Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. State

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan

Opinion
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

FILED MAY 15, 2001

YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 113656

STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT

OF TREASURY and ITS STATE TREASURER,

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE and

ITS DIRECTOR, and MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION and ITS COMMISSIONERS,

Defendants-Appellants.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

WEAVER, C.J.

This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation.

Plaintiff, Yellow Freight System, Inc., alleges that

defendants collected registration fees in excess of the amount

allowed under the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation

Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 49 USC 11506, which restricts a

state's registration fees to an amount "equal to the fee . . .

that such state collected or charged as of November 15, 1991,"

49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). Specifically, plaintiff

contends that in determining the amount of the fee charged or

1

collected on November 15, 1991, one must consider the effect

that any then existing reciprocity agreements had on the fees.

We reject plaintiff's claims and hold that in determining

the "fee . . . collected or charged" under 49 USC

11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), Michigan's reciprocity agreements are

irrelevant. We reverse the Court of Appeals decision

affirming the Court of Claims order for summary disposition in

favor of plaintiff and remand this case to the Court of Claims

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among

the several States” and “[t]o make all Laws which shall be

necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” that power

to regulate commerce. US Const, art I, § 8. Under the

Commerce Clause, states can impose significant regulatory

burdens on interstate motor carriers only when authorized to

do so by Congress. Michigan Pub Utility Comm v Duke, 266 US

570, 577; 45 S Ct 191; 69 L Ed 445 (1925). Over the years

Congress has authorized the states to require registration of

interstate motor carriers, subject to the supervision of the

Interstate Commerce Commission. See Motor Carrier Act of

1935, PL 74-265, 49 USC 301 et seq. In 1991, Congress passed

the ISTEA,1 which directed the Interstate Commerce Commission

(ICC) to restructure the then existing regulations governing

vehicle registration and registration fees. 49 USC 11506. As

a result, the ICC issued the “single state” registration

1
Provisions similar to those in this section are now
contained in 49 USC 14504.

2

system (SSRS) in 1993, 49 CFR 1023.2

A brief overview of the previous interstate motor carrier

registration system is helpful in understanding the dispute

now before this Court. Before 1991, states could require

interstate motor carriers to annually register and pay fees on

each vehicle that operated within its borders. Thirty-nine

states, including Michigan, elected to participate in a "bingo

card" system.3 Under the “bingo card” system interstate motor

carriers attached a "bingo card" to each of their motor

vehicles. States through which the vehicle traveled then

issued each vehicle a registration "stamp" which was placed in

a designated area on the bingo card. Participating states

were allowed to charge no more than $10 per stamp.

While operating under the prior "bingo card" registration

system, some states entered into reciprocity agreements, under

which a state would discount or waive the registration fee for

carriers based in the other's state. The motor carrier’s

principal place of business was most commonly used as the

basis for determining reciprocity. Michigan, however,

initially based its reciprocity agreements on the state in

which the vehicle was “base-plated,” i.e. where it was

2
This was redesignated in 1996 as 49 CFR 367.
3
The “bingo card” system served three main purposes: (1)
to make it easier to determine whether a specific vehicle had
been registered by simply looking at the “bingo card,” (2) to
ensure compliance by interstate motor carriers to register all
vehicles in operation, and (3) to prevent carriers from
operating uninsured vehicles.

3

registered or license-plated.4

Seeking to “benefit the interstate carriers by

eliminating unnecessary compliance burdens” and “to preserve

revenues for the states which had participated in the bingo

program,” Congress replaced the old system by enacting the

ISTEA.5 The SSRS was intended to serve as the sole avenue for

state registration of interstate carriers.6 Nat'l Ass'n of

Regulatory Utility Comm’rs v Interstate Commerce Comm 309 US

App DC 325; 41 F3d 721 (1994). Under the SSRS a motor carrier

registers annually with only one state. This “registration

state” is responsible for collecting the per-vehicle fees and

distributing them to any participating states through which

the carrier runs its motor vehicles. 49 USC

11506(c)(2)(A)(iii).

The section of the ISTEA at issue in the present case is

subsection 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv). It provides that each state

“shall establish a fee system” that “result[s] in a fee for

each participating state that is equal to the fee, not to

exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State collected or charged

as of November 15, 1991 . . . .”

