosen because it conveys the idea of active
interference, with the drafting committee rejecting more
passive language such as ‘object’ or ‘fail to cooperate.’”
(continued...)
7
The words “assault, beat, or wound” necessarily contain
an element of violence; whereas, the words “obstruct, resist
[or] oppose” may, but do not necessarily, contain an element
of violence. For example, one cannot “assault, beat, or
wound” an officer without being violent; however, one can
“obstruct, resist, [or] oppose” an officer without necessarily
being violent. What this leads us to believe is that when the
Legislature used these six words together, it intended to
proscribe both violent and nonviolent physical interference;
physical interference being the only element common to all six
words. Therefore, by grouping these six words together as a
part of a single type of prohibited conduct, the Legislature
has demonstrated a purpose of proscribing conduct amounting to
actual or threatened physical interference.2 In this case,
1
(...continued)
Iowa v Smithson, 594 NW2d 1, 2 (Iowa, 1999), quoting Yeager &
Carlson, Criminal Law & Procedure, § 422 (Supp 1998)(emphasis
added). Therefore, the mere act of providing false
information to a police officer does not amount to a violation
of this statute. Iowa v Henley, 2001 WL 57994 (Iowa App,
2001).
2
The dissent asserts that “the fact that the word
‘obstruct’ later appears with the words ‘assault, beat, or
wound’ should not be given any special significance,” post at
8, because “[a]t the beginning of the statute, regarding the
service of process, the words ‘obstruct, resist, or oppose’
are specifically set apart from the words ‘assault, beat, or
wound.’” Id. at 7. We respectfully disagree. Rather, that
the Legislature initially separated the six terms into two
groups in the statute does suggest that the two groups of
(continued...)
8
defendant’s conduct did not constitute threatened or actual
physical interference. Defendant instead lied to the officer
about his name and age. While certainly not laudatory,
defendant’s conduct did not physically interfere with or
threaten to physically interfere with the officer.3
2
(...continued)
words have a distinct meaning. This distinction is that the
words “obstruct, resist, [and] oppose,” refer to nonviolent
physical interference; while, the words “assault, beat, [and]
wound” refer to violent physical interference. However, the
fact that the Legislature then combined the two sets of words,
in the portion of the statute that we are interpreting here,
suggests that it is referring to both violent and nonviolent
physical interference, with physical interference being the
only element common to both sets of words.
Further, in our judgment, the Legislature used six verbs
in the “resisting and obstructing” statute, not to prohibit
six discrete forms of conduct, but rather to prohibit one
general category of conduct in as thorough a manner as
possible, by ensuring that there were no obvious gaps that
could be exploited in the statute. Therefore, we must
interpret each of the six words by looking at them together in
order to determine the general category of conduct that the
Legislature intended to prohibit.
3
The dissent asserts “[w]hen asked to provide his name
and age, defendant had two lawful choices: he could have
answered truthfully or exercised his constitutional right not
to answer at all. Instead, defendant chose to lie. By doing
so, he impeded the officer’s investigation by creating a
nonphysical obstacle to the officer’s attempt to gather
accurate information.” Post at 6. Under the dissent’s
reasoning, if defendant had refused to answer at all, he could
also have been charged under the “resisting and obstructing”
statute. If defendant had refused to answer, this would have
also “impeded the officer’s investigation by creating a
nonphysical obstacle to the officer’s attempt to gather
accurate information.” However, one cannot be compelled to
answer questions posed by a police officer. Davis v
Mississippi, 394 US 721, 727, n 6; 89 S Ct 1394; 22 L Ed 2d
(continued...)
9
Moreover, the principal “purpose of [the “resisting and
obstructing” statute] is to protect officers from physical
harm.” Philabaun II, supra, at 262, n 17. “The purpose of
the resisting arrest statute is to protect persons (the
officers) from physical violence and harm.” People v
Kretchmer, 404 Mich 59, 64; 272 NW2d 558 (1978). The statute
“attempts to punish an assault upon an officer while in the
discharge of his duty by a penalty more severe than that
imposed for other assaults,” i.e., assaults on private
citizens.4 People v Tompkins, 121 Mich 431, 432; 80 NW 126
3
(...continued)
676 (1969); Risbridger v Connelly, 122 F Supp 2d 857, 866 (WD
Mich, 2000)(holding that a police officer cannot compel one to
disclose one’s identity); People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 458;
339 NW2d 403 (1983). Therefore, one cannot be prosecuted for
“obstructing” a police officer on the basis of one’s refusal
to answer questions. City of Pontiac v Baldwin, 163 Mich App
147, 152; 413 NW2d 689 (1987). The dissent asserts that a
defendant does not “obstruct” a police officer by refusing to
answer questions posed by an officer. However, the dissent
concludes that when one hinders or impedes an investigation,
one violates the “resisting and obstructing” statute. Perhaps
the dissent is willing to make an exception where one merely
refuses to speak, but that does not change the fact that under
the dissent’s reasoning, one who merely refuses to speak
violates the “resisting and obstructing” statute because such
conduct may obviously hinder or impede an investigation and
that is exactly the type of conduct that the dissent argues is
proscribed by this statute. In our judgment, a reasoning that
leads to the conclusion that one may violate a statute by
exercising a constitutional right is problematic, even though
one is prepared to make an exception for constitutionally
protected conduct.
4
Not only is the purpose of this statute to punish
assaults upon officers more severely than assaults upon
(continued...)
10
(1899). In our judgment, defendant’s conduct, i.e., the
4
(...continued)
private citizens, but it is also to punish physical
interferences with officers more severely than nonphysical
interferences with officers. This is evidenced by the
differences in punishments in the law placed upon physical and
nonphysical interferences with officers. The punishment for
violation of MCL 750.479 (proscription of physical
interferences) is “imprisonment in the state prison not more
than 2 years, or by a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars.”
MCL 257.324(1), in contrast, provides in relevant part:
A person shall not do any of the following:
(h) Furnish to a peace officer false, forged,
fictitious, or misleading verbal or written
information identifying the person as another
person, if the person is detained for a violation
of [the motor vehicle code] . . . .
