The ELEANOR.
Donnell, claimant.
Supreme Court of United States.
March 12, 1817. March 15, 1817.*348 Mr. Key, for the appellant.
Mr. D.B. Ogden, contra.
*355 Mr. Justice JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents two questions, 1st. Are the appellees entitled to recover?
*356 2. Does their right of recovery extend to the commander of the squadron?
In whatever view the case be considered, it is one of extreme hardship; both the claim and the defence are founded in the most rigid principles of the strictum jus; and it is impossible not to regret if the libellant have no means of indemnity, or if that indemnity should be exacted of men whose characters and conduct were so far above all imputation of malice or oppression. Nor can this court altogether close its feelings against the claims to protection of that navy which has so nobly protected the reputation of the country. Yet we mistake the character of the men who constitute it, if they would not be among the first to declare the government unworthy of their skill and valour, in which the rights of the meanest individual was not as much an object of earnest solicitude as the rights of those whom their country delights most to honour. Whether the commander of a squadron be liable to individuals for the trespasses of those under his command is a question on which it would be equally incorrect to lay down a general proposition either negatively or affirmatively. In case of positive or permissive orders, or in case of actual presence and co-operation, there could not be a doubt of his liability. But on the other hand, when we consider the partial independence of each commander of a vessel, and that the association is not a subject of contract, but founded on the orders of their government, which leave them no election, it would be dangerous indeed, and dampening to the ardour of enterprise, to trammel a commander *357 with fears of liability, where it is not possible, from the nature of the service, and the delicate rules of etiquette, for him always to direct or control the actions of those under his command. We feel no inclination to extend the principle of constructive trespass, and will leave each case to be decided on its own merits as it shall arise. Where a capture has actually taken place with the assent of the commodore, express or implied, the question of liability assumes a different aspect; and the prize-master may be considered as bailee to the use of the whole squadron who are to share in the prize money. To this case there is much reason for applying the principle, that qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus; but not so as to mere trespasses unattended with a conversion to the use of the squadron.
The case of the commander of a single ship varies materially from that of the commander of a squadron, and the rigid rules of liability for the acts of those under our command may, with more propriety, be applied to him. The liability of the owners of a privateer for the acts of their commanders has never been disputed. And it is because they are left at large in the selection of a commander, and are not permitted to disavow his actions as being unauthorized by them. So, in the case of a commander of a ship, the absolute subordination of every officer to his command attaches to him the imputation of the marine trespasses of his subalterns on the property of individuals, when acting within the scope of his commands. Orders even giving a discretion to a subordinate in such cases is no more *358 than adopting his actions as the actions of the commander; and placing him in a command which requires skill, integrity, or prudence, makes the commander the pledge to the individual for his competence to discharge the duties of the undertaking.
With these views of the subject we should have found no difficulty in deciding on the liability of Captain Smith, of the Congress, had he been a party to this libel, and the facts of the case had made out a marine trespass in himself, or in Lieutenant Nicholson, or a want of competence or due care in the latter to discharge the command assigned him. But we are of opinion that no one act is proven in the case which did not comport with the fair, honorable, and reasonable exercise of the rights of war. To detain for examination is a right which a belligerant may exercise over every vessel, not a national vessel, that he meets with on the ocean. And whatever may be the injury that casually results to an individual from the act of another while pursuing the reasonable exercise of an established right, it is his misfortune. The law pronounces it damnum absque injuria, and the individual from whose act it proceeds is liable neither at law nor in the forum of conscience. And the principal right necessarily carries with it also all the means essential to its exercise. Thus, in the present case, a vessel must be pursued in order to be detained for examination. But if in the pursuit she had been dismasted, and upset or stranded, or run on shore and lost, it would have been an unfortunate case, but the pursuing vessel would have stood acquitted. The counsel in argument *359 have not denied the general doctrine, but have endeavoured to show that the commander of the Congress had unreasonably exercised the right of detention.
1st. By the deception, in passing himself off for an enemy, thereby reducing the crew to a state of insubordination.
2d. By taking out both the master and the mate, and thus removing the possibility of bringing the seamen back to their duty.