In 1991, before the implementation of the SSRS, the

4
In other words, Michigan would waive its registration
fee for vehicles base-plated in a state that waived its fee
for vehicles that were base-plated in Michigan.
5
H R Conf Rep No 102-404, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess 437 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U S Code Cong & Admin News, 1526, 1679,
1817.
6
Participation in the SSRS was limited to the thirty-nine
states that had elected to participate in the “bingo card”
program. 49 USC 11506(c)(2)(D)

4

Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) altered its

reciprocity agreements. The MPSC adopted the more common

"place of business" method of determining reciprocity, instead

of the "base-plated" system that the MPSC had been using.

This change was scheduled to become effective in February

1992. The MPSC mailed renewal applications reflecting this

change to all interstate motor carriers, including the

plaintiff, in September 1991. Plaintiff paid its 1992 fees7

in September of 1991, under protest. Subsequently, plaintiff

instituted this litigation.

Plaintiff contended that Michigan could not alter its

reciprocity agreements, arguing that under the federal statute

those agreements were frozen at their November 15, 1991,

levels. Ruling on cross motion, the Court of Claims agreed

with plaintiff and granted its motion, in part, for summary

disposition.8 In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the Court of Claims ruling. 231 Mich App 194; 585

NW2d 762 (1998). This Court granted leave to appeal, 461 Mich

1009 (2000).

7
At that time plaintiff’s principal place of business was
in Kansas, and it had 3,730 vehicles base-plated in Illinois
and Indiana. Under Michigan's old reciprocity agreements,
Michigan's fees for those 3,730 vehicles base-plated in
Illinois and Indiana would have been waived. However, after
Michigan changed its method for determining reciprocity to one
based on a company’s principal place of business, Plaintiff
was required to pay a $10 vehicle registration fee for each of
the 3,730 vehicles. Thus, rather than paying nothing under
the old reciprocity method, plaintiff was required to pay
$37,300 annually under Michigan’s new system.
8
Plaintiff’s complaint also sought attorney fees under

42 USC 1988. The Court of Claims did not grant this relief,

and plaintiff has not appealed that decision to this Court.

5

 III

There is no dispute that 49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III)

froze the registration fees that a state can charge as of

November 15, 1991. The parties dispute the proper

interpretation of a key phrase in that section of the ISTEA:

"equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such

State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991." The

fundamental question before us is whether Michigan's

reciprocity agreements should be considered in determining

what fees were charged or collected as of November 15, 1991.

We conclude that under the plain language of the statute,

reciprocity agreements are not relevant in making that

determination.

A

This is an issue of first impression for this Court; nor

have any other state courts addressed it. The only court that

has considered it is the District of Columbia Circuit Court of

Appeals, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm’rs, supra.

That court followed the ICC's decision9 to ban states from

9
The ICC has taken varying positions on this issue. In
its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 57 Fed Reg 20,072
(1992), and its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 58 Fed Reg 5951
(1993), the ICC found that the reciprocity agreements were
made voluntarily, and that there was no good reason for the
ICC's involvement in them. The ICC had noted that "it might
place a heavy administrative burden on a registration State
were we to require that it collect from different carriers
different fees from the same State depending on the various
reciprocal agreements negotiated by the various states in
which each carrier operates." 9 ICC2d 610, 617 (1993).

However, the ICC subsequently reversed its position, and

now says "we have concluded that participating States must

consider fees charged or collected under reciprocity

agreements when determining the fees charged or collected as

6

charging registration fees in excess of preexisting reciprocal

discounts, saying:

[W]e think the Commission was correct in

concluding that the plain language of the statute

precludes petitioners’ interpretation. It does not

matter whether Congress actually focused on the

reciprocal discount practice or even was aware of

it. Nor is it of any significance that the

Commission initially misread the statute; that is

what comment periods are for. Id., at 729.

We are not bound to follow that decision,10 and, for the

reasons given below, we do not agree with the federal court's

decision to defer to the ICC's interpretation of the ISTEA.

B

Plaintiff contends that in interpreting the ISTEA we must

give deference to the ICC's interpretation. Because the issue

is the interpretation of a federal statute and the deference

due a federal agency's construction of that statute, we will

apply the rules of construction set out by the federal

judiciary.11 The seminal case is Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural

of Nov 15, 1991, as required by § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)." Single

State Insurance Registration Exparte No MC-100 (Sub-No 6), 9

ICC2d 610, 618-619 (1993).