The punishment for violation of this statute (proscription of
nonphysical interferences) is suspension of driver’s license
for ninety days. Similarly, MCL 750.217 provides:
Any person who shall in any manner disguise
himself, with intent to obstruct the due execution
of the law, or with intent to intimidate, hinder or
interrupt any officer or any other person, in the
legal performance of his duty, or the exercise of
his rights under the constitution and laws of this
state, whether such intent be effected or not,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
The punishment for violation of MCL 750.217 (proscription of
nonphysical interferences) is “imprisonment in the county jail
not more than 1 year or by fine of not more than 500 dollars.”
Thus, the punishment for “resisting and obstructing” an
officer is far more severe than the punishment for lying to an
officer while detained for a violation of the motor vehicle
code or the punishment for disguising one’s self to an
officer. When MCL 750.479 is read in the context of these two
statutes, specifically the types of punishments attached to
each, it is increasingly evident that the purpose of MCL
750.479 is to punish physical interferences with police
officers.
11
giving of a false name and age to an officer, does not fit
within the range of conduct that MCL 750.479 was meant to
prohibit.
It is clear that the principal purpose of this statute is
to protect police officers from harm. However, from its
language, we do not believe that this is the only purpose.
Because one may threaten to or actually physically interfere
with a police officer without threatening to or actually
hurting a police officer, we believe that one may physically
“obstruct” an officer without necessarily posing a threat to
the officer’s safety. For example, one may “obstruct” an
officer by placing an object in the way of the officer with
the intent of making it less accessible to the officer. This
may pose no real threat to the officer’s safety, but it may
nevertheless “obstruct” because of the physical barrier
interposed to the officer’s performance of his duties.
Therefore, both physical interference that poses a threat to
the safety of police officers (“assault, beat, or wound”) and
physical interference that does not necessarily, but
nevertheless may, pose a threat to the safety of police
officers (“obstruct, resist, [or] oppose”) are proscribed.
If the Legislature had intended to proscribe any manner
of interference with a police officer, as the dissent asserts,
12
why did the Legislature not clearly express this intent?5 If
the Legislature intended to proscribe nonphysical forms of
“obstruction,” it could have used such terms as “lies,”
“falsifies,” “refuses to cooperate,” “interferes with” or
“objects to.” It did not.6 Instead, the Legislature chose
5
For example, the federal statute, 18 USC 1001,
provides, in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this
section, whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch of the Government of the United
States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
entry;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 5 years, or both.
This statutory language clearly proscribes the giving of a
false statement to a police officer. Brogan v United States,
522 US 398, 400; 118 S Ct 805; 139 L Ed 2d 830 (1998). If
Michigan had a similar statute, clearly defendant could be
charged under such a statute. However, for whatever reasons,
Michigan has no such statute, and MCL 750.479 cannot
reasonably be interpreted by this Court to fill that void.
Rather, if giving false information to the police is to become
an offense, it is for our Legislature to say so.
6
The dissent contends that “our job is to interpret the
meaning of the plain language of the words actually used by
the Legislature.” Post at 10 (emphasis added). We agree, and
(continued...)
13
six words that, when read together, evidence an intent to
proscribe only threatened or actual physical interference.
Indeed, the fact that the Legislature used six separate
terms to describe the types of conduct that it sought to
proscribe, makes it even more probable that, had the
Legislature truly intended to proscribe “lying” to a police
officer, it would have expressly included such a term in its
litany.7 That is, to the extent that the Legislature sought
to proscribe the types of conduct that the dissent attributes
to the statute, what more obvious starting point could there
have been than to prohibit “lying?” Why, in light of its
laundry list of proscribed activities, its literal thesaurus
of forms of misconduct, would the Legislature have been so
cryptic in setting forth such an obvious form of wrongdoing as
“lying”? After all, “lying” is something more than an obscure
verb describing an abstruse form of misconduct; rather, it
6
(...continued)
that is exactly what we are doing here. We are merely
attempting to interpret reasonably the meaning of the words
“obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat, or wound” as used in
the statute. In this process, we are simply not prepared to
insert the word “lies” into the statute.
7
Although we fully concur with the dissent that “lying
to a police officer during an investigation could have grave
consequences,” post at 6, n 3, MCL 750.479 simply does not
proscribe such conduct. Just as it is Congress’
responsibility to address this issue in the context of federal
law, see note 5, it is the responsibility of the Legislature
to insert “lying” into MCL 750.479.
14
describes a form of misconduct that, by itself, has been made
the subject of numerous significant criminal statutes,
including, for example, those described in notes 4 and 5.8
Our opinion is consistent with Philabaun II, where we
concluded that the defendant’s refusal to comply with a search
warrant for a blood sample constituted an obstruction under
Michigan’s “resisting and obstructing” statute.
“[D]efendant’s conduct, although indisputably passive in
nature, was nevertheless sufficient to constitute obstruction,
resistance, or opposition to the deputy’s execution of the
search warrant for the extraction of defendant’s blood.”
Philabaun II, supra at 264, quoting Philabaun I, supra, at
488-489(Murphy, J., dissenting). In reaching this conclusion,
we stated:
Although the classic example of resisting or
obstructing involves a defendant who physically
interferes with the officer, actual physical
interference is not necessary because case law
instructs that an expressed threat of physical
interference, absent actual physical interference,
is sufficient to support a charge under the
statute. And while an expressed threat of physical
interference with an officer is sufficient to
8
The dissent misunderstands our point here. We are not
implying that the prosecutor could have charged defendant
under these other statutes. We agree that these other
statutes are inapplicable in this case. Our point is merely
that, because the Legislature has specifically proscribed
“lying” in various other significant statutes, it is even more
likely that, had it truly intended to proscribe “lying” in
this statute, it would have specifically done this as it has
done in these other statutes.
15
support a charge under the statute, such a threat
is not necessary because this Court has held that a
constant barrage of obscene and abusive remarks to
an officer, taken together with the refusal to
comply with the officer’s orders, is sufficient to
warrant a charge under the statute. [Philabaun II,
supra at 263, quoting Philabaun I, supra at 488
(Murphy, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).]
We agree with Philabaun II that passive conduct may
sometimes be sufficient to constitute obstruction under the
“resisting and obstructing” statute. Passive conduct, if it
rises to the level of threatened physical interference,
constitutes “obstruction” within the meaning of the statute.
For example, in Philabaun II, the defendant’s refusal to
comply with the search warrant, although passive conduct, rose
to the level of threatened physical interference because the
officers were placed in a situation in which, in order to get
a sample of the defendant’s blood, they would have had to
physically constrain him and take his blood against his will.
