ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT
Frederick B. Ettl DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION
South Bend, Indiana Seth T. Pruden, Interim Executive Secretary
Indianapolis, Indiana
_____________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
FILED
Apr 01 2010, 1:20 pm
_________________________________
CLERK
of the supreme court,
No. 71S00-0811-DI-608 court of appeals and
tax court
IN THE MATTER OF:
RODNEY P. SNIADECKI,
Respondent.
_________________________________
Attorney Discipline Action
Hearing Officer Christine Talley Haseman
_________________________________
April 1, 2010
Per Curiam.
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this
Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified
Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on briefing by the parties. Respondent's 1992
admission to this state's bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction. See IND.
CONST. art. 7, § 4.
We find that Respondent, Rodney P. Sniadecki, engaged in attorney misconduct by
violating the terms of a previous suspension from the practice of law, by entering into an
improper business transaction with a client, and by committing crimes and engaging in dishonest
conduct that is incompatible with the privilege of practicing law in this state. For this
misconduct, we find that Respondent should be disbarred.
I. Background
At relevant times, Respondent practiced law as a sole practitioner in Mishawaka and
South Bend, Indiana. On November 20, 2008, the Disciplinary Commission filed its Verified
Complaint consisting of three counts. The final hearing was held over a period of six days.
Twenty-nine witnesses testified, resulting in 1,800 pages of trial testimony. Hundreds of pages
of documents were presented as exhibits. The hearing officer filed a 75-page report containing
detailed findings of fact ("Report"). Respondent filed a petition for review on March 2, 2010, by
which he incorporated by reference lengthy findings of fact he proposed to the hearing officer.
In his petition for review, Respondent contends that the hearing officer displayed a
prosecutorial bias, ignored Respondent's evidence, misunderstood the law, and made improper
evidentiary rulings. A review of the record indicates that the hearing officer was diligent and
even-handed in conducting the hearing and evaluating the evidence. Her Report shows no
misunderstanding of the law. Any arguable errors in evidentiary rulings are harmless in light of
the overwhelming evidence of Respondent's misconduct.
Having considered the evidence, the Report, and Respondent's petition for review, the
Court concludes that the hearing officer's findings are well supported by the evidence and adopts
those findings of fact, except as noted in the discussion below.
II. Respondent's Misconduct
Count I: Failure to Obey Suspension Obligations
Prior suspension order. On October 17, 2007, this Court issued an order in a prior
disciplinary case against Respondent under Cause Number 71S00-0512-DI-627, suspending him
from the practice of law for six months with automatic reinstatement, effective November 26,
2007 (“Order of Suspension”). See Matter of Sniadecki, 875 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. 2007).
2
The Order of Suspension explicitly reminded Respondent the he was required to fulfill all
the duties of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26), which states:
(b) Duties of Disbarred and Suspended Attorneys. Upon receiving notice of the
order of suspension or disbarment, the respondent shall not undertake any
new legal matters between service of the order and the effective date of the
discipline. Upon the effective date of the order, the respondent shall not
maintain a presence or occupy an office where the practice of law is
conducted. . . .
(c) Duties of Suspended Attorneys. The suspended attorney shall, within twenty
(20) days from the date of the notice of the suspension, file with the Court an
affidavit showing that:
(1) All clients being represented by the attorney in pending matters have
been notified by certified mail, return receipt requested, of the nature and
duration of the suspension, and all pending matters of clients requiring
the attorney's services during the period of suspension have been placed in
the hands and care of an attorney admitted to practice before the Supreme
Court of Indiana with the consent of the client. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Failure to notify all active clients of his suspension. Subsequent to receiving the Order of
Suspension, Respondent dictated the following letter (“Stepping Away Letter”) to his legal
assistant of fifteen years, Sherry White ("White"), which was sent to some but not all of his
active clients:
As you are probably aware, on November 26, 2007 I will be stepping away from
my practice for six months. In accordance with 71S00-0512-DI-00627, I have
arranged for Attorney Michael Wandling to serve as substitute counsel with
regard to any legal matters you presently have pending with my office. Should
you desire representation other than this, I encourage you to contact Mr.
Wandling immediately and obtain alternate counsel as soon as reasonably
possible. Otherwise, rest assured that your legal needs remain in good hands and
Mike will take good care of you during my absence.
