APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Todd Allen Clark Steve Carter
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Frances H. Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
___________________________________________________________________________
In the
FILED
Indiana Supreme Court Mar 12 2009, 12:36 pm
_________________________________
CLERK
of the supreme court,
No. 35S05-0809-CV-506 court of appeals and
tax court
TODD ALLEN CLARK,
Appellant (Respondent below),
v.
MICHELLE D. CLARK,
Appellee (Petitioner below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Huntington Superior Court, No. 35D01-0702-DR-62
The Honorable Jeffrey R. Heffelfinger, Judge
_________________________________
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 35A05-0801-CV-26
_________________________________
March 12, 2009
Sullivan, Justice.
In Lambert v. Lambert, 861 N.E.2d 1176 (Ind. 2007), this Court held that pre-
incarceration income should not be imputed to an imprisoned parent when setting an initial order
of child support. But, until the question was before us, we declined to go further and decide
whether or not incarceration constitutes a substantial change in circumstances justifying modifi-
cation of an existing child support obligation. That question is presented in this case and we
conclude, based on the same reasoning we employed in Lambert, that modification is justified.
Background
On June 15, 2007, the trial court ordered Todd A. Clark to pay child support in the
amount of $53 per week. This figure was based on the minimum wage. Clark is now incarce-
rated, with a projected release date in 2013. Clark claims that he is unable to fulfill his support
obligation because he makes less than $21 per month at his prison job assignment. Clark filed a
Verified Petition for Abatement and/or Modification of Child Support Order requesting the trial
court to reduce, revoke, or abate his child support obligation until his release. In his petition,
Clark asserted that incarceration creates a substantial change in circumstances which would war-
rant modification of his child support obligation. The trial court denied Clark’s petition. The
court also noted that it was contrary to public policy for a person who engaged in criminal con-
duct to avoid a support obligation. Clark appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Clark’s incarceration constituted a substan-
tial change in circumstances that could justify a modification of his support obligation. Clark v.
Clark, 887 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). That Court reasoned that although this
Court specifically limited our decision in Lambert to initial determinations of child support,
Lambert’s rationale applied equally to a modification request based on changed circumstances
due to incarceration. Clark, 887 N.E.2d at 1024.1
We granted transfer, Clark v. Clark, 898 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 2008) (table), and now con-
clude that Lambert’s holding extends to petitions to modify a child support obligation based the
incarceration of an obligated parent.
1
The trial court also found that public policy demands that an incarcerated parent’s child support obliga-
tion cannot be set at less than minimum wage. The Court of Appeals held that based on the Commentary
to Ind. Child Support Guideline 2, the minimum wage should not be interpreted as a cut-off amount for
child support payments. Clark, 887 N.E.2d at 1025. We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals on this point. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).
2
Discussion
I
The modification of child support orders is governed by statute, specifically Ind. Code §
31-16-8-1. This section provides that “[p]rovisons of an order with respect to child support . . .
may be modified or revoked.” Id. Except as provided in another statute which is not applicable
here, modification may be made only:
(1) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to
make the terms unreasonable; or
(2) upon a showing that:
(A) a party has been ordered to pay an amount in child support that differs by
more than twenty percent (20%) from the amount that would be ordered
by applying the child support guidelines; and
(B) the order requested to be modified or revoked was issued at least twelve
(12) months before the petition requesting modification was filed.
I.C. § 31-16-8-1(b).
Clark argues that his incarceration has resulted in changed circumstances so substantial
and continuing as to make the terms of the current support unreasonable. In support of his argu-
ment, Clark relies on Lambert, 861 N.E.2d 1176.
Lambert addressed whether pre-incarceration income should be imputed to the obligor
when setting an initial support order of an imprisoned parent. After reviewing various approach-
es in other states on the issue of calculating child support during incarceration, we stated that
“[w]hile our Child Support Guidelines obligate every parent to provide some support even when
they have no apparent present income, it was error to set support based on employment income
that plainly would not be there during incarceration.” Id. at 1176. We concluded that “in deter-
mining support orders, courts should not impute potential income to an imprisoned parent based
3
on pre-incarceration wages or other employment-related income, but should rather calculate sup-
port based on the actual income and assets available to the parent.” Id. at 1177.
Criminal activity “reflects a voluntary choice, and carries with it the potential for incarce-
ration and consequent unemployment.” Id. at 1180. However, we distinguished between unem-
ployment due to incarceration and unemployment that is voluntary by saying that “[t]he choice to
commit a crime is so far removed from the decision to avoid child support obligations that it is
inappropriate to consider them as identical.” Id. We rejected the idea of suspending child sup-
port obligations while a parent is incarcerated as contrary to law. Rather, we supported the idea
of permitting the minimum support requirements provided by the Child Support Guidelines, not
imputing income. Id. at 1179-80. Lambert only “counsels against imputing pre-incarceration
wages, salaries, commissions, or other employment income to the individual. A court may, ob-
viously, still consider other sources of income when calculating support payments.” Id. at 1182.