When the defendant refused to cooperate, the next likely
sequence of events very well could have been the possible
injury of a police officer attempting to enforce the search
warrant.
We also agree with Philabaun II that actual physical
interference is unnecessary to support a charge under the
“resisting and obstructing” statute. Rather, conduct that
rises to the level of threatened physical interference is
16
sufficient to support a charge under the statute.
Additionally, we agree that an expressed threat of physical
interference is unnecessary to support a charge under the
statute. Rather, any conduct that rises to the level of
threatened physical interference, whether it is expressed or
not, is sufficient to support a charge under the statute. For
example, in Philabaun II, the defendant’s refusal to comply
with the search warrant, although not an express threat of
physical interference, was sufficient to support a charge
under the statute because by refusing to cooperate, defendant
was, in effect, physically interfering with the police
officers; his refusal left the officers with no other choice
than to use physical force to execute the search warrant.
In the present case, unlike Philabaun II, the police
officer was not faced with a situation in which his next act
would, more likely than not, involve physical confrontation.
Defendant did not physically obstruct or resist the officer in
any way. He instead lied to the officer about his name and
age.9 This is not the type of conduct that Michigan’s
9
The following cases are illustrative of cases in which
defendants supplied false information to police officers and
courts subsequently held that there was insufficient evidence
to find the defendants guilty of violating statutes that
proscribe obstructing an officer: Louisiana v Daigle, 701 So
2d 685 (La App, 1997)(the defendant falsely told the police
that a woman was not present, when, in fact, she was);
Pennsylvania v Shelly, 703 A2d 499 (Pa Super, 1997)(the
(continued...)
17
“resisting and obstructing” statute was intended to
proscribe.10
9
(...continued)
defendant gave a false name to a police officer); Steele v
Florida, 537 So 2d 711 (Fla App, 1989)(the defendant gave a
false name to a police officer); Louisiana v Smith, 352 So 2d
216 (La, 1977)(the defendant falsely told a police officer
that her son, who was wanted for armed robbery, was not in the
house, when, in fact, he was); Ohio v Stephens, 57 Ohio App 2d
229; 387 NE2d 252 (1978)(the defendant falsely told police
officers that she did not know a person, who subsequently was
found in defendant’s basement); Wilbourn v Mississippi, 249
Miss 835; 164 So 2d 424 (1964)(the defendant gave a false
description of the man who shot her husband, when, in fact,
her son shot her husband).
10
Even if one were to accept the dissent’s proposition,
that the statute proscribes any interference with a police
officer while he is attempting to “keep the peace,” one may
still reasonably question whether defendant’s lies, in fact,
“obstructed” the officer in “keeping the peace” in this case.
Although, for example, defendant gave the officer a false age,
defendant nevertheless gave him an age that still made
defendant a minor. Therefore, even though the information was
false, it could hardly have prevented the officer from
arresting defendant for being a minor in possession.
Additionally, the majority does not identify any actual
“obstruction” that occurred in this case as a result of
defendant supplying the officer with a false name. It did not
cause any apparent delay in processing the charge against
defendant, nor did it lead to any charge being wrongfully
pursued against any innocent persons. While such an
“obstruction” is, of course, conceivable, it simply did not
occur here.
Michigan’s “resisting and obstructing” statute provides
that “[a]ny person who shall . . . obstruct . . . shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . (emphasis added).
Accordingly, one may commit obstruction of a police officer
only by actually obstructing a police officer, rather than by
merely attempting to obstruct an officer. See id. at 274; see
also In re McConnell, 370 US 230, 233-234; 82 S Ct 1288; 8 L
Ed 2d 434 (1962)(holding that a statute authorizing federal
courts to punish “misbehavior of any person in its presence or
(continued...)
18
IV. CONCLUSION
An officer’s attempts to “maintain, preserve and keep the
peace” under MCL 750.479 encompass the execution of all
lawfully assigned duties of a law enforcement officer. In the
present case, the police officer was attempting to “keep the
peace” when defendant lied to him, because the officer was
legally executing one of his duties when he questioned
defendant. Under the plain meaning of MCL 750.479, conduct
that rises to the level of threatened or actual physical
interference is proscribed. Michigan’s “resisting and
obstructing” statute does not proscribe any manner of
interference with a police officer, and it also does not
proscribe only conduct that poses a threat to the safety of
police officers; rather, it proscribes threatened, either
expressly or impliedly, physical interference and actual
physical interference with a police officer. Defendant’s
conduct did not constitute threatened or actual physical
10
(...continued)
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice”
requires an actual obstruction of the administration of
justice) (emphasis added); Ohio v Wilson, 101 Ohio Misc 2d 43;
721 NE2d 521 (1999)(holding that a false statement made to a
police officer does not violate a statute prohibiting the
obstruction of official business unless the officer is
actually hampered in some substantial way)(citing Ohio v
Stephens, supra at 230) (emphasis added). Therefore, even if
one were to accept the dissent’s proposition, that the statute
proscribes any interference with a police officer, defendant,
at the most, attempted to “obstruct” the officer.
19
interference. Therefore, defendant did not “obstruct” the
police officer, within the meaning of MCL 750.479, when he
lied to him. Accordingly, we would reverse the decision of
the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order
dismissing the charges against defendant.11
CAVANAGH and TAYLOR , JJ., concurred with MARKMAN , J.
11
In Justice Kelly’s separate opinion, she agrees with
the conclusion set forth here that defendant’s conduct did not
“obstruct” the officer within the meaning of MCL 750.479. She
further agrees that this statute does not proscribe any manner
of interference with police officers; rather, it only
proscribes threatened or actual physical interference with
police officers.
20
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116660
MARK JOHN VASQUEZ, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
KELLY, J.
Mark John Vasquez, Jr., lied about his age and identity
to a policeman and, as a consequence, was charged with
resisting and obstructing a police officer. MCL 750.479. The
trial court quashed the charge on the ground that the lies did
not constitute an "obstruction" within the meaning of the
statute. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 240
Mich App 239; 612 NW2d 162 (2000).
We granted leave to interpret the meaning of "obstruct"
and "keep the peace" as those terms were used by the
Legislature in § 479. Our primary task is to interpret the
term "obstruct" to determine the scope of actions the statute
was intended to penalize. We would hold that the statute
proscribes acts of interference that physically hinder a
police officer's efforts to keep the peace or that threaten to
hinder them. Defendant's lies did not violate the statute.
Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed.1
BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours of May 1, 1999, Michigan State
Police Trooper Stephen Spinner investigated a complaint about
a loud party in Union Township, Isabella County. Arriving at
the residence where the party was being held, the trooper
encountered defendant urinating on the front lawn. He
approached and asked defendant whether he had been drinking.
Defendant responded, "Yes, but not very much." Spinner
observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery and noticed
a strong odor of intoxicants on defendant's breath.
Spinner requested identification. Defendant said that
his name was "John Wesley Chippeway" and that he was sixteen
years old. Spinner took defendant into custody and started
booking him on charges of minor in possession. MCL
1
Defendant raised an alternative argument in the Court of
Appeals that § 479 was impermissibly vague and therefore
unconstitutional. He has not pursued that issue.
Accordingly, we do not treat it here.
2
436.1703(1). During the booking process, other officers
recognized defendant as Mark John Vasquez, Jr. When
confronted with the apparent false identification, defendant
admitted his true identity and age.
Authorities then fingerprinted him and administered a
preliminary Breathalyzer test that showed legal intoxication.
The Isabella County prosecutor charged defendant with being a
minor in possession-second offense, and with resisting and
obstructing a police officer in violation of § 479.
Section 479 provides:
Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully
obstruct, resist or oppose any sheriff, coroner,
township treasurer, constable or other officer or
person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting
to serve or execute any process, rule or order made
or issued by lawful authority, or who shall resist
any officer in the execution of any ordinance, by
law, or any rule, order or resolution made, issued,
or passed by the common council of any city board
of trustees, or common council or village council
of any incorporated village, or township board of
any township or who shall assault, beat or wound
any sheriff, coroner, township treasurer, constable
or other officer duly authorized, while serving, or
attempting to serve or execute any such process,
rule or order, or for having served, or attempted
to serve or execute the same, or who shall so
obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound
any of the above named officers, or any other
person or persons authorized by law to maintain and
preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts
and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the
peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 2
years, or by a fine of not more than 1,000 dollars.
[Emphasis added.]
3
Defendant moved to quash the resisting and obstructing
charge. In addressing the motion, the trial court analyzed
the statute and reasoned that Vasquez' lies did not create the
kind of "obstruction" that the statute contemplated.
The court gave the terms of the statute their "ordinary
usage." It noted that the statute required the obstruction to
occur while the officer was "maintaining or preserving the
peace." Thus, since defendant's lies did not hinder the
progress of determining whether defendant had been drinking,
they "did not obstruct the actions required of the officer to
maintain the peace under a totality of the circumstances in
this case."2
Before the Court of Appeals decided Vasquez, we reversed
the decision in Philabaun I. See People v Philabaun, 461 Mich
255; 602 NW2d 371 (1999) (Philabaun II). In Philabaun II, we
held that the defendant had violated § 479 by resisting the
officer's attempt to execute a search warrant. Moreover, we
2
The court relied on the Court of Appeals opinion in
People v Philabaun, 234 Mich App 471; 595 NW2d 502 (1999)
(Philabaun I). At issue in Philabaun was whether the
defendant's refusal to permit the police to execute a search
warrant by obtaining a blood sample was resisting and
obstructing under the statute. The defendant did not
"physically resist" the police officer. The Court of Appeals
majority in Philabaun I found that the defendant's passive
refusal to submit to a blood test did not constitute an
offense under the statute. The trial court likened Vasquez'
conduct to that operating in Philabaun, noting the absence of
"affirmative action taken against the trooper which would have
been threatening to public safety."
4
observed that a defendant could violate the statute without
engaging in a physical altercation with the officer.
We concluded that the purpose of the statute is to
protect officers from physical harm. See Philabaun II, supra
at 262, n 17, citing People v Kretchmer, 404 Mich 59, 64; 272
NW2d 558 (1978). We also concluded that determinations
whether specific conduct falls within the statute should be
made on a case-by-case basis. See Philabaun II, supra at 263
264.
The Court of Appeals relied on Philabaun II to support
its finding that Vasquez' verbal acts were violations of the
statute, despite the absence of physical obstruction or
resistance on his part. From the language and holding of
Philabaun II, the Court of Appeals discerned and applied the
following test:
[A] prosecutor must support a [charge under §
479] with competent evidence showing that there is
probable cause to believe that (1) the conduct
alleged, whether active or passive, obstructed,
resisted, or opposed (2) any of the listed
officials (3) in their described duties and (4) the
alleged conduct was done knowingly and wilfully.
[240 Mich App 244.]
It concluded that the evidence tended to show that
Vasquez knowingly lied to Spinner about his name and age.
Vasquez' conduct, while passive, "suggested that [he] wished
to prevent the State Police from instituting any legal action
against him as an individual and would actually hinder law
5
enforcement agents from taking action against him, which fits
under the broad definitions of restricting, obstructing, or
opposing." 240 Mich App 245. The Court of Appeals continued:
We see a marked similarity between the effect
of saying "no" to a police request, as in
Philabaun, and giving false and misleading
information in response to a similar request by a
State Police trooper; both responses presented an
obstacle to the investigating law enforcement
agent's attempt to discharge his legal duties. [Id.
at 245.]
Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded, Vasquez' act of
lying to Spinner fell within the coverage of § 479.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case involves a question of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. Genesee Co Friend of
the Court v General Motors Corp, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___
(2001); Brown v Michigan Health Care Corp, 463 Mich 368, 374;
617 NW2d 301 (2000).
DISCUSSION
The question presented is whether the lies that Vasquez
told constitute conduct that the statute was intended to
penalize. The primary goal of judicial interpretation of
statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature. Frankenmuth Mutual Ins v Marlette Homes, Inc,
456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998); People v Morey, 461
Mich 325, 329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). The first criterion
in determining intent is the specific language of the statute.
6
In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596
NW2d 164 (1999); People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 284;
597 NW2d 1 (1999).
The language is sometimes given meaning by context or
setting. Consumers Power Co v Pub Serv Comm, 460 Mich 148,
163, n 10; 596 NW2d 126 (1999); Tyler v Livonia Pub Schs, 459
Mich 382, 391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). As we interpret it, we
keep in mind the subject matter and purpose of the act. In re
Wirsing, 456 Mich 467, 474; 573 NW2d 51 (1998); People v
Seeburger, 225 Mich App 385, 391; 571 NW2d 724 (1997).