The Stepping Away Letter does not state the nature and duration of Respondent's
suspension. Indeed, it does not disclose the fact that he was suspended, contrary to the
requirement of the rule. Respondent directed White to send the Stepping Away Letter only to
clients who would not care if they received it or would not understand what they were reading.
Respondent therefore failed to comply with Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26)(c)(1).
3
In addition, Respondent instructed White that the office staff was not to tell clients who
called he had been suspended. Instead they were to say he was unavailable and to offer to
schedule an appointment with Wandling. By misleading clients about the nature of his
suspension, Respondent violated Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
False compliance affidavit. On November 7, 2007, Respondent filed an affidavit
("Compliance Affidavit”) with this Court stating:
I do hereby affirm, under the pains and penalties of perjury, that, on November 5,
2007, I delivered to each of my current clients, a letter, via certified mailing,
return receipt requested, in compliance with Rule 23 §26(c) and specifically
referencing the cause number of the captioned disciplinary action. . . .
Respondent knew when he made this statement that he had not provided written notice of
his suspension to all of his current clients. By knowingly submitting a false, material statement
under oath to this Court, Respondent committed the crime of perjury, see Indiana Code 35-44-2-
1, and he violated these Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:
3.3(a): Knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal.
8.4(b): Committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Maintaining a presence in a law office while suspended. Prior to Respondent’s
suspension, Wandling occasionally covered hearings for Respondent for $50.00 each. In
October 2007, Respondent hired Wandling to work as a full-time attorney. Wandling received a
weekly salary from Respondent for the duration of his employment, which included the period of
Respondent's suspension. Wandling did not have any authority to make changes within the law
office and he did not have any supervisory authority over law office employees. Indeed, efforts
he made to exert control and to make changes were thwarted by employees, who took directions
only from Respondent.
Respondent never relinquished his authority over the management of the law office to
Wandling. Instead, he delegated the day-to-day operation of the law office during his suspension
4
to White, telling her she was to keep the office running smoothly and to make sure the cases and
hearings were covered, and the only difference during his suspension would be that he wouldn’t
be at the office. White managed the operation of the law office at the direction of Respondent,
not Wandling.
During his suspension, Respondent maintained frequent telephone contact with law office
staff, primarily White. One employee testified that Respondent called daily. Wandling testified
that work was not getting done because White was "perpetually" on the phone with Respondent.
Respondent's cell phone records indicate he placed calls to the law office or White's cell phone at
least 675 times during his suspension. Respondent was also physically present at the law office
at times during his suspension. One employee observed Respondent dictating a letter to White
relating to one of his cases. While White was on vacation, Respondent came to the law office
and asked this employee to print a copy of a pleading in one of his cases.
The money that Wandling generated in fees during Respondent’s suspension was
deposited into Respondent’s business operating account. Respondent did not add Wandling to
the operating account or his trust account, either as an owner or as a signatory. Instead,
Respondent added White as a signatory to the operating account. Throughout his suspension,
Respondent used a debit card and checks to purchase personal items with funds from the
operating account. During his suspension, Respondent occasionally came to the back door of the
law office and delivered money to White to deposit into the operating account. Respondent
submitted evidence that he put more personal money into the firm's account than he used for
personal purposes. Even if this is true, he nevertheless exercised control of the firm's operating
account during his suspension.
The evidence establishes clearly and convincingly that Respondent maintained a presence
at his law office during his suspension in violation of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26)(b).
Accepting clients subsequent to Order of Suspension and representing clients while
suspended. White testified that Respondent accepted new clients after his notice of suspension.
5
Documentary evidence shows he met with at least 11 new clients between the time he received
the notice and the effective date of his suspension.
Less than one week prior to the effective date of his suspension, Respondent appeared as
counsel for a client at an extradition hearing. Although he had represented this client in prior
matters, this was a new matter. At Respondent's direction, White signed Wandling’s name
without his knowledge to documents filed in this case. After his suspension became effective,
Respondent directed White to prepare a letter to authorities in Florida regarding this client.
When Wandling refused to sign this letter, Respondent instructed White to sign it.
During his suspension, Respondent dictated a demand letter on behalf a personal injury
client, who was also a relative and close friend. Respondent directed White to sign Wandling’s
name to the letter without Wandling’s knowledge.
Respondent leased or provided office space to attorney Angela Russo, who occasionally
handled matters for Respondent. During Respondent’s suspension, White prepared and filed an
appearance and petition for guardianship on behalf of a client, signing Russo’s name to them
without Russo's knowledge pursuant to Respondent's instruction that it was "okay" to file
appearances on behalf of Russo.