10
Michigan adheres to the rule that a state court is

bound by the authoritative holdings of federal courts upon

federal questions, including interpretations of federal

statutes. See Bement v Grand Rapids & Indiana R Co, 194 Mich

64; 160 NW 424 (1916), and In re Hopps Estate, 324 Mich 256;

36 NW2d 908 (1949). However, where there is no United States

Supreme Court decision upon the interpretation in question,

the lower federal courts' decisions, while entitled to

respectful consideration, are not binding upon this Court.

See Winger v Grand Trunk W R Co, 210 Mich 100, 117; 177 NW 273

(1920), Schueler v Weintrob, 360 Mich 621; 105 NW2d 42 (1960),

and 21 CJS, Courts, § 159, pp 195-197.

11
This Court has not previously determined what deference
the courts of this state owe to a federal agency's
interpretation of a federal statute. However, in that

7

Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S Ct 2778; 81

L Ed 2d 694 (1984). There the United States Supreme Court

established that a court must first determine whether the

statute's meaning is clear; if so, then the court must apply

the statute as written. If the statute is ambiguous, then the

court must give deference to the agency's interpretation.

When a court reviews an agency's construction

of the statute which it administers, it is

confronted with two questions. First, always, is

the question whether Congress has directly spoken

to the precise question at issue. If the intent of

Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;

for the court, as well as the agency, must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress. If, however, the court determines

Congress has not directly addressed the precise

question at issue, the court does not simply impose

its own construction on the statute, as would be

necessary in the absence of an administrative

interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or

ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the

question for the court is whether the agency's

answer is based on a permissible construction of

the statute. Id. at 842-843.

Here we find that the plain meaning of the terms of the ISTEA

is clear, and we apply the statute as written. Because we

find that the statute is not ambiguous12, we need not proceed

circumstance the Court of Appeals has applied the federal

standards of deference as set out in Chevron, supra 2778.

See Walker v Johnson & Johnson Vision Products, Inc, 217 Mich

App 705, 713; 552 NW2d 679 (1996), Gibbs v General Motors

Corp, 134 Mich App 429, 432; 351 NW2d 315 (1984), and 231 Mich

App 200. This is also the approach taken by several other

state courts. See for example: Totemoff v State, 905 P2d 954,

967 (Alas, 1995), Delorme v North Dakota Dep’t of Human

Services, 492 NW2d 585, 587, n 2 (ND, 1992), Rodriguez v

Perales, 86 NY2d 361, 367; 657 NE2d 247; 633 NYS2d 252 (1995),

and Bell Atlantic Mobile, Inc v Dep’t of Public Utility

Control, 253 Conn 453, 470; 754 A2d 128 (2000).

12
The dissent contends that the statute is ambiguous,

asserting that this is demonstrated by “the several

interpretations of its wording advanced by the parties.” If

8

to the second step of Chevron, supra, and we do not reach the

agency’s interpretation.

C

The question before us is whether any then-existing

reciprocity agreements should be considered when determining

what fee the state charged or collected as of November 15,

1991. The ISTEA itself refers only to the fee collected or

charged, and contains no reference to reciprocity agreements.

49 USC 11504(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) directs the ICC to “establish

a fee system” that " result[s] in a fee for each participating

State that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle,

that such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."

The new “fee system” is based not on the fees collected from

one individual company, but on the fee system that the state

had in place on November 15, 1991. We must look not at the

fees paid by plaintiff in any given year, but at the generic

fee Michigan charged or collected from carriers as of November

15, 1991.

To determine what registration fee Michigan charged on

November 15, 1991, we examine MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4)

in the Motor Carrier Act. Since 1989 that statute has

provided for a fee of $10 to be charged for those motor

carrier vehicles operating in Michigan and licensed in another

state or province of Canada:

The annual fee levied on each interstate or

the parties’ conflicting interpretations were the measure of

a statute’s ambiguity, then almost every statute litigated

would be deemed ambiguous. A statute is not ambiguous because

it requires careful attention and analysis.

9

 foreign motor carrier vehicle operated in this

state and licensed in another state or province of

Canada shall be $10.00.

