ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Patricia Caress McMath Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ryan D. Johanningsmeier
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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In the
Indiana Supreme Court FILED
Jan 18 2012, 10:58 am
_________________________________
CLERK
No. 49S02-1201-JV-26 of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
A.T.,
Appellant (Respondent below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Petitioner below).
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Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49D09-1004-JD-1002
The Honorable Gary Chavers, Judge Pro Tempore
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On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-1012-JV-1394
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January 18, 2012
Per Curiam.
A.T. was adjudicated delinquent for an act that would be felony murder if committed by
an adult, and the juvenile court ordered both a determinate and an indeterminate commitment to
the Department of Correction. A.T. appealed his determinate commitment only, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. A.T. v. State, 953 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
A.T.’s determinate commitment was imposed pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-37-19-
9(b) (“section 9”), which we recently explained is “a determinate commitment statute that is
applicable to juvenile offenders who are sex or violent offenders and who fit certain other
criteria.” D.C. v. State, 958 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ind. 2011). Section 9 provides that “[a]fter a
juvenile court makes a determination under IC 11-8-8-5,” a determinate commitment may be
imposed for juveniles of certain ages who commit certain offenses. Section 11-8-8-5, in turn,
involves sex and violent offender registrations. It is undisputed in this case that A.T.’s age and
his delinquent act meet the criteria of section 9, but it also is undisputed that A.T. has not been
determined to be a sex or violent offender under section 11-8-8-5.
The Court of Appeals, following its decision in B.K.C. v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003), trans. not sought, interpreted section 9 in a manner that chose to ignore the
introductory phrase “[a]fter a juvenile court makes a determination under IC 11-8-8-5,” which
the Court of Appeals opined was necessary “to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature
and to avoid a construction that would be an absurdity.” A.T., 953 N.E.2d at 494 (quoting
B.K.C., 781 N.E.2d at 1167).
We recently addressed a similar issue in D.C. There, while acknowledging that the
applicable statutes, as written, seemed antithetical to the purpose of the statutes, we emphasized
that we were bound by the clear and unambiguous statutory language. D.C., 958 N.E.2d at 764
(“We leave it to the legislature to change the statutes, if it deems necessary.”)
Although D.C. involved a determinate commitment imposed under a different section, the
same rationale applies here. A determinate commitment may be imposed under section 9 only
“[a]fter a juvenile court makes a determination under IC 11-8-8-5[.]” This language is plain and
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unambiguous. Because A.T. does not meet the criteria of section 9, a determinate commitment
under that section may not be imposed.
Transfer having been granted by separate order, we reverse the trial court’s dispositional
order and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate that portion of its order committing
A.T. to the Department of Correction until his eighteenth birthday.
All Justices concur.
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