Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 18, 2001
PETRONELLA BATSHON and BENSON
RUBIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v No. 116895
MAR-QUE GENERAL CONTRACTORS, INC.,
DEWEY STEWART and EXPERT PLUMBING,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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PER CURIAM
The plaintiffs sued the defendants, who successfully
interposed a release executed by the plaintiffs and an
insurance company. Summary disposition was granted in favor
of the defendants, and the circuit court and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. We reverse on the ground that the release
did not limit the potential liability of the defendants.
I
Plaintiffs Petronella Batshon and Benson Rubin owned a
house in Southfield.1 An October 1993 fire did substantial
damage to the structure. Working from several trucks,
firefighters evidently pumped a significant amount of water
into the building. Perhaps in connection with the fire, the
basement flooded knee-deep several weeks later.
Substantial reconstruction work was done in early 1994.
The cost was apparently borne by AAA of Michigan, the insurer
of the house.
As the reconstruction work was being done, the plaintiffs
decided to connect with the city water line. They contracted
with Mar-Que General Contractors. Mar-Que, in turn,
subcontracted with Dewey Stewart to dig a trench for the pipe,
and with Expert Plumbing, Inc., to install the water line.
In March 1994, the basement walls of the house buckled,
causing additional damage. This suit is premised on the
plaintiffs’ allegation that this damage was caused by the
negligence of Mar-Que and its subcontractors (Stewart and
Expert Plumbing) in the course of installing the water line.
Evidently, the plaintiffs’ initial conclusion had been
that the collapse of the walls was the result of the fire and
the efforts of the fire department. With the assistance of
counsel, they sent AAA an April 1994 letter demanding that AAA
pay a significant portion of the $27,900 bill for repairing
the walls.
1
We present the facts from the materials at hand,
cautioning that this case has not been tried.
2
The negotiations with AAA led to a $3,000 settlement, in
exchange for a May 1994 release. The meaning of that release
is the central question in this case.
In October 1995, the plaintiffs filed in district court
a complaint against Mar-Que, Stewart, and Expert Plumbing.2
The defendants responded with motions for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), saying that the language of the release
barred the plaintiffs’ claim.
The district court granted the motions, agreeing that the
release barred the claims against the present defendants. The
court later denied reconsideration. The plaintiffs appealed,
but the circuit court affirmed.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed,3 and the plaintiffs
now seek leave to appeal in this Court.
II
The release was executed on a generic printed form that
bore the title, “RELEASE COVERING ALL CLAIMS .” AAA’s name was
typed into a blank space, so that the plaintiffs were
releasing “AAA of Michigan, his/her/their executors,
administrators, and all persons or organizations responsible
2
The materials at hand indicate that Expert Plumbing
filed a cross-claim against Mar-Que and Stewart.
3
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 25, 2000
(Docket No. 212062). Initially, the Court of Appeals had
denied leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered June 30,
1997 (Docket No. 201729). However, this Court remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave
granted. 457 Mich 875 (1998).
3
for his/her/their acts from all claims and causes of action
for all injuries, losses, and damages sustained by [the
plaintiffs], arising from an incident, all or part of which
occurred on or about the 23rd day of March, 1994, at or near
[the plaintiffs’ Southfield address].” The printed form also
contained the language, “I intend this document to operate as
a release for all consequences of the injuries, losses and
damages sustained by me,” after which were typed the words “in
regards to the basement walls whether or not I am presently
aware of such consequences.”
The defendants argue that the release covers “all
persons.” Agreeing, the Court of Appeals said that “[t]he
word ‘all’ encompasses the broadest possible classification.”
The plain language of the release does not, however, cover all
persons and organizations.4 The key sentence in the release
agreement provides for a “release of AAA of Michigan,
4
We agree with these statements made by the Court of
Appeals in the present case:
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion
for summary disposition de novo. Harrison v Olde
Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 605; 572 NW2d 679
(1997).
The validity of a release turns on the intent
of the parties. A release must be fairly and
knowingly made to be valid. Skotak v Vic Tanny
Int’l, Inc, 203 Mich App 616, 618; 513 NW2d 428
(1994). If the language of a release is clear and
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is
ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of
the language. Wyrembelski v St Clair Shores, 218
Mich App 125, 127; 553 NW2d 651 (1996).
4
his/her/their executors, administrators, and all persons or
organizations responsible for his/her/their acts.” The first
use of the term “his/her/their”5 unmistakably is as a
substitute for repeating AAA of Michigan. It is likewise
plain that when the term “his/her/their” is used again in the
same sentence that it is also a substitute for AAA of
Michigan. See Henderson v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 460
Mich 348, 356; 596 NW2d 190 (1999) (explaining that a court
should “give contextual meaning to [a contractual] phrase to
determine what the phrase conveys to those familiar with our
language and its contemporary usage”). It follows that this
printed release form is not a complete release of liability
with respect to all parties in connection with the incident
underlying the release, but rather pertains to “all persons or
organizations” only insofar as they might be “responsible for
[AAA’s] acts.”6
The nature of the potential claim being released was
stated in terms that were expansive (“I intend this document
to operate as a release for all consequences of the injuries,
losses and damages sustained by me in regards to the basement
5
The drafters of this form alternatively linked male,
female, and plural pronouns, but if the drafters had thought
to include “its” (“his/her/its/their”), the antecedent would
have been more clear.
6
By contrast, consider the broad wording of the releases
in Romska v Opper, 234 Mich App 512, 514; 594 NW2d 853 (1999),
and Meridian Mut Ins Co v Mason-Dixon Lines, Inc (On Remand),
242 Mich App 645, 649-650; 620 NW2d 310 (2000).
5
walls whether or not I am presently aware of such
consequences”). Because this document more narrowly
identifies the persons and entities being released, however,
only they can invoke this broad language. Again, the release
plainly states that AAA of Michigan and certain parties
connected to AAA were released. The present defendants were
not among those covered by the expansively worded release of
potential liability unless they can be fitted within the
phrase “all persons or organizations responsible for [AAA’s]
acts.”
For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the
district court, circuit court, and Court of Appeals, and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings
that are consistent with this opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.
6