The same statute, MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4), also gives

the commission the ability to waive the $10 fee under certain

circumstances:

The commission may enter into a reciprocal

agreement with a state or province of Canada that

does not charge vehicles licensed in this state

economic regulatory fees or taxes and may waive the

fee required under this subsection.

Thus, under MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4), the fee charged as

of November 15, 1991, was $10. While that fee may be waived,

and thus not “charged or collected,” for a particular carrier

under a reciprocity agreement, such voluntary agreements to

waive the fee that happen to benefit a particular carrier do

not affect the generic per vehicle fee in place on November

15, 1991. As stated, the clear focus of 49 USC

11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III) is on the generic “fee” that Michigan

charged or collected as of November 15, 1991, and not on

whether that fee was charged to or collected from a particular

carrier.

The ICC's position that "participating States must

consider fees charged or collected under reciprocity

agreements when determining the fees charged or collected as

of Nov 15, 1991, as required by § 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv),”13 added

a concept not within the express language of the statute. It

added consideration of voluntary agreements between the states

to waive or reduce the fees imposed. It is not for the ICC,

13
Single State Insurance Registration Exparte No MC-100
(Sub-No 6) 9 ICC2d 610 (1993)

10

or this Court, to insert words into the statute.

IV

We hold that Michigan's reciprocity agreements are not

relevant in determining what fee was "charged or collected" as

of November 15, 1991. The lower courts erred in granting

summary disposition for plaintiffs. We reverse the Court of

Appeals decision, and remand this case to the Court of Claims

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CORRIGAN , C.J., and TAYLOR , YOUNG, and MARKMAN , JJ.,

concurred with WEAVER , J.

11

 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 113656

STATE OF MICHIGAN, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY and ITS
STATE TREASURER, MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE and ITS
DIRECTOR, and MICHIGAN PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION and ITS
COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Appellants.

___________________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that

reciprocity agreements are not relevant in determining the

registration fees that Michigan charged under the 1991

Intermodel Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 49

USC 11506.1 One such agreement waived registration fees for

vehicles licensed in Illinois, including plaintiff's vehicles,

so that no fee was collected or charged within the meaning of

the statute. Consequently, I would affirm the decisions of

the Court of Appeals and the Court of Claims.

1
The ISTEA now appears at 49 USC 14504.
 The ISTEA replaced the bingo card system of registering

interstate motor carriers with a single state registration

system. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v

Interstate Commerce Comm, 309 US App DC 325, 328; 41 F3d 721

(1994). Under the ISTEA system, a state can charge a fee

"that is equal to the fee, not to exceed $10 per vehicle, that

such State collected or charged as of November 15, 1991." 49

USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III). The question in this case is

what effect reciprocity agreements have on determining the fee

that Michigan can charge under the single state registration

system.

As an initial point, I disagree with the majority's

conclusion that the meaning of the language in the statute is

plain, reasonably susceptible of only one interpretation.

Rather, I find it ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous when

reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning. In re MCI

Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164

(1999). That the ISTEA is ambiguous as regards the

reciprocity agreements is demonstrated by the several

interpretations of its wording advanced by the parties and by

justices on this Court. The language of the statute supports

both positions, allowing for opposing and similarly plausible

constructions. Despite careful attention and analysis,

reasonable minds can and do differ with respect to the

statute's meaning concerning reciprocity agreements.

Alternatively, if the statute's language were plain, the

meaning of the words "collected or charged" must lead to a

result opposite that reached by the majority. The majority

2

concludes that Michigan was entitled to charge plaintiff a

registration fee, but the majority's interpretation of the

ISTEA depends on addition to the statute of words not present

there. Whether the state of Michigan could have collected or

charged a "generic" per vehicle fee is not pertinent. The

statute specifies "fees . . . collected or charged as of

November 15, 1991." It does not say "fees that the state

could have collected or charged."

While the ISTEA does not expressly make reference to

reciprocity agreements, the fee system in place on November

15, 1991, does. MCL 478.7(4); MSA 22.565(1)(4) provides:

The annual fee levied on each interstate or

foreign motor carrier vehicle operated in this

state and licensed in another state or province of

Canada shall be $10.00. The commission may enter

into a reciprocal agreement with a state or

province of Canada that does not charge vehicles

licensed in this state economic regulatory fees or

taxes and may waive the fee required under this

subsection.