"Keep the Peace"
The wording of § 479 indicates that it applies to
conduct encountered by a law enforcement officer while
attempting to "maintain, preserve and keep the peace." Thus,
to apply the statute, we must gain an understanding of what it
means to "keep the peace."
The phrase originated under the common laws of England
and referred to the "king's peace." It related to the general
duties assigned to justices of the peace, first instituted in
England by King Edward III in 1326. People v McLean, 68 Mich
480, 482; 36 NW 231 (1888), citing 1 Steph Crim Law, 190. The
justices were "assigned to keep the peace" and, by order of
the king, empowered "to take and arrest all those they may
find by indictment or suspicion, and put them in prison." Id.
7
Thus, the common-law duties of English justices of the peace
resemble those associated with modern-day law enforcement
officers.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "keeping the peace" as
"[a]voiding a breach of the peace; dissuading or preventing
others from breaking the peace." Black's Law Dictionary, 6th
ed (1991). Breach of the Peace, in turn, was a criminal
offense at common law. In 1884, in Davis v Burgess,3 this
Court set forth a commonly accepted definition for "breach of
the peace":
Now, what is understood by "a breach of the
peace?" By "peace," as used in the law in this
connection, is meant the tranquillity enjoyed by
citizens of a municipality or community where good
order reigns among its members. It is the natural
right of all persons in a political society, and
any intentional violation of that right is "a
breach of the peace." It is the offense of
disturbing the public peace, or violation of public
order or public decorum.
Similarly, in People v Johnson,4 this Court described
"breaking the peace" as "any act or conduct inciting to
violence, or tending to provoke or excite others to break the
peace."
Absent statutory provisions or internal definitions to
the contrary, we must interpret the language of a statute in
3
54 Mich 514, 517; 20 NW 540 (1884).
4
86 Mich 175, 177; 48 NW 870 (1891).
8
light of previously established rules of common law. We give
those words that acquired unique meaning at common law the
same meaning when used in a statute dealing with the same
subject. Nummer v Dep't of Treasury, 448 Mich 534, 544; 533
NW2d 250 (1995); Pulver v Dundee Cement Co, 445 Mich 68, 75;
515 NW2d 728 (1994); People v Young, 418 Mich 1, 13; 340 NW2d
805 (1983). Therefore, we read the statutory phrase
"maintain, preserve and keep the peace" to refer to conduct by
law enforcement officers. It is conduct intended to
discourage and prevent acts that violate the tranquility and
good order of a peaceful community or incite others to do so.
The phrase, as used in § 479, evokes a setting in which
a law enforcement officer is performing official duties. We
note that such a setting extends beyond the location where an
arrest occurs. There is ample authority to suggest that an
officer's efforts to "keep the peace" include ordinary police
functions not directly involved in placing a person under
arrest. See, e.g., People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 759; 456
NW2d 237 (1990); People v Krum, 374 Mich 356, 362; 132 NW2d 69
(1965); People v Weatherspoon, 6 Mich App 229, 232; 148 NW2d
889 (1967).
As we observed in Little, supra at 756, n 6, "[a] police
officer is expected to be, and should be, in a constant state
of readiness to quell any disturbance." Thus, activities
9
encompassed by the phrase "maintain, preserve and keep the
peace" are patrolling, surveilling, responding to suspected
criminal activity, quelling actual disturbances, and executing
many other duties legally assigned to a police officer.
In this case, Trooper Spinner was responding to a
complaint about a loud party complaint when he encountered
defendant urinating on a lawn. He questioned defendant and
observed signs of drunkenness. It was in that setting that he
requested identification from him and encountered the lies at
the center of this dispute. Since Trooper Spinner was
executing his duties as a police officer when the encounter
took place, we find that he was engaged in "efforts to
maintain, preserve and keep the peace" within the meaning of
§ 479.
"Obstruct"
The question becomes whether Vasquez "obstructed" Trooper
Spinner's performance of those efforts. The portion of the
statute at issue proscribes knowing and wilful acts that
"obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound" a police
officer engaged in keeping the peace.
As we proceed, we are mindful of the well-settled purpose
of the statute, recognized by virtually every court that has
addressed § 479 since the Legislature enacted it in 1931. The
purpose is to "punish an assault upon a public officer in the
10
discharge of his duty by a penalty more severe than that
imposed for assaults on private citizens . . . ." Little,
supra at 757, citing People v Tompkins, 121 Mich 431; 80 NW
126 (1899); United States v Feola, 420 US 671; 95 S Ct 1255;
43 L Ed 2d 541 (1975). Moreover, the statute is a tool for
protecting officers from physical violence and harm. See,
e.g., Kretchmer, supra at 64; Philabaun II, supra at 262,
n 17.
The prosecution and our dissenting colleagues argue that
the term "obstruct" should be construed broadly. They view it
as encompassing any physical or oral act that causes delay or
presents an obstacle to an officer's efforts to gather
information. While such an expansive meaning may be
consistent with a literal reading of the word, it does not
comport with the legislative intent underlying § 479.
This Court often consults dictionary definitions to
ascertain the generally accepted meaning of a term that is not
expressly defined by statute. See Consumers Power Co, supra,
at 163, n 10; Oakland Co Rd Comm'rs v Michigan Property &
Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751
(1998). Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1984)
defines "obstruct" as:
1. to block or close up with an obstacle or
obstacles, as a road. 2. to interrupt, hinder or
oppose the passage, progress, course, etc., of. 3.
to block from sight.
11
However, as with the word "obstruct," dictionaries often
contain multiple definitions and define a term using multiple
terms that, themselves, have multiple definitions. Thus,
exclusive reliance on dictionary definitions can blur, as much
as clarify, the meaning of a word. Dictionaries are therefore
properly regarded as mere interpretive aids for the court.
See Consumers Power Co, supra, at 163, n 10; note, Looking it
up: Dictionaries and statutory interpretation, 107 Harv L Rev
1437 (1994).
Keeping the lay definition in mind, along with the
purpose of the statute, we next examine the statutory context
in which the word "obstruct" appears. Our consideration of
context involves an examination of the family of words or
phrases associated with the word "obstruct" in § 479. This
analytical concept is known in law by the Latin phrase
noscitur a sociis ("It is known from its associates").
Livonia Pub Schs, supra at 390. It stands for the proposition
that, when we seek the meaning of words and clauses, we do not
divorce them from those that precede and those that follow.