During his suspension, Respondent met with a client at her home to discuss several
pending legal matters and to have her sign papers relating to one of the matters. Respondent
orally informed this client that he had been suspended and told her Wandling would be covering
his cases. When she told him she did not want Wandling to be handing her cases, he assured her
he would still be "keeping an eye" on them. Members of Respondent's office staff testified that
no one but Respondent handled this client's cases during his suspension.1
The evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent undertook new legal matters
between the service of the Order of Suspension and its effective date and that Respondent
1
This is the client with whom Respondent entered into an improper business relationship, as charged in
Count II. Respondent testified that this client was not sent a notice of his suspension because her files
had already been taken over by Wandling. This contradicts all other evidence on the subject.
6
continued to provide legal services to clients during his suspension, in violation of Admission
and Discipline Rule 23(26)(b) and Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(c), which prohibits knowingly
disobeying a court order.
Forgery. Respondent does not deny that documents were drafted, affixed with forged
signatures, and used in the practice of law during Respondent's suspension. The Court rejects
Respondent's suggestion that White took these actions totally on her own initiative without his
involvement. By directing or authorizing White, as his agent, to prepare and sign documents in
the names of Wandling and Russo, including legal papers filed in courts, as described above,
Respondent committed forgery, see Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2, and violated these Professional
Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:
3.3(a): Knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal.
8.4(b): Committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
False sworn statements to the Commission. During the Commission's investigation of
this case, Respondent denied under oath that he received any financial benefit from having
Wandling handle cases for him during his suspension. The Commission charges that in making
this statement, Respondent violated Professional Conduct Rule 8.1(a), which prohibits
knowingly making a false statement of material fact to the Disciplinary Commission in
connection with a disciplinary matter.
Respondent knew that funds generated from legal work performed by Wandling during
his suspension were going into the firm's operating account from which he made cash
withdrawals and paid personal expenses. As noted above, however, Respondent submitted
evidence that he deposited more personal funds into the account than he used for personal
purposes. Although the receipt of Wandling's fees financially benefited Respondent's law office
during his suspension, on balance, Respondent's statement may have been meant to convey his
belief that he received no net personal benefit from Wandling's fees during his suspension. We
cannot say that there is clear and convincing evidence that this particular sworn statement was
knowingly false when Respondent made it.
7
Count II: Improper Business Transaction with a Client
Prior to June 2007, Respondent operated his law practice at 228 W. Colfax, South Bend,
Indiana (“Colfax Property”). Respondent owned the Colfax Property as tenant in common with
a co-owner ("Co-owner"). The Colfax Property was encumbered by a mortgage debt for which
Co-owner and Respondent were both responsible.
At relevant times, Respondent represented a client ("Client") on several legal matters. In
June 2007, Respondent told Client that he was purchasing property at 620 South Ironwood Drive
in Mishawaka (“Ironwood Property”) for use as his law office and that the Colfax Property was
for sale. During the discussion, Client became interested in purchasing the Colfax Property.
Soon afterward, Respondent and Client entered into an oral agreement for the sale of the Colfax
Property to Client for $225,000.2 Client had no experience or expertise in purchasing real estate.
Respondent did not advise Client that he did not hold clear title to the Colfax Property, he did not
put the terms of the sale of the Colfax Property in writing, and he did not advise her to seek
independent legal counsel regarding her purchase.
About two days after Client agreed to purchase the Colfax Property, Respondent asked
her if she could get the money quickly. Client intended to pay cash, but she could not get the
entire $225,000 as quickly as Respondent wanted it. Client therefore borrowed $180,000 on
margin from her stockbroker and gave it to Respondent as partial payment for the Colfax
Property. Respondent did not inform Co-owner about this payment. Respondent used the
$180,000 as a down payment on the Ironwood Property.
After transferring the $180,000 to Respondent, Client sought permission from
Respondent to have the Colfax Property more fully inspected. Respondent told Client that this
would “ruin everything" in a tone Client found intimidating. Client then notified Respondent
that she no longer wanted to purchase the Colfax Property and requested a refund of her down
payment. All these events occurred in the space of about one week.
2
There is conflicting evidence on whether the agreed price was $225,000 or $240,000, but this fact is
irrelevant to the issue of Respondent's misconduct. The agreed price will be taken as $225,000 for the
purpose of this opinion.