A plain reading of this provision leads to the conclusion that

reciprocity agreements are an inherent part of the state's

registration fee system. The generic fee levied under the

statute is not absolute, but subject to reciprocity agreements

that waive the fee. Thus, the fee charged as of November 15,

1991, was $10.00, unless a reciprocity agreement pertained.

Voluntary agreements to waive the fee are relevant in

determining the per vehicle fee system in place on November

15, 1991, as well as the fee collected or charged pursuant to

that system.

The parties do not dispute that Michigan had a

reciprocity agreement with Illinois that, by its terms, waived

3

Michigan registration fees for interstate motor carriers

licensed in Illinois. Pursuant to the agreement, the state

did not charge registration fees for plaintiff's vehicles in

1990 and in 1991. It was not until Michigan revised its

reciprocity system in 1991 that it charged plaintiff a

registration fee.

This change in the reciprocity system did not become

effective until the 1992 registration year. Plaintiff was not

charged a registration fee in Michigan, nor was one collected

from it in Michigan for the 1991 registration year. The fact

that the state had a right to or could have charged a

"generic" registration fee does not change the fact: it did

not charge plaintiff a fee until the 1992 registration year.

The majority's characterization of the language of the

statute as "plain" is belied by the fact that the majority is

obliged to construe the phrase "collected or charged" to reach

its result. Only a strained reading of "collected or charged"

leads to the conclusion that the state charged a fee when it

did not do so. That the statute does not expressly mention

reciprocity agreements does not change the fact that

reciprocity agreements were an inherent part of the fee system

in place on November 15, 1991. In this case, the reciprocity

agreement with Illinois in effect during the 1991 registration

year caused Michigan to waive the fees it might have imposed

under MCL 478.7; MSA 22.565(1). As a consequence, no fees had

been "collected or charged as of November 15, 1991."

The Court should give deference, as did the District of

4

Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,2 to the Interstate Commerce

Commission's construction of the language in question, because

it is based on a permissible construction of the ISTEA.

Chevron, USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,

467 US 837, 842-844; 104 S Ct 2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984). It

should affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the

Court of Claims in favor of plaintiff.

2
Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs, supra.
5
 S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 113656

STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF

TREASURY, STATE TREASURER,

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DIRECTOR

OF DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION and MICHIGAN PUBLIC

SERVICE COMMISSIONERS,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the

relevant provision of the federal Intermodal Surface

Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA), 49 USC

11506(c)(2)(B)(iv)(III), is unambiguous and that this Court is

free to decide that the section does not take into account

reciprocity agreements. Rather, I conclude that this

provision is ambiguous, and that the Interstate Commerce

Commission (ICC) has permissibly construed it to take into

account reciprocity agreements. Under Chevron, USA, Inc v

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837; 104 S Ct

2778; 81 L Ed 2d 694 (1984), then, this Court should defer to

the ICC’s interpretation of that provision. I, therefore,

would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and must

respectfully dissent.

In this case, the Court is called on to review a federal

statute that was administered by the ICC when this case

arose.1 As the majority points out, under the Supreme Court’s

decision in Chevron, when a court reviews an agency’s

construction of a statute the agency administers, the court

faces a two-part inquiry. First, the court must determine

whether the statute clearly and unambiguously expresses the

legislative intent. If so, it then must give effect to the

statute as written. However, if the statute is not clear and

unambiguous, the court “does not simply impose its own

construction on the statute,” but instead reviews whether the

agency has permissibly construed the statute. If it has, the

court should defer to the agency’s construction. Chevron at

842-843. As alluded, the ICC, in Single State Insurance

Registration, 9 ICC2d 610, 618-619 (1993), construed the

statute in question to take into account reciprocity

agreements that exempted some interstate carriers from state

fees, a conclusion opposite to that reached by the majority.

To determine whether a statute clearly and unambiguously

expresses legislative intent, courts begin with the statutory

language. If the words of a statute are clear and

unambiguous, the court must apply them as written, and no

1
The ICC was abolished in 1996, and the references to

the ICC in the governing statute, which was recodified, were

changed to refer to the Secretary of Transportation. See 49

USC 14505; see also PL 104-88, 109 Stat 803, tit I, § 103.