3d. By devesting the master of his command, without putting a competent crew on board to navigate her.
On the first of these grounds, it is only necessary to remark, that, to assume the guise of a friend or an enemy, is, in legitimate warfare, an act the most familiar and frequent in its occurrence. It is so ordinary a ruse de guerre, that it ought rather to be expected than the display of real colours. And, innumerable cases that have come before this court prove, that in the actual state of things during the late war it became as necessary to practice the deception upon our citizens as upon a neutral or an enemy. We, therefore, see nothing reprehensible in this. But on what ground could the crew assume the right of judging for themselves on this subject, and of abandoning their duty before they were actually made prisoners? Suppose the frigate had been an enemy, it did not follow that their vessel must be made prize, and they were unquestionably unpardonable in abandoning their duty? Their doing so, was by no means a necessary consequence *360 of ordering their officers on board the frigate, nor ought the captain of the Congress to have anticipated such a state of things, as their vessel was reduced to, by their misconduct. They were bound to obey the second mate in the absence of their other officers; and if they had done so, this misfortune would not have happened. So far from actually devesting him of his command, it appears, that Nicholson's orders were addressed to him, and only addressed to the men to try his personal influence in bringing them to order.
To the second and third grounds, the attention of this court has been drawn with peculiar force. Either of them appeared to be an irregularity, which the reasonable exercise of the right of search did not strictly justify. But, upon a close examination of the testimony, we are of opinion, that neither of those grounds is supported by the evidence. It is true, that both the master and first mate were taken on board the frigate, and the master and supercargo say they were both ordered on board. But Nicholson, the boarding officer, who certainly knew best what orders he gave, swears that he ordered the master to go on board with "one of his mates," thus leaving it to his election to choose between them; he farther swears, that these were the orders he received from the captain. And there is a fact in the case, which makes it probable, that the master of the schooner himself called on the first mate to attend him, for at that time the second mate was stationed at the bow, in charge of sinking certain despatches, in case of capture. Had the master remonstrated *361 against taking his first mate along with him, he would have done his duty, and perhaps saved his vessel. On the third point, it is unquestionably true, that, whenever an officer seizes a vessel as prize, he is bound to commit her to the care of a competent officer and crew. Not that the original crew, when left on board, in case of seizure of the vessel, of a citizen or neutral, are released from their duty without the assent of the master; for they are bound to attend the vessel, as she may be discharged, and pursue her original destination. But the obligation to man the prize, results from the want of a right to subject the crew of the captured vessel to the authority of his own officer. If, then, this vessel had been seized as prize, and no one put on board but the prize-master, without any undertaking of the original ship's company to navigate her under his orders, it is very questionable whether the appellants would not have been liable for any loss that followed, from the insubordination of the crew. For after capture, as before observed, the prize-master becomes the bailee of the squadron, who are to share in the partition of the proceeds.
But we are of opinion that this was a mere case of detention for search; that the vessel was never actually taken out of possession of her own officers; that the captain of the Congress had a right to detain the vessel by orders from his own quarter-deck, and that the officers of the schooner, at their peril, were bound to obey; that Lieutenant Nicholson was left on board for no other purpose than to enforce, in a more convenient mode, the observance, on their *362 part, of the duty which the rights of war authorized the frigate to exact of her. And all the misfortunes which followed resulted to the appellees from the fault or folly of their own crew.
One argument, insisted on at the bar, it is proper for this court to notice before we conclude. It was contended, that the master of the Eleanor ought not to have been removed from his vessel; that the right of search only authorized the sending of an officer on board to examine her papers. But we think otherwise. The modern usages of war authorize the bringing of one of the principal officers on board the cruising vessel, with his papers, for examination. To devest her of both her principal officers, without putting on board her, for the time, a competent officer and crew, would certainly be irregular. But it is for the interest of the commercial world, that the investigation should be made by the commander himself, and not left to any subordinate officer. In that case it would be absurd to require of the commander of the commissioned vessel to quit his command, for the purpose of making the necessary examinations.
We are, upon the whole, of opinion, that the court below erred; that the decree must be annulled, and the libel dismissed.