8
Respondent no longer had the $180,000 Client had paid him. Client made numerous
attempts to get Respondent to provide her with documentation to protect her right to repayment
of the $180,000. In response, Respondent presented Client with a promissory note for this
amount, but he failed to comply with Client's requests to set up a payment schedule. Respondent
continued to represent Client in legal matters until she discharged him in December 2007.
By these actions, Respondent violated these Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the
following misconduct:
1.8(a): Entering into a business transaction with a client unless the terms are fair and
reasonable, the terms are fully and clearly disclosed, the client is given reasonable
opportunity to seek independent counsel, and the client consents in writing to the
transaction.
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Count III: False Loan Documents and Attempted Obstruction of Justice
Repayment agreement. Shortly after discharging Respondent, Client met with attorney
Andrew Nickle, who agreed to represent Client in attempting to collect the $180,000 payment
she made to Respondent. In discussing the matter with Nickle, Respondent told Nickle that he
would repay Client from the proceeds of the sale of the Colfax Property and would provide
Client with first mortgages on the Colfax Property and on the Ironwood Property. Nickle had
prepared title work on both properties, however, and told Respondent he did not have clear title
to the Colfax Property and that Respondent’s wife, not Respondent, was the owner of the
Ironwood Property. In response, Respondent falsely stated or implied that Co-owner had no real
interest in the Colfax Property. Respondent also said that the Ironwood Property was actually his
even though it was in his wife's name and that he could get his wife to sign a mortgage in favor
of Client.
Client agreed to accept a short-term note secured by mortgages on the Ironwood Property
and the Colfax Property. On or about January 17, 2008, Respondent and his wife executed a
promissory note (“Promissory Note”) in favor of Client in the amount of $190,481, representing
the $180,000 down payment plus interest and attorney fees, due to be paid by April 16, 2008.
The Promissory Note was secured by a mortgage on the Ironwood Property signed by
9
Respondent and his wife. Respondent was unable to provide a mortgage on the Colfax Property
because of Co-owner’s interest in it.
False statements and documents for loan application. To repay Client, Respondent
sought to refinance the Ironwood Property, which was in his wife's name. In February 2008,
Respondent therefore contacted Stephen Riner, a loan originator for Landmark Mortgage known
to Respondent from prior business dealings, to begin the process of obtaining a loan in his wife's
name. Riner filled out an application falsely showing Respondent's wife as having a monthly
salary of $15,000.3 On April 9, 2008, Respondent's wife signed the application (according to
her, without reading it). Riner submitted the completed application to a lender and provided
Respondent's office with a copy of it.
Riner and Respondent expected the loan to be approved based on the value of the
property and Respondent's wife's excellent credit rating. The lender, however, requested
additional information regarding Respondent's wife's employment. Riner testified that he spoke
with both White and Respondent about these requests. White testified that she contacted
Respondent each time the lender requested additional information or documentation for the loan.
Respondent repeatedly stressed to White the importance of the loan and told her to do whatever
was necessary to get it closed, even when she protested. During various points in the loan
application process, Respondent's wife was falsely portrayed as the CEO of Respondent's law
office and as self-employed with "St. Joseph Valley Mortgage."4 With Respondent's
authorization, White completed a "Verification of Employment" falsely confirming Respondent's
wife's employment with the law firm. When the lender requested corporate and personal tax
returns relating to Respondent's wife's employment and income, Respondent told White to give
the lender whatever was necessary, asking her to "make" the tax returns. White then used a
3
Riner admits he listed Respondent's wife's monthly salary as $15,000 without knowledge of whether this
was correct because he knew that was the income level required for the loan. Riner disclaims any
knowledge that any documentation supporting the application was false. The Court reaches no
conclusion on this point; however, even if Riner was involved in falsifying documents, this would not
excuse or lessen Respondent's misconduct.
4
Although St. Joseph Valley Mortgage Company was a real entity Respondent incorporated in his wife's
name, she received no income from the company.
10
computer program to prepare false corporate tax returns for 2006 and 2007, purporting to be for
St. Joseph Valley Mortgage and listing Respondent's wife as a compensated officer. White also
prepared false personal tax returns for 2006 and 2007 purporting to be for Respondent's wife.
White then provided the false returns to Landmark Mortgage.
At some point Riner told White that the lender needed a letter from the accountant for St.