2

further judicial construction is required or permitted. See,

e.g., Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135;

545 NW2d 642 (1996). However, when there can be reasonable

disagreement over a statute’s meaning, see People v Adair, 452

Mich 473, 479; 550 NW2d 505 (1996), or, as others have put it,

when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably

well-informed persons in two or more different senses, that

statute is ambiguous. See 2A Singer, Statutes & Statutory

Construction (6th ed), § 45.02, pp 11-12. For example, this

Court has concluded that statutes have been ambiguous when one

word in the statute has an unclear meaning, see Perez v Keeler

Brass Co, 461 Mich 602, 610; 608 NW2d 45 (2000), when a

statute’s interaction with another statute has rendered its

meaning unclear, see People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 699; 564

NW2d 13 (1997), or when application of the statute to facts

has rendered the correct application of the statute uncertain,

see Elias Bros v Treasury Dep’t, 452 Mich 144, 150; 549 NW2d

837 (1996).

In this case, the majority concludes that the governing

ISTEA provision is plain and unambiguous. In the words of our

prior decisions, then, the majority concludes that there

cannot be reasonable disagreement over the statute’s meaning,

and that reasonably well-informed people cannot understand the

statute in two or more different senses. Before amendment,

the governing section provided that the ICC, and through it,

states

shall establish a fee system for the filing of

proof of insurance as provided under subparagraph

(A)(ii) of this paragraph that (I) will be based on

the number of commercial motor vehicles the carrier

3

 operates in a State and on the number of States in

which the carrier operates, (II) will minimize the

costs of complying with the registration system,

and (III) will result in a fee for each

participating State that is equal to the fee, not

to exceed $10 per vehicle, that such State

collected or charged as of November 15, 1991 . . .

. [49 USC 11506(c)(2)(B)(iv).]

I cannot agree that the meaning of this language is clear and

unambiguous. Rather, it is subject to reasonable

disagreement.

The majority concludes that the fee “collected or

charged” refers only to the fee system a state had in place on

November 15, 1991, and that this is clear from the plain

meaning of § 11506(c)(2)(B)(IV). See slip op at 11-12.

However, the conclusion that the fee “collected or charged”

refers only to the fee system requires that “collected or

charged” include the possibility that the fee “charged” can be

simultaneously “waived.” Id. at 12. Otherwise, there would

be no question that the state had not collected or charged

anything from plaintiff until the changes in the reciprocity

system became effective in 1992, after the cutoff date

provided in § 11506. The conclusion that a fee can be

“charged,” yet concurrently “waived,” though, is not

consistent with this Court’s approach to plain language.

When construing a statute according to its plain

language, unless the statute itself dictates otherwise, this

Court generally turns to dictionary definitions of the

statutory terms to find those terms’ ordinary and generally

accepted meanings. See, e.g., Denio at 699. Applying this

approach to the instant case calls the majority’s conclusion

that a fee can be simultaneously “charged” and waived into

4

question. “Charge” is defined variably as (1) “To hold

financially liable; demand payment from,” (2) “To demand or

ask payment,” (3) “A financial burden, as a tax or lien,” (4)

“To set or ask (a given amount) as a price,” (5) “Expense;

cost,” or (6) “The price set or asked for something.” The

American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed, 1982).

The problem in this case is that the ordinary and

generally accepted meanings of the term “charge” do not

dictate the majority’s conclusion. Rather, the definitions of

“charge” present a spectrum of concepts ranging from those

that might encompass the majority understanding that a fee can

be “charged” but concurrently “waived”—definitions 4, 6, and

arguably 5—to those that do not encompass that understanding

because they require that the charge be a “demand” or a

“burden.” Definitions 1, 2, and 3 do not support the

majority’s conclusion because, under those meanings of

“charge,” the state would have to waive a fee, yet also hold

a carrier financially liable for it, or demand or ask for

payment of a fee that had been waived. Similarly, if a fee

has been “waived,” it is not a financial burden on the party

responsible for the fee. In this case, plaintiff was not made

financially liable for, or financially burdened with, the

waived fee, and the state did not demand the waived fee before

November 15, 1991. Thus, although several accepted

definitions of “charge” support the majority conclusion,

several others weigh against it.