Sanchick v State Bd of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559; 70 NW2d
757 (1955). Words grouped in a list should be given related
meaning. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v Impac Ltd, Inc, 432
US 312, 322; 97 S Ct 2307; 53 L Ed 2d 368 (1977).
12
In a similar vein, it is appropriate to consider the
doctrine "ejusdem generis." Again from the Latin, it means
"[o]f the same kind, class, or nature." Black's Law
Dictionary (6th ed). If general words follow an enumeration
of specific subjects, the general words are presumed to
express only things of the same kind, class, character, or
nature as the enumerated subjects. Sands Appliance Services,
Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242; 615 NW2d 241 (2000). Of
course, interpreting a statute, we must examine its objective,
the harm it is designed to remedy, and we must apply a
reasonable construction that best accomplishes its purpose.
People v Adair, 452 Mich 473, 479-480; 550 NW2d 505 (1996).
Here, the statute uses the word "obstruct" in a six-term
list that contains "resist," "oppose," "assault," beat" and
"wound." Defendant contends that each, when read in context,
implies some action by a person that either causes or
threatens physical harm or interference to a police officer.
This is consistent with our interpretations of the statute in
Little and Philabaun II.
Defendant urges that the word "obstruct" be read to
describe a physical obstruction, such as a person physically
blocking an officer from pursuing his duties. It can also mean
a passive act of obstruction, defendant asserts, one that
exposes an officer to harm or physically blocks his ability to
13
carry out his duties. Within the meaning of § 479, mere words,
even lies, cannot "obstruct" unless they create an enhanced
risk of physical interference or harm to an officer's personal
safety, defendant contends.5
We find merit in defendant's interpretation. The six
words, presented as they are in the statute, create a
continuum. The first, "obstruct," is the mildest manner of
violating the statute, and the final, "wound," the most
severe. The dissent opines that the first three words
preclude a finding that § 479 was intended to address only
actual or threatened harm to police officers. This is so,
surmises the dissent, because the word "assault" would be
rendered nugatory if the "obstruct," "resist" and "oppose"
were narrowed to the physical realm.
We cannot agree. Where broadly defined words are grouped
with terms of specificity, the general words are interpreted
as belonging to the same class as the narrowest in the list.
Sands Appliance Service, supra at 242. Here, none will deny
the terms "assault," "beat," and "wound" necessarily involve
a physical component of actual or threatened harm. Therefore,
for purposes of applying § 479, the doctrine of ejusdem
5
I note that defendant's observation about limits on the
way "words" can violate the statute says nothing about whether
acts that actually or threaten to physically interfere with a
police officer violate § 479. Indeed, as we would hold today,
such acts do constitute obstruction under the statute.
14
generis supports restricting the first three terms in the list
to behavior involving actual or threatened physical harm or
physical interference.
Indeed, the only common thread that reasonably can be
woven through the entire list is the element of actual or
threatened physical interference or action. Such an
interpretation provides the most effective way of addressing
the mischief the statute was designed to remedy. On this
basis, we find that the Legislature drafted the list of six
verbs to describe a fluid string of behavior that constitutes
a violation of the statute. And, it follows, the words and
the concepts covered are interrelated.
"Obstruct," "resist," "oppose," and "assault" address
actions or words that threaten physical harm to an officer or
impose a physical barrier to the officer's performance of
official duties. The final two, "beat" and "wound," proscribe
actual physical harm to an officer. When viewed together, in
proper context, the words depict the range of conduct. The
behavior runs from verbal utterances and physical acts that
threaten to physically interfere with an officer to the
erection of physical barriers, physical interference, and the
perpetration of physical harm.6
6
Section 479 exists today in its original form. The
Legislature has never amended it.
15
Moreover, one can infer that, in elevating these offenses
to high misdemeanors, the Legislature intended to reserve
harsher punishment for assaulting police officers than for
committing ordinary assault. This Court drew that inference
in Little, supra, when making a plain language analysis of the
statute.7
There are other reasons to interpret "obstruct" narrowly.
Today's holding, requiring more than mere lies to offend §
479, avoids the creation of an unduly harsh penal scheme.8 It
7
The prosecution also argues that defendant's lies should
be included in conduct proscribed by § 479 because they could
have led to a criminal charge being made against an innocent
person. Indeed, the prosecutor contends that suspects who
provide false identification to police officers typically do
so for one of two reasons. First, they wish to avoid being
treated as habitual offenders by concealing their true
identity and the nature of their past record. Second, they
intend to abscond from justice by avoiding future court
hearings in connection with the criminal charge. Authorities
then encounter difficulties locating a fugitive because they
do not know his true name.
In this case, had Vasquez successfully lied, then
absconded from justice, a warrant would have been issued for
the arrest of a different person. The prosecutor contends
that § 479 should be interpreted broadly enough to encompass
Vasquez' actions, because it will discourage similar deceptive
behavior. Certainly, some criminals engage in the dishonest
activities described by the prosecutor. Had Vasquez absconded
from justice, he could have implicated an innocent person in
a criminal proceeding. While this is a good reason for the
Legislature to consider revising the statute, it does not
advance us in ascertaining legislative intent. That is
because it is not pertinent to ascertaining the meaning to the
words used in § 479.
8
This point is made clear by careful consideration of the
(continued...)
16
rejects the scenario embraced by the prosecutor and our
dissenting colleagues that would contravene legislative intent
and create a statutory meaning ripe for misuse and injustice.
Here, as defense counsel aptly reminds, Vasquez was caught and
charged with being a minor in possession, a crime not
punishable by incarceration. Under the reading sanctioned by
the prosecutor and the dissent, a lie about his name and age
could bring him a two-year jail sentence.
Moreover, if mere lies violated the statute, virtually
any misstatement of fact given to a police officer by any
witness or bystander could lead to a resisting and obstructing
conviction. Such harshness could chill citizens' willingness
to cooperate with police investigations. Although the
prosecution contends that this weapon would be used
8
(...continued)
broad application endorsed by the dissent. The dissent would
interpret "obstruct" to proscribe any oral utterance that
creates a synapse of delay for an officer carrying out
official duties. The absurdity of such a rule is apparent when
the following hypothetical example is considered:
Suppose a man witnesses a pickpocketing crime on the
street. Suspecting that the man saw the crime, an officer
approaches and queries, "Which way did he go?" The man does
not respond for a full ten seconds. Then, he says, "He went
that way," and points in the direction the pickpocket fled.