Joseph Valley Mortgage, which did not have an accountant. At Respondent's direction, White
hired a Certified Public Accountant ("CPA"), to review the falsified tax returns and prepare a
letter that would satisfy the lender. The CPA reviewed the returns and prepared a letter
addressed to “To Whom It May Concern” saying that he had reviewed Respondent's wife's tax
returns and that she had filed as self-employed for the past two years. The CPA was not
informed of the purpose of this letter.
White also created a false loan broker license for St. Joseph Valley Mortgage and a false
loan originator certificate for Respondent's wife. In addition, she altered the contents of a letter
Nickle sent to Riner regarding payoff information for the loan to Client.5 White provided these
documents to Riner for use in the application process.
The president of Landmark Mortgage eventually became involved in the loan application
process due to the inconsistencies in the documentation for the loan. The lender ultimately
withdrew funding on May 19, 2008, because of an anonymous phone call suggesting there were
falsehoods in the documentation. In a subsequent meeting with the president of Landmark
Mortgage to discuss why the loan was cancelled, Respondent assured him that none of the
information that had been provided for the loan application was fraudulent in any way, insisting
in particular that his wife was indeed a CEO as represented.6 Respondent obtained a loan from a
relative of his wife, and he paid Client the amount due on the Promissory Note on May 22, 2008,
over a month after it was due.
5
Riner testified that he asked White to obtain a revised pay-off letter from Nickle and that he did not
know she altered the original letter Nickle had sent.
6
The president of Landmark testified that after this conversation, he was satisfied that the information in
its file was accurate, but he had warned Respondent that if he discovered something had been altered,
Landmark would reopen the case and take legal action.
11
Respondent asserts that he was in Italy while the loan documents were being prepared
and unaware of the falsifications. He contends that White prepared and submitted all the false
documents of her own volition out of friendship for Riner, who stood to earn a commission if the
loan went through. However, other than maintaining her employment with Respondent, White
stood to gain nothing for herself by fabricating the documents and exposing herself to criminal
liability. Moreover, White's testimony is not the sole evidence of Respondent's culpability. The
record also shows:
Respondent was in frequent phone contact with both White and Riner during the loan
application process. Respondent was in Italy for only two weeks (April 14-28, 2008) and
he admits he spoke to White by cell phone during this period.
Riner testified that he spoke not only with White, but also directly with Respondent about
the lender's requests for documentation. Riner estimated he spoke directly with
Respondent ten times throughout the course of the application process.
Respondent was under pressure to finalize the loan to repay Client. When Respondent’s
repayment to Client was not made timely, Client’s attorney started to prepare the
paperwork to foreclose on the Ironwood Property.
Riner testified that even after he decided the loan process should end due to
documentation problems, Respondent insisted that it was important to continue.
Any documentation provided by anyone to support the loan application's
misrepresentations regarding Respondent's wife's employment and income could not be
authentic and would have to have been fabricated.
The president of Landmark Mortgage testified that Respondent assured him in person in
late May 2008, after all the forged documents had been submitted, that none of the
information provided for the loan application was fraudulent, including specifically that
Respondent's wife was CEO of his law office.
Although Respondent may not have known the full extent of White’s forgeries, the
totality of the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent directed White to create and
falsify whatever documents were needed for approval of the loan application.7 Respondent's
argument that White would commit a series of serious crimes motivated only by her wish to help
7
Finding 341 on page 69 of the hearing officer's Report says Respondent "was unaware of the false
information that was being used." This, however, is contrary to every other finding on the issue,
including statements immediately following in Finding 341. We conclude from the context and totality of
the hearing officer's findings that the quoted statement was a scrivener's error.
12
her purported friend Riner earn a commission is not credible. The fact that White was deeply
complicit in the fraudulent activities in no way lessens Respondent's culpability for directing
them.
By the actions described above, Respondent committed forgery, see Indiana Code § 35-
43-5-2, and violated these Professional Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:
8.4(b): Committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
Attempted obstruction of justice. The Commission initiated an investigation of a
grievance against Respondent pertaining to the false loan documents. At Respondent’s direction,
White called Riner to ask Riner to sign an affidavit taking sole responsibility for the allegations
regarding the falsified documents. Respondent told White to tell Riner that if he did so,
Respondent would open a child support recovery office and put Riner in charge of the office.
Riner refused to sign the affidavit.