As mentioned above, the meaning of a facially unambiguous

term can be ambiguous in certain circumstances. See Denio at

5

699; Perez at 610. Thus, although “charged” may not at first

blush appear ambiguous, in the context of a fee that was

established in a fee system, but never demanded because of a

reciprocity agreement, “charged” is ambiguous because the fee

may or may not fit the definition of a fee that is “charged.”

If the statutory term “charged” is narrow and requires a

demand for payment, the state had not charged plaintiff the

fees before November 15, 1991, and cannot charge plaintiff for

later years. On the other hand, if “charged” is broad and

requires only the setting of a fee, the state had charged the

fee by the cutoff date, and plaintiff cannot avoid payment.

Compare Perez at 610 (“refuses” could have a broad or narrow

meaning).

Although it does so without explanation, the majority

chooses the latter meaning, concluding that even when the fee

was waived for particular carriers, it still had been charged

in general. Slip op at 12. I do not contend that the

majority has chosen the wrong definition of “charge,” or that

its conclusion about § 11506's meaning is unreasonable.

However, for the majority to come to its conclusion, it had to

resolve the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the statutory

term “charged,” specifically, whether “charged” was used in

its broad or narrow sense.2 Normally, this Court has a duty

2
To conclude that the fee “charged” refers only to the

fee set by the fee system, the majority must nevertheless

conclude that “charged” is broad, meaning only that the state

“set a price” for carriers but did not hold a carrier liable

for that price. Such an understanding comports only with

definitions 4 and 6 above, but not the narrower meaning of

“charge” in definitions 1, 2, and 3. Otherwise, the fee

“charged” could refer to only a particular fee and not the

(continued...)
6

to make such a decision. In this case, however, the different

possible meanings of “charged” present an ambiguity in §

11506. Under Chevron, rather than this Court imposing its own

construction on the statute, we must consider whether the ICC,

the agency responsible for administering this statute and

which has already resolved this ambiguity in § 11506, did so

permissibly.

I conclude that the ICC did permissibly construe the

statute, and, therefore, I would defer to that agency. In

Single State, the ICC considered whether the freeze on

registration fees enacted through the ISTEA should take

reciprocity agreements into account. It decided that the

ISTEA does take reciprocity agreements into account when

freezing the fees that states “charged.” Thus, an interstate

carrier that was not charged any fees before November 15,

1991, because it was operating under a reciprocity agreement,

could not be charged fees after that time. See Single State,

supra at 617-619. This interpretation evidences that the ICC

preferred the narrow approach to “charged,” concluding that an

2
(...continued)
system itself.

Further, if the majority is correct that the fee charged

refers only to the fee system in place, but not the fees

charged of particular carriers, then apparently Michigan could

waive fees for every carrier operating in the state, under

reciprocity agreements or not, but nevertheless continue to be

said to “charge” a generic fee. In such a scenario, the

majority would apparently conclude that Michigan “charged” a

fee even though it held no carrier financially liable for any

fee.

Again, there is room for reasonable disagreement over the

proper understanding of these statutory terms. That room for

disagreement, though, indicates that we should defer to the

ICC understanding.

7

interstate carrier had not been “charged” a registration fee

unless a state had made a demand for the fee, or unless the

carrier had been held financially liable for the fee. Under

reciprocity agreements, states did not make demands for fees,

and did not hold carriers liable for fees. Hence, carriers

operating under those agreements were not “charged” before the

cutoff date, and could not be charged after it. Though this

Court may not prefer the ICC’s interpretation of § 11506 or

the narrow approach to the term “charged,” in light of the

different possible meanings of the statute, the ICC approach

is certainly a permissible construction. I would, therefore,

defer to that agency’s interpretation of this section.

In sum, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 49

USC 11506 is not reasonably subject to different

understandings. Whether the statutory term “charged” is

understood narrowly or broadly affects this statute’s meaning.

Because the statute can be understood differently, this

Court’s only role is to consider whether the federal agency

responsible for administering this statute, which has already

considered the question before this Court, permissibly

answered that question. The ICC took a narrow view of the

meaning of “charged,” but nevertheless a view that is

supported by § 11506. I would defer to that agency’s view

and, therefore, must respectfully dissent.

8