APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Charles Young Steve Carter
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
______________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court FILED
Jun 26 2008, 2:47 pm
_________________________________
CLERK
No. 27S02-0806-PC-363 of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
CHARLES YOUNG,
Appellant (Petitioner below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Respondent below).
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Appeal from the Grant Circuit Court, No. 27C01-9205-CF-35
The Honorable Robert L. Barnet, Jr., Special Judge
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On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 27A02-0703-PC-00263
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June 26, 2008
Sullivan, Justice.
Charles Young was convicted of Class A felony Conspiracy to Deal Crack Cocaine in
1992, and sentenced to 40 years in prison. Young’s 1992 sentencing order stated that he “[wa]s
entitled to 204 days CREDIT TIME for time spent incarcerated awaiting sentence, and further,
should be given credit for good time conduct for time spent in confinement.” (App. at 20 (em-
phasis in original).) In 2007, after having filed a direct appeal and a petition for post-conviction
relief, Young filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, in which he claimed that he had not
been credited 204 days of earned Class I credit time in addition to 204 days of time served to-
ward his sentence.1 The trial court denied Young’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Y-
oung v. State, No. 27A02-0703-PC-263, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2007). Young petitioned
for transfer, which we now grant. Ind. Appellate Rule 58.
Discussion
Young claims that the trial court should have specified in its sentencing order that he was
to receive 204 days of earned credit time in addition to 204 days of time served toward his sen-
tence, instead of merely stating that he “should be given credit for good time conduct for time
spent in confinement.” (App. at 20.) As the Court of Appeals observed, our opinion in Robin-
son v. State held that where a trial court specifies an amount of credit time already served toward
a sentence, but does not specify an amount of earned credit time, the presumption shall be that
the inmate is a Class I offender and has earned an amount of credit time equal to the amount of
time already served. 805 N.E.2d 783, 792 (Ind. 2004). Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that Young is presumptively entitled to 204 days of earned credit time in addition to
his 204 days of time already served, and need not resort to our state court system in order for the
time to be credited toward his sentence.
It is, of course, possible that a prisoner could accidentally be deprived of earned credit
time toward his sentence. The presumption in Robinson has the effect of treating such an acci-
dent as merely an administrative error that can be addressed by the Department of Correction
(DOC) easily and efficiently through its offender grievance process. It is for this reason that we
hold today in Neff v. State, No. 49S02-0806-CR-362, slip op. (Ind. June 26, 2008), that a pris-
oner must show that administrative remedies have been exhausted before pursuing a remedy in
the state court system.
1
Class I offenders earn one day of credit time for every day served. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 (2004); see
Neff v. State, No. 49S02-0806-CR-362, slip op. at 2-3 (Ind. June 26, 2008).
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Today in Neff, we also address some of the practicalities of making a claim that earned
credit time has not been applied to a sentence. Neff focuses on how to properly calculate an in-
mate’s earliest release date. Young’s claim highlights yet another need for clarification. Even if
Young had, as we instruct today in Neff, correctly calculated his earliest release date and ex-
hausted his administrative remedies before appealing to the state courts, he did not provide the
court any documentation of what the DOC has on record as his earliest release date, nor his own
calculation of his earliest release date. More broadly, to present such a claim to a court, a peti-
tioner must show what the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures are, and that they
have been exhausted at all levels.
Conclusion
The trial court properly denied Young’s motion to correct erroneous sentence because the
presumption in Robinson—that, in the absence of information to the contrary, he is entitled to
earned credit time equal to served credit time—applies here. However, we also note for future
reference that Young did not supply us with sufficient information to evaluate his claim had that
been appropriate.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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