ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Regunal R. Dowell, pro se Steve Carter
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ann L. Goodwin
Special Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
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In the
Indiana Supreme Court
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No. 32S01-0709-CR-352
REGUNAL R. DOWELL,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
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Appeal from the Hendricks Circuit Court,
No. 32C01-0510-FB-13,
The Honorable Jeffrey V. Boles, Judge
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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 32A01-0606-CR-263
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September 10, 2007
Per Curiam.
Following a jury trial, Regunal R. Dowell was convicted of three counts of rape as a class
B felony, one count of criminal deviate conduct as a class B felony, and one count of criminal
confinement as a class D felony, 1 and was sentenced to an aggregate executed term of 43 years.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence in Dowell v. State, 865 N.E.2d 1059
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), and Dowell petitioned to transfer jurisdiction to this Court. We grant
transfer to address the Court of Appeals’ resolution of a conflict between the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence and the written sentencing order.
After finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court sentenced Dowell
to 20 years for one count of rape, concurrent with 20 years for criminal deviate conduct, 20 years
each for the other two rapes, concurrent with each other but consecutive to the other sentences,
and three years for criminal confinement, consecutive to the other sentences. At one point in the
sentencing hearing, the trial court indicated that the three-year sentence was suspended, which
would have resulted in an aggregate executed term of 40 years. The written sentencing order,
however, stated the three-year sentence was to be executed with no time suspended, which would
result in a 43-year term.
In addressing Dowell’s argument that he is entitled to the more lenient sentence, the
Court of Appeals cites Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 323 (Ind. 1993), for the proposition
that a trial court’s oral sentencing statement controls over the written judgment order. Only days
before the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case, we addressed the issue of conflicting
statements by trial courts in McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007):
1
Ind. Code. § 35-42-4-1(a) (rape); Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2(a) (criminal deviate conduct); Ind. Code § 35-
42-3-3(a) (criminal confinement).
2
Rather than presuming the superior accuracy of the oral statement, we examine it
alongside the written sentencing statement to assess the conclusions of the trial
court. This Court has the option of crediting the statement that accurately
pronounces the sentence or remanding for resentencing. This is different from
pronouncing a bright line rule that an oral sentencing statement trumps a written
one.
(citation omitted).
We grant transfer to apply McElroy. As Dowell points out, the trial court did state at the
sentencing hearing that the three-year sentence was suspended. 2 However, both immediately
before and after that statement, the trial court announced its intention to follow the
recommendation in the pre-sentence report. 3 The pre-sentence report recommended that the 3-
year sentence be executed with no time suspended. 4 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
trial court’s intent was to impose the sentence recommended in the pre-sentence report, which
called for an executed three-year sentence on the criminal confinement conviction.
Accordingly, we grant transfer of jurisdiction, address the conflict between the oral
pronouncement of sentence and the written sentencing order, affirm the 43-year executed
sentence as stated in the trial court’s written sentencing order, and summarily affirm the
remaining portions of the Court of Appeals opinion. See App. R. 58(A)(2).
All Justices concur.
2
(Appellant’s App. p. 240 (“[S]o on case one I’m going to order you sentenced to twenty years in the
Indiana Department of Corrections [with credit for time served in pre-trial detention] to run concurrently
[to] count two but consecutive to counts three and four, and twenty years on count two to run concurrent
with count one but consecutive to three, four and five, three years executed on count three, suspended, to
run consecutive to all other counts, twenty years executed to run concurrent to count five but consecutive
to one, two and three, and twenty years executed to run concurrent to count four, but consecutive to
counts one, two and three.”).)
3
(Appellant’s App. p. 238 (“[M]y opinion in sentencing you in this case follows the recommendations [of
the probation officer] that are well thought out.”); Appellant’s App. p. 241 (In response to defense
counsel’s questions on how many years were to be executed, the trial court responded: “[T]he pre-
sentence investigation sets those out . . . on . . . page ten.”).)
4
(Appellant’s App p. 192.)
3
4