We reasoned that under the Guidelines, the concept of “voluntary unemployment or un-
deremployment requires both the ability to earn more income, and the conscious choice on the
part of a parent to reduce income.” Id. at 1180. We concluded that I.C. § 31-16-6-1(a)(4)2 re-
quires that courts consider “the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent” when
setting support orders. Id. Moreover, our decision stated that “[w]e believe the conclusion is
also supported by the overarching policy goal of all family court matters involving children:
protecting the best interests of those children.” Id.
II
On several occasions prior to our Lambert decision, the Court of Appeals addressed
whether a petition for modification of child support due to voluntary criminal conduct is a valid
rationale for abatement of an existing child support obligation. These cases held that incarcera-
2
In an action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or child support, the court may order either or
both parents to pay any amount reasonable for support of a child, after considering all relevant factors
including: the financial resources of the custodial parent; the standard of living a child would have en-
joyed if (1) the marriage had not been dissolved or (2) the separation had not been ordered; the physical
or mental condition of the child and the child’s emotional needs; and the financial needs of the noncus-
todial parent. I.C. § 31-16-6-1(a).
4
tion due to voluntary criminal conduct was not a valid rationale for abatement of an existing
child support order. See Holsapple v. Herron, 649 N.E.2d 140, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (hold-
ing that when a criminal act or the resulting consequences therefrom are the primary cause of an
obligor’s failure to pay child support, abatement of the obligation is not warranted); Davis v.
Vance, 574 N.E.2d 330, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that it would be contrary to the Indi-
ana Child Support Guidelines and to public policy favoring a child’s security and maintenance to
allow payments to abate based upon a willful, unlawful act of the obligor). In this post-Lambert
case, the Court of Appeals concluded that it “no longer believe[d] these cases properly reflect the
current status of the law.” Clark, 887 N.E.2d at 1023.3
We agree. Strengthening marriages and relationships between children and non-custodial
parents has emerged as a national strategy for enhancing the well-being of children.4 In Lam-
bert, we considered sociological evidence and concluded that “imposing impossibly high support
payments on incarcerated parents acts like a punitive measure, and does an injustice to the best
interests of the child by ignoring factors that can, and frequently do, severely damage the parent-
child relationship.” 861 N.E.2d at 1180. And studies have generally concluded that unsustaina-
ble support orders result in greater failure of non-custodial parents to pay their support obliga-
tions, making it “statistically more likely that the child will be deprived of adequate support over
the long term.” Id. at 1181.
Proscribing the consideration of incarceration as a substantial change in circumstances
justifying the modification of a child support order is not in the best interest of children. When
released, most obligated parents face the twin barriers of large arrearages and difficulty finding
3
Since Lambert, the Court of Appeals has addressed petitions for modification of child support due to
incarceration in addition to this case. See e.g., In re Paternity of E.C., 896 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that the Lambert decision applies equally to requests for modification of child support due
to incarceration).
4
See Preamble for Ind. Parenting Time Guidelines (2009); U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Healthy Marriage and Responsible Fatherhood Initiative: Further Progress Is Needed in Developing a
Risk-Based Monitoring Approach to Help HHS Improve Program Oversight (2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081002.pdf; Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2007,
S. 1626, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by Senators Evan Bayh and Barack Obama specifically discuss-
ing the pressures on incarcerated parents of the child support system).
5
employment. Such a situation makes it more likely that the newly-released obligated parent will
face jail time as a result of non-payment of child support or participate in the underground econ-
omy – once again straining family relationships, if not jeopardizing public safety. Lambert rec-
ognized the realities of incarceration for families, and is equally applicable to modifications of
child support orders.
III
In light of our analysis in Lambert, we hold that in petitions to modify a support order,
incarceration may serve as a changed circumstance so substantial and continuing as to make the
terms of the support order unreasonable pursuant to I.C. § 31-16-8-1. Thus, it follows that a
support obligation should be set based on the obligated parent’s actual earnings while incarce-
rated (and other assets available to the incarcerated person). To the extent that prior opinions of
the Court of Appeals like Holsapple v. Herron, 649 N.E.2d 140, and Davis v. Vance, 574 N.E.2d
330, are inconsistent with this conclusion, we disapprove those decisions.
As articulated in Lambert, a court may order the child support obligation to revert to the
pre-incarceration level upon release, consistent with the modification recommendation. 861
N.E.2d at 1182. This has the effect of relieving the custodial parent from the burden of obtaining
a new modification order when the obligated parent is released. Id.
In the present case, the trial court set Clark’s child support obligation at $53 per week.
Clark receives less than $21 per month at his prison job assignment. Leaving this support order
undisturbed would likely burden Clark with a high arrearage upon his release from prison. Addi-
tionally, denial of Clark’s petition would thwart the goal of having child support obligations re-
flect the present earning capacity of parents. The record is silent as to whether Clark has other
sources of income and assets to underwrite his support obligation. Upon remand, the trial court
should consider whether other income sources exist before making its determination.
6
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed supra, we vacate the trial court’s denial of Clark’s Petition for
Abatement and/or Modification of Child Support, and summarily affirm the Court of Appeals as
to all other issues not addressed in this opinion. App. R. 58(A)(2). We remand this case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
7