ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Patricia Caress McMath Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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In the FILED
Indiana Supreme Court May 28 2009, 4:21 pm
_________________________________
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
No. 49S02-0905-CR-252 tax court
JEFFREY YOUNG, Appellant (Defendant Below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
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Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G23-0706-FB-105813
The Honorable Patrick Murphy, Master Commissioner
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On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0709-CR-829
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May 28, 2009
Dickson, Justice.
Resolution of this appeal is determined by our holding today in Meredith v. State, ___
N.E.2d ___ (Ind. 2009), that it is legally insufficient to display a paper temporary license plate
inside the rear window of a motor vehicle. For this reason, we affirm the conviction of the
defendant, Jeffrey Young, for Possession of Cocaine, rejecting his claim of improper admission
of evidence resulting from an unlawful traffic stop.
One night in June 2007, Officer Greg Milburn stopped a vehicle because he could not see
its license plate. As he approached the vehicle, he saw a paper temporary plate taped to the
inside of the rear window. The vehicle's temporary vehicle plate was not found to be invalid, but
after receiving the defendant driver's identification, Officer Milburn learned the defendant's
license was suspended and that he had a prior conviction of driving while suspended, and he
therefore arrested the defendant. While searching the defendant's vehicle in preparation for
impoundment, Officer Milburn found cocaine. At a bench trial, the defendant moved to suppress
the evidence obtained after the officer learned that the defendant's license plate was valid. The
trial court took the motion under advisement and allowed the State to introduce evidence pending
the court's ruling. After the close of evidence, the trial court denied Young's motion to suppress
and found him guilty of possessing cocaine. The defendant appealed, claiming that the traffic
stop violated the search and seizure clauses of both the federal and Indiana constitutions. The
Court of Appeals reversed. Young v. State, 886 N.E.2d 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). We granted
transfer.
The defendant's constitutional claims rely upon his assertion that his vehicle was licensed
and properly displaying the temporary license plate and thus the officer's traffic stop should have
concluded as soon as the information on the plate was visible to the officer as he approached the
rear of the vehicle. The officer's further investigation, according to the defendant, was devoid of
reasonable suspicion and therefore subjected him to an unreasonable search and seizure.
In Meredith, we conclude that statutory requirements for the illumination and mounting
of license plates on the rear of a vehicle apply to all license plates, whether temporary or
permanent, and uphold as proper a traffic stop resulting from the improper display of a
temporary license plate in the back window of a vehicle. ___ N.E.2d at ___. Upon the authority
of Meredith, we find that because the defendant's temporary license plate was not illuminated
and not mounted on the rear of the vehicle but rather was displayed inside the rear window, the
officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. We thus reject Young's claim that his
conviction is based on erroneously admitted evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search
or seizure.
2
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. Rucker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
3
Rucker, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Meredith v.
State, No. 89S04-0808-CR-430, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. May 28, 2009) (Rucker, J., dissenting).
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