In such a case, under the dissent's rule, the man's honest
answer would constitute an obstruction. The manner in which
the man answered the officer's question created a delay in the
officer's gathering of information pursuant to an
investigation. Contrary to the dissent's argument, this
certainly is not conduct that the Legislature intended to
penalize.
17
"sparingly" by law enforcement officers, we are concerned that
it would open wide a door for the unscrupulous. Thus, we
reject the request to read it into § 479.
For the reasons previously set forth, we would hold that
the Legislature enacted the resisting and obstructing arrest
statute to penalize actual or threatened acts of physical
interference or violence against police officers. Lies,
alone, do not violate the statute. Vasquez' use of a false
name and age, in this case, did not rise to an obstruction
within the meaning of § 479 and therefore did not offend it.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that an officer's attempts to "maintain,
preserve and keep the peace" under MCL 750.470 encompasses the
execution of all lawfully assigned duties of a law enforcement
officer. In this case, Trooper Spinner was actively engaged
in efforts to keep the peace when he encountered Vasquez.
We would hold, also, that the Legislature intended § 479
to operate against actual or threatened physical harm to or
interference with a law enforcement officer engaged in keeping
the peace. It is intended to make unlawful the placement of
physical barriers before an officer engaged in the performance
of official duties. Therefore, the word "obstruct" as used in
the statute means interference that physically hinders the
progress of an official action or creates actual or threatened
18
harm to the police. The statute contemplates both expressed
and implied threats of such harm. Mere lies are insufficient
to trigger a violation.
Thus, Vasquez' conduct was not of the kind that the
statute was designed to prevent. The decision of the Court of
Appeals retaining the § 479 charges against Vasquez should be
reversed.
19
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 116660
MARK JOHN VASQUEZ, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________
CORRIGAN, C.J. (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the lead
opinion’s conclusion that the police officer in this case was
attempting to “keep the peace,” I reject its unnecessarily
narrow reading of the word “obstruct.”1 In effect, the lead
opinion inserts a new element--actual or threatened physical
-
interference—into the resisting and obstructing statute. In
my view, defendant’s alleged conduct—lying to the officer
about his name and age—clearly falls within a common
1
For the reasons set forth in this dissent, I also
disagree with Justice Kelly’s separate opinion, which reaches
essentially the same conclusion as the lead opinion.
1
understanding of the word “obstruct.” Accordingly, I would
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I. THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Resolution of this case requires an examination of the
text of the resisting and obstructing statute.2 As set forth
in Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119
(1999), the principles guiding our interpretation of statutes
are well established:
The foremost rule, and our primary task in
construing a statute, is to discern and give effect
to the intent of the Legislature. Murphy v
Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 447 Mich 93, 98; 523
NW2d 310 (1994). See also Nation v W D E Electric
Co, 454 Mich 489, 494; 563 NW2d 233 (1997). This
task begins by examining the language of the
statute itself. The words of a statute provide
“the most reliable evidence of its intent.” United
States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 593; 101 S Ct 2524;
69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981). If the language of the
statute is unambiguous, the Legislature must have
intended the meaning clearly expressed, and the
statute must be enforced as written. No further
judicial construction is required or permitted.
Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129,
135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).
The Legislature has provided that “[a]ll words or phrases
shall be construed and understood according to the common and
approved usage of the language.” MCL 8.3a. We thus consult
a lay dictionary when defining common words or phrases that
lack a unique legal meaning. See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich
2
This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory
interpretation. Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243,
248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).
2
439, 456; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).
II. ANALYSIS
The resisting and obstructing statute states:
Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully
obstruct, resist or oppose any sheriff, coroner,
township treasurer, constable or other officer or
person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting
to serve or execute any process, rule or order made
or issued by lawful authority, or who shall resist
any officer in the execution of any ordinance, by
law, or any rule, order or resolution made, issued,
or passed by the common council of any city board
of trustees, or common council or village council
of any incorporated village, or township board of
any township or who shall assault, beat or wound
any sheriff, coroner, township treasurer, constable
or other officer duly authorized, while serving, or
attempting to serve or execute any such process,
rule or order, or for having served, or attempted
to serve or execute the same, or who shall so
obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound
any of the above named officers, or any other
person or persons authorized by law to maintain and
preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts
and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the
peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 2
years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars. [MCL 750.479 (emphasis added).]
Resolution of this case turns on our interpretation of
the word “obstruct” as it refers to police attempts to keep
the peace. Consistent with the principles of statutory
interpretation set forth above, we must examine the “common
and approved usage” of the word. MCL 8.3a. As noted in the
lead opinion, Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991)
defines “obstruct” as: “1. to block or close up with an
obstacle . . . . 2. to hinder, interrupt, or delay the
3
passage, progress, course, etc. of. 3. to block from sight; be
in the way of (a view, passage, etc.).” Although this
definition of “obstruct” clearly encompasses physical
interference, it is not limited to physical interference.
Certainly, it is possible to hinder, interrupt, or delay an
officer’s attempts to keep the peace without resorting to
actual or threatened physical interference, as the lead
opinion would require.
This Court recognized as much in People v Philabaun, 461
Mich 255, 264; 602 NW2d 371 (1999), when we held that the
defendant’s polite refusal to comply with a search warrant for
the extraction of blood, “although indisputably passive in
nature, was nevertheless sufficient to constitute obstruction,
resistance, or opposition.” We explained that “[p]hysical
resistance, threats, and abusive speech can be relevant facts
in a prosecution under this statute, but none is a necessary
element.” Id. at 262. Today, the lead opinion attempts to
revise Philabaun by explaining that the defendant’s
nonphysical conduct in that case actually “rose to the level
of threatened physical interference.” Ante, p 17. Thus,
under the lead opinion’s curious logic, although neither
physical resistance nor threats are necessary elements of the
statute, prosecutors must still prove the existence of either
an actual or threatened physical interference.