In his proposed findings, Respondent admits he prepared the affidavit and asked Riner to
sign it. He contends, however, that he did this after he discovered that the payoff information
letter from Nickle to Riner had been altered and the purpose of the affidavit was for Riner to
accept responsibility for this alteration. The affidavit did in fact address the alteration of this
letter; however, it was far broader, stating that the lender requested "a number of documents not
readily available, which I then had prepared in order to comply with the lender's request . . . for
the purposes of expediting the loan . . . ." The affidavit continued: "Neither Mrs. Sniadecki or
Mr. Sniadecki were . . . even aware of the existence of these documents." The Court therefore
rejects Respondent's account of the events regarding the affidavit.
By creating a false document and attempting to induce Riner to sign it for use as evidence
in this disciplinary investigation, Respondent committed the offense of attempted obstruction of
justice, see Indiana Code §§ 35-44-3-4 and 35-41-5-1, and thereby violated these Professional
Conduct Rules prohibiting the following misconduct:
13
8.4(b): Committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
III. Respondent's Discipline
The hearing officer made the following characterization of Respondent's misconduct,
which we adopt:
The nature of Respondent’s misconduct goes to the very heart of the
characteristics of candor and honesty that are to be maintained by lawyers. There
may be no more serious professional misconduct than to concoct false statements
to the Indiana Supreme Court, forge documents to be filed in court, and to engage
in criminal acts of dishonesty. In addition to those acts, Respondent failed to
protect his client in a business transaction and tried to bribe a witness in this
discipline case.
Respondent’s mental state was not one of neglect or incompetence. His
mental state was purposeful, deliberate and calculated. Respondent had many
opportunities to tell the truth, but chose a different path. . . . All of the acts
proven in this case were made with thought and intent.
The potential harm caused by Respondent’s conduct is immeasurable. His
harm to the standing of lawyers and the profession by filing false documents with
the Supreme Court, committing perjury and forgery, and attempting to bribe a
witness is tremendous. His potential harm to Client was over $180,000, without
even considering the emotional harm to Client caused by the violations of her
trust and his obligations to her as her attorney. . . .
There are numerous aggravating factors here. Respondent has failed to
accept responsibility for his actions and still denies wrongdoing. He has been
disciplined previously for dishonesty and his conduct here is repetitive and
chronic.
We add that to accept Respondent's arguments, we would have to find that nearly every
witness who testified on key disputed matters, save Respondent, was lying, even those witnesses
with no conceivable motive to lie, such as the president of Landmark Mortgage. We agree with
the hearing officer's assessment of the witnesses' credibility and conclude that Respondent's
testimony in this proceeding was knowingly false.
14
The hearing officer recommends that Respondent be disbarred. In Indiana, disbarment
permanently strips an attorney from the privilege of practicing law in the state. Disbarment is
reserved for the most serious misconduct. The American Bar Association's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (as amended in 1992) ("Standards") provide the following examples
of misconduct warranting disbarment:
Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which
includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, [or] fraud; . . . or
(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's
fitness to practice.
Standard 5.11.
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the
court, makes a false statement [or] submits a false document, . . . and causes
serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or
potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.
Standard 6.11.
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court
order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and
causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes serious or
potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.
Standard 6.21.
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer . . . intentionally tampers with
a witness and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes
significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal
proceeding . . . .
Standard 6.31(a).
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer . . . intentionally or knowingly
violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or
potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession . . . .
Standard 8.1(a).
15
Respondent's misconduct fits within all of the above Standards. We therefore conclude
that Respondent should be disbarred.
IV. Conclusion
The Court finds clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated these rules
prohibiting the following conduct:
Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23(26): Failing to comply with the obligations of a
suspended attorney.
Ind. Professional Conduct Rules:
1.8(a): Entering into a business transaction with a client unless the terms are fair and
reasonable, the terms are fully and clearly disclosed, the client is given reasonable
opportunity to seek independent counsel, and the client consents in writing to the
transaction.
3.3(a): Knowingly making a false statement of fact to a tribunal.
3.4(c): Knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal.
8.4(b): Committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
8.4(c): Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
For Respondent's professional misconduct, the Court disbars Respondent effective May
12, 2010. Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a disbarred attorney under Admission and
Discipline Rule 23(26).
The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The hearing officer
appointed in this case is discharged.
The Clerk of this Court is directed to give notice of this opinion to the hearing officer, to
the parties or their respective attorneys, and to all other entities entitled to notice under
Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d). The Clerk is further directed to post this opinion to the
Court's website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this opinion in the bound
volumes of this Court's decisions.
All Justices concur.
16