4
The lead opinion reasons that the defendant’s conduct in
Philabaun rose to the level of threatened physical
interference because, when he refused to cooperate, “the next
likely sequence of events very well could have been the
possible injury of a police officer attempting to enforce the
search warrant.” Ante, p 17 (emphasis added). Accordingly,
rather than focusing on a defendant’s actual oral or
nonphysical act of obstruction, the lead opinion demands a
difficult inquiry into “likely” and “possible” consequences of
such an act. It would have courts ask whether the defendant’s
act would place the police officer in a “situation in which
his next act would, more likely than not, involve physical
confrontation.” Ante, p 18 (emphasis added). I do not
believe that such inquiry is practicable or required by the
plain statutory language. Consistent with the most
straightforward reading of our decision in Philabaun, I would
hold that oral, nonphysical acts that hinder, interrupt, or
delay an officer’s attempts to keep the peace constitute
obstruction under the resisting and obstructing statute.
Applying the statute to these facts, defendant’s alleged
conduct falls within the plain meaning of the word “obstruct.”
A state trooper tried to gather information to investigate his
suspicion that defendant was an intoxicated minor. When asked
to provide his name and age, defendant had two lawful choices:
he could have answered truthfully or exercised his
5
constitutional right not to answer at all. Instead, defendant
chose to lie. By doing so, he impeded the officer’s
investigation by creating a nonphysical obstacle to the
officer’s attempt to gather accurate information.3
The lead opinion, relying on the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis, concludes that the word “obstruct” refers only to
physical obstruction despite the fact that the common
understanding of the word clearly encompasses both physical
and nonphysical obstruction. The noscitur a sociis doctrine
stands for the simple proposition that the words of a statute
should be understood in context. See Tyler v Livonia Schs,
459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). While I have no
objection to interpreting the word “obstruct” in the context
of its placement in the statute, I disagree with the lead
opinion’s conclusion that the Legislature’s placement of the
word “obstruct” in a list of words also including “resist,
oppose, assault, beat or wound,” indicates an intent to limit
the common meaning of the word to include only physical
obstruction. The lead opinion’s conclusion that physical
interference is the only element common to all six words
overlooks the fact that the simple notion of interference also
3
While the facts of this case indicate a de minimis
violation of the statute, I caution my colleagues that hard
facts make bad law. It is certainly conceivable that under
different factual circumstances, lying to a police officer
during an investigation could have grave consequences.
6
connects all six words. While all six words are verbs that
could be used to describe acts of physical interference, only
two of them, “beat” and “wound,” definitely require a physical
act; the other four may also be used to describe nonphysical
acts. Thus, read in context, it is at least equally likely
that the Legislature meant to criminalize all types of
interference, both physical and nonphysical.
More fundamentally, the unique structure of the statute
at issue demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend that
its grouping of the six words together give special meaning to
any of the words. At the beginning of the statute, regarding
service of process, the words “obstruct, resist, or oppose”
are specifically set apart from the words “assault, beat, or
wound.” Later, however, when the statute refers to keeping
the peace, all six words are listed together. Notably, in the
second instance the list is preceded by the word “so,” which
refers readers directly back to the statute’s earlier use of
the same words. Because the meaning of each word contained in
the list of six is established by reference to the first part
of the statute, where “obstruct, resist, or oppose” are set
apart from “assault, beat, or wound,” the fact that the word
“obstruct” later appears with the words “assault, beat or
wound” should not be given any special significance.
To the extent that the meaning of the word “obstruct” can
be determined from context, the only relevant comparable words
7
are “resist” and “oppose.” Because resistance and opposition
can be oral or nonphysical just as easily as they can be
physical, proper application of the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis does not support the conclusion that the Legislature
intended the word “obstruct” to have a limited meaning. If
anything, the Legislature’s decision to initially separate the
words “obstruct, resist, or oppose” from the words “assault,
beat, or wound” suggests an intention to avoid an
interpretation that would require a physical component.
III. THE LEAD OPINION ’S OTHER ARGUMENTS
Perhaps not entirely satisfied with the force of its
statutory construction argument, the lead opinion includes a
number of additional arguments in support of its position.
First, the lead opinion suggests that my interpretation of the
statute would criminalize a defendant’s assertion of the
constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination.
See ante, p 9, n 3. I disagree. The silence of a person with
no independent legal duty to speak simply cannot be
characterized as an obstacle to a police investigation in the
same manner as an affirmative untruthful statement. Unlike a
false statement, which by its nature is misleading, lawful
silence merely requires police officers to perform the full
extent of their investigative duties—unaided and
unimpeded—within the boundaries of the law. In other words,
a legally justified refusal to offer assistance is not the
8
equivalent of a positive decision to interfere.
Second, the lead opinion relies heavily on the notion
that the Legislature could have written the resisting and
obstructing statute to more clearly criminalize lying to the
police by simply including “lying” in the list of prohibited
actions. Ante, pp 13-15, n 8 at 16. This argument is not
persuasive. Generally speaking, our job is to interpret the
meaning of the plain language of the words actually used by
the Legislature. Rather than making assumptions based on what
the Legislature could have done, we should strive to determine
what it actually did. Certainly, our job would be easier in
this case if the Legislature had specifically listed “lying”
among the prohibited actions. Nevertheless, the Legislature’s
failure to use the word “lying” does not alter the conclusion
that lying can “obstruct” a police investigation.
Finally, the lead opinion suggests that its position is
bolstered because the Legislature has specifically addressed
the problem of lying to police officers in other statutes.
Ante, p 11, n 4. The first statute identified in the lead
opinion, MCL 257.324(1)(h), is clearly inapplicable because it
relates only to persons detained for violations of the motor
vehicle code. The second statute identified in the lead
opinion, MCL 750.217, is also arguably inapplicable because it
has been construed to apply only to situations involving
physical concealment. See People v Jones, 142 Mich App 819,
9
823; 371 NW2d 459 (1985) (holding that lying to the police
does not constitute a “disguise”). Accordingly, the
prosecutor’s only alternative in this situation was to charge
defendant under MCL 750.479.4
IV. CONCLUSION
The lead opinion’s conclusion that the crime of resisting
and obstructing requires actual or threatened physical
interference has no basis in the text of the statute. Our
recent decision in Philabaun established that oral or
nonphysical conduct may fall within the plain meaning of the
statute. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
WEAVER and YOUNG , JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN , C.J.
4
Even if MCL 750.217 or MCL 257.324(1)(h) were available
under these facts, nothing in either statute reflects a
legislative intent to limit the prosecutor’s charging
discretion. The enactment of a statutory provision covering
a factual scenario does not automatically preclude a
prosecutor from proceeding under a different statutory
provision that also encompasses the same factual scenario.
E.g., People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 760; 456 NW2d 237 (1990).
10